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Summary
The dissertation Inequality and Finanial Stability in an Agent-Based Model onsiders
the eet of inequality on nanial stability by means of an Agent-Based model.
In setion 2, an overview of the theoretial and the empirial literature of the subjet
is provided. In partiular, the reent nanial risis is displayed. In the ontext of rising
inequality, a bust in real estate markets emerged, whih also witnessed the partiipation
of low-inome households due to deteriorating lending standards. The inreased disparity
of urrent aounts an also be partly attributed to the inreased inequality. While
the inreased deits in the USA and the European periphery result to a large extent
from the inreased import of redit for low-inome individuals, the inreased surpluses of
China and Germany an be partly rationalized by means of a savings glut of high-inome
households.
Setion 3 provides an overview of the theoretial literature dealing with this subjet.
This overview dierentiates between several strands of literature ranging inluding lit-
erature from the eld of Post-Keynesian theory. In partiular, Heterogeneous Agent
Models - an extension of lassial growth models with heterogeneous agents - are on-
trasted with Agent-Based Models (ABMs). The latter ategory - also used in this work
- dierentiates espeially due to the assumption of behavioral deision rules and the
disussion of non-linear omplex dynamis.
Setion 4 provides a literature overview on the onsumption and savings deision,
building the theoretial foundation of our model. Besides pointing to the most important
determinants, the question under whih onditions debt an be sustainable is onsidered.
In the ontext of inequality, the Relative Inome Hypothesis is of utter importane as it
predits that individual level of onsumption depends on the onsumption level of other
agents.
The underlying model is derived and disussed in setion 5. The key ingredients are
the onsumption/savings deisions and the trading rules in a market for durables. Based
on a slightly simplied model, losed-form onditions for nanial stability are derived
and interpreted. In partiular, inequality of inome ontributes to inreased nanial
instability. The latter ategory an be further deomposed into instability of debt and
of durable markets. Moreover, we present the losed-form relationships between stok
and ow variables and the resulting impats on the interation between personal and
funtional distribution of inome as well as the interation between inome and wealth
inequality.
The omplex model dynamis an only be totally aptured by means of numerial
simulations (setion 6). An important fator driving the aggregate dynamis is the
onrete form of delveraging taken by over-indebted households being either in the form
of massive onsumption dereases (Austerity) or re sales of durables both feeding bak
iii
to other households. The goodness of the model is evaluated by its ability to reprodue
stylized fats, while robustness is tested by means of parameter variation.
Setion 7 takes the developed models to disuss poliy ations. In partiular, dierent
forms of redistribution are investigated. The most ommon form of impating on the
distribution of inome is the tax and transfer system. The disussion is embedded
in a literature review of the eonomis of taxation. The model shows that stronger
redistribution by indiretly inreasing the minimum onsumption level an inrease the
indebtedness and thereby inrease nanial instability - nally being welfare reduing.
Setion 8 provides a ritial summary of the omplete work.
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Summary in German 
Zusammenfassung
Die Dissertation Inequality and Finanial Stability in an Agent-Based Model  zu
Deutsh Ungleihheit und Finanzstabilität in einem agentbasierten Modell - untersuht
die Wirkung von Ungleihheit auf Finanzstabilität mit Hilfe eines agentenbasierten Mod-
ells.
Nah einer knappen Einführung in die Thematik gibt Abshnitt 2 der Arbeit einen
Überblik über die theoretishe und empirishe Literatur, die sih mit diesem Zusammen-
hang beshäftigt. Insbesondere wird der Verlauf der jüngsten Finanzkrise nahgezeih-
net. Vor dem Hintergrund steigender Einkommensungleihheit fand in vielen Staaten ein
Immobilienboom statt, an dem auh Haushalte mit niedrigen Einkommen partizipieren
konnten, da Kreditvergabekriterien aufgeweiht wurden. Auh die steigende Dispar-
ität in den Leistungsbilanzsalden wird zum Teil auf die gestiegene Ungleihheit zurük-
geführt. Die erhöhten Leistungsbilanzdezite in den USA und in der Peripherie der
Euro-Zone resultierten im hohen Umfang aus dem Import von Krediten, welher von
Beziehern von Niedrigeinkommen nahgefragt wurde. Auf der anderen Seite sind die
erhöhten Übershüsse in China und Deutshland unter anderem aus der Sparshwemme
(savings glut) vermögender Haushalte zu erklären.
Abshnitt 3 stellt die Fragestellung der Arbeit in den Kontext der theoretishen Lit-
eratur. Hierbei wird ein dierenzierter Überblik über vershiedene Literaturstränge
einshlieÿlih der heterodoxen Literatur in der Post-Keynesianishen Tradition gegeben.
Insbesondere werden heterogene Agentenmodelle (HAM) - eine Erweiterung des neo-
klassishen Wahstumsmodells mit heterogenen Individuen - den Agenten-Basierten
Modellen (ABM) gegenübergestellt. Letztere  welhe auh in dieser Arbeit verwen-
det werden  untersheiden sih von HAM vor allem über die Annahme von verhal-
tensökonomishen Regeln und die Betrahtung von niht-linearen komplexen Dynamiken.
In Abshnitt 4 wird ein umfassender Überblik über die Modellierung der Konsum- und
Sparentsheidung gegeben, welhe die theoretishe Grundlage für das Modell darstellt.
Neben den wihtigsten Einussfaktoren wird auh untersuht, unter welhen Bedingun-
gen Vershuldung niht grenzenlos wähst und somit nahhaltig sein kann. Im Zusam-
menhang mit Ungleihheit ist insbesondere die Bedeutung der Relativen Einkommenshy-
pothese hervorzuheben, der zufolge Individuen ihr Konsumniveau an das Konsumniveau
anderer Individuen anpassen.
Das Modell wird in Abshnitt 5 aufgestellt und diskutiert. Im Zentrum stehen die
Konsum- und Sparentsheidung sowie die Handelsregeln an einem Markt für ein Ver-
mögensgut. Auf Basis einer vereinfahten Version des Modells werden Determinanten
für Finanzstabilität identiziert und interpretiert. Insbesondere trägt erhöhte Einkom-
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mensungleihheit in dem Modell zu erhöhter Finanzinstabilität bei. Instabilität wird
zudem in die Unterkategorien Stabilität von Vershuldung und Blasen am Markt für
Vermögensgüter aufgegliedert. Des Weiteren wird die Beziehung zwishen Strom- und
Bestandsgröÿen analytish diskutiert. Auf dieser Grundlage können auh Beziehungen
zwishen personeller Einkommens-Verteilung und funktioneller Verteilung (Lohn- und
Kapitaleinkomen) sowie zwishen Einkommens- auf Vermögensungleihheit dargestellt
werden.
Die komplexen Modelldynamiken können nur in numerishen Simulationen erfasst
werden. Dies geshieht in Abshnitt 6. Entsheidend für die Dynamik ist insbeson-
dere die Reaktion übershuldeter Haushalte, da etwa massive Konsumzurükhaltung
oder Panikverkäufe von Vermögensgegenständen auh Rükkoppelungseekte zu anderen
Haushalten haben. Die Güte des Modells wird anhand seiner Fähigkeit empirishe Fak-
ten wiederzugeben untersuht, während die Robustheit des Modells durh Parameter-
variationen überprüft wird.
Abshnitt 7 nutzt das Modell um Politikempfehlungen zu evaluieren. Insbesondere
werden vershieden Formen der Umverteilung untersuht. Die gängigste Form der Beein-
ussung der Verteilung ndet über das Steuer- und Transfersystem statt. Diese Systeme
werden auf Basis einer breiten Literaturübersiht diskutiert. In dem Modell zeigt sih,
dass verstärkte Umverteilung den Mindestkonsumstandard erhöhen kann und somit mit
erhöhte Vershuldung sowie erhöhte nanzielle Instabilität auslösen kann.
Abshnitt 8 shlieÿt die Arbeit mit einer kritishen Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse.
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1. Introdution
If a free soiety annot help the
many who are poor, it annot save
the few who are rih.
John F. Kennedy (1961)
The reent nanial risis was initiated by the burst of a prie bubble in the US housing
market. This housing bubble was preeded by a strong rise in inequality in wealth
distribution. Several popular-siene books, suh as Rajan (2010) and Reih (2010), see
a ausal relation between these two phenomena and link the topis of wealth distribution
and nanial stability. Their main rationale is that in the presene of low interest rate
levels nanial intermediaries started to expand the ativities of house naning for the
group of low-inome households (the so-alled subprime segment). This shift to risk
was baked by government oials, opaque nanial innovations for risk transfer, and
speial bankrupty rules in the US allowing for only adhering with ollateral and not
with personal wealth
1
. This debt-naned prie bubble in housing markets eventually
burst, with major onsequenes for the nanial setor, resulting in a strong worldwide
maroeonomi shok, whih in turn is now followed by a sovereign-debt risis in many
ountries.
Housing business is a very speial business with a widespread partiipation rate. In
general, house purhases represent the most expensive life-yle onsumption expense
of private households. Thus, they are normally baked by external naning. Houses,
moreover, are the most valuable asset of households and therefore also represent their
best ollateral in the Geanakoplos (2003) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) determining
the level of debt a household an inur. Hene, inreasing house pries allow for higher
indebtedness for low-inome households. This debt-naned onsumption again stim-
ulates the eonomy. In a theoreti sense, a nanial market transfers liquidity from
high-inome net-savers to low-inome net-borrowers with high onsumption preferene
and thereby an at as a measure of onsumption smoothing. If, on the other hand,
these eets are only baked by an unsustainable bubble, the busting of whih has ma-
jor maroeonomi onsequenes.
In the aftermath of the nanial rises the widespread and strong use of leveraged
nane, not only in the household setor (Mian and Su, 2010), but also in a general
framework (Kalemli-Ozan et al., 2012), was severely ritiized. But as already pointed
1
The latter implies a moral-hazard problem in whih individuals have the inentive to default in ase
the value of the ollateral drops below the value of the debt imposing osts of default on their lenders.
In the model disussed in this work as we exlude the ase of default.
1
out by Tobin (1980), debt only matters if eonomi agents are heterogeneous, otherwise
it would just be a zero-sum game: the net savings of one household represent the on-
sumption of another in exess of her urrent budget. In fat, debt annot be onsidered
in representative agent models as it always requires a ounter-position. Hene, inreasing
inequality might also explain the growing demand for nanial intermediation.
One the asset prie bubble burst, a high number of households found themselves
with negative net worth and in need of deleveraging. The latter, however, an have
adverse onsequenes for the entire maroeonomy, in partiular by its eet on aggregate
demand. Moreover, other desperate measures in this ase - suh as re sales - also feed
bak with negative externalities on other agents, espeially leading to a further deline
of asset pries. These problems are well-known under the term debt-deation oined in
the Great Depression (Fisher, 1933). Similar behavior emerged in Japan's lost deade
(Koo, 2014) and now is visible in a majority of developed eonomies.
While the this reasoning fouses more on the demand for debt, an alternative strand
of literature blames the bubble as being the result of an extensive supply of debt from
foreign ountries. This literature poses a global savings glut hypothesis (e.g. Bernanke
(2005), Obstfeld and Rogo (2009)). Its ore idea is that inequalities not only inreased
within ountries, but also on an inter-ountry level. Exess savings from ountries like
Germany and espeially China manifesting themselves in urrent aount surpluses are
also blamed for having fueled the housing prie bubble in the US and other urrent
aount deit ountries.
2
As shown in Kumhof et al. (2014), the urrent aount
imbalanes an also be the result of inreased inequality within the ountry, espeially
from an extended supply of savings from very high-inome households. The pair-relation
between the US and China is reeted in a smaller sale version between Germany and
virtually the entire rest of the European Monetary Union (EMU) member ountries.
Mutual ausation on an ex-post manner blaming the other party being responsible
for building up unsustainable interlinkages, ignore that it always takes two to tango.
While urrent aount surplus ountries boosted their export industries by low exhange
rate levels, urrent aount deit ountries were able to sustain stable onsumption
growth. International imbalanes therefore are also always related to imbalanes between
onsumption and investment. Current aount deits favor onsumers (mostly low-
inome agents), while surpluses benet savers (mostly high-inome agents). Hene,
inequalities in times of open nanial markets are never only a problem of a single
ountry (espeially when they onern large ountries suh as the US), but of the world
eonomy.
Not least after the publiation of the work of Piketty (2014) and its resulting publi
debate, inequality is identied as one of the major problems in developed eonomies.
As a result, the all for a higher level of redistribution gains momentum. Standard
eonomi theory identies a trade-o between eieny and equity, sine a higher level
of redistribution distorts inentive systems and thereby might be umbersome to growth.
The issue of nanial instability puts another argument in the hand of pro-redistribution
2
For empirial evidene the reader is referred e.g. to Adam et al. (2011).
2
advoates. The onrete implementation is still far from trivial and has to onsider
ertain onstraints and possible unintended onsequenes.
Thus, last but not least, the urrent eonomi risis may also be treated a risis of
eonomi theory. The major determinants of the reent risis, inequality, nanial mar-
kets, and debt levels (stok not ow) are not onsidered in standard maroeonomi
models. Moreover, these phenomenona an be strongly linked to the eet of hetero-
geneity between households whih is ruled out in these models by the strong assumption
of a representative agent. There has been a reent ountermovement mostly oming
from the eonophysis diretion by trying to onstrut a model of the eonomy as an
Agent-Based Model (ABM)
3
, whih aording to the author is very promising to gain
a better understanding of the workings of the eonomy. In any ase, this movement is
still in its infany. The aim of this work is to built a model of heterogeneous households
and thereby found a theoretial explanation not only of the urrent risis but also of the
impat of inequality on nanial markets and the maroeonomy in general.
This dissertation is organized as follows: the following setion presents long-run em-
pirial and theoretial evidene linking the issues of inequality and nanial stability.
Moreover, important stylized fats that played a major role in the reent nanial risis
are identied - not least to benhmark our theoretial model. Setion 3 reviews the
existing literature also overing non-mainstream strands. In partiular, we lassify the
modeling tehnique of Agent-Based Models (ABMs). While the role of heterogeneity
is also onsidered in so-alled Bewley-type models - whih we label as Heterogeneous
Agent Models (HAMs) - ABMs in partiular dier by their assumption of behavioral
rules and the disussion of omplex disequilibrium dynamis. Setion 4 provides an ex-
tensive review of the literature disussing the onsumption/savings deision whih is the
key ingredient of our model. In partiular, we show onditions that lead to a stability
of debt aumulation. To over the soial dimension of onsumption, the role of the
Relative Consumption Theory is furthermore emphasized. Setion 5 presents our model
and analytially disusses fators that impat on nanial (in)stability. Moreover, we
emphasize the role of stok quantities and thereby on the funtional distribution of in-
ome as well as the distribution of wealth. Due to the omplex nature of the model, a
omplete disussion of its features requires numerial simulations as presented in setion
6. In this setion, we not only benhmark the model to stylized fats, but also test its
robustness. Setion 7 uses the developed model to disuss the eet of redistribution. As
the model identies onrete hannels for whih inequality an inrease nanial insta-
bility, one might expet that the model would also favor a high degree of redistribution.
We onsider two forms of redistribution (1) by means of the linear tax and transfer
system and a (2) real progressive tax system. The model, however, raises some autious
notes on the strong redistribution by means of taxation and transfers emphasizing the
role of unintended onsequenes.
3
A reent survey an be found in Chakraborti et al. (2011).
3

2. Connetion between Inequality,
Finanial Markets, and Current
Aounts
From the ie-age to the dole-age
There is but one onern
I have just disovered:
Some girls are bigger than others
The Smiths - Some Girls are Bigger
Than Others (1985)
In this setion, we review the literature relating inequality and nanial markets fo-
using on empirial results. Our theoretial model is to be benhmarked against these
stylized fats and thereby also allows to omprehend the underlying mehanisms. In
this setion, we take both a long-run view (where we also give a brief review of the the-
oretial literature) and a more medium-run view with a partiular fous on the events
in the wake of the Global Finanial risis. The model at the ore of this work is aimed
at explaining medium-run relations for the urrent situation.
2.1. A Long-Run View
There is a general literature on the long-run relation between nanial development (in
the form of inreased nanial ativity) and inequality, as presented in the reent survey
of Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009). In a nutshell, the large share of the theoretial
literature emphasizes the positive impat of nanial development on equality through
dierent hannels. In partiular, it asserts that nanial development enhaning the
sreening abilities will result in better redit onditions to low-inome households and
thereby derease inequality. Enhaned redit markets will espeially ontribute to lower
the ross-dynasty persistene by naning higher eduation for poor inome households
and (espeially for underdeveloped ountries) lowering the labor market partiipation
of hildren. Extensive insurane systems will also aid households to protet against
exogenous risks suh as unemployment or health risks. Furthermore, better availability
of redit an enhane small businesses. This, however, an eventually lead to an inrease
in inequality amongst a generation. Besides the inreased investment opportunities in
(human) apital the authors also point to the danger of destabilizing speulation and
overborrowing for exess onsumption rather than onsumption smoothing.
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In most theoretial models, apital markets are assumed to be perfet and - being
only a veil - do not impat aggregate outomes suh as growth or equality. However,
real redit markets dier severely from the theoreti notion of perfet redit markets.
As put forward by the information eonomis literature, the existene of information
asymmetries results in problems of adverse seletion (ex-ante) (Akerlof, 1970), hidden
ations (ex-interim), and moral hazard (ex-post).
1
In order to address these problems,
redit is rationed (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), ollateral is required (Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Bernanke et al. (1998)), and sreening osts are imposed on reditors (Aghion
and Howitt, 2009, p. 136f.). Therefore, to make redit markets matter in theoretial
models, their imperfetions have to be onsidered. The interplay of redit onstraints
and wealth inequality leads to an interesting outome on maroeonomi dynamis, in
partiular multiple and and even self-sustaining equilibria an exist.
Amongst the rst to suggest those problems were Galor and Zeira (1993). In their sem-
inal paper, they argue that low-wealth individuals fae ollateral onstraints and there-
fore annot borrow in order to nane eduation and build up human apital. Thereby,
wealth inequality - by ontributing to inome inequality and subsequent wealth inequal-
ity - an be self-sustaining. To derive this onlusion, the only neessary assumptions
are imperfet redit markets and indivisible investment in human apital. The model
of Galor and Zeira (1993) - aimed at desribing development traps in low-inome oun-
tries - predits a two-lass soiety of rih and poor agents laking a middle-lass. The
work of Banerjee and Newman (1993) argues in a similar way showing that the pres-
ene of ollateral onstraints hinders low-inome agents beoming self-employed. The
high supply of workers depresses wages and ontributes to future inome inequality. As
argued in Aghion and Bolton (1997) the existene of redit markets allows the trikle-
down of growth from high-inome to low-inome agents. As this mehanism is however
hampered by redit onstraints, (fored) government redistribution an strengthen this
growth-improving behavior.
Piketty (1997) introdues the eet of redit rationing in a long-run Solow-type growth
model. Rather than the standard result that interest rate equals the marginal produt
of apital (making wealth distribution issues irrelevant), in the redit onstrained ase a
stationary interest rate is aompanied by a spei wealth distribution. A high interest
senario is aompanied by strong redit onstraints and leads to a lower equilibrium
apital and output level. High interest rates are also assoiated with low wealth mobility
sine the rih aumulate massively and poor households fae a ollateral onstraint
making this result also self-sustaining.
In their model, Aghion et al. (1999) investigate the long-run eets of the physial
separation of savers and investors, whih they label dualism, as well as the poorly fun-
tioning apital market generally hindering aess to redit. Both problems tend to our
in emerging eonomies. Strong imperfetions an not only generate a ylial growth
but also lead to a permanent slump steady state. From a poliy perspetive, they derive
the result that the issuane of publi debt during a reession an be beneial to absorb
idle savings. The eetiveness of this measure, fatually presenting a redistribution from
1
A general overview on these topis is e.g. given in Freixas and Rohet (2008).
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savers to investors, is further enhaned if the proeedings are used to nane subsidies
or tax uts for investors. They admit that the higher government debt burden auses
reessions to be more severe, nevertheless they onlude that a ylial regime is superior
to a permanent slump senario.
Summarizing this literature one an assert that well-funtioning and poorly regulated
redit markets an promote growth and equality. This also seems to be in line with the
general results of the empirial literature. The positive relation between nane and
growth is also suggested in various empirial studies (Levine, 2005). The key problem
with empirial literature is the problem of ausality. The ausality ould eventually run
in the opposite diretion as niely put by (Robinson, 1952, p. 86): Where enterprises
leads, nane follows. for the growth-nane nexus. Modern empirial studies, however,
use various sophistiated tehniques to deal with these problems (Levine, 2005).
It might be argued that the relation between equality and nane is just a by-produt
of the relation between equality and growth. The seminal empirial ontribution in this
ontext was made by Kuznets (1955) showing that there is a inverse u-shaped relation
between inome level and inequality. Therefore, it is often argued that higher inequality
might be aepted in the short-run sine it fosters growth. Theory predits that growth
- in partiular the emergene of new tehnologies - in the short-run inreases inequality
rewarding skilled labor (Quadrini, 2008). This theory argues in the same logial dire-
tion as the empirial work of Kuznets (1955). For the onverse ausation mehanism
running from inequality to growth, the established literature erties a negative relation,
implying that higher inequality leads to lower growth. This an be rationalized from
a politial eonomy point of view arguing that higher inequality leads to more redis-
tribution aompanied by distortionary taxes that are at odds with eonomi eieny
(Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971). Furthermore, wealth inequality in the presene of apital
market fritions hinders the aumulation of human apital and therefore is detrimental
to growth (Galor and Zeira, 1993).
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) also survey the empirial literature on the relation
between inequality and nane and make the point that - besides some strong method-
ologial problems in these studies - the overall results suggest a negative relation between
nanial development and growth of the Gini oeient (e.g. Levine et al. (2007), Bek
et al. (2007)). It is important to onsider that this might also be a spurious orrelation
sine growth inreases both equality
2
and nane. Reent studies using sophistiated
tehniques try to rule out this result and eventually also end up with dierent results. For
instane, Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot (2011) applying a sophistiated strutural autore-
gressive model (SVAR) for a dataset of 49 ountries between 1994 and 2002, show that
there is a strong ausality running from nanial deployment to inequality for whih in-
reased redit leads to higher inequality. This eet is amplied for high lending-deposit
spreads and liquidity suggesting that banking regulation ould atually lead to a more
welfare enhaning use of the nanial market by urtailing overborrowing as suggested
in Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009).
2
This applies to developed ountries on the right side of the Kuznets urve (Kuznets, 1955).
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Cihak et al. (2012) report that nanial depth (a pure size index), aess, and eieny
unambiguously inrease with the inome level of an eonomy. Only the measurements
of nanial stability do not vary with inome level. This is in line with the empirial
studies of Kaminsky and Shmukler (2003) and Loayza and Raniere (2006) showing
that nanial liberalization an have a negative impat by inreasing boom-bust yles.
Therefore, the relation between nane and eonomi stability - measured by volatility
of output - is less lear-ut. This also has impliations for nanial regulation. Korinek
and Kreamer (2013) emphasize that nanial regulation hinders the eient funtioning
of the nanial system and redistributes surplus away from the nanial setor. By om-
paring it to the (tehnial) regulation of nulear power plants, they, however, argue that
it redues the hazard of severe downside risks, in partiular redit runhes resulting
from too muh ex-ante risk. As moreover, presented in the empirial investigation of
Delis et al. (2013) the form of regulation also matters. While nanial market regula-
tion in the form of market disipline (private monitoring) inreases inequality, banking
regulation by a supervisory authority eventually dereases inequality.
The stritly positive relation between nane and growth is also put to the test in re-
ent empirial work. Under the thought-provoking title Too muh nane?, Berkes et al.
(2012) suggest a non-monotone onave relationship between nane (measured in the
form of the redit/GDP ratio) and growth. They suggest a Goldiloks eet, implying
an optimal medium sized level (not too muh, not too little) of nane amounting to an
approximate level of 100% redit/GDP, whih is already exeeded in many developed
eonomies suh as the US, UK, or Spain.
There are some theoretial arguments for an over-supply of redit. The over-supply
ould emerge for the ase in whih unsophistiated private households over-onsume
debt as predited by behavioral theory (Zinman, 2013). The deleveraging from this high
amount of debt, moreover, an have extremely undesirable maroeonomi onsequenes
(Fisher, 1933). Too muh debt might also go along with the emergene of a systemi
risis (Fisher and Riedler, 2014). Furthermore, there is a brain drain argument putting
forward that nane steals human talents (in partiular natural sientists or engineers)
who ould been of better use in other eonomi setors (Tobin, 1989). In general, there
is the ase of too muh nane, if nane does not support sustainable investment, but
promotes asset bubbles. This argument is frequently artiulated in the ontext of the
reent nanial risis. In partiular, Rajan (2010) argues that the nanial risis in
the US was the result of inequality inreasing (unsustainable) nanial intermediation
ending in the risis.
Some empirial literature using large datasets also investigate the relation between
inequality and nanial rises in the long-run. In diret response to the work of Rajan
(2010), Bordo and Meissner (2012), using a dataset of 14 advaned ountries from 1920
to 2000, researh the relation between top inome growth and redit booms (preeding
nanial risis), but annot nd a signiant eet. The redit boom, however, an
be attributed to low interest rates emphasizing an Austrian view for whih the over-
investment is a diret result of over-expansive monetary poliy. The view is also in line
with the study of Shularik and Taylor (2012) showing the role of redit expansion as
a preditor of nanial rises. Another reent empirial study by Agnello and Sousa
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(2012) using data from 1980 to 2006 for 62 ountries, however, shows that banking
rises are preeded by growth in inequality and are followed up by lower inequality
afterwards. More preisely, the inrease is only signiant for Non-OECD ountries
(as a proxy for developing ountries) while the derease is only signiant for OECD
ountries (as a proxy for developed ountries). This inversed-V-shaped behavior an
be attributed to the fat that the top inomes are disproportionately aeted by both
the inreased stok market pries leading to the bubble and its bursting (Roine et al.,
2009).
3
The derease in inequality after a banking risis in developed ountries an be
attributed to the higher developed soial welfare system and automati stabilizers. The
onverse view (espeially important for developing ountries), argues that in times of
nanial rises low-inome individuals are massively aeted in their ability to smooth
onsumption. More generally, Maestri and Roventini (2012) investigate the relation
between inequality and business yles. While onsumption inequality is ylial, inome
inequality is ounter-ylial. The business yles an explain the transitory omponents
of inequality, yet not its general inrease. Atkinson and Morelli (2011) also ompile a
large amount of ase studies investigating the relation of hanges in inequality and
eonomi risis, but annot nd a lear-ut relation. However, they foused on the role
of hanges rather than levels leaving the question unresolved whether a partiular level of
inequality an ause a risis. A similar investigation is onduted in Aiginger and Guger
(2013), presenting a ross-ountry analysis for the period of the Great Reession and
also nding no lear patterns between inequality and subsequent eonomi performane.
In summary, the long-run relation between inequality, nane, eonomi risis is far
from being lear-ut. However, empirial work - in ontrast to theory - an only predit
what has already been witnessed making it subjet to the Turkey fallay
4
espeially
important in the reent nanial risis. The reent years - starting in the 1980s - however,
saw some very interesting development, whih we doument in the following setion.
2.2. Empirial Evidene for the Medium-Run
There are several studies mostly fousing on the reent development in the US linking
inequality, indebtedness, and overall eonomi onditions (suh as the level of GDP,
asset pries, unemployment, bankrupty rates). Due to the low frequeny of the data
3
The theoretial growth literature states that times of eonomi expansion are assoiated with lower
inome and onsequential lower wealth inequality. The rationale for this is that expansion regimes are
modeled as positive tehnologial shoks that more severely aet labor inome than apital inome
(Maliar et al., 2005). Both the Great Depression and the Great Reession, however, are assoiated
with a positive shok to the produtivity of apital only, taking the form of higher leverage, reversing
the preedent argument.
4
The idea dates bak to Bertrand Russell disussing problems of indutive reasoning (Russell, 1936).
A turkey being treated niely and fed regularly may infer with inreasing ondene that humans
mean it no harm. A few days before Thanksgiving, however, the turkey's ondene is shattered.
The latter idea had a revival under the label of Blak Swan event in the ontext of the nanial
risis espeially put forward by Taleb (2010). Note that in his original work Russell used the image
of a hiken rather than a turkey.
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(espeially onsidering data measuring inequality) this laks the eonometri rigor of the
aforementioned studies. However, some stylized fats emerge whih must be aounted
for in a theoretial framework.
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Figure 2.1.: Gini [%℄ after taxes and redistribution from 1980 to 2010 (Data soure:
OECD (2012))
The inrease in inequality has been a widespread positive trend in the reent 30 years
in developed eonomies.
5
Comparable peaks were measured at the times of the Great
Depression, while the period from the end of World War II to early 1980s is assoiated
with a leveling of top inomes leading to an overall bathtub shaped behavior in time
(Anselmann and Krämer, 2012).
6
Figure 2.1
7
shows that the Gini-ratio for OECD
ountries in general has inreased sine the 1980s
8
for all OECD ountries. While the
OECD only reports gures at a low frequeny, the ambitious study of Atkinson et al.
5
As shown in Berthold and Brunner (2011) the developing ountries of the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia,
India, China) eventually witnessed a derease in inome inequality.
6
This behavior an be found for the US and Germany. The empirial assessment of Card et al. (2013) is
able to trak the reent inrease in inome inequality in Germany to an inrease in both worker and
plant heterogeneity, also onrming that younger rms, by not partiipating in olletive bargaining
praties and due to dierent management style, have a higher variane in wages.
7
We take the index of the Gini oeient after taxes and transfers for the working age population
(18-65 years) for seleted ountries of the OECD database. This represents the nal measurement
for evaluating inequality, sine it onsiders the value of disposable inome available for onsumption
and savings of private households. Most ountries only report this value eah 5 years. Missing values
are replaed by the last reported value.
8
Notable exeptions inlude Frane (where inequality leveled) and southern European ountries (where
inequality eventually dereased).
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Figure 2.2.: 5% top inome share [%℄ (Data soure: Atkinson et al. (2011))
(2011)
9
using tax data to depit the share of the top inomes is able to onrm this
trend with annual data. As presented in gure 2.2
10
, top inome shares for various
ountries have an upward trend.
11
The most extreme data speiation is reported the
USA with the top 5% inome share exeeding the 30% level. As presented in gure 2.3
both measurements are learly related to eah other. This gure also suggest that the
inequality in the Anglo-Saxon ountries Canada and USA (sine being above the linear
t), in ontrast to southern European ountries Italy and Portugal (being below the t
line), is mostly driven by the higher inome supporting the rih get even riher rather
than the poor get even poorer narrative.
The literature identies dierent soures for the inrease in inome inequality suh
as skill-biased tehnologial hange
12
(Aemoglu and Autor, 2012) as well as skill mis-
math in the labor market, inreased rm bargaining power through globalization and
9
The data for the top inome share is publi available in The World Top Inomes Database
http://g-mond.parisshoolofeonomis.eu/topinomes.
10
This ratio presents the share of inome from total inome by the 5% rihest households by headount.
Higher values exeeding the 5% threshold indiate inequality. We exlude apital gains presenting
a lower bound for the atual inequality. If the eet of apital gains are inluded, this measurement
of inequality furthermore inreases (Atkinson et al., 2011).
11
Important exeptions where inequality leveled were - one again - measured in southern Europe.
Although having a higher frequeny than the Gini data, this database suers from a low inter-
ountry and time overage of data.
12
The idea is niely aptured in the title of the work of Goldin and Katz (2009) The Rae between
Eduation and Tehnology for whih the tehnologial development as requirement for jobs outpaed
the level of eduation reating large wage premiums for individuals with high eduation.
11
Figure 2.3.: Top inome and inequality (Data soure: Atkinson et al. (2011) and OECD
(2012))
the threat of outsouring (Skott, 2011), rent-seeking by top-exeutives
13
(espeially in
the nanial setor) (Philippon and Reshef, 2012)
14
, and assortative mating (Green-
wood et al., 2014)
15
. The derease in marginal tax rates as well as the deline of trade
unions (Card et al., 2004), sometimes are even referred to as a paradigm shift to a more
deregulated eonomi environment starting in the 1980s (Piketty et al., 2014).
A trend only sparsely overed in the literature is the onvergene in redistribution as
measured in the log-dierene of Gini before (GBT ) and after (GAT ) taxes and redis-
tribution depited in gure 2.4
16
espeially in Europe. While high-inome European
13
As already presented, the inrease in inequality in Anglo-Saxon ountries is mostly driven by an
inreased share of the top inomes. This behavior an be rationalized by miroeonomi theory
(initially aimed at desribing the behavior of show business as well as sports) following the theory of
superstars for whih produtivity and wage outome are related in a onvex way (Rosen, 1981). The
theory of tournaments asserts that individuals are paid aording to their rank rather than their
output level (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), whih instead of providing an adequate ompensation for the
high inome serves as an inentives for the low inome to work harder. This behavior is expeted
for CEOs, for whih taking an ordinal sale has lower observation osts than a ardinal sale, also
implying a skewed inome distribution.
14
We treat the latter subjet in a separate theoretial paper (Fisher, 2014) deriving a relation be-
tween given unequal abilities and unequal inome. We show that inequality of inome inreases in
environments with strong sale eets, low risk aversion and strong inentive mehanisms.
15
This mehanism emphasizes that individuals with similar inomes tend to marry, inreasing inome
inequality on an inter-household level. Or to put it more vividly, the dotor does not marry the nurse,
but a lawyer. This eet is furthermore pronouned by the high female labor market partiipation.
16
This is omputed as follows: Redistt = log(GBTt) − log(GATt) = log(GBTtGATt ). The key idea of this
index is that not absolute but relative hanges in inequality matter. Or more vividly, a hange from
a before redistribution Gini of 0.9 to 0.7 represents less redistribution than a hange from 0.3 to
0.1. Furthermore, this index will be of partiular use in setion 7.2 where we an derive losed-form
solutions for this value for a given taxation-transfer system.
12
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Figure 2.4.: Redistribution in various ountries (Data soure: OECD (2012))
ountries (espeially Sandinavia) dereased their redistributive measures, southern Eu-
ropean ountries inreased their ativities leading to a onvergene to a level of roughly
0.2. We will disuss this important topi - also relating it to theoretial rationales - more
thoroughly in setion 7.1.
All in all, the underlying auses of inome inequality are a very important subjet.
However, in this work we abstrat from these issues and treat inome inequality as
exogenous.
The inrease in inome inequality is not aompanied by a omparable inrease in
onsumption inequality. To ope with this eet households ould reat by inreasing
their working hours and their labor supply. This an atually be measured in the US
data not only reporting longer working hours but also a higher female labor market
partiipation
17
(Bowles and Park, 2005).
However, the most important eet for maintaining high onsumption in a world with
inreased inome inequality is the inrease in onsumer redit as reported in Krueger and
Perri (2006). The rationale for this is that the inreased saving amount by high-inome
households is met by an inreased demand for redit of low-inome households using it to
smooth onsumption. This result annot only be aptured by a demand perspetive of
redit but also from a supply perspetive for whih rih households aumulate massive
amount of savings looking for a high yield options in whih to invest. As put forward
by Rajan (2010), in the USA this option was found in apparently sophistiated nanial
produts linked to real estate.
17
Stiglitz (2008) even makes the point that, sine households work more, they have lower leisure time,
whih makes them seek higher onsumption as a ompensation mehanism. Thus, the initial problem
is even aggravated.
13
Figure 2.5.: Development of two measurements of inequality and debt in the US (Data
soure: Ekstein and Nagypál (2004) and Atkinson et al. (2011) )
Figure 2.5
18
shows the strong omovement of debt level and inome inequality for US
data from the 1960s to now. Kumhof et al. (2014) relate the very reent episode to a
similar behavior leading to the Great Depression in the 1930s.
There is more sophistiated empirial literature that goes beyond the simple eyeball
evidene presented in gure 2.5. Perugini et al. (2013) show a positive relationship
between inequality and redit growth after ontrolling for onventional redit fators
suggesting that redit was used by low and middle-inome households to keep up with
the onsumption level of high-inome households. Bertrand and Morse (2013) also nd
evidene of trikle-down onsumption in US-data where low-inome households emulate
onsumption of high inomes. In fat, middle-inome individuals should have saved
signiantly more for the (ounterfatual) ase where their inome had grown at the
same pae as the inome of high-inome individuals.
18
Data soure for inome http://www.bea.gov/national/ and debt
http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/fof/. Standard deviation of log wages from Ek-
stein and Nagypál (2004), top inome share from The World Top Inomes Database
http://g-mond.parisshoolofeonomis.eu/topinomes.
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One might summarize this as follows: in a world with inreasing inome inequality,
higher net worth inequality is needed in order to sustain a given level of onsumption
inequality.
Figure 2.6.: Wealth inequality measured by the share of top 10% and top 1% (Data
soure: Piketty (2014))
The empirial evidene on net worth or wealth inequality is even more sparse than
the evidene about inome inequality.
19
One option - refraining the method of Atkinson
et al. (2011) applied to the distribution of inome - would be to draw on wealth or estate
tax data, whih, however, are seldom available to researhers. In a very ambitious study,
Davies et al. (2011) survey the distribution of wealth for 39 ountries. Only few ountries
provide aurate household balane sheet data. Other good observations are available
in the form of representative panel group studies, with the most famous being the Panel
Study of Inome Dynamis (PSID)
20
onduted in the US and the Sozio-oekonomishes
Panel (SOEP) for Germany. These studies - besides suering from the usual problems
of self-reported values
21
- moreover, deliberately exlude very high net worth individuals
for privay reasons. There are, however, lists ompiled by private organizations aimed at
estimating the wealth of extremely high net worth individuals - suh as the Forbes 400
list for the USA. The sampling tehnique of these studies, however, is highly opaque and
the data quality is also rather dubious. A reent attempt at onduting a standardized
estimation for Euro area ountries under the supervision of the European Central Bank
19
Note that - albeit impreise - we will use these terms interhangeably in this setion, implying that
whenever we speak of wealth inequality we refer to values net of debt. This is only for readability
purposes.
20
For the US, furthermore, data from the Survey of Consumer Finane (SCF) is available even providing
more detailed data. In this dataset, moreover, the rih population is oversampled, yet the data laks
the panel struture of the PSID (Cagetti and De Nardi, 2008).
21
Amongst the most important ones in our ontext are non-response of high net worth individuals
leading to a biased sample and non-truthful response resulting from the deliate subjet.
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is made under the label of the so-alled Household Finane and Consumption Survey
(HFCS). First results were reently presented (Bover et al., 2014).
In the long-run, wealth inequality dereased until the 1980s, as reported in the survey
of Davies and Shorroks (2000). The authors rationalize this result by the emergene of
popular assets - in partiular real estate - with a widespread partiipation rate amongst
dierent households. Piketty (2014), moreover, emphasizes the role of the world war
destrution in Europe that not only ontributed to a lower stok level of wealth but also
to a more egalitarian distribution of it. However, Piketty (2014) also emphasizes that
this trend reversed in the 1980s (see gure 2.6
22
). A natural explanation for this would
be the higher inequality of the ow quantity of inome (as e.g. reported in gure 2.2)
that umulated over time.
23
Another reent attempt for measuring wealth inequality was
presented in Saez and Zuman (2014) in whih the authors use data from the apitalized
inome tax to estimate the distribution of wealth for the USA. They onrm the results
of Piketty (2014) indiating an inrease of wealth inequality - as measured by the share
of top-wealth holders - setting in in the 1980s after a long period for whih wealth
inequality delined. Moreover, they report even more extreme values than identied by
Piketty (2014) and depited in gure 2.6. Saez and Zuman (2014) report a urrent
share of the top 10% roughly amounting to 77% and top 1% share of approx. 42%. As
underlying fators they identify the - already reported - inrease in the ow quantity
of labor inome inequality and savings ratios that inrease with the level of wealth. In
fat, they show that the middle-lass savings rates were negative in the 2000s. They also
report the members of the top wealth holder group have beome younger in time. The
middle-lass (dened as the bottom 90%) exhibited an inverse u-shaped pattern in time.
The inreased holding of the popular asset real estate was ounterated by an inrease
in mortgage debt and other forms of debt (student loans, redit ard debt) eventually
lowering the net worth of the middle-lass. Using the result of Shorroks et al. (2011)
respetively Shorroks et al. (2013), we take a more short-run view in the following.
Table 2.1 reports values of the study of Shorroks et al. (2011) and an updated ver-
sion (Shorroks et al., 2013).
24
The table reports a strong inrease in wealth inequality
between the outbreak of the nanial risis and the topi date 2013 for most ountries.
Most notable is the value from Denmark where the Gini of net-worth inequality exeeds
the 100% level.
25
The seond and third highest Gini ratios of wealth for 2013 are re-
22
The underlying data is available online at piketty.pse.ens.fr/apital21.
23
In his work Piketty (2014), moreover, emphasizes other theoretial fators - espeially the role of
inheritane and the relation between the growth rate and the rate of interest. We will analyze these
(theoretial) arguments more preisely in setion 5.5.2.
24
The results are based on the methodology presented in Davies et al. (2011). The authors update
these results annually and publish it under the label of Credit Suisse - Global Wealth Databook.
In the table, we only report values for ountries with a very good data quality - whih are in the
minority.
25
This result seems very odd at rst sight. Note, however, that the ordering of the agents aording
to level only satises the ondition that the Lorenz-urve is onvex. If the input-values are negative
(implying negative net-worth individuals) the slope is negative. If the amount of negative net worth
as well as the share of those individuals holding it is high enough, the Gini oeient an exeed
the 100% threshold.
16
Gini of Net Worth Inequality [%℄
Gini of inome
Country 2010 2013 Change after taxes
(average 1981-2011)
Australia 63.6 32.4
Canada 68.3 72.7 6% 32.8
Denmark 84 107.7 28% 24.3
Finland 57.8 66.4 15% 25.8
Frane 75.8 69 -9% 29.2
Germany 68.4 77.1 13% 30
Italy 62.6 65 4% 28.9
Japan 63.5 32.3
Netherlands 64.3 73.2 14% 29.7
Spain 56.5 66.1 17% 31.3
Switzerland 88 80.6 -9% 29
United Kingdom 71.7 67.7 -6% 34.5
USA 80.9 85.1 5% 37
World 88.1 90.5 3%
Table 2.1.: Wealth inequality (Data soure: Shorroks et al. (2011), Shorroks et al.
(2013) and OECD (2012))
ported for Russia and the Ukraine (93.1 respetively 90), whereas the lowest values is
doumented for Slovenia (53.5). Conerning very high-inome individuals the USA and
Switzerland stik out. Aording to Shorroks et al. (2013) 10% of the Swiss popula-
tion have a net worth of at least one million US-dollars being aompanied by a mean
wealth of approx. 500,000 US-dollars. The absolute number of persons owning (at least)
one million US-dollars, however, is highest in the USA, amounting to 1.3 million, and
thereby ontributing to a share of approx. 40% of world-wide millionaires. Table 2.1
also ontrasts the wealth inequality with the inome inequality. The stok size of wealth
is always more unequally distributed than the ow size inome. Nevertheless, some very
egalitarian ountries with respet to inome - espeially Germany and Sandinavia - ex-
hibit a high degree of wealth inequality.
26
Davies et al. (2011) partly attribute this result
to the existene of a well-funtioning publi pension system that weakens the private
savings and wealth aumulation motive. As put forward in Davies et al. (2011), a high
level of inome is usually aompanied by with a high level of wealth. Notable exeptions
26
This fat also sparked a publi debate in the Euro zone after the publiation of the rst results of
the HCFS study showing that the median wealth in the net transfer paying ountry Germany is
lower than in net transfer reeiving ountries suh as Italy or Greee. As shown by DeGrauwe and
Ji (2013) the ratio between mean and median is very high for Germany suggesting high wealth
inequality. Other explanations for this ounter-intuitive result inlude the low real-estate wealth
of Germans (due to well-evolved rental markets) and the long-lasting eets of war destrution in
Germany.
17
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Figure 2.7.: Average portfolio share [%℄ of nanial assets for private households (Data
soure: Shorroks et al. (2013))
where a low level of inome is aompanied by a high level of wealth are reported for
Hong Kong or Ireland.
In an international omparison, there are also substantial ross-ountry dierenes in
the omposition of the wealth portfolio. In partiular in the USA, the (average) portfolio
mainly onsists of nanial assets rather than other assets suh as real estate (see gure
2.7). We an also investigate the passive side of the private household balane sheet
and disuss the share of debt as depited in gure 2.8. Germany exhibits a long-run
downward trend. Moreover, there is onsiderable time variation. In partiular, the UK,
USA, and Denmark all peak in the year 2008. One again, the speial role of Denmark
with its massive levels of debt is notable. As Denmark also exhibited an extreme ase of
wealth inequality debt seems to be a good preditor for wealth inequality. We investigate
this hypothesis more formally in a simple empirial model.
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Figure 2.8.: Average debt ratio [%℄ for private households (Data soure: Shorroks et al.
(2013))
In this model we estimate the transformed Gini-ratio of wealth
27 28
. As explanatory
variables, we hoose the Gini of inome after taxes (Gini(y)), the log of the absolute
value of wealth (W ), the average share of nanial assets (wfin), the average share of
debt (D), and the real interest rate (r).29 The expeted signs of the regressions are
presented in the square brakets:
Gini(W ) = f(W [+], wfin[+], D[+], r[+], Gini(y)[+]). (2.1)
A higher level of mean wealth (W ) indiates that there are some very high net worth
individuals ontributing to inequality. As high-wealth individuals have a high share of
nanial assets (Wol, 2013), a high average share of nanial assets (wfin) is expeted
to oinide with high wealth inequality. The seond most important asset, (self-used)
27
For the transformation, we follow Galli and von der Hoeven (2001) transforming the Gini (whih for
the onsidered year 2010 is bounded within 0 < Gini < 1) using y = log
(
Gini
1−Gini
)
with−∞ < y <∞
(the logit-transfomration).
28
The sample only inludes 13 ountries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Frane, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, USA, and UK). These ountries are hosen sine
they are the only ountries with high data quality as reported in Shorroks et al. (2011). Thereby,
we only have developed ountries in our sample. In theses ases, wealth inequality does not have
to be estimated based on regressions, but is reported with onrete values. If this were not be the
ase, our regression would only regress on a regression.
29
The wealth inequality, the level of wealth, the share of nanial assets and debt all originate from the
study of Shorroks et al. (2011). As the variables real interest rate and inome inequality impat
in the long-run, we take the long-run average for the last 30 years. This data originates from the
World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/).
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real estate is more of a middle-lass phenomenon. A high share of debt (D) implies
that there exists some very low net worth individuals ontributing to high net worth
inequality. The real interest rate, on the one hand, presents the inome out of apital
for high net worth individuals and, on the other hand, the osts of debt for low net
worth individuals. A high real rate of interest thereby ontributes to high net worth
inequality. The ow inome is the essential soure of stok inequality. If ow inome
is already distributed very unequally, the stok of net worth should also be unequally
distributed.
Transformed Gini No Gini
of wealth (2010) All Controls No Gini No n. assets & n. assets
Interept -26.535881 * -23.83884 ** -26.79344 ** -23.10065 **
(4.946557) (4.19037 ) (4.11406 ) (4.38304)
Log-wealth 2.058987 * 1.92308 ** 2.07374 ** 1.90382 **
(0.357606) (0.33296) ( 0.30266) (0.35137 )
Share of debt 0.051975 0.03301 . 0.05556 ** 0.04575 **
(0.023598) (00.01449) (0.01042) (0.01093 )
Real interest rate 0.122851 . 0.10297 . 0.12361 * 0.086 .
(0.043668) (0.03919 ) (0.03783 ) (0.03887)
Share of 0.002606 0.01321
nanial assets ( 0.014779) (0.01051)
Gini of inome 3.773958 4.23658
after taxes (3.715010) ( 2.29004)
R2 0.9316 0.908 0.9309 0.8717
Adjusted R2 0.8175 0.8161 0.8617 0.7947
p-value 0.05708 0.02382 0.01368 0.01145
Table 2.2.: OLS regression of wealth inequality (standard error in parentheses) (.,*,**
signiane at 10%, 5%, 1% level)
Spearman-orrelation wfin W D r Gini(y)
wfin
W -0.2545
D 0.6818* -0.2091
r -0.4364 0.2198 -0.1000
Gini(y) 0.2273 0.1099 -0.0273 -0.4615
Table 2.3.: Spearman orrelation matrix of regression ontrols (* signiane at 5% level)
The results of a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression are reported in table
2.2. All oeients show the expeted signs. For the omplete lassiation, however,
only the level of wealth is signiant at a reasonable level. The Spearman orrelation
matrix of the ontrols is presented in table 2.3. Only the orrelation between nanial
20
assets and debt is signiantly dierent from zero, while both indies are positively
orrelated. This emphasizes the view that the debt of one (low-inome) agent is the
nanial asset of another (high-inome) agent.
30
Debt, however, has a slightly stronger
explanatory power for wealth inequality than the share of nanial assets. Exluding
nanial assets from the explanatory variables inreases the explanatory power of the
regression and the signiane of the fators. In partiular, debt - besides the level
of wealth - turns out to be the most important determinant for net worth inequality.
Meanwhile, the Gini of inome never ame up signiant in any speiation. However,
its inlusion inreases the explanatory power of the real interest rate being negatively
orrelated with debt and espeially nanial assets (albeit not at a level that ensures
signiant dierene from zero, see table 2.3). A theoretial argument for the latter
ould be that inome inequality inreases the supply of debt and thereby lowers the
real interest rate. Thereby, the wealth inequality is self-destroying, implying that higher
wealth inequality leads to a higher supply of nanial assets, lower interest rates and
nally to lower wealth inequality. This is an important subjet we treat more extensively
from a theoreti perspetive in the setion 5.5.2. The key nding - yet not surprising
result - is that debt massively inreases net worth inequality.
Albeit the urrent debate about exessive publi debt, the level of private debt
31 32
far exeeds the sovereign debt for developed ountries. Figure 2.9
33
reports the ratio
of private to publi debt. Apart from the ase of Japan with its enormous sovereign
debt, this ratio exeeds 1 indiating higher private than publi debt. The trend-reversal
in the very reent years an be attributed to the massive debt-naned government
spending trying to ompensate for publi deleveraging. Shularik (2014), using a long-
run empirial sample of developed ountries and ontrolling for war times, shows that
nanial stability risks have ome from private debt rather than publi debt. Moreover,
he shows that private debt evolution and publi debt are negatively orrelated indiating
the former thesis that publi debt steps in times of private deleveraging and vie versa.
30
A more positive view - frequently emphasized in the literature - is that both are proxies for high
nanial development (see also setion 2.1).
31
In this ase - and in ontrast to the results presented in gure 2.8 - we present the debt of both -
private households and rms. This ertainly subsumes two very dierent forms of debt, as debt for
private households has little growth-payo in ontrast to private business debt (Levine et al., 2007).
The values are in nominal terms, not aounting for ination.
32
As reported in Kalemli-Ozan et al. (2012) there was a general inrease in leverage for both private
households and rms. These debt positions present laim positions to other entities. Ultimately,
they an be attributed to private households holding the rms. The swith of rms from equity to
debt, on the onverse side presents a swith from shares traded in the stok exhange to bonds. As
pointed out in Merton (1974), the underlying ontrat struture implies a hange from all to put
options, whih are senior to all options whose gain, however, is leveled.
33
The data originates from the study of Cihak et al. (2012) benhmarking nanial systems around the
globe drawing on World Bank data.
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Figure 2.9.: Ratio of private to publi debt (Data soure: Cihak et al. (2012))
Iaoviello (2008) states that both inequality and debt levels exhibit long-term growth.
The average growth rate of the private debt/GDP level
34
has been positive for all oun-
tries but Germany and Japan (see gure 2.10) and sometimes even exessive (espeially
for Ireland). As furthermore emphasized by Iaoviello (2008) debt growth itself, how-
ever, is ylial and learly related to overall eonomi onditions espeially ollateral
pries. Due to information asymmetries in the nanial market, lenders require ollat-
eral, resulting in the fat that in times of asending ollateral value the volume of redit
also inreases. The latter feature is niely illustrated by Taylor (2012) (presented in
gure 2.11) showing a strong omovement of housing pries and debt level for the US.
Both fators inreased until 2006. After that, both delined, with house pries leading
and debt levels lagging as indiated by the lokwise spiral.
34
We measure growth rate as log-dierene of debt levels.
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Figure 2.10.: Log-growth of private debt (Data soure: Cihak et al. (2012))
Figure 2.11.: Real US housing pries and real onsumer debt (Taylor, 2012, p. 59)
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Kumhof et al. (2014) report that value added GDP of the nanial setor inreased
from approximately 4.5% to over 7.5% from 1982 to 2007.
35
Mah-Hui and Ee (2010)
even state that the nanial setor is the largest ontributor to US GDP, even surpassing
wholesale/retail trade as well as manufaturing. This growth not only ontributed to
the inreased inequality - as stressed in Philippon and Reshef (2012), arguing with
exessive ompensation shemes in nanial industry - but also emerges as a result
(and thereby lags) inequality. Inreased debt levels signal inreased ativity of nanial
intermediation. The debt positions are mostly held by low-inome households. Kumhof
et al. (2014) show that the debt to inome ratio severely inreased for the bottom
95% of the wealth distribution (rossing the 100% level roughly in 2006, implying that
households have negative net worth) naning their onsumption inrease, whilst being
at a signiant lower and at a rather onstant level for the top 5% of wealth distribution.
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Figure 2.12.: Ratio of domesti to total debt for publi (left panel) and private debt
(right panel) for Anglo-Saxon, northern and southern European ountries
in time (Data soure: Cihak et al. (2012))
The private debt run-up is also related to the following reession. In a study using
miro data of several US ounties, Mian and Su (2010) also show that the massive
employment of debt, as measured by the level of leverage, has preditive behavior for
severity of a reession, as measured by onsumer default on debt or unemployment.
35
A rationale for the large share of the nanial setor is that - as e.g. doumented in Piketty (2014) -
the wealth/GDP ratio inreased massively in the last deade. The role of the nanial setor is to
manage this stok of wealth. Gennaioli et al. (2014) arguing in a theoretial framework, show that
the rising share of nanial servies in total GDP even sustains when management fees deline as
the volume eet prevails.
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Figure 2.13.: Ratio of domesti to total debt for publi (left panel) and private debt (right
panel) for various ountries in time (Data soure: Cihak et al. (2012)
They show statistially signiant orrelations between the piling up of household debt
until 2006 and the default rate after 2006, indiating that ounties with high inreases
in debt level (they espeially name ounties in California and Florida) were subjet to
higher default rates afterwards. On the other hand, an inrease in the debt level until
the peak of 2006 is also aompanied by more severe housing prie slumps. This an be
justied by the lassi Fisher (1933) debt-deation argument reasoning that re sales
aimed at reduing debt levels go along with higher real indebtedness through asset prie
deation. Similar behavior (even though laking the strong statistial signiane of the
house market) an be found when analyzing ar sales (Mian and Su, 2010). Comparable
to houses (even though not in suh an important manner) ars represent durable goods
that frequently require debt naning and an be used as ollateral.
Glik and Lansing (2010) - losely related to the approah of Mian and Su (2010) -
nd the same positive orrelations between leverage run-up until 2007 and house prie
inrease afterwards in a ross-ountry international study. Furthermore, they report
a negative orrelation between leverage inrease and onsumption growth on an inter-
national ountry level. The strongest absolute values in leverage growth, onsumption
deline and house prie level hange are reorded for Ireland. In ontrast to the other
sample ountries, Germany and Japan atually had a deline in private leverage levels.
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As opposed to publi debt, whih is subjet to a strong home bias
36 37
, private debt
is held to a large extent by foreigners (see gure 2.12 and 2.13). The nanial globaliza-
tion eventually enfores international indebtedness as indiated by downward trends of
domesti debt issuane. However, this makes private debt also more sensitive to global
maroeonomi onditions. While in Anglo-Saxon and northern European ountries
there is still a shift from domesti to international issuane of debt, in entral and and
espeially southern Europe this trend broke down or even reversed. In fat, the trend
to domesti debt is the ase of a sudden stop (Calvo, 1996). The lassi example is the
so-alled Tequila Crisis in Mexio in the mid 1990s learly visible in the data (see gure
2.13). On the other side, developing ountries China and Mexio exhibit a strong trend
to domesti debt issuane for both publi and private debt. The reported ratio whih
an also be interpreted as an inverse measurement of nanial openness is espeially
high for Asian ountries China and Japan implying low nanial openness.
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Figure 2.14.: Growth rate of top inomes and the standard deviation of urrent aounts
(Data soure: Atkinson et al. (2011) and OECD (2012))
Similar to the inrease in world wide inome inequality, urrent aounts imbalanes
have inreased in reent years. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) reports inreasing stan-
dard deviations of urrent aounts in the years leading to the risis, showing that
inequality prevailed not only on an inter-ountry but also an international level. If
we relate the growth rate of the standard deviation of urrent aounts to the growth
of top inomes (as an index of inequality), we nd a strong omovement
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(see gure
2.14). While the urrent aounts show a higher inter-time variane, both peak at sim-
36
This strong home bias eventually inreases pressure on politiians not to default on government
debt, as the default would hurt the domesti population and thereby potential voters. Yet, as
the example of Argentina also tells, default on foreign debt an blok aess to urgently needed
international apital and therefore also is aompanied by high osts.
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Note that the data only reports the issuing loation of the debt, but not the loation where the debt
is held. In partiular, the US - as the world's largest nanial market issues most debt domestially.
The buyers of these bonds, however, frequently ome from abroad.
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The Spearman orrelation oeient amounts to 0.628 and is statistially dierent from zero at a
5% level. The data set inludes China, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Japan,
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ilar points. Espeially the negative peaks oiniding with the bursting of the dot-om
bubble and the outbreak of the nanial risis are worth mentioning. The ollapse of
asset pries and the deterioration of naning onditions not only lessened inter-ountry
trade and naning, but also inequality on an inter-agent level.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) interpret the dispersion of urrent aounts as the
outome of asset (and espeially oil) prie run-ups as well as low risk aversion being
aompanied by a loosening of redit onditions. The risis, however, reversed these
trends also aompanied by a derease in exessive urrent aount imbalanes whih
were primarily stemmed by deit ountries onduted through the hannel of demand
redution. Meanwhile, the surplus ountries remain at a high level of urrent aount
surplus.
Kollmann et al. (2014) analyze the extreme urrent aount surplus of the German
eonomy for the European Commission estimating a three ountry Dynami Stohasti
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with Germany, the rest of the Euro zone and the
rest of the world. They ome to the onlusion that the Germany's urrent aount an
be explained by the existene of positive shoks to the German savings rate (without
further presenting an underlying rationale), an inreased demand for German export
goods by the rest of the world, and positive aggregate supply shok - in partiular labor
market reforms in Germany. Hale and Obstfeld (2014) meanwhile fous on the peripheral
ountries and their deits. Their empirial analysis suggests that redit booms going
along with urrent aount deits in the peripheral ountries were supported by low
interest rates as a result of greater nanial integration. The ore ountries of the
European Monetary Union inreased their borrowing from the rest of the world while
lending to European periphery (the GIIPS ountries; Greee Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain) thereby inreasing their own fragility.
Figure 2.15.: Current Aount Balane [% of GDP℄ and Inequality (Data soure: OECD
(2012))
Frane, USA, and Australia. The hoie of ountries was made aording to maximize data avail-
ability of top inomes.
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Current aount Current aount
Interept 14.557 37.02
(5.198) (32.166)
Gini of inome -45.656** -62.867*
after taxes (16.102) (29.295)
log(inome) -1.69
(2.388)
R2 0.3211 0.3417
adjusted R2 0.2811 0.2594
p-value 0.01142 0.03527
Table 2.4.: OLS-regression between inequality, inome, and urrent aounts (standard
error in parentheses) (*,** signiane at 5%, 1% level)
CA Gini(y) y
CA
Gini(y) -0.726 ***
y 0.546 * -0.693 **
Table 2.5.: Spearman orrelation matrix of regression ontrols (*,**,*** signiane at
5%, 1%, 0.1% level)
As the omovement presented in gure 2.14 suggests, there seems to be a positive
relation between urrent aount imbalanes and inome inequality. The result, however,
does not make a statement about the sign of the relation between growth of inequality
and urrent aount growth. To delve deeper into the subjet, we relate the level of
urrent aounts and inequality for the mid 2000's in the satter-plot in gure 2.15. As
shown in table 2.4, in a stati and simple univariate analysis urrent aount deits go
along with high inequality suggesting that both problems ome as twins. This result
was also presented in Kumhof et al. (2012).
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As the authors, however, emphasize this
result only holds if emerging eonomies are exluded. As with any univariate regression
omitted-variable bias is a key onern. A natural andidate for the latter would be
inome.
As stated in the seminal result of Kuznets (1955), for developed ountries (being on
the right hand side of the Kuznets urve), a higher level of development (as measured
by the inome level) is aompanied by higher equality. As reported in the Spearman
orrelation matrix (see table 2.5
40
) the fators inome and inequality are negatively
orrelated. Meanwhile, theory suggests that - for a ommon tehnologial progress -
high-inome ountries already being at a high level of development only oer a small
rate of return, should have a urrent aount surplus by exporting apital abroad in line
39
In their study, they take top inomes as measurement of inequality and also disuss hanges rather
than levels, whih we will also do in the latter.
40
In this ase, Gini(y) is inome inequality, y is inome level, and CA signies the urrent aount.
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with neolassial growth theory (Solow (1956), Swan (1956)). The latter is onrmed by
the sign of the orrelation in table 2.5 as well as by a more sophistiated reent study for
the Euro area (Herrmann and Kleinert, 2014). This also explains the breakdown of the
nding of Kumhof et al. (2012) by inluding developing ountries. Developing ountries
are expeted to be on the left side of the Kuznets urve, for whih a positive orrelation
between inome and inequality is measured. Together with the positive relation between
urrent aounts and inome, this results in an overall positive relation between urrent
aounts and inequality. It is also important to point out that the two developing
ountries in the sample (Mexio and Turkey) have the strongest deviation from the
regression urve as shown in the satter plot in gure 2.15, furthermore onrming their
dierent behavior.
By inluding inome as a ontrol the negative relation loses its signiane, yet re-
mains existing as reported in table 2.4. Kumhof et al. (2012) argue that a theoretial
explanation for the latter behavior an be found in the Relative Inome Hypothesis
(whih will be treated more rigorously in setion 4.3). In order to keep up onsumption
levels for low-inome individuals, developed eonomies with highly developed nanial
markets - in partiular the USA and the UK - imported apital from abroad to nane
onsumption of low-inome households. The inreased level of debt in this ase is ex-
plained from a demand perspetive. As the relative inome hypothesis is not a theory
of levels but of hanges, we disuss hanges in the times of the risis.
Figure 2.16(a) shows a satter plot of the hange in inequality ompared to the hange
in urrent aounts. The related regressions are reported in table 2.6. As before, the o-
eient of inequality shows the expeted negative sign. The overall regression, however,
is not signiant at all. If we take a loser look at the satter plot, this an be related to
some ountries grouped in the rst quadrant of the oordinate system. These ountries
- in partiular Denmark and Germany - exhibit both inreased inome inequality as well
as inreased urrent aounts. Thus, the thesis of Kumhof et al. (2012), arguing with
the relative inome hypothesis is far from universal.
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As also argued by Al-Hussami
and Álvaro Martín Remesal (2012), up to the risis inequality - rather than inuening
the hange in urrent aounts - inuened the absolute hange in urrent aounts (see
gure 2.16(b) as well as the regression results in table 2.6). One again the inlusion of
the (hange) of inome level, slightly weakens the results, but does not destroy them.
42
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In a related paper, Shmidt-Hebbel and Serven (2000) showed that there is no lear-ut evidene
between inequality and the aggregate savings ratio. However, the authors also show that on a ross-
ountry basis higher inequality is aompanied by higher aggregate savings - standing in diametrial
result to the hypothesis of Kumhof et al. (2012).
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Note that this time we ompare two dierenes. This dierene-in-dierenes approah is able to
ontrol for omitted-variable bias for non time-varying variables. As the inome level, however, is
time varying it should be inluded.
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∆ CA ∆ CA |∆ CA| |∆ CA|
Interept -0.03384 0.01705 1.2002 *** 1.4366 ***
(0.40285) (0.63806 ) (0.1834 ) (0.2793)
∆Gini(y) -4.66814 -5.0893 10.3624 ** 8.4054 *
(6.95271) ( 8.21948) ( 3.1658 ) (3.5974)
∆ log(y) -0.86468 -4.0178
(8.22132) (3.5982)
R2 0.0274 0.02812 0.4011 0.447
adjusted R2 -0.03338 -0.1015 0.3636 0.3733
p-value 0.5115 0.8074 0.004781 0.01176
Table 2.6.: OLS-regression for hanges (2000's to 2005's) in inequality, inome, and ur-
rent aounts (standard error in parentheses) (*,**,*** signiane at 5%,
1%, 0.1% level)
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.16.: Change inequality and hange (left) respetively absolute hange (right) of
urrent aount early to mid 2000s (Data soure: OECD (2012))
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Figure 2.17.: Change of inequality and hange of urrent aount mid to late 2000s (Data
soure: OECD (2012))
The run-up to the risis (early 2000's to mid 2000's) is well desribed by this behavior.
As also pointed out by Al-Hussami and Álvaro Martín Remesal (2012), the behavior,
however, is not stable in time. The follow-up of the risis shows a dierent piture (see
gure 2.17 and table 2.7). In ontrast to the run-up period, the eonometri analysis
shows no evidene of a relation between hange in inequality and the absolute hange
in urrent aounts. However, there is some weak evidene that after the risis higher
inequality led to higher levels of urrent aount.
The post-risis results and the behavior of ountries like Germany are at odds with
the theory of relative onsumption. Opposed to that, one ould argue that inequality
not only inuenes the demand for debt and nanial assets but also the supply of
it.
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Theorizing the latter would imply that rih households - in partiular in ountries
with underdeveloped domesti markets - export their apital to foreign ountries. This
argument bares lose resemblane to the global savings glut hypothesis rst artiulated
by Bernanke (2005).
While debt is a stok, savings are a ow. When looking at global savings
44
, there
is a trend of dereasing savings (see gure 2.18) until and espeially in the peak of
the risis. Yet, there is a strong ross-ountry heterogeneity. Derease in savings an be
espeially found for the USA, UK, and southern Europe. Inreased savings are measured
for Sandinavia, Canada, and Germany but espeially for the ase of China. China not
43
Note that our eonometri evidene only makes a statement about orrelations. The depition of the
results suggests a ausation running from inequality to urrent aounts. For a more sophistiated
eonometri approah supporting the latter notion the reader is referred to Al-Hussami and Álvaro
Martín Remesal (2012). A rationale for a reverse mehanism (whih we, however, feel to be a
bit far-fethed) ould be that positive urrent aounts - indiating a strong export setor - dis-
proportionally benet entrepreneurs in ontrast to workers reating domesti inome inequality.
44
One again the data originates from the study of Cihak et al. (2012) drawing from World Bank data.
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∆ CA ∆ CA |∆ CA| |∆ CA|
Interept -0.5443 -0.4028 1.3349 *** 1.5751 ***
( 0.4126 ) (0.5222) (0.3054) (0.3754)
∆Gini(y) 16.5587 . 17.0453 . 1.5535 2.3796
(8.7251) (8.9966) (6.4582) (6.4680)
∆ log(y) -2.2999 -3.9045
(4.9885) (3.5864)
R2 0.1748 0.1856 0.003392 0.07213
adjusted R2 0.1263 0.08385 -0.05523 -0.04385
p-value 0.07484 0.1934 0.8128 0.5494
Table 2.7.: OLS-regression for hanges (2005's to 2010's) in inequality, inome, and ur-
rent aounts (standard error in parentheses) (., *,**,*** signiane at 10%,
5%, 1%, 0.1% level)
only exhibits an upward trend but also an anomalous high level whih also stands in stark
ontrast to its GDP per apita sine high savings ratios are usually assoiated with high
living standards. Bosworth and Chodorow-Reih (2007) argue that the inreased Chinese
savings emerge due to lower fertility ombined with lower mortality in the presene of
underdeveloped publi retirement systems. Rather than relying on the intergenerational
transfer individuals now have to take are of themselves.
Gu et al. (2014) argue that the relation between inome inequality and aggregate
savings depends on the ountries harateristis. For the group of OECD ountries they
nd a negative orrelation between inequality and the aggregate savings rate, whereas for
Asian ountries a positive orrelation emerges. The onrm this behavior by means of a
sophistiated eonometri analysis also ontrolling for other andidate explanations suh
as demographi fators. They even argue that while the mehanism of a urrent aount
deit e.g. witnessed in the OECD ountries implies a nane-led growth strategy,
the Asian ountries and Germany follow a export-led growth strategy to ounterat
inequality.
In another empirial assessment, Al-Hussami and Álvaro Martín Remesal (2012) re-
port that high nanial development ontributes to a urrent aount deit. The em-
pirial analysis of Chinn and Ito (2007) further points out that, rather than nanial
development, the openness of the nanial markets (refer also to gure 2.12 and 2.13
for a simple (inverse) proxy of nanial openness) and the development of the nanial
markets ontribute to a urrent aount deit. This explains the eet that nan-
ial development for Asian ountries is assoiated with inreased savings and depressed
investment.
On the other side, the savings ratios in the developed ountries also inreased after
the onset of the risis. Carroll et al. (2012) argue that this deleveraging eet an be
rationalized in a theoretial framework by the presene of higher unemployment risk
resulting in a higher steady state savings ratio aompanied by temporary overshooting
of savings. Empirial analysis also supports the notion that lower redit availability
33
1995 2000 2005 2010
10
15
20
25
30
Gross National Savings / GDP [%]
 
 
USA
Canada
Australia
UK
Ireland
1995 2000 2005 2010
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Gross National Savings / GDP [%]
 
 
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Portugal
Greece
Italy
1995 2000 2005 2010
15
20
25
30
35
40
Gross National Savings / GDP [%]
 
 
Japan
Germany
Netherlands
Switzerland
France
1995 2000 2005 2010
10
20
30
40
50
60
Gross National Savings / GDP [%]
 
 
Mexico
Turkey
China
India
Figure 2.18.: Gross National Savings/GDP [%℄ in various ountries (Data soure: Cihak
et al. (2012))
(therefore arguing from a supply rather than a demand side) and negative shoks to
household wealth ontributed to the result. Aording to Gropp et al. (2014), debt
was mostly driven by supply. In their eonometri analysis based on a miro data-set,
they show that the derease in debt in ounties with strong real estate prie slumps
also aeted renters, who are not subjet to an adverse wealth shok. Koo (2014)
argues that this private deleveraging only omes to a halt, one households reahed a
minimum onsumption level. In the tradition of Fisher (1933), he emphasizes its adverse
maroeonomi eet in the form of a Balane Sheet Reession - arguing from a stok
rather than a ow perspetive. He relates this to both Japan's lost deade and the
Great Depression and argues that this behavior - despite expansive monetary poliy -
led to a derease in total money supply and thereby to deation. Therefore, he favors
the inrease in publi debt during the times it takes for private households to repair
their balane sheets.
As already pointed out, the big urrent aount imbalanes urrently primarily exists
amongst the pair USA (deit) and China (surplus) and within the Euro area, with the
southern European ountries having large deits, while Germany espeially takes the
role of the surplus ountry. The US-Chinese interonnetion is disussed under the label
of the global savings glut hypothesis.
The global savings glut hypothesis was introdued into the aademi disourse by
Bernanke (2005), stating that the US urrent aount deit was the result of an over-
supply of savings of surplus ountries, in partiular China. The dierent savings ratio
annot only be rationalized by heterogeneous time preferene but also by dierent abili-
ties to produe in the present and the future. Countries having a ompetitive advantage
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in produing in the present are expeted to exhibit a higher savings ratio. Usually
these ountries are developed ountries with a high apital stok. However, the empir-
ial evidene ontradits the results of standard textbook theory, making the eet of
money owing upwards for whih money ows from developing ountries (i.e. China) to
developed ountries (i.e. USA), a puzzle (Gourinhas and Jeanne, 2007). There are sev-
eral theories trying to solve this puzzle arguing both from the perspetive of developed
ountries and developing ountries.
Taking the perspetive of the developed ountries - in partiular the USA - it is
often argued that over expansive monetary poliy fueled the unsustainable redit boom
(Taylor, 2009). Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010) in partiular point out that the savings
inow was not used for investment but for onsumption whih in turn promoted an asset
bubble in the real estate market. Lastly, the speial role of the US-dollar still maintaining
an exorbitant privilege amongst the world urrenies is emphasized (Gourinhas et al.,
2010). The USA - rather than having a ompetitive advantage in produing goods -
has a ompetitive advantage in produing safe nanial assets making it attrative to
foreign investors (Caballero et al., 2008). This, moreover, makes the USA the onsumer
of last resort.
On the other hand, we an take the perspetive of the developing ountries. As al-
ready mentioned, their underdeveloped nanial markets together with the demographi
hange in their soiety make it neessary to inrease savings in foreign urreny (Men-
doza et al., 2009). Furthermore, the savings an also be thought of as hedge against
ommodity prie volatility (espeially for oil exporting ountries) leading to a surplus in
ommodity booms and vie versa. The massive holdings an also be rationalized against
the bakground of the Asian risis in the 1990s. The Asian surplus ountries hold foreign
assets in order to hedge against sudden stops of foreign apital inow. Some authors go
even further, arguing that China atively devaluates its exhange rate in order to stim-
ulate their export industry (Jeanne, 2012) oining the term New Merantilism (Durdu
et al., 2009).
We an ompare this behavior to the Euro area. In ontrast to the pair US / China,
the ow of apital is in line with neo-lassial theory by owing from highly developed
ountries to those with lower development (Herrmann and Kleinert, 2014).
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The per-
sistene of these imbalanes is due to the xed exhange rate. In the opposite senario,
a oating exhange rate is self-stabilizing: a surplus would inrease the prie of the do-
mesti urreny thereby raising the pries of export goods and nally lower the surplus.
While the xed exhange rate in the Euro zone is de jure by means of a ommon ur-
reny area, the exhange rate for the ase of US / China is only de fato xed by the
peg of the Chinese Renminbi to the US dollar. Similar to the former ase, we disuss
both the ase of the deit and the surplus eonomy.
The deit eonomies in the Euro area seem to exhibit a preferene for onsumption.
Similar to the US ase, the ow of savings was primarily hanneled into the real estate
setor, fueling an unsustainable bubble (espeially in Ireland and Spain). Germany -
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Or put negatively, this study disonrms the Luas paradox (Luas, 1990) showing that underdevel-
oped ountries tend to have a urrent aount deit.
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being the large surplus ountry - in this relation mostly argues with the ompetitiveness
of its export produts as a result of moderate wage growth. However, the ompetitiveness
is also a result of the xed exhange rate regime. The fear of a sudden stop or the eet of
ommodity prie booms does not apply for Germany. To use the same nomenlature as
before, the southern European ountries are onsumers of last resort, whereas Germany
ends up being a produer of last resort.
We, however, also think that inequality is important in explaining the results. If the
supply of savings of high-inome households annot be hanneled into investment (either
due to lak of high yield investment opportunities or due to underdeveloped nanial
markets), these savings are exported to foreigners. There is a reent debate, whih in
Germany is led by von Weizsäker (2014), arguing that the exess supply of savings has
suppressed the real rate of interest to a negative level. von Weizsäker (2014) following
a Austrian tradition - argues that the negative level of real interest is the result of
the Seond Law of Thermodynamis, for whih inreasing entropy in dynamis systems
redues the produtivity of investments. In a more traditional eonomi rationale, one
ould argue that the return on apital - dereasing with the level of apital
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- is lower
than a onstant rate of depreiation. These idle savings ould ow to the fator land
being in onstant supply. This would result in an inrease in the prie of real estate, as
eventually witnessed in ountries suh as the US or Spain.
The large savings of China are frequently explained by the demographi struture -
espeially an inrease in longevity - whih surely is an important fator for Germany
too. In theoretial models, this an be aounted for in the framework of Overlapping
Generations (OLG) (Samuelson (1958), Diamond (1965)) models. However, the soial
pensions systems are highly developed in Germany.
The high supply of savings an also be rationalized in the so-alled Bewley-type models
(Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994)) for whih the high level of savings results from an
uninsurable inome risk. Yet, the latter ase ould also be exluded in Germany due to
highly developed unemployment insurane systems.
Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) present a simple New-Keynesian model with over-
lapping generations that allows for losed-form solutions to takle the issue of seular
stagnation reourring in the urrent debate. In their model a negative real-interest rate
an emerge as a log-run phenomenon - in ontrast to other models suh as Eggertsson
and Krugman (2012) - in whih it is only of a temporary nature due to a deleveraging
shok. The low real interest rate emerges due to deleveraging, a slowdown in popula-
tion growth, a derease in the prie of investment goods due to advanes in information
tehnology (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2013), and strong inome inequality inreasing
the supply of savings by wealthy households. As a result, the aggregate demand urve
has a kink and a positive slope for low values of ination allowing for the existene of
multiple equilibria. Thereby, diverse Keynesian paradoxes emerge. Besides the las-
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This is for output y being a funtion of apital in eetive labor terms k; y = f(k), we have ∂
2f(k)
∂k2 < 0
as in the standard Cobb-Douglas speiation (f(k) = kα) with α < 1.
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It is also important to point out that this is a point made by Karl Marx. Yet, he eventually argues
that this eet would result in the long-run breakdown of the apitalist system.
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si paradox of thrift (higher saving leads to less aggregate demand in turn resulting
in lower inome), the paradox of toil (Eggertsson, 2010) (more labor supply leading to
lower wages lowering inome), and a paradox of exibility (Eggertsson and Krugman,
2012) for whih higher exibility in wages and pries lowers the real interest rate whih,
however, annot be followed by interest rate uts due to the binding zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates. As a poliy onlusion they reommend a substantial inrease
in the ination target, an inrease in government spending (diretly ounterating the
adverse eets of private delevearging), or redistribution of inome.
It is notable to point out that not only in the latter model but also in the general
OLG as well as the Bewley-type model literature, publi debt an eventually be welfare
enhaning.
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This stands in stark ontrast to the Riardian equivalene. In his seminal
paper, Barro (1974) asked whether government bonds are private wealth to answer in the
negative. The basi idea is that inreased government expenditures naned by means
of a deit are ompletely outdone by inreased private savings of the same amount. As
the net wealth remains unhanged, there is also no aggregate onsumption eet to a
government expenditure inrease in line with the permanent inome hypothesis (Fried-
man, 1953). The basi underlying notion is that representative forward-looking rational
agents antiipate that an inrease in government debt today is followed by an inrease
in taxes in the future posing the so-alled Riardian equivalene. In a framework with
heterogeneous agents that are subjet to idiosynrati uninsurable inome risk, Aiyagari
and MGrattan (1998) show that government debt an provide utility to private house-
holds by allowing to ondut preautionary savings. This relaxes borrowing onstraints
and allows to smooth and thereby (temporary) inrease private onsumption in times
of negative inome shoks. In the framework of Aiyagari and MGrattan (1998), these
eets highly outweigh adverse eets of publi debt suh as rowding out of investment
(by means of inreasing the interest rate) and future taxes. Empirial evidene also
shows that the distribution of inome matters when quantifying the impat of a govern-
ment spending shok. Anderson et al. (2012) show that wealthy households eventually
behave like Riardian households as assumed in Real Business Cyle (RBC) models.
Meanwhile, low net worth households are Non-Riardian and inrease their onsump-
tion due to binding redit onstraints. This is eventually in line with standard textbook
IS-LM analysis emphasizing the role of disposable inome rather than wealth. To put
it even more bold, RBC-models assume that the representative onsumer is wealthy,
whereas standard Keynesian model assume that the representative onsumer is rather
poor in terms of wealth. Anderson et al. (2012) also show that expansionary sal poliy
is aompanied by a redution in onsumption inequality.
Bhandari et al. (2013) refresh the disussion regarding the Riardian equivalene. In
ontrast to Barro (1974) arguing in a representative agent framework, they disuss the
model for the ase of heterogeneous agents in a inomplete market setup and aggregate
shoks. Bhandari et al. (2013) eho the famous result of Barro (1974) showing that
the absolute level of debt does not matter, but its distribution is of importane. As
48
This is espeially interesting sine the latter type of models mainly dierentiate from standard models
by the assumption of heterogeneous agents.
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government debt is an asset for high-inome individuals this would inrease the level
of inequality. As the Ramsey planner is assumed to also exhibit an equity onern he
reats by also inreasing taxes and transfers. They show that during reessions (negative
aggregate shoks) it is advisable to issue debt as well as inrease taxes and transfers. If
the soial planner would not are about inequality, it would reat to a reession (modeled
by a negative Total Fator Produtivity (TFP) shok) by inreasing debt and taxes but
dereasing transfers in order to maintain a balaned budget.
Note that - at this point of time - we do not onsider the role of the government debt.
Note that our model does not laim to give a full representation of a full maroeonomy
but fouses on important agents, in partiular private households. Nevertheless, this
is probably the rst natural andidate for a model extension. In ontrast to private
households, the government nds it easier to maintain a high level of debt not least
owing to the fat that government an reate inome by means of sovereign power by
inreasing taxes (for high-inome individuals). However, we introdue a taxation system
in setion 7.2. In ontrast to government bonds, tax payers (espeially high inome)must
pay taxes, while they an buy government bonds. Bonds being a debt ontrat, however,
also reassure them a return.
In our theoretial framework, we fous on the eet of inequality of inome rather than
age as in the OLG-type literature. We, moreover, feel that the Bewley-type literature
fails to address this problem properly. The following setion gives an overview about
theoretial models trying to explain the reent risis, ategorizes them, presents their
results as well as shortomings.
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3. Literature Overview of
Theoretial Models in this Area
The diulty lies,
not in the new ideas,
but in esaping from the old ones [...℄.
(Keynes, 1936, p. xxiii (prefae))
Several models try to aount for the presented fats. We ontrast the mainstream
approah (DSGE, New-Keynesian et.) with a heterodox approah - both presenting
stylized models. On the other hand, we disuss omplex models with heterogeneous
agents both from a more traditional eonomi bakground (in partiular the so alled
Bewley-type models) and the more heterodox approah of Agent-Based Modeling om-
ing from the eonophysis eld. For the sake of distinguishing them we will label the
former as Heterogeneous Agent Models (HAMs) and the latter as Agent-Based Models
(ABMs).
1
Both models are losely related to the disipline of omputational eonomis
as they are hard or virtually impossible to solve in a losed-form analytial manner. We
follow the ABM-type paradigm and will disuss advantages as well as shortomings of
this approah.
3.1. Dynami Stohasti General Equilibrium Models
The models related to more standard literature mostly only slightly soften the represen-
tative agent assumption by introduing dierent forms of onsumers. A highly stylized
model is presented in King (1994). A two-type agent eonomy diering in initial endow-
ment (high endowment agents being reditors and vie versa for debtors) is modeled.
Downturns result in hanges of net worth from debtors to reditors, who have a lower
marginal propensity to onsume. Upon this assumption, a non-monotonous aggregate
demand urve is modeled resulting in one unstable and two stable (one at low-level and
one at a high-level) equilibria aounting for nanial instability.
Another representation of this approah an be found in Eggertsson and Krugman
(2012), introduing two types of onsumers, patient and impatient, in a standard New-
Keynesian framework. In the model agents dier only by their time disount rate. The
authors interpret the model as a representation of the behavior in Japan's lost deade
and the Great Depression as well as the urrent situation. They show the emergene
1
Note, however, that the distintion is not always that expliit in the literature.
39
of a debt-deation spiral triggering a negative equilibrium interest rate and thereby
is aompanied by the problem of zero lower bound of the nominal interest rate. This
topsy-turvy (Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012) situation is aompanied by the Keynesian
paradox of thrift as well as another destabilizing mehanism oined paradox of toil, for
whih in the presene of the lower interest rate bound inreased labor demand lowers
real wage level leading to lower aggregate demand resulting in lower labor demand. In
the framework of a New-Keynesian model, they derive the poliy onlusion that this
situation has to be met by a higher ination target and espeially by higher government
expenditure.
Kumhof et al. (2014) try to explain the stylized fats of inequality and debt level
growth in a model with utility maximizing workers and investors. Workers in their
modeling framework only derive utility from onsumption, whilst investors also derive
utility from physial apital and deposits. Consistent with empirial data, they assume a
positive relation between leverage level and default probability. By applying a negative
shok in worker's bargaining power (resulting in inreased wealth inequality) and a
exogenous risis event (leading to higher loan rates due to default as well as a drop of
wages), the stylized fats are being rebuilt. If subsistene onsumption is assumed to
be variable, workers redue onsumption signiantly in downturns and thereby redue
debt levels as well as risis probability. The authors derive the poliy onlusion that
orderly debt restruturing tapers the severeness of the downturn. Meanwhile, an inrease
in worker's bargaining power an redue the leverage build-up and thereby the risis
probability.
Kumhof et al. (2012) extend the model of Kumhof et al. (2014) by onsidering an open
eonomy set-up. In this ase, the loans for workers originate from abroad resulting in a
urrent aount deit. To derive this result in their model they not only require higher
inequality (as modeled one again in the form of a negative bargaining shok of workers)
but also nanial liberalization (modeled by a lower banking spread). The model is able
to represent the behavior of the US and UK (eventually being alibrated to UK data),
for whih inreased inequality resulted in a urrent aount deit. However, as already
elaborated on in setion 2.2 this is far from a universal result. Kumhof et al. (2012) at
least explain the inverse behavior of China - where inreased inequality was aompanied
by a urrent aount surplus - via underdeveloped nanial markets. To aount for this
result in the model they assume the presene of binding redit onstraints.
Midrigan and Philippon (2011) build a theoretial model upon the empirial result
that a higher initial debt inrease results in stronger slumps (as measured by unem-
ployment) found in Mian and Su (2010). They model households with durable and
non-durable onsumption and a ollateral onstraint depending on the prie of durables
interpreted as houses. They assume heterogeneity in borrowing onstraints as well as
shoks to borrowing onstraints. Simulations prove that heterogeneity dereases the ef-
fet of shoks due to trade amongst agents. The negative shok in redit an be met
by a entral bank's inrease in high powered money, sine - in the given model - both
assets are perfet substitutes.
Iaoviello (2005) examines the eet of housing pries on monetary poliy in a frame-
work with entrepreneurs, patient and impatient households with dierent time preferene
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rates owning houses and using them as ollateral. He shows that monetary shoks are
stronger if the ollateral eet as well as debt-deation is assumed (by supposing that
debt is not indexed). If debt were indexed, the prie adjustment proess would dampen
these shoks. This an also explain the sluggish reation to ination shoks found in
empirial data. On the other side, supply side shoks are stabilized by nominal debt that
is not indexed. Therefore, the author argues against indexed debt, sine the demand
shoks - ounterated by nominal debt - are under the ontrol of monetary poliy in any
ase. In fat, the presene of debt amplies the poliy instrument of the entral bank.
As a result, Iaoviello (2005) shows that reating to asset prie ination only inreases
welfare marginally. On the other hand, the demand shoks amplied by debt-deation
an run out of ontrol if the entral bank faes other onstraints suh as the zero lower
bound of nominal interest.
Following a similar modeling strategy, the author addresses the urrent situation of
inome inequality and household debt in Iaoviello (2008). In this model, agents dier
in their patiene, derive utility from onsumption and the stok of houses, and are sub-
jet to a ollateral onstraint. Shoks in the ollateral margin (due to hanges in risk
pereption) as well as household inome shoks are estimated from empirial time series
and imposed on the model. The onstrained households behave like hand to mouth
onsumers and engage in debt-naned onsumption and durable aquisition (in the
form of houses). The model is able to apture many of the stylized fats found in the
reent risis inluding growth in debt-level, short-term ylial behavior of debt, and a
small rise in onsumption inequality ompared to a strong rise in wealth inequality. The
orrelation between debt and inequality highly depends on the amount of onstrained
agents. Iaoviello and Pavan (2013) further extend this model of the housing market
with a life yle prole of housing onsumption. The model is able to apture realisti
patterns of wealth inequality and further is able to repliate the reent maroeonomi
development. The Great Moderation - lasting from the early 1980s to the onset of the
nanial risis (Stok and Watson, 2003) - in this model an be (partly) attributed to
higher individual inome risk - implying higher inome inequality - and lower downpay-
ment requirements on loans making the model more stable in the fae of small shoks.
The same mehanisms in the Great Reession, haraterized by a tightening of redit
onditions and modeled as a ombination of a negative nanial and tehnologial shok,
make the eonomy more unstable to large shoks. In a short extension, moreover, the
important eet of default is brought up.
Chadha et al. (2013) present a model with savers and borrowers that are linked through
a ommerial bank giving loans at interest rate with a premium relative to the entral
bank rate of interest. The equilibrium interest rate in this ase results from an opti-
mizing behavior of the bank. The onsumption of the lenders and the borrowers are
mirror images of eah other. Lower interest rates and a lower loan to value ratio on debt
easing the redit onditions for lenders inrease their onsumption while dereasing on-
sumption of borrowers and vie versa. For the given alibration, the onsumption eet
of borrowers is stronger than for lenders. Chadha et al. (2013), moreover, show that
onsumption growth and asset pries are learly orrelated. This is not due to a wealth
hannel but the result of a redit hannel, as higher ollateral value allows for higher
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borrowing for onsumption purposes. In ontrast to Iaoviello (2005), they argue that
monetary poliy should target asset prie ination due to its impat on onsumption.
Menno and Oliviero (2013) remodel the Great Reession as the ase of heterogeneous
households in the presene of ollateral onstraints. The risis itself is simulated by as-
suming a negative shok to nanial intermediation and inome (a tehnologial shok).
The adverse prie shok to house pries is a negative welfare shok to borrowers (the
onstrained agents). Meanwhile, the savers (unonstrained agents) eventually use the
times of low asset pries to stok up on real estate assets. Similar to the results of
Chadha et al. (2013), the intermediation shok aompanied by higher redit spreads
- by redistributing from borrowers to lenders - inreases onsumption of lenders while
dereasing onsumption of borrowers in a mirror-image manner. On the other hand, the
negative tehnology shok aets both types of agents.
In summary, the mainstream literature desribes the Great Reession as a debt-
deation problem similar to the Great Depression. As the presene of debt, however,
requires the existene of heterogeneous agents - lenders and borrowers - the role of in-
equality is also disussed in some of the more standard literature.
3.2. Heterodox Literature
In ontrast to mainstream maroeonomis, heterodox eonomis has traditionally on-
sidered the distribution of inome. But rather than fousing on the personal distribution
of inome, it foused on the funtional distribution of inome.
The literature fousing on the reent behavior does not nd lear-ut evidene on the
evolution of the prot share. On the one hand, it is argued that the funtional distri-
bution lost its importane in the last 50 years as ompared to the personal distribution.
It is argued that the urrent situation therefore annot be attributed to surplus redis-
tribution from the fator labor to apital but rather to a stronger dispersion of wage
inome (Anselmann and Krämer, 2012). In the lassi Marxist framework, inequality
persists beause apitalists exploit the working lass. However, in the urrent situation,
for whih the apitalists are working rih, apitalists tend to exploit themselves in a
ompetitive rat rae reating inequality. The latter is not only measured by a higher
dispersion of outomes (i.e. labor ompensation), but also by a higher dispersion of
provided eort (e.g. overtime hours) (Landers et al., 1996). Moreover, as put forward
in Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009), sine high-inome agents have beome workers
rather than rentiers, the soure of these utuations has shifted from stok market risk
to inome risk that for this partiular group is substantially onneted to the eonomi
situation of the rm in the form of performane-based payments.
On the other hand, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) doument a deline in the labor
share during the last 40 years. In a alibrated theoretial model, they argue that this is
the ase due to the deline in the prie of investment goods leading to a substitution of
labor for apital. The latter eet is related to the advanes in information tehnology.
Moreover, Piketty (2014) argues that we have been reently witnessing a "return of
apital" and "patrimonial apitalism" for whih inherited wealth gains momentum as
42
opposed to self-earned wealth. Piketty (2014) aknowledges that the reent inrease in
inome inequality was due to the inreased dispersion of wages. The years from the
1970s to the 2010s saw working rih rather than oupon lipping rih, as in the times
of Marx. The strong wage inequality, however, allowed some agents to aumulate high
amounts of wealth replaing wage inome with apital inome as main soure of their
inome.
2
In the further ourse of this work, in partiular in setion 5.5.1, we will relate
personal and funtional distribution of inome in a formal way.
There is some theoretial literature from the heterodox perspetive disussing the
reent risis. Kim (2012) presents a stok-ow onsistent neo-Kalekian model with
workers and apitalists and the eet of onsumption emulation.
3
In this framework,
lower bargaining power of workers inreases the prot share. As workers try to emulate
the onsumption of apitalists, aggregate demand inreases resulting in higher growth.
The aumulation of debt by means of the establishment of lender-borrower links between
workers and apitalists, however, also results in potential instabilities.
An interesting approah is presented in Kapeller and Shütz (2012). By introduing
onspiuous onsumption eets in a Post-Keynesian model the authors are able to
reate what they label as Minsky-Veblen-yles.
4
They put forward that theoretial
literature dedues that the inrease in the prot share in the US should go along with
inreased investments. Or - to use standard Post-Keynesian terminology - growth should
be prot-led rather than wage-led. In fat, the inreased prot share was aompanied
by an inreased onsumption level. Kapeller and Shütz (2012) therefore oin the term
debt-led growth, sine the inreased onsumption was naned via onsumer debt. The
authors also point to similar behavior leading to the Great Depression.
By introduing the dihotomy between apitalists and workers the Post-Keynesian
models argue based upon two agents and allow for losed-form solutions. The next
setion - disussing Heterogeneous Agent Models - present a more omplex approah
with N agents allowing for inequality in the personal distribution of inome.
3.3. Heterogeneous Agent Models
Heterogeneous Agent Models (HAMs) drop the assumption of a representative agent in
favor for a group of heterogeneous agents. Compared to the more stylized approahes
presented in the previous setions assuming two or three types of agents, these models
involve real heterogeneity with N agents. Eventually, this literature already has a rather
long tradition dating bak to seminal work of Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). Most
of the literature does not distinguish between Heterogeneous Agent Models and Agent-
2
The ausality eventually ould also run in the opposed diretion. An inrease in the prot share,
inreases wealth inequality, sine wealth (as soure of apital inome) is more unequally distributed
than wage inome (Milanovi, 2014).
3
It is interesting to point out that this model is very lose to the model of Kumhof et al. (2014). One
might even go as far as labeling the model of Kumhof et al. (2014) a Post-Keynesian model disguised
in a DSGE framework.
4
This expression is owed to Hyman Minsky as the reator of the Finanial Instability Hypothesis and
Thorstein Veblen as the reator of the theory of relative onsumption.
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Based Modeling. We, however, make a lear distintion in the nomenlature. The
former are rather standard growth models that introdue the notion of heterogeneous
agents, whereas the latter are more heterodox. In partiular, for the latter the behavior
of the agents results from behavioral rules. We will treat Agent-Based Models in the
subsequent setion.
The assumption of a representative agent driving the behavior of the omplete maroe-
onomy is prevalent in standard eonomi theory. Sometimes this assumption is on-
ealed under some very tehnial terms. As elaborated in Keen (2011), to derive a
standard well-behaved
5
aggregate demand funtion, some very strong assumptions are
needed. As put forward in the so-alled Sonnenshein-Mantel-Debreu theorem (Sonnen-
shein, 1972), (1) all goods must be neutral or homotheti (implying a linear slope of the
Engel-urve linking inome level and onsumption demand) and (2) the Engel-urves of
individual agents must be parallel. The rst assumption - onerning the heterogeneous
goods - rules out important ases of luxury or ommodity goods, implying that the level
of inome does not impat on demand. The seond assumption - aimed at heteroge-
neous onsumers - is even more important in the ontext of our model. To make it hold,
the distribution of inome should be independent of the level of pries. Taking both
assumptions together implies that the Engel urves and thereby the marginal propen-
sities to onsume a spei good i of a an agent j are idential for all agents. If this
ondition hold, it is onvenient to assume a representative agent (or an army of identi-
al lones). We elaborate more thoroughly on this topi in A.2 under the label fallay
of omposition. There are some maroeonomi models with heterogeneous agents for
whih - by onstrution - inequality does not impat on aggregate results allowing for an
independent disussion of aggregate dynamis (e.g. growth) and distributional issues.
In Chatterjee (1994), wealth inequality is given exogenously and shown to onverge or
diverge depending on the relation between average savings propensity and wealth level.
6
In Ventura and Caselli (2000), furthermore, inequality in tastes and skills are introdued.
The authors show that despite idential aggregate dynamis a wide array of distributions
in onsumption, assets, and inome an emerge.
The existing literature treating heterogeneity in a DSGE framework is often referred
to as Bewley-type models.
7
These models assume that the inome heterogeneity - re-
sulting in subsequent wealth heterogeneity - is a result of insurable idiosynrati inome
risks. The seminal ontributions are Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1993), assuming
heterogeneous agents with preautionary savings subjet to liquidity onstraints. By
assuming an idiosynrati uninsurable inome risk, inome inequality resulting in sub-
sequent wealth inequality is reated. This - slightly obsure assumption - however also
implies that, sine the idiosynrati risk has the same funtional form for all agents, the
5
By this, we mean that the aggregate demand for a good i depends negatively on its prie xi(pi).
Moreover, a spei level of prie goes along with a spei level of aggregate demand. Or to use a
term from mathematis, the demand funtion is injetive.
6
He assumes a homotheti CRRA funtion, however, also inorporates a minimum onsumption level
(f. setion 4.3). As disussed more thoroughly in setion 5.5.2, this leads to a divergene of wealth
inequality.
7
Named after US-eonomist Truman F. Bewley sparking the initial idea to this form of modeling.
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distribution of inome amongst agents at a partiular point of time equals the distribu-
tion of a partiular agent during his life time. Or - as put in Castaneda et al. (2003) - all
agents are essentially idential and only subjet to spei irumstanes of (bad) luk.
In the aggregate, the equilibrium interest rate is lower than the rate of time preferene.
If higher borrowing limits are introdued (weakening the imperfetion resulting from the
redit onstraints), aggregate apital is redued and the interest rate inreases oming
loser to the level of time preferene. Meanwhile, higher idiosynrati risk inreases
inequality and savings and thereby lowers the equilibrium interest rate indiating that
inequality is aompanied by a low level of the equilibrium interest rate (Aiyagari, 1994).
It is interesting to point out that the oversavings results are also derived in Overlapping
Generations (OLG) models (e.g. Diamond (1965)), for whih the heterogeneity of agents
results from the heterogeneous age.
In essene, the inequality emerges due to non-existing insurane options. Thereby
- based upon these models - it is often argued in favor of nanial liberalization re-
ating assets that allow for insurane against any unfavorable state of the world. This
is in partiular the ase sine dierent soures of negative inome shoks - suh as
(un)employment, health and martial status (i.e. divore) - are positively orrelated
(Heathote et al., 2009). On the other hand, there are other options to insure against
these idiosynrati shoks and thereby ounterating inequality. Government an pro-
vide publi goods suh as health and eduation as well as publi soial seurity systems
(Piketty, 2014).
8
Moreover, agents an adjust their labor supply aording to the shoks
- given suiently exible labor markets (Heathote et al., 2009). On a more individual
level family also provides a measure of insurane (Beker and Tomes, 1986). Conretely,
hildren are supported by their parents, the elderly by their ospring, and non-working
individuals by their partners (Heathote et al., 2009). In the latter ase - and in the
ontrast to the government system and the nanial market - the risk sharing ability is,
however, very limited.
Krusell and Smith (1998) an probably be onsidered the seminal ontribution in
the Bewley-type literature. They present a simple stohasti growth model for whih
households maximize intertemporal utility from onsumption subjet to a budget on-
straint and a Cobb-Douglas type prodution tehnology. As the households, however,
are subjet to an uninsurable idiosynrati inome risk, inome heterogeneity emerges.
Moreover, the authors assume heterogeneous time preferenes. Yet, the authors onlude
that inome and wealth heterogeneity does not have a strong impat on maroeonomi
dynamis and the behavior of the maroeonomy is well desribed by the behavior of a
representative agent multiplied by the number of agents. However, they also admit that
in this type of model - due to the inompleteness of insurane markets - onsumption
is more losely linked to inome (rather than wealth) as emphasized in the Keynesian
literature. Moreover, the existene of borrowing onstraints leads to the fat that inome
distribution an not be ompletely negleted. There is still a large amount of literature
8
We disuss this idea intensively in setion 7.
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stemming from the original work of Krusell and Smith (1998). Yet, this literature mostly
fouses on omputational issues in solving the sophistiated models.
9
The presented models, however, also suer from some deienies. First and foremost,
they underestimate the degree of inequality in both inome and espeially wealth. An
important fator is that they annot rationalize the high amount of savings by very rih
individuals. A very good representation of US earnings and wealth inequality is ahieved
in the model of Castaneda et al. (2003) by inorporating aspets of dynasti models with
bequests to rationalize the high savings of rih individuals. They, however, fail to address
the low savings and attribute this to the fat that they disregard publi soial seurity.
Benhabib et al. (2011) try to address these problems in a ontinuous time OLG-model
with a nite life of agents and intergenerational transmission of wealth. Besides being
subjet to labor inome risk, they add apital market risk in their model. By doing so
they are able to repliate the power-law behavior for the right tail of wealth distribution
measured in empirial data. While both strong apital inome taxation and estate taxes
redue wealth inequality in this framework, strong bequest motives lead to a higher
degree of wealth inequality. In a similar model following the tradition of Blanhard
(1985) and Yaari (1965), Benhabib et al. (2014) are able to repliate a double Pareto-
distribution of wealth featuring power-law behavior at both the left and the right tail of
the distribution.
A very interesting Bewley-type model inspired by the reent situation is presented in
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011). The authors disuss a model for whih a redit runh
(modeled as a shok to the debt limit) leads to a deleveraging of indebted households
and an inrease in preautionary savings by high-inome households both promoting
a fall in interest rate. The resulting onsumption derease and onsequential output
derease is further promoted in the ase of a zero lower bound. If, moreover, durable
assets are introdued in the model the redit runh leads to a aumulation of durables
for high-inome (as a form of preautionary holding) and respetive sales for onstrained
households. In eet, this eventually leads to an output level stabilization as a result of
inreased durable onsumption. An inrease in banking intermediation osts (modeled as
a positive shok of the redit spread) aeting all households, however, results in strong
output ontration. This result is further intensied by nominal rigidity of pries.
3.4. Agent-Based Modeling
In this setion, we will present the paradigm of Agent-Based Modeling (ABM). The
basi modeling idea is presented and ontrasted with the well-established approah of
DSGE modeling. The most important shortoming an be subsumed under the label
of the Luas ritique. We give an overview of the (aspiring) literature of Agent-Based
9
A survey is e.g. found in Heer and Maussner (2005). The underlying problem is that no losed-form
solution an be found as the model inludes a distribution whih is an objet of an innite dimension
(Heathote et al., 2009). The solution strategy is usually to take a nite number of measurements
(e.g. the mean and variane in the ase of Krusell and Smith (1998)) to ompute a numerial
solution.
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Modeling and qualify our own ontribution within this area. We also point out other
arguments brought forward against ABMs and our attempt to address them.
Agent-Based Models give up an expliit mirofoundation with a representative agent
in favor of a behavioral foundation with heterogeneous agents. The heterogeneous agents
in this framework rather than being utility maximizing individuals with rational expe-
tations exhibit bounded rationality in the Simon (1955) sense (due to limited resoures
time and money) and therefore employ heuristis in expetation formation. In ontrast
to this, in the standard established theory perfetly rational and forward-looking agents
ontinuously solve optimal ontrol problems. The ABM-approah is niely summarized
by Bruun (2008) in the way that these models "rather than assuming omplex behavior
in a simple world [...℄ model simple rule-based behavior in a omplex world". Thus, they
are losely linked to experimental and psyhologial literature, but also to rule-of-thumb
reommendations from the management literature (Raberto et al., 2012). The modeling
paradigm is bottom up rather than top down as in the established representative agent
maro literature. In ontrast to the DSGE and Real Business Cyle literature, eo-
nomi yles in this ontext do not arise due to exogenous shoks but endogenously via
the proess of expetation formation. Furthermore, ABMs an aount for instability,
whilst this aspet is ruled out by assumption in DSGE models that only measure impulse
propagation with long-run onvergene to equilibrium. ABMs, on the other hand, an
produe long-run growth with ylial behavior around this growth trend (Dosi et al.,
2006) as measured in time series of GDP, but also of debt levels. The emergene of
these models is also losely linked to the reent developments in omputer tehnology
and software engineering.
10
Drisoll and Holden (2014) disuss the role of behavioral eonomis in maroeonomi
models in an extensive manner starting out from the standard New-Keynesian model.
Rule-of-thumb onsumption an alter the IS-urve whih will also be the main onern
of our work. Behavioral assumption also matter for aggregate supply in the form of the
expetation proess espeially regarding the future level of ination allowing for multiple
equilibria and omplex dynamis. The onrete form of the expetation proess is also of
importane for disussing nanial markets in partiular to explain asset prie bubbles.
Drisoll and Holden (2014), moreover, emphasizes that seemingly irrational behavior is
frequently result of an underlying prinipal-agent problem for whih the prinipal (e.g.
reating to short-term inentives) violates the rules of optimality at the ost of the agent.
The advantages of the ABMs as put forward in the previous paragraph, however,
an also be onverted into shortomings following the strong Luas ritique. In this
vein, one ould argue that while there is only one single optimal deision rule, there
exist an indenite number of behavioral rules of thumb. Or to paraphrase Tolstoy: all
rational agents are rational in the same way, whereas all irrational agents are irrational
in their very own way.
11
As a result, the role hosen by the modeler of the ABMs is an
10
An interesting trivia is that the the publiation of the General Theory (Keynes, 1936) and the
development of the rst omputer Z1 (1935-1938) by Konrad Zuse oinide.
11
This is sometimes referred to as the Anna Karenina Priniple owing to the rst stanza of the fa-
mous novel saying "Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way."
(Diamond, 1997).
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arbitrary deision only to derive a desired model outome - as e.g. to promote a ertain
politial reommendation.
12
The well-known debate surrounding e.g. the Phillips-urve
makes the point that eonomi agents are not subjet to fallaies suh as money illusion.
Therefore, money is neutral in the long-run. As money is only a veil, the established
literature assumes money to be absent and thereby (impliitly) models pure transation
or barter eonomies. In their ABM, Ashraf et al. (2012) (partly) address the Luas
ritique by showing that their model results are robust to hanges in the behavioral
parameters.
It is not surprising that the debate in maroeonomis and espeially the Rational
Expetations Revolution resembles the debate in nane in the ontext of the Eient
Market Hypothesis (EMH). On the one hand, we have a very simple and powerful theory
basially relying on a non-arbitrage argument arguing that all variations in eonomi
variables are the result of exogenous shoks. Its preditions - at least in the short-
run - however are ounter-fatual. As the nane domain is dominated by business
pratitioners only interested in exploiting prot-making opportunities it is, however,
more open to heterodox approahes suh as Agent-Based Modeling.
13
In ontrast to that,
maroeonomists from all sides - ranging from neo-lassial to Marxist approahes - feel
obliged to their shool of thought and try to defend it against ontrasting approahes.
ABMs are intensively used and widely aepted for modeling the behavior of stok
markets (as presented for instane in the surveys of Chiarella et al. (2009), Lux (2009)
and Hommes and Wagener (2009)). Their are several attempts to adopt this model-
ing framework, also heavily used in other sienti elds suh as biology, to a broader
maroeonomi sope. Amongst the most famous supporter of these models was the
former hairman of the European Central Bank (ECB) Jean-Claude Trihet (Trihet,
2010). One major shortoming of these models - also resulting from its infany - is
that in the ontrast to the New-Keynesian (Woodford, 2011) or Real Business Cyle
(RBC) (Kydland and Presott, 1977) literature, there is no anonial model for dis-
ussing maroeonomi problems in an ABM setting.
14 15
Yet, there are dierent oex-
isting and ompeting attempts. A very ambitious attempt is undertaken in the so-alled
EURACE projet (Deissenberg et al., 2008). This projet involves a large number of re-
12
As we will, however, also elaborate for our partiular setting in setion 4.3, the mirofounded models
rely on an arbitrary utility and prodution funtions to derive their results.
13
Due to this whatever works-premise, ABMs are now widely used in trading ompanies. The oial
authorities, therefore, are also interested in implementing them to ounterat possible resulting
instabilities for the nanial system (Bookstaber, 2012).
14
Moreover, one pratial shortoming that - in ontrast to DSGE models running on the Matlab based
tool Dynare - there is no anonial simulation software. A widely used software pakage oming
from the elds of biology is Repast - a open-soure software pakage based on the objet-oriented
(being highly suitable for the agent-based paradigm as every agent represents an objet) programing
language Java. The simulation work presented in this paper is done in Matlab also reeting the
more traditional approah hosen in this work.
15
Another pratial shortoming in the ABM-area is the problem of nding a ommon language. Stan-
dard models are presented by means of mathematial equations. As the deision rules in the ABM-
framework, however, derive from an if-then-else logi, they are frequently represented in the form of
pseudo-ode. As the models, moreover, are highly omplex it is hard to represent them ompletely
in an journal artile, leading to a high degree of opaqueness (see e.g. Geanakoplos et al. (2012)).
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searhers fousing on dierent key aspets of the model suh as the labor market (Dawid
et al., 2008) or the nanial market (e.g. Raberto et al. (2012)). Beside this large sale
projet there are bold attempts by individual researhers in modeling the maroeonomy
in ABMs. Lengnik (2013) presents a rather simplisti ABM that is, however, apable
of reproduing a wide array of interesting maroeonomi phenomena suh as the Bev-
eridge urve or boom-bust yles endogenously. In ontrast to this simple approah,
there are also very ompliated and ambitious approahes by individual researhers or
small groups. While Haber (2008) fouses on a realisti representation of entral bank
ativity and Ashraf et al. (2011) on the role of banks, Ashraf et al. (2012) onentrate
on the eet of ination, whereas Oener (2008) presents a very wide approah.
The latter attempt, on the other hand, also reveals the major shortoming of these
models. The model onsists of a large amount of behavioral variables not diretly mea-
surable in empirial data. Therefore, researhers should keep in mind the famous Joan
Robinson saying that a map on the sale 1:1 is useless (Robinson, 1962). The highly
non-linear behavior of the model also makes it diult for either analytial disussion
or eonometri alibration.
16
Bringing omplexity into eonomis is therefore not only
an ahievement of ABMs, but a shortoming at the same time. Resulting from that,
disussion of ABMs mostly rely on simulation studies or desription of representation
of stylized fats. In the ase of nanial time series this mostly onerns the higher
moments of return distribution indiating non-Gaussian behavior (Lux, 2009). Similar
results an be found for the ase of rm size distributions whih exhibit fat tails that
an be desribed by power-law behavior (Gatti et al., 2010) as well right skewness (Dosi
et al., 2006). The heterogeneity in the nanial markets models mostly omes from dif-
ferent expetation formation (e.g. Hommes and Wagener (2009)). Attempts like Gatti
et al. (2010) or Raberto et al. (2012) meanwhile fous on the heterogeneous harater-
istis of rms and banks and thereby follow the rationale by Shumpeter, onsidering
the entrepreneur as the key eonomi agent. We take a more Keynesian approah in
building the model around the private household or more preisely the onsumer. In
most of the existing models, the onsumer is treated in a very simple manner, espeially
not allowing for onsumption redits (Raberto et al., 2012).
Chakraborti et al. (2011) survey the eonophysis attempts to aount for wealth
inequality in an ABM-framework. The exhange models losely linked to the kineti
theory of gases from physis (even though being very simplisti in their formulation) an
aount for power-law behavior in distribution as initially observed by Pareto (1896).
Reently, this model type has been advaned by a simple mirofoundation (Chakrabarti
and Chakrabarti, 2009).
In an extension of the Dosi et al. (2010) model, Dosi et al. (2013) investigate the eet
of inome inequality in an Agent-Based setup. In this ase, the funtional distribution
between prots and labor (rather than the personal distribution) - as modeled by high
prie mark-up ratios - is taken into aount. The general result is that high inequality
an amplify business yles implying periods of high unemployment and a high risis
16
A very bold attempt at alibrating ABMs is onduted by Jeleskovi (2011). For a more preise
overview on the subjet also refer to Sornette (2014).
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probability. In this setting, a redistributive sal poliy an, however, be very eetive.
Meanwhile, monetary poliy is not eetive below a ertain interest rate threshold.
Above this threshold inreasing interest rates are ounterprodutive sine rms prefer
naning via volatile internal funds leading to lower growth rates and larger output
volatility.
As we onsider inequality by means of an ABM, our model is lose to Dosi et al.
(2013). Another very omparable paper is Geanakoplos et al. (2012). The authors use
the ABM-framework to disuss systemi risk eets arising from the housing market
motivated by the reent nanial risis. This very rih model uses miro data from
the Washington area to alibrate the model. The results suggest that instability is
driven by high leverage of private households as well as low interest rates. Another
very reent and omparable paper is König and Gröÿl (2014) in whih the authors use
the ABM-paradigm to disuss the role of the interation of relative onsumption eets,
borrowing onstraints, and private debt. By means of simulation they show that if poor
households overstreth their resoures by exessive borrowing, the resulting defaults an
have adverse eets on the aggregate maroeonomy putting forward an argument for
tight borrowing onstraints.
Our model is a partial model of the eonomy abstrating from important fators, in
partiular labor markets and behavior of rms. The hosen simpliity, however, allows to
derive some losed-form solutions.
17
By this means we also hope to address the problem
of arbitrary model tunings that are also relevant for the DSGE models. Basially - and
thereby similar to e.g. Krusell and Smith (1998) - the key omponent of the model is
the intertemporal deision how muh to onsume and to save.
Bruun (2001) disusses the eet of a wealth tax on inequality in an ABM-framework.
The model predits a strong orrelation between wealth inequality and business yle,
resulting in high values for the Gini oeient (as an index of inequality) in times of low
asset pries and vie versa. One interesting key assumption made in this model is that
agents base their onsumption on the onsumption of their neighbors as proposed in
Duesenberry (1949). A theory of onsumer inequality therefore rstly requires a theory
of onsumption. The next setion therefore will present dierent forms of onsumption
theories and evaluate them.
17
The paramount share of setion 5 is devoted to the analytial analysis of the model.
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4. Theoretial Consumption
Funtions - Assumptions and
Impliations
Rather go to bed without dinner
than to rise in debt.
Attributed to Benjamin Franklin
(1706-1790)
I still owe money to the money to the
money I owe
The National - Bloodbuzz Ohio
(2010)
The theory of onsumption asks the question how muh households onsume today
and will onsume in the future and - as a mirror image - save today. There are several
ompeting theories whih build on dierent fundamental assumptions. Moreover, the
dierent theories also have mixed empirial validity. Consumption deisions require
knowledge about future behavior of dierent variables suh as inome, ination and
interest rates. The most popular are the opposing theories ad-ho theory in the spirit
of Keynes (1936) and the utility maximizing rational expetations approah (Luas,
1972) as theoretial foundation for the permanent inome (Friedman, 1957) and life-
yle hypothesis (Brumberg and Modigliani, 1954). In this setion, we follow a similar
approah as in the literature overview of setion 3 in omparing (more) standard theories
with behavioral and heterodox approahes. Moreover, we fous on the sustainability of
debt, whih will be of major importane in our model, and also benhmark the theories
with some empirial data.
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4.1. Keynesian and (Neo)Classial Consumption
Theory
One of the rst major attempts at modeling onsumer behavior was made by Keynes
(1936) in partiular elaborating on the marginal propensity to onsume.
1
Here, we
present a simple text book treatment (e.g. Carlin and Soskie (2005)) and - for the
sake of onveniene - in the further ourse will refer to it as the Keynesian onsumption
funtion. The main determinant of the onsumption level in the work of Keynes is
the disposable inome Y dt
2
- representing a ow variable. Furthermore, the textbook
literature assumes that there is a subsistene level of onsumption c¯ independent of atual
disposable inome. The seond important assumption he makes is that the marginal
propensity to onsume (MPC) is positive but less than 1 (0 < dCt
dY dt
= cy < 1), implying
that onsumption is less volatile than inome.
3
These assumptions an be presented in
a simple linear equation:
Ct = c¯+ cyY
d
t . (4.1)
The assumption of a subsistene level of onsumption yields the result that the average
propensity to onsume
Y dt
Ct
= c¯
Y dt
+cy is lower for higher inomes. This theory furthermore
implies that onsumers who have a disposable inome lower than a threshold level Y ∗ <
c¯
1−cy engage in dissavings, while onsumers above this level represent the net savers (also
see gure 4.1). Dissavings an be onduted by means of selling already aumulated
wealth or - and this is the ase emphasized in this work - by aggregation of debt.
Moreover, the ombination of the assumption c¯ > 0 and 0 < cy < 1 guarantees a
well-dened stable steady state of inome and onsumption Y ∗.
The Keynesian ideas are still at the ore of modern onsumption theory. Thus, the
funtion itself is based upon rather ad-ho assumptions without proper miro- or behav-
ioral foundation and laks empirial evidene (Sørensen and Whitta-Jaobsen, 2010).
Maroeonomi time series data suggest that the subsistene level of onsumption c¯ is
zero, whilst onrming a MPC lower than one
4
and at a very low level.
Following the argumentation of the Friedman (1953) permanent inome hypothesis,
households only respond to permanent hanges in inome and not to transitory varia-
tions. Friedman (1953) emphasizes that the stok level of wealth rather than the ow of
urrent inome determines onsumption behavior. For those individuals born without
physial apital or land (allowing them to have fator inome in the form of prots or
rents), their wealth is represented by the time disounted value of their labor inome
- their human apital. While physial wealth an be (with some spei liquidity on-
1
Note that he argues from a top-down maroeonomi perspetive. In ontrast, the (neo)lassial
literature argues from a bottom-up miroeonomi perspetive.
2
This equals inome from wages, rents and apital gains less taxes.
3
The latter is easy to show given the relation presented in equation 4.1:
V ar(Ct)
V ar(Y dt )
= c2y < 1.
4
If onsumption is plotted as a funtion of disposable inome, this implies that the line is always below
the 45-degree line.
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Figure 4.1.: The basi Keynesian onsumption funtion with onsumption C being a
funtion of disposable inome Y d
straints) be traded on markets as a bulk, the human apital an not be sold entirely as
a stok (in the absene of slavery).
5
Mirofounded models present the onsumption/savings deision as an intertemporal
deision of onsumption in time. They assume that eonomi agents optimize a utility
funtion U(C0)
6
and exhibit an individual time disount fator 0 < β = 1
1+ρ
< 1 with
0 < ρ being the rate of time preferene. They therefore maximize the following target
funtion:
U(C) =
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct) (4.2)
In the presene of a perfet apital market
7
agents with innite lifetime, initial wealth
level W0, and a disposable inome Yt
8
in every period t are subjet to an intertemporal
budget onstraint:
∞∑
t=1
RtCt = W0 +
∞∑
t=1
RtYt. (4.3)
5
Note following a similar argument the absene of slavery in modern soieties is the key rationale why
Piketty (2014) does not inlude human apital as the apital in his work.
6
This follows the standard assumptions of positive (
dU
dC = U
′ > 0) but dereasing (d
2U
dC2 = U
′′ < 0)
marginal utility.
7
Major assumptions of a perfet apital market are equal market rates R < 1 for borrowing and
lending and no redit onstraints (espeially ollateral).
8
Note that for sake of readability we exlude the index d in the further ourse.
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The fator R = 1
1+r
represents the disount fator determined by the market interest
rate r.9 This leads to the following optimality ondition:10
U ′(Ct)
U ′(Ct+T )
=
(
β
R
)T
. (4.4)
This ondition implies that individuals with stronger future disounting than market rate
(β < R) prefer urrent onsumption and vie versa. The dierene in individual time
preferene has been a key rationale in many models desribing the urrent heterogeneous
savings-onsumption patterns witnessed in between nations and individuals (see setion
3.1).
A reent large-sale international survey based on experiments by Wang et al. (2011)
revealed strong variation in disount rates between international regions. They measure
patiene (and thereby high values for β) for Germani/Nordi as well as Anglo-Saxon
ountries and high time preferene for Latin Amerian, Latin Europe as well as Afrian
ountries. The authors attribute this eet to ultural dierenes and are able to dis-
entangle it from a wealth eet. Espeially, the strong dierene between between Ger-
mani/Nordi ountries and Latin European ountries is a good andidate for explaining
the urrent Euro risis.
If, for sake of onveniene, we assume T = 1 and a simple utility funtion of the
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) type (U(Ct) = ln(Ct))
11
the so-alled Ramsey
equation an be derived (Ramsey, 1928):
U ′(Ct)
U ′(Ct+1)
=
Ct+1
Ct
=
β
R
⇒ Ct+1 − Ct
Ct
=
β − R
R
. (4.5)
If we transform the dierene equation into a dierential equation a losed-form solution
of the onsumption path an be derived:
dC(t)
C(t)
=
β − R
R
⇒ C(t) = C0 · exp
(
t · β − R
R
)
. (4.6)
In the ase of β > R this results in an expanding onsumption path over life time and
vie versa for the opposite ase (see gure 4.2). The market interest rate R is determined
by the aggregate savings and demand for apital. Sine by the no-arbitrage-law no
exess gains an be made, the market interest rate R should equal the time preferene
rate β. Aordingly, in the representative agent eonomy for all agents β = R. In
the Ramsey-sense this leads to the result Ct = C0, implying that agents onsume an
equal amount in every period. This eet is alled onsumption smoothing as argued by
Friedman (1953). Similar to the results of the Eient Market Hypothesis (EMH) the no
arbitrage ondition, representative agent supposition as well as the rational expetations
9
Note that - in ontrast to a large amount of literature - we dene R = 11+r rather than R = 1 + r,
sine we feel that it aids readability espeially when omparing β and R.
10
A formal derivation of the result is presented in the appendix A.1.
11
In this ase the relative risk aversion equals 1: −U ′′U ′ · C = 1.
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Figure 4.2.: Consumption C(t) as a funtion of time t for dierent values of time pref-
erene β
assumptions result in the fat that onsumption should behave like a random walk
triggered only by new information about future inome (Hall, 1978).
To aount more preisely for risk aversion, we now investigate a more general CRRA
utility funtion for whih γ aptures risk aversion:12
U(Ct) =
C1−γt
1− γ . (4.7)
This yields the following optimality ondition:
U ′(Ct)
U ′(Ct+1)
=
Cγt+1
Cγt
=
β
R
⇒ Ct+1 − Ct
Ct
=
(
β
R
) 1
γ
− 1. (4.8)
If this dierene equation is transformed into a dierential equation, there is a losed-
form solution to the Ramsey equation:
C(t) = C0 exp
(
t ·
(
β
R
) 1
γ
− 1
)
. (4.9)
The rationale of this equation is that with inreasing risk aversion (higher values for γ)
the slope of the onsumption funtion dereases:
13
This implies that more risk averse
individuals engage more severely in onsumption smoothing.
Cagetti (2003) estimates the eet of eduation on the parameters of the Euler-
equation using Panel Study of Inome Dynamis (PSID) as well as SCF-data (Survey of
Consumer Finane) both reporting data for the US. A key nding is that higher edua-
tion ontributes to higher risk aversion γ and a higher disount fator β. As eduation
12
The beforehand presented utility funtion U(C) = ln(C) represent the speial ase of this one with
γ → 1. The relative risk aversion in this ase is dened as follows: −U ′′U ′ · C = γ.
13
This is for the ase without perfet onsumption smoothing (β 6= R).
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is orrelated with inome (Miner, 1958), this implies that high-inome individuals are
more patient and hold less risky assets. Furthermore, the onsumption path peaks ear-
lier for lower eduation. In fat, for ollege eduation there is no peak but onsumption
is ever inreasing (Cagetti, 2003).
Another interpretation is given when onsidering the reiproal value
1
γ
that is referred
to as the elastiity of substitution.
14
The intertemporal elastiity of substitution (IES)
also plays an important role in qualifying the onsumption eet of an interest rate
hange. If we log-linearize
15
the rst order ondition, the following result emerges:
log
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
= log(Ct+1)− log(Ct) ≡ ∆C = log
(
β
R
1
γ
)
=
1
γ
(log(β)− log(R)) ≈ r − ρ
γ
.
(4.10)
This variable is an important feature of maroeonomi values by aessing the eet
of an (exogenous) interest rate hange on onsumption also impating on savings and
thereby investment. A reent meta-analysis of empirial studies ompares dierent em-
pirial estimates and points to a wide diversity of results (Havranek et al., 2013). The
authors put forward that in ountries with low inome, low asset market partiipation,
and strong liquidity onstraints - all haraterizing underdeveloped nanial markets -
the IES is low in magnitude, implying that monetary poliy has little impat on on-
sumption.
Guvenen (2006), moreover, emphasizes that heterogeneity of agents is important when
estimating the IES. Estimation from onsumption data point to a level of the IES lose to
zero. This, eventually, mainly aptures the IES of low-inome individuals ontributing
to the major share of aggregate onsumption. In ontrast to that, alibrated models
that try to derive realisti interest premia usually assume a value of the IES lose to
one (the isoelasti ase). This eventually aptures the behavior of the wealthy agent
being the investors agitating at asset markets. In essene, this implies that high-inome
agents have a higher IES and thereby a lower risk aversion implying that they hold
a riskier portfolio yielding a higher return.
16
Guvenen (2006) emphasizes that this is
also a andidate explanation for the low risk-free rate of interest and the high equity
premium. Moreover, it implies that low-inome agents eventually smooth onsumption
17
in a stronger manner than high-inome agents.
18
14
Formally, it is dened as
1
γ =
d ln
Ct
Ct+1
d ln(MRS) , in whih the marginal rate of substitution MRS is given as
follows MRSt = −
∂U
∂Ct
∂U
∂Ct+1
.
15
In the proess of linearization the linear Taylor-approximation for the logarithm is assumed: log(1 +
x) ≈ x for small values of x.
16
This issue will also be of importane when disussing the stability of the wealth distribution, sine it
implies that wealth inequality onverges to a Gini of 1 (see setion 5.5.2).
17
The latter an also be rationalized by publi transfer systems - that are espeially important for low
inome individuals - smoothing their inome and thereby their onsumption.
18
Note, however, that these results (indiretly) stand in ontrast to the results of Cagetti (2003) pre-
sented earlier. The results of Guvenen (2006) imply that wealthier households have a lower risk
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In line with human apital theory and also onrmed by empirial results, it is reason-
able to assume that inome grows with age (Miner, 1958). Consider the ase for whih
the rate of time preferene equals the market rate β ≡ R = 1
1+r
resulting in a onstant
level of onsumption in life time (also refer to gure 4.2). Furthermore, onsumption
is assumed to grow with a onstant rate g > 0 following a simple exponential growth
proess (Yt = (1 + g)
tY0). Using the onstraint 4.3, the following onsumption level
- being onstant in time - emerges for the innite living agent with no initial wealth
W0 = 0:
19 20
Ct = Ct+1 = C = Y0
1 + g
r − g . (4.11)
A higher growth of inome g inreases life-time wealth and onsumption. In this ase, in
the early years of life time onsumption exeeds urrent inome requiring individuals to
aumulate debt.
21
In the latter years, agents onsumer less than their urrent inome
and use the residual amount to pay interest on aumulated debt. In this senario
emphasized by Friedman (1953) onsumption only depends on the stok quantity wealth.
The time-varying inome is also aounted for in the life-yle hypothesis of Brumberg
and Modigliani (1954). Life time inome follows a hump-shaped pattern, being low (or
even zero) in early years of eduation, steadily growing during employment and falling
bak to zero at retirement. Thus, agents engage in onsumption smoothing, imply-
ing high saving rates during working times and dissavings for students and pensioners.
The lassial theory and espeially the permanent inome hypothesis thereby predit a
roughly onstant level of onsumption. Empirial examinations, espeially for least de-
veloped ountries, on the other hand show that onsumption is losely linked to urrent
inome (Deaton, 1992). This result might be rationalized by the underdevelopment of
nanial markets in these regions imposing severe liquidity onstraints on households.
Rather than assuming innitely living agents we assume a nite life-time of only two
periods. For this simple two-period ase using the rst-order ondition (equation 4.8:
C2 = C1
(
β
R
) 1
γ
) as well as the budget onstraint (equation 4.3), the following result an
be derived:
C1 +RC2 = W0 + Y1 +RY2 = C1(1 +R
1− 1
γ β
1
γ )⇒ C1 = W0 + Y1 +RY2
1 +R1−
1
γ β
1
γ
. (4.12)
In fat, this an be onsidered the representation of a simple Overlapping Generations
(OLG) model with only two periods; the period when agents are young (t = 1) and when
they are old and retired (t = 2). This result shows that households with higher wealth
aversion. As wealthier households also have a higher inome whih goes a long with a higher level
of eduation, a higher level of eduation should also go along with higher risk aversion. However,
Cagetti (2003) shows the ontrary result.
19
The life time level of inome is omputed using the rules for geometri series and requires the as-
sumption g < r.
20
A more formal argument using the tehnique of optimal ontrol is made in setion 4.2.
21
More preisely for the ase with no initial wealth (W0 = 0), this level equals t <
ln(r)−ln(r−g)
ln(1+g) .
57
W0 and present value of work inome onsume more.
22
In fat, for the OLG-ase it is
often assumed that the work inome of retirees is zero (Y2 = 0). Moreover, the marginal
propensity to onsume out of the urrent disposable inome Y1 an be dened:
∂C1
∂Y1
=
1
1 +R1−
1
γ β
1
γ
≡ cy. (4.13)
Considering the denition of the market rate R and the time preferene rate β this model
yields Keynesian features (0 < cy < 1). If time preferene rate equals market interest
rate (β = R) the MPC only depends on the interest rate (MPC = c1 =
1
1+R
≡ 1
1+β
). The
same result holds true for innite risk aversion (γ → ∞) as onsumption is smoothed
out perfetly.
We an also dene the marginal propensity to onsume out of total wealth. The
latter is dened as the sum of initial apital and (time-disounted) human apital (W ≡
W0 + Y1 +RY2):
∂C1
∂W
=
1
1 +R1−
1
γ β
1
γ
≡ c1 ≡ ∂C1
∂Y1
. (4.14)
It is important to point out that the marginal propensity to onsume out of total wealth
(stok) is idential to the marginal propensity to onsume out of urrent inome (ow)
for the young agents (t = 1).
As emphasized in Dynan et al. (2004), the assumed CRRA type utility funtion implies
homotheti preferenes, implying that the savings ratio does not depend on the level of
inome or wealth.
23
Thus, onsumption is proportional to inome. Thereby, for the ase
in whih all agents have the idential risk aversion γ and time preferene β the total
savings (respetively onsumption) an easily be derived from a representative agent.
24
Starting from equation 4.12, the eet of an interest rate hange an be further ex-
amined:
∂C1
∂R
=
(1 +R1−
1
γ β
1
γ )Y2 − (1− 1γ )( βR
1
γ )(W0 + Y1 +RY2)
(1 +R1−
1
γ β
1
γ )2
. (4.15)
The ase of low risk aversion (γ < 1) leads to a positive partial derivative. Realling the
relation between the disount fator R and the interest rate r (R = 1
1+r
) an inrease in
the real interest rate leads to lower onsumption or higher savings today. Vie versa,
lower real interest rates leads to lower saving rates. This eet is referred to as the
substitution eet. The idea is that in times of high interest rates, agents deide to
postpone more onsumption into the future. It also implies that in time of lower interest
rates agents onsume more in the present. The opposite an be observed for a strong
inome eet. This is the ase for very high risk aversion (γ >> 1). In this ase, the
very risk averse agents reat to the derease in interest rates by also dereasing their
urrent onsumption and vie versa for a higher interest rate. Oener (2008) surveys
22
In this ase present value of inome is PV Y = Y1 + RY2. This results in the following relations
∂C1
∂W0
> 0 and ∂C1∂PV Y > 0 justifying the preeding statement.
23
Or put dierently the Engel urve of onsumption is linear in inome and wealth.
24
A more formal proof for the latter is given in appendix A.2.
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15 empirial studies devoted to the dominating eet and nds a stronger result for the
substitution eet and thereby for inreased saving in time of high interest rates. The
latter is highly relevant for maroeonomi models as it implies that a derease in the
real rate of interest - e.g. by means of an expansionary monetary poliy - results in
higher urrent onsumption.
We an also disuss the speial ase of γ = 1 leading to logarithmi utility. This ase is
also referred to as the isoelasti ase sine inome and substitution eet exatly anel
out eah other (Bertola, 2000):
∂C1
∂W
≡ ∂C1
∂Y1
=
1
1 + β
=
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
. (4.16)
For a given level of wealth W the onsumption in the rst period inreases with the rate
of time preferene ρ without being aeted by the rate of interest r. Resulting from the
intertemporal budget onstraint (equation 4.3) the marginal onsumption out of wealth
in the seond period is given as follows:
∂C2
∂W
=
β
(1 + β)R
=
1 + r
2 + ρ
. (4.17)
This result shows that the interest rate r ounterats the rate of time preferene ρ. If
both are idential, onsumption is smoothed out and idential in both periods (also refer
to gure 4.2). In a senario without interest rates r = 0, the rate of time preferene
ρ > 0 guarantees higher urrent onsumption (C1 > C2). The onverse holds true for a
ase without a rate of time preferene (ρ = 0 and r > 0 leading to C1 < C2). For the
ase in whih neither interest rates nor time preferenes exists (ρ = r = 0) onsumption
is distributed equally among the life span of the individual, whih for the simple ase of
T = 2 implies a 50/50-distribution.
We have shown so far that the level of interest r does not impat rst-period on-
sumption C1 for the log-ase (γ = 1). We an reonsider equation 4.15 for the log-ase
resulting in:
∂C1
∂R
=
Y2
1 + β
= Y2
1 + ρ
2 + ρ
> 0. (4.18)
Given this partial derivative a derease in interest rate r leads to an inrease in rst
period onsumption C1. This an be attributed to a pure wealth eet, sine with lower
interest rates the present value of future wages Y2 is higher (Bertola, 2000). Note that
this is only the ase for agents reeiving inome in period t = 2. For the ase in whih
agents are retired in the seond period and only reeive apital inome (Y2 = 0), hanges
in the interest rate do not impat on the onsumption in the rst period.
In result, the individual reation on an (exogenous) interest rate hange ruially
depends on the shape of the utility funtion; in partiular the value of γ. As the
latter is also of importane to disuss the eet of a apital inome tax, we summarize
these eets in table 7.2 in setion 7.2.1. The onsumption funtion is at the heart of
maroeonomi models. In fat, the Euler-equation in ombination with a negative sale
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prodution tehnology
25
onstitutes the IS-urve - representing the equilibrium of savings
and investments linking money and good markets - in the literature of New-Keynesian
models (Gertler et al., 1999). Combining this IS-urve with a mehanial Taylor-rule
(Taylor, 1993) - whih itself omputes interest rates as a funtion of ination, thereby
also linking money and good markets - an aggregate demand urve (AD-urve) an be
onstruted. The Phillips-urve introdues the relation between labor and good markets
and onstitutes the aggregate supply urve nalizing the maroeonomi equilibrium.
Now, we relax the assumption of perfet foresight in disposable inome. Most em-
ployers do not have well dened areer-paths and fae the risk of unemployment. Fur-
thermore, agents reeive inome from holding xed inome and ompany shares, thereby
being subjet to interest rate and prie risk.
The role of unertainty in inome an be disussed in a model assuming a Constant
Absolute Risk Aversion
26
(CARA) utility funtion in whih agents live for T = 2 periods
(Menz, 2010). If we take the optimality ondition and the budget onstraint
27
for the
two-period ase and further assume that future inome is normally distributed (Y˜2 ∼
N(µY , σ
2
Y )), the following result an be derived:
U ′(C1)
U ′(C2)
=
β
R
=
e−ηC1
e−ηC2
⇒ −ηC1 = ln
(
β
R
)
− η
R
(W0 + Y1 − C1) + ln(E1[e−ηY˜2 ]). (4.19)
After short manipulation the following result for urrent onsumption C1 an be pre-
sented:
C1 = − R
η(1 +R)
ln
(
β
R
)
+
R
1 +R
(
W0 + Y1
R
+ µY
)
− R
1 +R
1
2
ησ2y . (4.20)
Firstly, this result onrms the previous results that stronger future disounting than
market rate (β < R), higher wealth W0, higher urrent inome Y1, and expeted inome
µY , inrease urrent onsumption C1. Seondly, higher unertainty of future inome (as
measured in the variane in disposable inome σ2Y ) together with a higher risk aversion
η lead to lower urrent onsumption C1. This introdues a savings motive out of inome
unertainty.
In fousing on onsumption out of disposable inome, a large amount of literature
neglets the role of wealth as a soure of onsumption. US-Amerian households hold
their wealth in home equity rather than stok or bond market equity (Belsky, 2004).
28
As emphasized by Bosti et al. (2009) the housing wealth is not only a onsumption
good but also an instrument of savings. There is also a strong relation between the age
25
The latter implies that marginal returns of investment derease with the level of investment implying
a urve with a negative slope.
26
We assume the funtion U(Ct) = − 1η e−ηCt . This funtion implies a onstant absolute risk aversion
(−U ′′U ′ = η).
27
This ondition an be solved for future onsumption yielding the following result: C2 =
W0+Y1−C1
R +
Y˜2.
28
As the authors also point out a notable exeption to this regularity ourred during the dot-om
bubble period ranging roughly from 1996 to 2000.
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of the household and the wealth holding, in whih old households have a high propensity
to onsume out of housing wealth
29
while young households fae problems in naning
this lumpy illiquid asset due to a low amount of aumulated life-time wealth serving
as ollateral (Campbell, 2006). The marginal propensity to onsume out of wealth in
dierent empirial estimations is estimated at a level between 0.05 and 0.3 (Bosti et al.,
2009). This result, however, relies on the strong notion of a representative households.
As pointed out in Carroll (2012) the level an be far higher for low-inome households
that pose a non-negletable amount of the wealth distribution.
30
The authors derive
the MPC out of wealth using both US data and the reent Household Finane and
Consumption Survey (HFCS) of the Euro area allowing to show ross-ountry dierenes
(Carroll et al., 2014). In Europe the MPC is lower than in the US due to the fat that
wealth is more equally distributed in Europe and Europeans also hold a higher absolute
amount of wealth.
31
A theory of onsumption therefore annot disregard the eets of
wealth, however, also is a theory of wealth distribution by desribing the aumulation
of wealth.
As already emphasized at the beginning of this setion onsumption and savings are
two sides of the same oin. While lassi theory emphasizes the role of time preferenes
for the onsumption path, the seminal work of Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997) labeled
the buer stok theory of savings streth the role of savings. In their model framework
savings (ow) are aumulated in order to protet against inome shoks. Formally,
agents solve the following forward-looking problem:
max
Cτ
E
{ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tU(Cτ )
}
, (4.21)
with E being the expetation operator. The agent is subjet to a ash-on-hand onstraint
restriting urrent onsumption to the sum of urrent inome and wealth:
Ct ≤Wt + Yt. (4.22)
Without restriting assumptions about the evolution of the inome proess no losed-
form solution an be derived. In this model, agents target a spei level of wealth.
Another testable impliation of the model is that the growth of aggregate onsumption
will equal the growth of aggregate inome (Carroll, 2004). Moreover, this model is able
to produe dereasing marginal propensity to onsume for higher inomes. In ontrast
to the Keynesian representation that required a subsistene level of onsumption c¯ > 0,
this is solely due to a risk aversion motive requiring higher rates of savings for high-
inome individuals. We will ompare both theories more preisely in setion 4.4, where
we estimate a onsumption funtion for Germany.
The detailed HFCS dataset allows to test the theories for European households and
point to other fators not inorporated by standard theory. In the sample, for approx. 70
29
Pratially, this result of the empirial maroeonomi literature implies that older households sell
their real estate assets when getting older to nane urrent onsumption.
30
This an be aounted for by a onave onsumption funtion.
31
The latter is the ase sine the onave onsumption funtion implies a lower MPC for higher values.
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perent of households onsumption equals urrent inome, making them hand-to-mouth
onsumer in terms of eonomi theory. Le Blan et al. (2014) show that wealthier
households have a higher probability of saving. The inverse ase is true for households
whose head is female, divored, low-eduated, or young. Motives for savings not only
inlude old-age provision (in line with the lassi buer stok theory), but also are made
in order to provide support and eduation for hildren and grandhildren. The third
most important motive for saving is naning expensive goods suh as real estate or
vehiles.
4.2. Stability of Debt Aggregation
In the previous setion, we summarized the established approahes to lassify the deter-
minants of onsumption and related it to some empirial evidene. In all of the presented
theories
32
, onsumption and urrent inome an diverge. For the simple Keynesian ase,
onsumption an exeed urrent disposable inome if inome is below a ertain thresh-
old. For the permanent inome hypothesis of Friedman (1953) inome is only given by
the level of wealth and onstant in time and may exeed urrent inome or ash-on-hand.
In order to smooth onsumption, nanial markets allow for borrowing. A household
that borrows aumulates debt. The life-yle hypothesis in the sense of Brumberg and
Modigliani (1954) furthermore argues that while young households smooth onsump-
tion by inurring debt (D = −K > 0), old and retired households do so by onsuming
aumulated apital (K > 0).
The HFCS dataset also provides some interesting empirial evidene for the ways of
naning (Le Blan et al., 2014). For rih individuals negative savings are mostly overed
by deumulating existing stok of wealth. Low-wealth households meanwhile do so by
means of redit ards or overdraft failities. Moreover, informal redit from relatives
and friends is also a highly popular instrument for naning. Another key result is
that households in Mediterranean European ountries are more likely to be subjet to
redit onstraints. The empirial evidene also points to the fat that redit onstraints
are redued if personal bankrupty laws exist also indiating a moral hazard problem.
This result, however, is highly overshadowed by the fat that the data were olleted in
2010/2011 at the height of the eonomi risis in the peripheral EU. Moreover, the ross
ountry omparison shows that the presene of highly evolved publi pension system
lowers private savings implying that private savings are substituted by publi savings.
In this setion, we present approahes whih onsider the stability of debt aumula-
tion. In priniple, we restrit ourselves to the two most ommon approahes. On the
one hand, we present the debt sustainability approah in the tradition of Domar (1944),
whih is widely used for lassifying the sustainability of government debt and an also
be easily transfered to private households. It also helps us to relate ow and stok. This
model - lose to the Keynesian approah - has a more ad ho nature. We ontrast it
32
A notable exeption is the buer stok theory whih by introduing the ash-on-hand onstraint -
espeially designed to explain the behavior in ountries with underdeveloped nanial markets -
assumes that there is no way of naning onsumption with debt.
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with a more sophistiated approah from the theory of optimal ontrol (Kamien and
Shwartz, 1991).
The approah of Domar (1944) is (impliitly) assumed in the inuential work of Piketty
(2014). Moreover, it is lose to the neo-lassial growth model. Moreover, this approah.
In the latter model (Swan (1956), Solow (1956)) apital k = K
AN
(in eetive labor terms)
evolves aording to the following equation:
k˙ = sf(k)− (δ + g)k, (4.23)
for whih s represents a onstant savings ratio out of inome, δ the geometri rate of
depreiation of apital and g = gA + gN the growth of total fator produtivity and
population. Assume the standard Cobb-Douglas type tehnology:
y = Kα(AN)1−α ≡ kα = f(k). (4.24)
Inserting this result in the ow equation and solving for the steady state leads to:
33
34
k
y
=
skα
(δ + g)kα
=
s
δ + g
≡ κ. (4.25)
This ratio presents a steady state value between the stok value of apital k and the
ow value of inome y, whih inreases with the savings ratio s and dereases with
depreiation of physial apital δ and growth of inome g. We will refer to this result
as the result of the apital model. In a reent empirial study, Piketty and Zuman
(2014) ompute this value, showing that for ountries overed in their study (USA, UK,
Germany, and Frane) this value rose from 2-3 in the 1970s to the value of 4-6 in the
2010s and thereby omparable to values seen in Europe in the 18th and 19th enturies.
Given equation 4.25, they explain this behavior by the inrease in asset pries and a
slowdown in produtivity (a fall in δ and g). Rather than being extraordinary high at
the moment, the authors argue that the apital-inome ratio was extraordinary low in
the 1970s and now returns bak to its long-run averages. They attribute the low rates
in the middle of the last entury to war destrutions and high ination as well as a
general more labor friendly atmosphere. They also deompose wealth and show that
rather than agriultural land (dominating in the 18th and 19th entury) housing wealth
33
This result does not rely on the restriting assumption of the Cobb-Douglas tehnology, but an be
derived for any prodution funtion f(k).
34
As put forward by Krusell and Smith (2014), in his book Piketty (2014) presents the ratio κ˜ = ky˜ =
s˜
g
with y˜ = y − δk and s˜ = s
(
g
g+δ
)
κ˜
κ being net of depreiation. In his argument, a onvergene of
the growth rate to zero thereby would result in explosion of the apital ratio κ. This is, however, a
fallay as even in a zero growth environment, the apital ratio would onverge as the gross savings
rate s˜ ≡ s gg+δ(1−s) also onverges to zero for a given linear savings rate s. As they show, we have:
κ˜ = sg+δ(1−s) whih for g = 0 implies κ˜ =
s
1−s
1
δ <∞.
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plays an important role nowadays.
35 36
Piketty (2014) argues that the prot share an
be diretly related to the presented variable by a simple aounting equality:
37
α ≡ rk
y
= rκ. (4.26)
The latter, however, taitly assumes that the interest rate and the rate of apital are
independently determined. The latter is e.g. the ase for a linear prodution funtion
r = f ′(k) = const (sine f ′′(k) = 0). As we will show however in setion 6.2.1, a positive
relation between the level of apital k and the apital share α an be onstruted in a
(neo)lassial setup if a Constant Elastiity of Substitution (CES) prodution funtion
that is apital-biased is assumed.
Piketty (2014) - following a rationale lose to Domar (1944) - argues that the derease
in the apital share was a period in whih r < g, whereas urrently this inequality has
hanged to its long-run average r > g.
In the approah of Domar (1944) debt rather than apital is used. Formally, this only
hanges the sign of the equation (D = −K) leading to the following ow equation:
Dt = (1 + r)Dt−1 − Yt + Ct. (4.27)
One again, assuming a onstant savings ratio (s = Yt−Ct
Yt
) and inome following a
geometri growth proess Yt = (1 + g)Yt−1, this results in the following equation:
Dt
Yt
=
(1 + r)Dt−1
Yt
− s = (1 + r)Dt−1
(1 + g)Yt−1
− s, (4.28)
implying the following long-run steady-state:
38
D
Y
=
−s(1 + g)
g − r =
s(1 + g)
r − g , (4.29)
whih for small values of g 39 result in:
D
Y
=
s
r − g ≡ d. (4.30)
A steady state of the debt-inome ratio d is only reahed if r < g. For negative savings
ratio (s < 0) this results in a steady state with positive debt (d > 0). For positive
savings ratios (s > 0) satisfying the ondition r < g a positive steady state of apital
35
Another interesting result of their study is that slaves represented the major assets in the Confederate
US states during 1770 and 1810.
36
Jones (2014), however, emphasizes that the trend of inreasing apital ratios strongly diminishes one
real estate is exluded from apital as dened in Piketty and Zuman (2014).
37
The left-side of this equation holds if we - as frequently done in neo-lassial eonomis - assume that
fators are paid aording to their marginal produtivity leading to r = ∂f(k)∂k =
∂y
∂k = αk
α−1 = α yk .
38
Note that for indiating the steady-state we spare the time indexes.
39
Implying that the produt s · g ≈ 0 is negligible.
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emerges (κ ≡ −d > 0) as emphasized in the work of Piketty (2014). For the inverse
ase r > g the situation is unstable - also referred to as the the Ponzi ase, implying
that interest on debt is served by aumulating more debt.
40
The equation (without
simpliation) an also presented in the following manner:
∆d =
r − g
1 + g
d− s. (4.31)
We depit this equation in a phase diagram of gure 4.3 showing the four possible ases.
This model follows the rationale of Domar (1944) and is widely used nowadays for
evaluating the sustainability of government debt. In partiular, the Maastriht riteria
of the European Monetary Union - starting from the simplied version of the model
- setting the maximum budget deit (−s in the terms of our model) to 3% and the
maximum debt to GDP ratio to 60%. The latter implies an exess growth rate (g−r) of
5% whih seems highly unrealisti and points to an arbitrariness of the onrete values.
Figure 4.3.: Phase diagram for the debt-inome ratio based on (Carlin and Soskie, 2005,
p. 184f.)
In our model, we will refer to the sustainability of private household debt. Regarding
the fat that low-inome households are frequently harged a high rate of interest on
redits (resulting from a risk ompensation onsideration of the lender) and that their
40
The name refers to one of the most notorious pyramid shemes onduted by Charles Ponzi in the
early 1900s.
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inome grows at a slow pae, point to the fat that the No-Ponzi ondition (r < g) is
frequently not satised for private households.
One an also ompare the results of the apital ratio κ with the debt ratio d. The
apital model assumes apital to be a physial good that is subjet to tehnial depre-
iation for whih the return is given by its marginal produtivity. In the debt model of
Domar (1944), the rate of interest is given exogenously. The key dierene, however, is
that in the Solow type model, apital inome is reinvested, ontributing to an inrease
in inome, whereas in the Domar type argumentation interest on debt is transferred
to an exogenous sink and thereby redues disposable inome. Furthermore, there is no
depreiation of apital also not in the form of onsumption out of wealth.
We ontrast this simple approah that assumes a simplisti and ad-ho onsumption
/ savings funtion with a more omplex approah using the tehnique of optimal ontrol
allowing for deriving a sustainable debt and onsumption path. While the aforemen-
tioned example is also rather easy to grasp for non-eonomists (suh as politiians), this
approah is more sophistiated and therefore hard to explain to someone without a grad-
uate degree in eonomis - in partiular for private households that fae debt problems.
As we, however, will also show it has some very intuitive results lose to the Keynesian
onsumption funtion.
We onsider the problem in ontinuous rather than in disrete time. The problem itself
is idential to the disrete time problem presented in the preeding setion, yet allows
us to make a preise statement about sustainability of debt. The following objetive
funtion shall be maximized (ompare with equation 4.2
41
):∫ ∞
0
exp(−ρt)U(C(t))dt, (4.32)
subjet to the following ow equation:
42
D˙ = rD + C − Y. (4.33)
Note that - one again - we onsider an innite horizon problem for whih the upper
bound satises T → ∞. This implies the unrealisti assumption that eonomi agents
live innitely. In the strong form of the life-yle hypothesis of Brumberg and Modigliani
(1954), agents die with zero debt. This, however, implies that agents preisely know the
time of their death. To use the tehnial terms of optimal ontrol theory, this transforms
the innite horizon problem into a xed end-point problem. There are optimal ontrol
formulations that inorporate the risk of not knowing when exatly dying - the longevity
risk - whih ats like an inrease in the disount rate r ontributing to higher savings
(Kamien and Shwartz, 1991, p. 62f.).
Blanhard (1985) present suh a model with a death probability p (respetively an
expeted life-time of
1
p
).
43
This parameter an easily model the eet of longevity as seen
41
Note that by log-linearizing exp(−ρt) ≈ βt =
(
1
1+ρ
)t
↔ −ρt ≈ −t ln(1 + ρ).
42
Note that this approah does not inorporate uninsurable idiosynrati inome risk as done in the
Bewley-type literature.
43
The survival probability in a ertain time t is given as 1− F (t) = p exp(−pt). In fat the probability
of dying in a partiular period t subjet to survival until then is p = dF (t)/dt1−F (t) . The expeted life time
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in reent years as a result of progress in mediine. Longer horizons, respetively longevity
(lower values of p), lead to a lower interest rate and a higher steady-state level of apital.
However, the presene of a nite horizon per se dereases apital aumulation. Finite
lives also lead to the fat that aggregate onsumption is ylial and not ompletely
smoothed out.
OLG-models take into aount that agents know the preise time of their dead; never-
theless they die with a apital larger than zero. This is the ase sine a bequest motive
is introdued in whih parent generations have an inentive to transfer wealth to their
ospring. Furthermore, this altruisti warm glow motive introdues wealth into the util-
ity funtion. The innite horizon problem - disussed in this setion - an be therefore
seen as the ase of agents optimizing the results for their whole dynasty.
To solve the problem, the Hamiltonian H has to be onstruted:
H = exp(−ρt)U(C)− λ(D˙ − rD + C − Y ). (4.34)
We have to ompute the rst-order onditions with respet to the ontrol (here the level
of onsumption C) and the state (here the level of debt D). The optimality onditions
are as follows:
∂H
∂C
!
= 0→ exp(−ρt)U ′(C) = λ, (4.35)
and
∂H
∂D
= −λr != λ˙. (4.36)
Dierentiating equation 4.35 and equating it with equation 4.36 yields:
− λr = exp(−ρt)U ′(C)r != λ˙ = −ρ exp(−ρt)U ′(C) + exp(−ρt)U ′′(C)C ′, (4.37)
whih an be solved leading to:
− U
′′(C)C ′
U ′(C)
= r − ρ. (4.38)
One again, let us assume the simple CRRA utility with a onstant relative risk aversion
of γ resulting in the well-known Ramsey equation:
C˙
C
=
r − ρ
γ
, (4.39)
with the losed-form solution (ompare equation 4.9:
44
)
C(t) = C0 exp
(
r − ρ
γ
t
)
. (4.40)
is omputed by
∫
∞
0 (1 − F (t))tdt = 1p . In fat p = 0 is the speial ase of innitely living agents as
disussed in the model presented in the following.
44
Note that the solution in equation 4.9 required no simpliations, for whih the growth rate of
onsumption amounts to:
β
R − 1 = 1+r1+ρ − 1 = r−ρ1+ρ whih approximates r − ρ for small values of ρ.
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Reinserting this result in the ow-onstraint (equation 4.33) results in a rst-order linear
dierential equation:
D˙ − rD = C0 exp
(
r − ρ
γ
t
)
− Y, (4.41)
that solves as follows:
D(t) = C1 exp(rt)− C0γ
ρ− r(1− γ) exp
(
r − ρ
γ
t
)
+
Y
r
. (4.42)
To ompletely solve this model we have to dene initial and end onditions. One re-
striting ondition is the so-alled Transversality Condition. This is frequently shifted
to a footnote and treated as a mere tehniality, yet is of utter importane for ahieving
long-run stability. For a nite end-point problem ending at time T it is required that:
λ(T )D(T ) = 0. (4.43)
For the innite horizon ase this ondition reads as follows:
lim
T→∞
λ(T )D(T ) = 0, (4.44)
and is often referred to as the No-Ponzi ondition indiating its role as leading to stability
of debt. Note that this ondition is weaker than a ondition requiring debt to be zero in
the long-run (limT→∞D(T ) = 0). Moreover, it does not even demand debt to be nite
in the long-run. It only requires the value of debt multiplied by the Lagrange-multiplier
λ at time T to be zero in the long-run. Resulting from equation 4.35, this multiplier
an be interpreted as the shadow prie of onsumption. Inserting equation 4.35 into the
No-Ponzi ondition yields:
lim
T→∞
exp(−ρT )U ′(C(T ))D(T ) != 0. (4.45)
Note that for any positive time preferene rate ρ > 0 the time disounting fator on-
verges to zero in the long-run (limT→∞ exp(−ρT ) = 0). If, however, in the long-run
onsumption onverges to zero (limT→∞C(T ) = 0) the marginal utility of onsumption
diverges (limC→0U
′(C) =∞)45 leading to no lear-ut result.
We an also use the result of equation 4.36. Solving this linear dierential equation
leads to:
λ(t) = λ(0) exp(−rt) = U ′(C(0)) exp(−rt), (4.46)
whih an be reinserted into the No-Ponzi ondition resulting in:
lim
T→∞
U ′(C(0)) exp(−rT )D(T ). (4.47)
Assume that debt grows in a geometri proess with a onstant rate gD (
D˙
D
= gD ↔
D(t) = D0exp(gDt)). To ensure stability
46
the growth rate of debt should be smaller
than the rate of interest going along with the following neessary ondition:
r > gD. (4.48)
45
This an be onsidered an Inada ondition for the utility funtion.
46
This is the ase sine the marginal utility of initial onsumption U ′(C(0)) is nite.
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For the ase of a time varying interest rate r(t), the onstant interest rate r has to be
replaed by the average interest rate r¯ = 1
t
∫ t
0
r(τ)dτ .
Now we insert the result of equation 4.42 into the transversality ondition:
lim
T→∞
U ′(C(0)) exp(−rT )
[
C1 exp(rT )− C0γ
ρ− r(1− γ) exp
(
r − ρ
γ
T
)
+
Y
r
]
=
U ′(C(0))C1
!
= 0⇒ C1 = 0.
(4.49)
The other neessary onditions are the existene of a positive time preferene ρ > 0 and
an inelasti utility funtion (γ > 1) for any positive interest rate r > 0. To ompletely
solve the system we have to set a seond boundary ondition. Consider the speial ase
for whih the agents start with initial debt (or wealth) (D(0) = D0 = −K0):
D(0) = − C0γ
ρ− r(1− γ) +
Y
r
!
= D0 → C0 = ρ− r(1− γ)
γ
(
−D0 + Y
r
)
, (4.50)
leading to the losed-form solutions:
D(t) =
(
−Y
r
+D0
)
exp
(
r − ρ
γ
t
)
+
Y
r
, (4.51)
and
C(t) =
ρ− r(1− γ)
γ
(
Y
r
−D0
)
exp
(
r − ρ
γ
t
)
. (4.52)
As required in equation 4.48 the growth rate of debt is stritly smaller than the interest
on debt (gD =
r−ρ
γ
< r ↔ r(1− γ) < 0 < ρ for all γ > 1 47).
Moreover, debt and onsumption grow at the same rate:
C˙
C
≡ D˙
D
=
r − ρ
γ
. (4.53)
Furthermore, they evolve in the inverse diretion:
C˙
D˙
= −ρ− r(1− γ)
γ
< 0. (4.54)
The isoelasti ase (γ = 1) is nested in this result with debt evolving aording to:
D(t) =
(
−Y
r
+D0
)
exp ([r − ρ]t) + Y
r
(4.55)
and onsumption following:
C(t) = ρ
(
Y
r
−D0
)
exp ([r − ρ]t) . (4.56)
For sake of simpliity, we restrit our further analysis to this ase.
47
The ondition an also hold for 0 < γ < 1 if the interest rate is suiently low.
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Figure 4.4.: Consumption C(t) and debt D(t) dynamis in time t for dierent relation-
ships between r and ρ
Following the logi presented in gure 4.2 we an distinguish three ases. The rst
and most simple ase would be ρ = r (idential to the ase of β = R presented in gure
4.2). In fat, this is the standard equilibrium result in a representative agent ase.
48
In
this ase onsumption is onstant in time:
C(t) = −ρD0 + ρY
r
= rK0 + Y. (4.57)
In fat, agents behave like hand to mouth onsumers onsuming all urrent labor inome
and interest on apital. Capital / debt is onstant in time (D(t) = D0). Due to the
triviality, we do not display this result graphially.
The seond ase emerges for ondition ρ = ρimpatient > r idential with β < R in
the initial model leading to dereasing onsumption in time as depited in gure 4.2
and is presented for the derived losed-form solution in the right panel of gure 4.4.
49
In the long-run, onsumption onverges to a level of zero. In fat, in the long-run
all inome is used to pay interest on debt inurred earlier (limt→∞ rD = r · Yr = Y ).
Initial onsumption inreases with initial apital (C(0) = ρ
(
Y
r
−D0
)
). Debt onverges
to
Y
r
being the time-disounted value of labor inome dening the human apital of
the agents. As a result, in the long-run the maximum debt level only depends on the
labor inome independent of initial endowment D0. Note that realisti results an only
48
If one interprets this in an open-eonomy setting it implies that there is neither export or import of
apital from foreigners implying a balaned urrent aount.
49
For the numerial simulations we assume Y = 1, 0 < ρpatient = 1% < r = 2% < ρimaptient = 5%,
−D0 = K0 = 5 > 0.
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be obtained for positive net worth agents (D0 <
Y
r
). In the other ase, agents would
exert negative onsumption in order to redue their debt to the value of their human
apital making them zero net worth in the long-run. For the speial ase of no initial
debt or apital (D0 = 0), the swithing point between net lending and net savings an
be easily omputed. In partiular, for t∗ > ln(ρ/r)
ρ−r > 0 agents onsume less than their
labor inome Y . Assessing this result, one an say that the temporary violation of the
budget onstraint in the initial periods is traded-o for a long-run onvergene to zero
onsumption. Given the assumption that there exists a subsistene level of onsumption,
this is not an attainable goal.
The third ase orresponding to the ase of a urrent aount surplus emerges for
ρ = ρpatient < r (equivalent to β > R for the ase depited in gure 4.2). In this
ase, onsumption diverges and therefore apital also diverges in the long-run (see the
left panel of gure 4.4).
50
This seems to be at odds with the transversality ondition.
Note, however, that as onsumption grows to innity the marginal utility of onsumption
onverges to zero in line with the transversality ondition as depited in equation 4.45.
Keep in mind that apital grows with r − ρ and therefore at a slower pae than the
interest rate r. In the theoretial model, the aumulated apital is not subjet to any
risk - in partiular default risk. In fat, the inreasing onsumption path of patient
agents (ρpatient < r) is naned via interest payment on aumulated apital.
We an also ompare this ompliated ase with a simple Keynesian formulation.
Assume an ad-ho formulation of onsumption with a subsistene level of onsumption
c¯ and propensity to onsume out of (disposable) ow inome cy and stok cw:
C = c¯+ cy(Y − rD) + cw(−D). (4.58)
We an insert the losed-form derivation of debt into this equation and ompare it with
the losed-form derivation of onsumption:
C(t) = ρ
(
Y
r
−D0
)
exp([r − ρ]t) !=
c¯+ cyY + (cyr + cw)
(
Y
r
−D0
)
exp([r − ρ]t)− (cw + cyr)Y
r
.
(4.59)
By equating oeients one an show that c¯ ≡ cw = 0 and cy = ρr . Consumption
therefore only depends on urrent inome. For the ase of ρ > r we have cy > 1,
implying negative savings ratios. Due to the disposable inome eet, this nevertheless
leads to a stable onsumption path. This is the ase sine the aumulation of debt
inreases the redit osts, thus dereasing disposable inome as well as onsumption.
This ase, however, is aompanied by a long-run onvergene of onsumption to a level
of zero. Therefore agents should be reommended to onsume with a ratio of ρ < r,
implying 0 < s < 1, in line with the ad-ho assumption of the simple models of Domar
(1944) or Solow (1956).
50
To rule out this ase and thereby guarantee an ergodi distribution of wealth in the Bewley-type
models the ondition ρ > r has to be satised (Sunel, 2013).
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Note that up to this point - and in the ontrast to the simple Domar ase - we
assumed that inome is onstant and does not vary in time. Following the rationale at
the beginning of this setion we now assume that inome grows following an exponential
proess Yt = Y0 exp(gt). The rst-order ondition leading to the Ramsey equation
remains unhanged. However, the ow onstraint (formerly equation 4.33) now reads as
follows:
D˙ − rD = C0 exp([r − ρ]t)− Y0 exp(gt). (4.60)
Solving the equation leads to the following result:
D(t) = C1 exp(rt) +
Y0
r − g exp(gt)−
C0
ρ
exp([r − ρ]t). (4.61)
Using the transversality ondition we know that:
lim
T→∞
[U ′(C(0)) exp(−rT )D(T )] = lim
T→∞
C1 +
Y0
r − g exp([g − r]T )
!
= 0 (4.62)
This ondition not only requires C1 = 0 (as before) but also g < r. Using the initial
ondition (D(0) = D0) we an solve for C0 resulting in:
C(t) = ρ
(
Y0
r − g −D0
)
exp([r − ρ]t). (4.63)
This implies the following evolution of debt:
D(t) = −
(
Y0
r − g −D0
)
exp([r − ρ]t) + Y0
r − g exp(gt). (4.64)
Let us assume a Keynesian onsumption funtion of the type:
51
c = c¯yY + c¯w(−D). (4.65)
Using the aforementioned method of omparing oeients leads to:
C(t) = ρ
(
Y0
r − g −D0
)
exp([r − ρ]t) != c¯+ c¯yY exp(gt)+
c¯w
(
Y
r − g −D0
)
exp([r − ρ]t)− c¯w Y
r − g exp(gt),
(4.66)
implying c¯ = 0, c¯w = ρ and c¯y =
ρ
r−g .
The most simple ase would be to assume that ρ = r − g > 0, implying that the
disount rate equals the wedge between interest rate and r and the growth rate g. This
ase is proposed for instane in Bertola (2000). In fat, this is also always required by
the standard asset priing theory. As formally shown in appendix A.3, this is the only
51
The ase without growth is nested in this result. For the ase without growth (g = 0) we have c¯y =
ρ
r
and c¯w = ρ.
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feasible ase for asset priing. Any deviation (r − g − ρ 6= 0) at some point of time
leads to an asset bubble with an ever-exploding or ever-ontrating prie path. It is
eventually hard to measure whether the ondition ρ = r−g holds or if we have r−g > ρ
or r− g < ρ. While the interest rate r and the growth rate g are observable, the rate of
time preferene is not diretly measurable. In fat, the equality ondition is frequently
assumed by dening ρ ≡ r − g.52
Sometimes it is even argued that the equality ondition is also the only sensible ali-
bration for models without growth (g = 0). In this ase, the ondition would read r = ρ.
As already presented in gure 4.4 both the ases of growing or ontrating onsump-
tion are thereby exluded. While the rst ase is aompanied by an ever inreasing
aumulation of apital (ρ < r), the latter leads to the unrealisti result of a long-run
onsumption of zero (r < ρ). In the ase of ρ = r holds exatly, agents onsume all their
urrent inome, whereas their wealth is only determined by their initial endowment of
inherited apital or debt D0.
We an also disuss the ondition r−ρ = g in the light of our Keynesian onsumption
funtion. The latter implies c¯y =
ρ
r−g = 1 one again going along with hand to mouth
households that onsume all their urrent inome. Moreover, the time preferene ρ = c¯w
an be interpreted as onsumption out of stok. As a result, agents neither aumulate
assets nor debt. In fat, the evolution of debt is given by:
D(t) = exp([r − ρ]t)
(
Y0
r − g −
Y0
r − g +D0
)
= exp([r − ρ]t)D0 = exp(gt)D0, (4.67)
only depending on their initial endowment D0. If agents start without initial endowment
(D0 = 0) they neither aumulate debt nor apital. The initial endowment grows as the
same pae as the total eonomy does - namely with the rate g. For the realisti ase that
agents are initially endowed with assets (−D0 > 0) rather than debt, this stok grows
indenitely. Or to use the terms of the Luas-type fruit eonomy (Luas, 1978): agents
are provided with a seed from their parent generation whih grows to be a large tree
bearing new fruits. The growth rate itself is determined by the overall growth rate of
the eonomy. More pratially, agents invest in a portfolio of shares and risk-free assets
yielding a return of r, but onsume with a ratio of ρ resulting in the fat that their total
apital grows at a pae of r − ρ ≡ g.
The rate of time preferene is always positive (ρ > 0) apturing the tendeny of agents
to prefer urrent as opposed to future onsumption. Thereby, the ondition r−g = ρ > 0
also implies r > g. This ondition is well-known as the ondition for dynami eieny
(Abel et al., 1989). For the nested ase without growth (g = 0) this requires a positive
interest rate r > 0. An eonomy that is haraterized by dynami eieny aggregates
a level of apital below the optimal level k < k∗. Or put dierently, an eonomy that
is haraterized by dynami ineieny aumulated apital above the optimal level
k > k∗.
52
This variable is taken for e.g. tuning maro eonomi models. In fat, the fator β in the onsumption
deision problem is given by β = 11+ρ .
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Figure 4.5.: Capital share α and savings ratio s in several OECD ountries (Data soure:
OECD (2012))
In the standard growth literature in the golden-rule level of apital aumulation we
have fk = r = g.
53 54
The optimal savings ratio is given by s∗ = gk
f(k)
= rk
y
.
55
For
the standard Cobb-Douglas type prodution funtion (f(k) = kα) we have s∗ = α.56
Aordingly, in a dynami eient eonomy we have s < α, implying that the aggregate
savings ratio is below the apital share.
As put forward in Phelps (1961) this ondition is idential to the ondition of prots
being larger than investment.
57
Abel et al. (1989) test this ondition for OECD ountries
from 1929 (after the Great Depression) until 1989 (publiation date of their paper) and
show that dynami eieny prevails.
53
Formally, this result is the rst-order ondition resulting from maximizing onsumption c = (1−s)y =
(1 − s)f(k) subjet to the steady state ondition sf(k) = gk.
54
Note that in this ase we abstrat from depreiations δ. If inluded, we would have r − δ = g.
55
It is important to aknowledge that any savings ratio s an onstitute a steady state.
56
For a more general Constant Elastiity of Substitution (CES) type prodution tehnology the apital
share α depends on the level of apital k. For the ase of a apital-biased prodution funtion,
the apital share inreases with the level of apital. This implies that a highly developed eonomy
with a high level of k aompanied by a large apital share, also requires a strong savings ratio to
sustain the ondition of dynami eieny. Or - if the savings ratio remains onstant - an inrease
in apital also aompanied by an inrease in the apital share is aompanied by a onvergene
to a situation of dynami eieny. This tehnology is empirially onrmed in the reent work of
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013). The inverse ase emerges for a labor-biased tehnology. A more
thorough disussion of this topi is provided in setion 6.2.1.
57
It is easy to verify that these ondition one again equals the onditions s < α. Reall that investment
are I = S = sy and prots are given by rk. With I = sy < rk we have s < α.
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In gure 4.5 we show more reent data of several OECD ountries. It is interesting
to observe that at the moment all ountries an be onsidered dynamially eient by
means of the ondition α > s. Eventually, before the mid 1980s for many ountries the
opposite was the ase. This eventually is in line with the rationale of Piketty et al. (2014)
who argue that the 1980s were a time of a paradigm hange to lower redistribution and
more deregulation also manifesting itself in a stronger apital share. It is also interesting
to point out that the USA always exhibited a signiantly positive gap between the
apital share and the savings ratio (α − s > 0) indiating that dynami eieny was
always prevailing. Moreover, the gap eventually even grew. Similar behavior an also
be observed for Japan and Spain.
58
This inreasing gap is also interesting to point out
as it implies inreasing wealth inequality.
59
The inverse ase would be dynami ineieny. In this ase we have g > r or for the
nested ase without growth a negative interest rate r < 0. In this ase, prots are lower
than investments, the apital share is lower than the savings ratio (s > α), and apital
is aumulated above the golden-rule level (k > k∗).
It is interesting to point out that the ondition of dynami ineieny g > r is the
ondition required in the Domar (1944) type model for a stable level of debt. To ompute
a losed-form solution of the evolution of apital in our model we required r > g. This
is made to have a onvergene in the value of human apital resulting from the Gordon-
growth model.
60
If the ondition is not satised, human apital is innite - by always
growing in exess of the interest rate - allowing for an innite absolute level of debt in
line with the Domar type logi. Or put dierently, debt an be sustainable even though
the Domar ondition r < g is not satised.
In the long-run, it is assumed that the growth rate g is exogenously given. The
interest rate dereases with the level of apital due to dereasing marginal produtivity
of apital.
61
Thereby in the long-run the interest rate ould derease below the level of
growth r < g leading to the ondition of dynami ineieny. Piketty and Saez (2013a)
argue that this ase holds for a small open eonomy. One ould, however, also argue that
the low fertility prevailing redues the growth rate g, whereas the the return to apital
is exogenously given, implying a onvergene to dynami eieny. This is eventually
in line with the empirial evidene reported in gure 4.5. A poliy maker that would
like to ahieve dynami ineieny ould do so by means of imposing a tax on apital
thereby lowering the eetive rate of return.
62
In an eonomy that is dynamially ineient many market interventions an eventu-
ally be welfare improving. The issue of dynami (in)eieny is frequently disussed in
Overlapping Generation (OLG) Models. In fat, in these models the presene of dynami
ineieny an make a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system of pensions superior to a apital-
market-based systems. The rationale is obvious sine the return of the PAYG is the total
58
Note that these observations rely on simple desriptive statistis and eyeball evidene. Future researh
should onsider this dataset more rigorously using eonometri methods.
59
This subjet will be treated more rigorously in setion 5.5.2.
60
For more details the reader is referred to appendix A.3.
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In the (neo)lassial setup r = fk and fkk < 0.
62
We will dwell more thoroughly on this topi in setion 7.2.1.
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growth rate of the eonomy g, whereas the return of the apital market based system
is r with g > r for dynami ineieny.63 Boadway and Keen (2000) argue that publi
insurane may eventually be welfare inreasing in the presene of dynami ineieny
providing redistribution amongst generations. Thereby, generational risks suh as being
born in a period with wars or natural atastrophes an be hedged. This also provides
a rationale for government debt as the osts of these disasters are naned by debt and
thereby paid by future generations. An overaumulation of apital also emerges in the
Bewley-type model of Aiyagari (1995) due to uninsurable idiosynrati risk. Following
the logi of this model the problem an be solved by government debt. As emphasized by
Piketty (2014) the OLG-models argue that there is an age war between urrent retirees
and the urrent working population or even between the urrent living generation and
the future generations (being the ospring of the urrent generation). In ontrast to
that, for dynasti models for whih wealth is transferred within families a lass war in
the Marxist sense emerges in whih wealthy individuals or dynasties ompete with poor
dynasties.
It is interesting to point out that dynami ineieny implies r − g < 0 < ρ and
thereby is aompanied by the aumulation of debt implied by r − ρ < g.64 Yet, it
is important to be preise about the relation. While the situations of the knife-edge
ase r − ρ = g and the apital aumulation ase of r − ρ > g always go along with
dynami eieny, the inverse ase of debt aumulation r − ρ < g an go along with
dynami ineieny.
65
The ondition r−ρ > g also is aompanied by inreasing wealth
inequality. We will dwell more thoroughly on this issue in setion 5.5.2. As an outlook
one an, however, already state that dynami eient eonomies have a tendeny to
go along with inreased wealth inequality thereby onrming the old equity-eieny
trade-o (Okun, 1975).
4.3. Behavioral and Heterodox Approahes to
Consumption
As emphasized by Duesenberry (1949), onsumption also has a soial dimension.
66
Households imitate their soial referene group when making onsumption deisions.
Sine agents adjust their deisions by opying the deisions of others, this is more a be-
havioral than a rational expetations approah on onsumption. Consumption not only
reets membership in a soial lass but in fat is used to express lass identity. The
63
If one takes a deeper look, other fators, however, are also of importane. One key determinant is
the ratio of working-age population to the number of retirees.
64
Formally, the debt presented in equation 4.64 diverges to a positive level limt→∞D(t) = ∞ > 0. In
the inverse ase, apital would be aumulated: limt →∞D(t) = −∞ < 0. Note that the ase with
zero growth (g = 0) is nested within this ase leading to long-run apital holding for r > ρ and debt
holding for ρ > r (also ompare with gure 4.4).
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Moreover, in this ase, as disussed in the appendix A.3 we have a ase of a negative asset bubble.
A positive asset bubble emerges for r − ρ > g.
66
The key idea even dates bak to Veblen (1899) oining the term onspiuous onsumption.
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latter eet is niely illustrated in the Agent-Based Model of Bruun (2001) implementing
this idea leading to onsumption lustering. The onsumption theory of Duesenberry
(1949) is often referred to as the relative inome hypothesis of onsumption. van Treek
(2012) emphasizes that the urrent situation requires for a revival of this thesis sine in
times of high inequality households inrease onsumption in positional and highly visi-
ble goods (Frank, 1997) suh as houses, ars or also eduation while dereasing savings
that are non-positional. Frank (2005) ompares this onsumption behavior to a welfare
dereasing military arms rae. Furthermore, he states that this might be an explanation
to the Easterlin Paradox (Easterlin, 1995) measuring a rather onstant level of happi-
ness despite a strong inrease in GDP. Even though the absolute level of onsumption
inreased, most agents ould not improve their relative position, leading to a stagnation
in the level of happiness. Alpizar et al. (2005) are able to onrm the relative onsump-
tion eet in a lab experiment also lassifying goods in the ategories of non-positional
(vaation and insurane) and positional goods (ars and housing). Moreover, they assert
that eonomi majors and females are more prone to omparing onsumption levels. As
a poliy onlusion, they suggest imposing taxes on positional goods to stop the over-
onsumption of these goods ompared above a soial optimum to non-positional goods
(espeially vaation).
Al-Hussami and Álvaro Martín Remesal (2012) provide a theoretial disussion of the
relative inome hypothesis in a two-period two-onsumer model, in whih low-inome
households imitate the onsumption level of high-inome households and disuss its
eets on the urrent aount. Furthermore, they also disuss the eet of inreasing
inequality as assumed by redistribution from low to high-inome households. The result
is that inreasing inequality inreases the urrent aount deit for borrowing eonomies
in whih β < R (suh as the USA) as well as inreasing the surplus of savings eonomies
with β > R (e.g. China). The urrent aount imbalanes are not only amplied by
inreased inequality but also by higher nanial development.
One an also aount for relative onsumption eets in a utility maximizing frame-
work. To do so, we have to assume a modied CRRA utility funtion with a minimum
onsumption level c¯:67 68
U(C) =
(C − c¯)1−γ
1− γ . (4.68)
This utility funtion was e.g. proposed in Uhlig and Ljungqvist (2000) to model Keeping
Up With the Joneses.
69
In fat, for this version of the onsumption funtion, onsump-
67
The Keynesian models are frequently blamed for their ad-ho nature. The miro-founded models,
however, do little else but transform this ad-ho level to an earlier stage starting from an ad-ho
assumption about the funtional form of the utility funtion.
68
This is eventually the utility funtion assumed in the DSGE framework of Kumhof et al. (2014) to
aount for relative onsumption eets.
69
An alternative earlier version with ratios rather than dierenes is presented in Abel (1990), in whih
he assumes U(C) = 11−γ
(
C
c¯θ
)1−γ
with θ being a taste parameter inreasing with strong taste for
relative onsumption. Uhlig and Ljungqvist (2000) furthermore disuss Cathing Up with the Jone-
ses, in whih urrent individual onsumption depends on a lagged form of aggregate onsumption.
Binder and Pesaran (2001) disuss soial interations in a life-yle model and emphasize the im-
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tion levels lower than a well-dened subsistene level lead to negative utility (U(C) < 0
for C < c¯). Using the well-known onstraint (f. equation 4.3), the following rst-order
ondition an be derived:
U ′(Ct)
U ′(Ct+1)
=
(Ct − c¯)−γ
(Ct+1 − c¯)−γ =
β
R
, (4.69)
whih an be solved leading to the following reursive onsumption equation (see also
Bertola (2000)):
Ct+1 =
(
β
R
) 1
γ
Ct + c¯
(
1−
(
β
R
) 1
γ
)
. (4.70)
The steady state is equal to the subsistene onsumption:
C = c¯, (4.71)
and only stable if β < R.70 The latter an be rationalized when onsidering the phase
diagram (see gure 4.6) as desribed by the following equation:
∆C = C
((
β
R
) 1
γ
− 1
)
+ c¯
(
1−
(
β
R
) 1
γ
)
. (4.72)
Moreover, for the speial ase β = R the eet of subsistene onsumption c¯ 6= 0
disappears.
This has some interesting eonomi interpretations. The urrent aount deit eon-
omy onverges to a steady level of onsumption equal to the subsistene level. Mean-
while, the equilibrium onsumption level (C = c¯) is unstable for the surplus ase. How-
ever, only the ase of an ever inreasing onsumption - as already presented in the
previous setions - is eonomially meaningful.
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We an also make a statement about the relation between the savings ratio and the
level of inome. Following an argument presented in setion 4.1 in whih agents live for
portane of these fators in a dynami rather than a stati senario. In partiular, the presene the
presene of jealousy and onformism within a peer group is able to explain time-series properties
of aggregate onsumption (suh as exessive sensitivity to antiipated labor inome hanges as well
as a general exess smoothness) whih annot be aounted for in a standard permanent inome
framework.
70
We an also take the inverse view. As already presented in gure 4.4, the steady state level in deit
eonomy without a subsistene level is zero.
71
The ever dereasing level of onsumption has no deeper eonomi meaning. Tehnially, it an be
explained by the fat that, if we start with onsumption at a level lower than c¯, we have negative
utility and marginal utility (U(C) < 0 and U ′(C) < 0 for C < c¯). The rst-order ondition
requires that this utility beomes larger - i.e. more negative in time - implying a onvergene to zero
onsumption and negative utility. While this makes perfet sense in the formal framework it seems
hardly feasible in reality. This ase is exluded in a standard CRRA utility funtion as U(C) > 0
and U ′(C) > 0 for all C > 0.
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Figure 4.6.: Phase diagram for onsumption with subsistene onsumption eet c¯ 6= 0
two periods and are subjet to simple life time budget onstraint (C1+RC2 = Y1)
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the
onsumption level for the young agents equals:
C1 =
Y1 − c¯R
(
1− ( β
R
) 1
γ
)
1 +R1−
1
γ β
1
γ
. (4.73)
For the ase of a surplus eonomy (β > R)73 this implies a higher level of onsumption
than without the relative onsumption eet (c¯ = 0, p. with the result of equation
4.12). Furthermore, this has the important impliation that - in this ase - the savings
ratio inreases with inome:
s =
Y1 − C1
Y1
= 1− 1
1 +R1−
1
γ β
1
γ
+
c¯R
(
1− ( β
R
) 1
γ
)
Y1
(
1 +R1−
1
γβ
1
γ
) , (4.74)
as the partial derivative of the third term with respet to Y1 is positive for the given ase
(β > R). The basi idea underlying this result is that the average propensity to onsume
72
Without loss of generality and for sake of illustration we assume that there is no labor inome in the
seond period and agents are born without heritage.
73
As pointed out in Dynan et al. (2004) this is only the ase for a surplus eonomy. In the onverse
ase, the ounterfatual result of low-inome agents saving a higher ratio is derived.
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exeeds the marginal propensity to onsume.
74
A further impat of the rih saving more
is that the distribution of wealth diverges. We will refer to this more preisely in setion
5.5.2. It is also important to note that the inverse result holds for a deit eonomy. In
this ase, savings derease for high-inome agents, leading to a onvergene of wealth
and - as already presented - in the long-run onsumption also onverges to the idential
level c¯.
Moreover, the model showed the proximity of relative onsumption and subsistene
onsumption. Standard models assume that there is no minimum level of onsumption
resulting in the fat that a zero level onsumption an be perfetly rational. This dis-
regards the fat that individuals need a ertain level of onsumption (e.g. in the form
of nutrition) to survive. The latter observation also justies the existene of govern-
ment intervention guaranteeing a minimum inome. This, however, quikly leads into
a debate about the required level of c¯. A basi inome level in a developing Afrian
ountry possibly takes a lower level than in a developed Western soiety resulting from
externalities in onsumption of others. For instane, the aess to internet is onsidered
as a standard in Western soiety. The assoiated problems are niely summarized in the
question "How muh is enough?" (Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 2012).
The idea of relative onsumption eets is elegantly aptured in the OLG-type model
of Alvarez-Cuadrado and Van Long (2011). Using a similar argument as above they
show that in the presene of relative onsumption eets the savings ratio inreases for
wealthy individuals.
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They furthermore show that due to the linearity of the eet
the aggregate savings ratio still remains unaeted by the distribution of inome.
76
As
Alvarez-Cuadrado and Van Long (2011) also inlude an expliit labor supply deision
they are able to show that presene of relative onsumption eets not only ontributes
to over-onsumption and too little saving but also to an over-supply of labor ompared
to entral planners results. To takle this welfare-reduing results, a tax on the over-
supplied or over-demanded goods (labor inome and onsumption) and a subsidy on the
under-supplied good (savings) is proposed.
In ontrast to neo-lassial theory, heterodox eonomists were always onerned with
the distribution of inome. Rather than regarding a personal distribution of inome
the funtional distribution of inome was put in the enter.
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Post-Keynesian theory
fouses on the distribution of total inome Y between wage inome w and prot/nanial
inome Π. The idea dates bak to the model of Kaldor (1955) arguing, however, from the
74
The dierene between the average and the marginal propensity to onsume is given by: APC −
MPC = CY − C′ > 0. For all positive inome this is equal to the ondition in the upper equation:
ds
dY =
d
dY
(
1− CY
)
= CY 2 − C
′
Y > 0. For a linear onsumption funtion with oset this yields:
APC −MPC = c¯Y + cy − cy = c¯Y > 0 being positive for positive levels of subsistene onsumption
c¯ > 0.
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In partiular, they are able to make a very general statement not relying on restriting assumption
about the relation between β and R.
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We will refer to this eet later more formally in this work. In partiular, this behavior is aptured
in setion A.2 showing that linearity in the underlying rules is neessary to avoid the fallay of
omposition.
77
In setion 5.5.1 we disuss the relation of personal and funtional distribution of inome formally.
80
mirror perspetive of savings.
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Menz (2010) presents a simple model of onsumption
that aounts for hanges in the distribution of inome on total onsumption. One
ruial assumption in this model is that borrowing is allowed and thereby inuenes the
disposable inome Y d. Disposable inome Y d in this ase not only depends on urrent
inome Y , but also on interest payments (rD depending on the interest rate r and the
stok level of debt D) and new borrowing B (ow of debt):
Y d = Y − rD +B. (4.75)
In this model, dierent MPC (0 < ci < 1) are assigned to dierent soures of inome
inluding onsumption of net borrowings:
C = cww + cΠΠ+ cBB. (4.76)
If the share of prot (Π′ = Π
Y
= 1 − w
Y
) is onsidered, this equation an be rewritten as
follows:
C = (1− Π′)cwY +Π′cΠY + cBB. (4.77)
Furthermore, lending restrition is imposed dening a maximum level of new indebted-
ness B as a funtion of inome less interest payments (this means ash-on-hand):
B = l(Y − rD). (4.78)
The value l an be interpreted as maximum leverage of households. These assumptions
yield an overall positive MPC:
∂C
∂Y
= (1−Π′)cW +Π′cΠ + lcB > 0. (4.79)
If we assume that the MPC out of wages cW is higher than the MPC out of apital inome
cΠ (cW > cΠ), a redistribution towards prot share dereases overall onsumption:
∂C
∂Π′
= (cΠ − cW )Y < 0. (4.80)
Furthermore, an inrease in lending ativities through better ollateralization of assets
via nanial innovation (i.e. higher values for l > 0), also leads to higher onsumption:
∂C
∂l
= cB(Y − rD) > 0. (4.81)
This latter result only holds true in the no-Ponzi sheme (Y > rD ↔ Y
r
> D) framework.
A similar argument is put forward in Gu et al. (2014) trying to rationalize the eet
of inequality on aggregate savings in dierent geographial regions. As already shown,
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One key argument of Kaldor (1955) is that, if the share of apitalists inreases, investment - as a
premise for growth - inreases. For a thorough disussion of the evolution of the argument in the
Post-Keynesian theory the reader is referred to Kurz and Salvadori (2010).
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the standard Post-Keynesian model predits that an inrease in inequality is also aom-
panied by an inreased share of apitalists is aompanied by an inrease in aggregate
savings due to the lower marginal propensity to onsume by apitalists. This behavior
is e.g. witnessed in Asian ountries and Germany. In a similar framework they, how-
ever, also argue that in the presene of onsumer redit the link between inequality and
aggregate savings an beome negative implying that higher inequality ontributes to
lower aggregate savings. The latter eet is furthermore strengthened by the presene
foreign naning rationalizing in partiular the behavior witnessed in the USA.
Up to this point we foused on (neo)lassial onsumption theory based on rational
expetations and also presented results of the less well-known onsumption theory in
heterodox eonomis. A very promising approah of onsumption theory is grounded
in behavioral theory abandoning the utility maximizing perfet foresight assumption
in favor for a more realisti approah grounded on empirial results and psyhologial
theory.
The perfet rational agent in this ase is replaed by a bounded rational one. Due to
limited resoures of money and time (espeially sine the onsumption proess itself is
time-onsuming) as well as ognitive sarity
79
agents rely on heuristis respetively rules
of thumb. The onsumption proess is mostly guided by habit behavior and therefore
shows little variane over time. This eet is rationalized by the the Status Quos Bias
(Kahneman et al., 1991). Moreover, agents show learning behavior in onsumption by
opying and adapting patterns of other individuals (Nelson and Consoli, 2010). Thus,
rules of thumb do not have to lead to suboptimal outomes. To paraphrase Friedman
(1953): an experiened pool player does not have to know Newtonian mehanis to be
suessful in his game. Deaton (1992) suggests a rule of thumb for onsumption behavior
whih implies onsuming all ash-on-hand - i.e. all urrent inome and wealth - until
median inome. For levels above median inome he suggests onsuming 30% of ash-
on-hand. This rule omes very lose to the optimal onsumption rule derived from a
omputational model. This result is reeted in a onsumption funtion measured in
empirial data (Carroll, 2001). This funtion exhibits a onave urvature resulting out
of the risk aversion of the agents.
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This furthermore reets the eet that the elastiity
of onsumption is lower than one.
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The presene of a redit market shifts the urve
to the left and above the 45-degree line, implying that low-inome households borrow
whilst high-inome households onsume less than ash-on-hand.
D'Orlando and Sanlippo (2010) emphasize that Keynes' original foundation of the
onsumption funtion is based on a behavioral approah rather than being utility max-
imizing. In 12th hapter Keynes (1936) already onjetured that unertainty about
the future plays an important role in the onsumption proess. Firstly, agents desribe
79
Allen and Carroll (2001) show that solving the onsumption problem is only possible due to advaned
omputational solution methods. However, rule-of-thumb behavior an provide good approximations
to the optimal solution.
80
This implies that MPC dereases with level of inome:
∂MPC
∂Y d
= ∂
2C
∂Y D2
< 0.
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If we assume that the onsumption funtion is given by C = Y θ the elastiity of onsumption is
dC
C
dY
Y
= log(C)log(Y ) = θ < 1 also satisfying the onavity ondition
C′′
C′ =
θ−1
Y < 0 for all Y > 0.
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subjetive probabilities to events not in line with their atual probabilities. The latter
result is one of the key ndings of prospet theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
Seondly, there is the problem of unertainty in the sense of Knight (1933) implying
that probabilities about events are not available and we therefore simply do not know.
When using rules of thumb eonomi agents express myopi behavior whih an be
onsidered by hyperboli disounting in a theoreti framework (D'Orlando and Sanl-
ippo, 2010). This leads to the eet that households have a strong preferene for urrent
onsumption and that interest rate hanges barely aet the onsumption deision. In
ontrast to the life-yle hypothesis, empirial evidene also suggests that households do
not aumulate savings for time of retirement but ount on the interation of the welfare
state as Good Samaritan, thereby exhibiting moral hazard behavior. In partiular this
implies that in ountries with well-developed publi soial seurity systems there are
little private savings by low-inome individuals. This myopi behavior suggests that
onsumption is losely traked by urrent inome.
Moreover, households are subjet to Mental Aounting, implying that hanges in dif-
ferent forms of inome have dierent results on the hange of onsumption (D'Orlando
and Sanlippo, 2010). This goes along with the eet of debt aversion. Households
refrain from taking debt sine the awareness that debt has to be repaid with inter-
est diminishes the pleasure out of the onsumption proess (D'Orlando and Sanlippo,
2010).
In their paper D'Orlando and Sanlippo (2010) built a onsumption funtion asso-
iated with several behavioral eets. Besides a subsistene level of onsumption they
assume a variety of inomes assoiated with dierent MPCs to model the mental a-
ounting eet. They ategorize inome in the ategories of urrent inome, future
inome and the stok level of wealth. This will also be the starting point for modeling
the onsumers in a positive rather than a normative approah in our model.
4.4. Estimating a Consumption Funtion for
Germany
The mirofounded onsumption theory as well as the buer stok savings theory provide
a normative approah to savings, deriving an optimal onsumption path. Empirial
evidene, however, disonrms theses theories. The overonsumption of the low-inome
households rationalized by behavioral theory an also be thought as an undersaving.
Fulford (2012) douments that the poor save too little ompared to the their target as
indiated by the buer stok theory of savings. This eet is further aggravated by the
fat that they also require a higher amount preautionary savings as fration of their
inome due to their higher inome risk as well lower overall insurane against dierent
hazards suh as health risk.
On the other hand, high-inome and old households exhibit higher savings than sug-
gested by theory. The latter, in partiular, is hard to apture in HAMs of the Bew-
ley-type tradition, providing little explanation for the fat right tail of the wealth dis-
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tribution (Cagetti and De Nardi, 2008). Therefore, the important researh question to
be answered by the theoretial literature might not be Why do the poor save so little?,
but Why do the rih save so muh? (Carroll, 1998). One key argument is the role of
bequests typially modeled in an OLG-type framework. It is still important to point
out that most bequests are inter-vivo in the form of human apital transfers (Beker
and Tomes, 1986). Moreover, very large bequests, an be the results of a sudden death
and are thereby aidental. As a result and as argued in Carroll (1998) dynasti models
inluding a bequest motive annot fully aount for the measured high savings.
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An opposing and more promising approah assumes Love of Wealth (e.g. Rehme
(2011)) or Capitalist Spirit (e.g. Zou (1994)) in the sense of Max Weber, in whih
agents derive utility diretly from holding wealth. As put forward in Carroll (1998) this
annot only be explained by the motive of aumulating positional goods but also by a
more altruisti Joy of Giving motive. It is also important to point out that aumulating
apital is not the nal purpose but money is rather thought of as a metri in measuring
personal suess (Carroll, 1998).
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The onept an be formalized in a simple model following the rationale of Carroll
(1998). He assumes an additive utility funtion in whih utility is derived from both
urrent onsumption and future wealth, in whih both individual funtions are of the
CRRA type:
U = u(Ct) + v(Wt+1) =
C1−γct
1− γc +
W 1−γwt+1
1− γw . (4.82)
The problem is subjet to a standard ow equation:
Wt+1 = (1 + r)(Wt + Yt − Ct), (4.83)
resulting in the following rst-order ondition:
C−γct = (1 + r)W
−γw
t+1 . (4.84)
To derive a losed-form solution Carroll (1998) now assumes onrete values for risk
aversion
84
being γc = 2 > γw = 1. Inserting the rst-order ondition in the given
onstraint yields a single feasible solution:
Cγct =
(Yt +Wt − Ct)γw
(1 + r)γw−1
→ C2t + Ct − (Yt +Wt) != 0
→ Ct = 1 +
√
1 + 4[Yt +Wt]
2
(4.85)
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Intuitively, older households an aumulate wealth in their life time and are therefore riher in terms
of stok. Models without bequest motives would, however, suggest a strong onsumption preferene
due to low remaining life time. On the other side, older households are faed with higher health risk
entailing monetary osts that motivate higher savings.
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Another rationale put forward for the high savings of wealth individuals is their high risk exposure
due to their strong entrepreneurial ativity (Cagetti and De Nardi, 2008). Moreover - in line with
the Banerjee and Newman (1993) argument - workers that having entrepreneurial ideas and fae
nanial market onstraints aumulate more wealth in order to reah minimum apital requirements
for running a business.
84
To derive the result that savings inrease with wealth, he has to assume that the relative risk aversion
for onsumption is lower than for wealth, in the line with the savings motive.
84
Consumption inreases with both urrent inome and urrent wealth. In fat onsump-
tion depends on ash-on-hand - being the sum of urrent inome and urrent wealth.
Due to the risk aversion, the relation between this input and the output (onsumption)
is not linear but onave. Furthermore there exists a spei thresholds value
85
below
whih onsumption exeeds urrent ash-on-hand and vie versa for values above this
threshold. The relation between ash-on-hand and onsumption is also depited in a
later setion in gure 5.22 where we disuss the impat of the urvature of the savings
funtion on the distribution of wealth.
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Figure 4.7.: Savings ratio [%℄ in Germany 2003 as a funtion of net inome (log-sale, in
Euro) (Data Soure: Bah (2005))
Figure 4.7 presents the savings ratio of disposable inome as a funtion of the level of
inome for Germany.
87
First of all, it is important to point out that the savings ratio
inreases with disposable inome.
88
The urve exhibits a onave form at the lower end,
85
In the onrete ase, this would be: Yt +Wt = 2.
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In this setion, we also show that the urvature of the onsumption funtion resulting from the
presented optimization problem does not have to be onave, but rather depends on the relation
between the degrees of risk aversion γc and γw.
87
I am grateful to Christina Anselmann and Hagen Krämer for pointing to the data set.
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As intensively disussed in Dynan et al. (2004), this an be perfetly in line with the permanent
inome hypothesis of Friedman (1953), sine an unexpeted positive inome shok does not lead to
higher onsumption but higher savings. They, however, are also able to show that the savings ratio
inreases with the level of permanent inome (amongst others proxied by eduation) arguing that
the wealthy save permanently more.
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Dependent variable s = S
Y
a0 -6,594.286***
(923.915)
a1 2,469.373***
(364.884)
a2 -307.753***
(47.578)
a3 12.784 ***
(2.049 )
R2 0.9696
adjusted R2 0.9595
Table 4.1.: Polynomial regression (Standard errors in parenthesis, *** Signiane at a
0.1% level)
but a onvex shape at the higher inome end. The empirial urve is well desribed by
a polynomial funtion of third order. The regression is of the form:
S
Y
≡
3∑
i=0
ai log(Y )
i, (4.86)
for whih Y is the monthly disposable inome. The regression result is reported in
table 4.1. The same exerise is exeuted in Fihtner et al. (2012) using higher frequeny
and updated data presenting a very good t using a third order polynomial. Yet, the
regression oeients are not reported in this paper.
This result an be ompared to the standard models. Following from the simple
Keynesian onsumption (equation 4.1) the following savings ratio an be omputed:
St
Y dt
=
Y dt − Ct
Y dt
= − c¯
Y dt
+ 1− cy = − c¯
Y dt
+ s, (4.87)
for whih we dene the savings ratio s = 1− cy. This theory emphasizes the eet of the
subsistene onsumption leading to negative savings ratios for low-inome households.
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On the other hand the savings ratio urve is onave for whih the rihest households have
a savings ratio amounting to s.90 This funtion therefore annot explain the behavior
of very high-inome households. As already put forward in the previous setion this
Keynesian approah with a subsistene level of onsumption is lose to the relative
inome hypothesis. The relatively high savings of the rih here in fat stem from too
low savings of the poor. The ontrasting approah in the spirit of Carroll (1998) with
89
Eventually, for the limiting ase the following result emerges: limY dt →0
(
St
Y dt
)
= −∞.
90
This is beause the following relation holds: limY dt →∞
(
St
Y dt
)
= s. The onavity is ensured due to
the relation
∂2(St/Y
d
t )
∂(Y dt )
2 = −2 c0Y dt 3 < 0
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wealth in the utility funtion as well as the buer stok theory of savings (Deaton (1991),
Carroll (1997)) attributes the high savings of the rih to an insurane motive.
We an generalize the approah of Carroll (1998) as presented in equation 4.85 in the
following equation with θ < 1:
C = (Y Y¯ )θ. (4.88)
One again, there exists a ertain threshold Y ∗ below whih onsumption exeeds inome
given by:
91
Y ∗ = Y¯
θ
1−θ . (4.89)
Starting from this onsumption funtion, the savings ratio is given as follows:
S
Y
= s =
Y − C
Y
= 1− Y¯ θY θ−1. (4.90)
The funtion one again has a onave struture.
92
Eventually, the very rih save their
total inome.
93
Taking the logs of onsumption ratio (c = 1− s whih in ontrast to the savings ratio
is stritly positive in the given dataset) leads to the following result:
log(c) = θ log(Y¯ ) + (θ − 1) log(Y ). (4.91)
We estimate this funtion using our data. In ontrast to the ad-ho polynomial regression
this estimation has a theoretial underpinning in the model of Carroll (1998). The ritial
level of inome going along with zero savings amounts to approximately 1,932 Euro per
household.
94
The onavity oeient yields θ = 0.74 < 1. The regression results are
summarized in the table 4.2.
Dependent variable log(c)
1.97914***
θ log
(
Y¯
)
(0.25063)
-0.26157***
(θ − 1) log(Y ) (0.03242)
R2 0.8554
adjusted R2 0.8423
Table 4.2.: Buer stok OLS-regression (Standard errors in parenthesis, *** Signiane
at a 0.1% level)
The results of both ts and the empirial data are ontrasted in gure 4.7 We an take
the results of the regression for the savings ratio and ompute the level of onsumption
as a funtion of disposable inome Y .
91
For the speial ase of θ = 0.5→ Y ∗ = Y¯ .
92
Tehnially, this is beause
∂2S/Y
∂Y 2 = (1− θ)(θ − 2)Y θ−3Y¯ θ < 0 with Y > 0 and θ < 1.
93
Formally, this is beause limY→∞(S/Y ) = 1 for θ < 1.
94
This value an be omputed from the regression as exp
(
1.9791
0.2615
)
.
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Figure 4.8.: Consumption funtion in Germany 2003 as a funtion of net inome
Let us rstly disuss the polynomial speiation. The result presented in gure
4.8 rstly shows that low-inome households onsume more than the urrent inome
resulting from their negative savings ratio. Even more interesting is the eet of a
saturation level of onsumption whih an be traked to a value of roughly 11,000 Euro
per month amounting to an annual disposable inome of 132,000 Euro.
95
This means that
beyond a ertain threshold - indiating a saturation level in onsumption - individuals
eventually onsume less than other lower inome individuals.
96
Or put dierently, no
saturation in the savings ratio orresponds to saturation in onsumption for high-inome
levels.
97
The latter result would be of far-reahing poliy meaning. In fat, it would imply
that taking away inome from high-inome persons (without redistributing it to low-
inome households) would inrease aggregate demand. The result, however, should be
treated with a pinh (or even a large amount) of salt. Firstly, the underlying data set
only onsists only of 13 observations is highly limited. Meanwhile, the onvexity in
the savings ratio driving this result was also reported in Fihtner et al. (2012) using a
far riher dataset. On the other hand, the level of inome going along with maximum
95
The saturation behavior in onsumption stems from the fat that the savings ratio exeed 100%
respetively the average propensity to onsume beomes negative.
96
This level emerges for a savings ratio of approximately
S
Y ≈ 40% < 1 sine at this point the following
ondition holds: C′(Y ∗) = 0↔ 1−f(Y ∗) = Y ∗ ·f ′(Y ∗) with f being the estimated savings funtion.
97
As disussed in Davis (1954) (Smith, 1776, p. 164f.) stated that "the desire of food is limited in
every man by the narrow apaity of the human stomah...". However, he asserted that the desire for
other goods (he names lothes and housing) are limitless. The empirial result seems to disonrm
the latter notion.
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onsumption roughly orresponds to the average inome level of the top 1% (amounting
to 12,143 Euro), whih is our last available data point. On the other side, the data
originating from the Einkommens- und Verbrauherstihprobe (EVS) are subjet to
right ensorship bias by not inluding the top 0.1% due to privay protetion making
it neessary to rely on regression to apture the tip of the ieberg. It might also be
interesting to exeute the presented exerise for dierent ountries. As emphasized in
Dynan et al. (2004), the fat that the savings ratio inreases with inome also implies
that all onsumption taxes (exept on luxury goods) are regressive having a stronger
impat on low-inome individuals.
We an ontrast this result with the onsumption funtion resulting from the Buer-
stok regression. In ontrast to the previous exerise, there is no absolute saturation
in onsumption. Note that by the onstrution of our regression - setting the log of
the average propensity to onsume as a dependent variable - this an never be the ase.
Nevertheless, the regression onrmed a value of θ < 1 indiating a onave onsumption
funtion. In fat, the existene of a onave onsumption funtion implies that a redis-
tribution from high to low-inome households inreases aggregate onsumption. For this
ase, aggregate onsumption is maximized for an egalitarian inome distribution. We
will dwell more thoroughly on this issue in the later part of this work where we onsider
the role of redistribution.
4.5. A Short Summary on the Theory of
Consumption and its Empirial Evidene
Before we begin with the modeling, we summarize the key ndings of this setion. There
are two major attempts at modeling onsumption behavior: the lassi Keynesian, the
heterodox, and the behavioral approah assume that onsumption is mainly driven by
urrent disposable inome. While the standard Keynesian approah assumed linear
relation between urrent inome and onsumption, reent empirial ndings suggest a
onave urve. On the other hand, (neo)lassial theory in the form of the permanent
inome hypothesis and life-yle hypothesis onjetures that onsumption is roughly
onstant over time and driven by life-time wealth. Neither model perfetly explains
reality, but the overview already revealed key determinants of onsumption. Besides the
level of urrent as well as future inome and the level of aumulated wealth the main
driver for onsumption is the rate of time preferene β. Behavioral models suggest that
individuals show myopi behavior and thereby tend to overonsume in the present. On
the other hand, sine agents are risk averse and future inome is unertain, agents try
to smooth onsumption, whereas future growth prospets inrease urrent onsumption
ativity. As onrmed by empirial evidene the substitution eet outweighs the inome
eet, resulting in the the fat that a rise in interest rate has negative eet on urrent
onsumption. But sine behavioral studies suggest hyperboli disounting this eet is
rather small. Consumers are sarely haraterized by rational behavior but use rules
of thumb and espeially adapt onsumption behavior of soial peer groups. A higher
89
level of nanial market development and lower ollateralization values allow for higher
onsumption than urrent inome and therefore for onsumption smoothing. Households
reat dierently to dierent soures of inome. Heterodox theory, in partiular, believes
that the MPC out of wages is higher than out of prots. Theory onrmed by empirial
data suggest that very high-inome agents have a saturation level of onsumption and
have a tendeny to oversave.
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5. The Model
Neither a borrower
nor a lender be.
William Shakespeare (1603) - Hamlet
At 1, sene 3, 7577
In this setion, we will present our model. Our aim is to represent and explain behavior
in an eonomy with inequality - in partiular for the situation of the reent nanial
risis as detailed in setion 2. The general model is presented in setion 5.1. Besides
making assumptions about individual behavior, we also have to model the distribution
of quantities - in partiular the distribution of labor inome, whih we assume to be
exogenous (f. setion 5.2). Moreover, we will disuss the model based upon losed-form
solutions. In partiular, we shed light on the issue of nanial (in)stability and its relation
to inequality, whih represents the ore of this work (f. setion 5.4). Furthermore, we
will also disuss the issue of wealth inequality and the funtional distribution of inome
5.5. This issue regained popularity and publi attention beyond the sienti ommunity
after the publiation of the work of Piketty (2014). We will disuss these issues based
upon our model and ompare it to the existing literature as already detailed in setion
4. The analytial disussion already presents some very interesting fats and espeially
points to the underlying mehanisms without relying on seemingly arbitrary numerial
alibrations. The true non-linear and omplex nature an, however, not be aptured by
the analytial part. The omplex dynamis are therefore onsidered in setion 6.
5.1. Model Formulation
This setion presents the general formulation of the model. The key ators in the model
are the households. This means that all form of inome is basially distributed amongst
this group. The other (passive) agents are the foreign ountries.
1
Households an engage
in onsumption of non-durables and in onsumption of durables. Furthermore, they have
the ability to aumulate debt or savings. Non-durable onsumption is onsumption in
the more immediate sense, for instane lothing or food. Durable onsumption an be
thought of as ars, but in partiular self-used real estate. These goods are not destroyed
1
If, as will be presented in simulation results, savings are higher (lower) than investments (or more
preisely dissavings), a urrent surplus (or deit) emerges, implying a transfer from domesti house-
holds to foreigners (from foreigners to domesti households). Foreigners are not modeled expliitly
but only ll the savings gap.
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in the proess of onsumption and therefore an also be taken as ollateral for borrowing
ativities. Besides the market for durables there is also a market for redit/savings.
The general timeline of the model is doumented in gure 5.1. The simulation runs
for t = 1, · · · , T periods and i = 1, · · · , N agents. In ontrast to standard homogeneous
agent models, the labor inome of households therefore is not a vetor Yt but a matrix Yi,t
.
2
The wage inome as well as the initial distribution of assets qi,0
3
is taken as exogenous.
The details about the distribution funtions are desribed in setion 5.2. Based on
their urrent wage inome Yi,t, their urrent asset holdings at urrent pries qi,tPt, and
their indebtedness Di,t households make their deisions about onsumption (normal
and durables) as well as (dis)savings.
4
As soon as all N ostumers have made their
onsumption plans, new pries in the market for durables and savings are established
in order for those markets to lear. At the end of every simulation period aggregate
quantities suh as Gross Domesti Produt (GDP) as well as distributional indies suh
as the Gini oeient of net worth are alulated.
Figure 5.1.: Timeline of the events in the model
Households have a rank order in their deisions. First and foremost, they deide on
how muh to onsume. The onsumption funtion is therefore related to the result
of setion 4. Sine we assume bounded rational agents rather than utility maximizing
agents, this onsumption funtion is based upon behavioral theory instead of a miro-
foundation.
5
In its results it also resembles more the Keynesian approah rather than
2
It is important to aknowledge that in our ase Yi,t does not represent inome out of apital, whih
is endogenously determined in the model by means of debt-redit interlinkages between agents.
3
This is in the unit number of assets. To get wealth in the unit of pries, the urrent asset holding qi,t
has to be multiplied with urrent real pries Pt.
4
In a future model extension it would interesting to disuss the ase for whih households an also
deide to default on their debt thereby making default a model endogenous variable rather than
being exogenous like in many standard models dealing with the eet of default.
5
However, as extensively disussed in setion 4.3, for a spei underlying utility funtion a similar
result an also be derived using a mirofoundation.
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the permanent inome or life-yle approah. Closely related to D'Orlando and Sanl-
ippo (2010) we assume a onsumption funtion with the dierent input fators urrent
inome Yi,t and net worth Wi,t.
6
Both fators ontribute to the size of onsumption
reeting the eet of Mental Aounting (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). As shown
in setion 4.2, they an also be derived from an intertemporal optimization problem.
Furthermore, there is also a subsistene level of onsumption c¯t independent of individ-
ual harateristis. To ahieve a onave onsumption funtion - suggested by empirial
evidene shown in setion 4.4 - we introdue a variable ε > 1:7
Ci,t = c¯t + cyY
1
ε
i,t + cw ·max{0;W
1
ε
i,t}. (5.1)
The MPC is higher for ow inome, but always lower than one (1 > cy > cw > 0). To
introdue the eet that onsumption only depends on the disposable inome we an
rewrite the equation as follows:
Ci,t = c¯t + cy ·max{0; (Yi,t − rtDi,t) 1ε}+ cw ·max{0;W
1
ε
i,t}. (5.2)
The introdution of the maximum operator ensures that households with strong indebt-
edness, reduing both net worth and disposable inome through the eet of interest
payments, do not end up with the unrealisti result of negative onsumption. To intro-
due a soial eet of onsumption in the sense of Duesenberry (1949) we assume that
the subsistene level of onsumption c¯t representing a minimum level of onsumption is
a funtion of the general inome distribution at time t:
c¯t = quantilej(Yi,t). (5.3)
The quantile j desribes the minimum level households onsume. This level therefore
ruially depends on the inome distribution funtion. In industrial ountries with higher
mean inome the subsistene level of onsumption is therefore higher than in developing
ountries.
8
Apart from that, the subsistene level ruially depends on the distribution
of inome.
9
As already disussed in setion 1 houses present the most important durable onsump-
tion good. For sake of onveniene we disregard the important fator of lumpiness in
housing onsumption - allowing only onsumption of large bundles of houses - in our
model. Instead we assume that households an buy any size of durables. If the eet of
lumpiness would be inluded this would only furthermore strengthen our points. In par-
tiular, the employment of debt to nane durable onsumption would be undersored.
6
In their work D'Orlando and Sanlippo (2010) also emphasize the role of future prie expetations
P ei,t+1 as a fator of inuene. For the sake of larity, we do not want, however, to inlude it.
7
As presented in footnote 81 of setion 4, in the ase of single input onsumption funtion the parameter
an be interpreted as the inverse onsumption elastiity.
8
Industrial ountries for example would onsider a TV set or PC as a basi need.
9
As will be presented in the following simulations, inreased inequality, eteris paribus, leads to a lower
level of subsistene onsumption for values of j < 0.5 (i.e. the subsistene level of onsumption
is below the median inome). If j > 0.5 inreased inequality inreases the level of subsistene
onsumption.
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The formation of the durable demand in our model is losely related to the demand in
nanial markets with heterogeneous agents as presented in reent surveys by Hommes
and Wagener (2009) and Chiarella et al. (2009). This approah seems onvenient for our
model sine it an produe boom/bubble behavior endogenously and thereby introdue
nanial fragility into the model.
We assume mean-variane portfolio optimization in a world with two assets: the
durables represent the risky asset with expeted return Eit(pt+1 − pt) 10 and savings as
the risk-free asset with safe return of rt.
The risky asset is the durable good as the the (expeted) return is unertain. In
ontrast to that, providing redit to another agent promises a ertain return. Note that
this return rt is also subjet to time variation, however, exhibits a lower volatility
11
than the return of the durable and - as will be onrmed in the numerial simulations
in setion 6 - is onstant in a long-run equilibrium justifying the assumption of zero
variane for the redits. The presene of margin requirements (0 < m < 1) furthermore
ensures that the amount of redit is always lower than the pledgeable ollateral making
it safer than diretly engaging in the durable market. To put this in the ontext of the
reent nanial risis, the safe redits to low inome households an be onsidered as
Mortgage Baked Seurities that in parts reeived top ratings and were bundled in liquid
seurities suh as money market funds.
The demand for durables (di,t) is derived with mean-variane portfolio optimization
(Hommes and Wagener, 2009) with onstant relative risk aversion γ (CRRA).
The results an be derived following Chiarella and He (2001) and Chiarella et al.
(2006). Wealth Wt evolves as follows:
Wt+1 = Wt · ω · (1 +Rt) +Wt(1− ω)(1 + rt) = Wt(1 + rt + ω[Rt − rt]), (5.4)
where ω indiates the relative proportion invested in risky assets yielding a return Rt as
opposed to risk free asset rt. Using a seond order Taylor approah assuming that risky
assets variane is given by V ar(R) = σ2R
12
the following result an be derived:
E[U(Wt+1)] = E[U(Wt +Wt(ω(Rt − rt) + rt))]
= U(Wt) + (ωWt(E(Rt)− rt) + rt)U ′(Wt) + 1
2
(W 2t ω
2σ2R)U
′′(Wt).
(5.5)
This yields the following (approximated) rst order ondition:
13
ω =
E(Rt)− rt
σ2R
(
− U
′(Wt)
U ′′(Wt) ·Wt
)
. (5.6)
10
We use the nomenlature of small ase letters for log-values and upper ase letters for real values
(pt = log(Pt)). In a rst-order approximation the dierene in log-values an be interpreted as the
returns: Rt ≈ ln(1 +Rt) = log
(
Pt+1
Pt
)
= pt+1 − pt.
11
The latter is formally ensured by the realisti assumption of a more liquid market for redits than
for durables (µr < µ). Note also that we exlude the possibility of default and thereby no default
premium is harged.
12
The risky asset is assumed to have zero variane as well as zero ovariane with the risk-free asset.
13
This result is derived by setting
∂(E[U(Wt+1)])
∂ω
!
= 0.
94
In the ase of CRRA utility funtion
14
this yields a onstant relative risk aversion γ:
γ = −U
′′(Wt) ·Wt
U ′(Wt)
. (5.7)
For heterogeneous households i the demand in unit of assets is given by the produt of
the ratio and the urrent net worth:
15
di,t = ω ·Wi,t = E(Rt)− rt
γ · σ2R
·Wi,t. (5.8)
There are k dierent expetation formation strategies with an individual time-varying
market weight wkt :
di,t = Wi,t
∑
k
wkt
Ekt (pt+1 − pt)− rt
γ · σ2R
= Wi,t ·MPCDt. (5.9)
This implies that agents engage in durable onsumption if, based upon their strategy,
durables will yield higher returns than savings. Therefore, durable onsumption is timed
on market and agents are not in a hurry to buy a house but an also deide to stay in
their rented at. In time of low risk aversion γ 16 and low interest rate rt demand
for durable onsumption inreases. The latter not only aptures the eet that for
wealthy households risk-free redit provision is unattrative, but also that for lower
inome households debt-naning of housing is heap. The CRRA approah, moreover,
links the demand of durables to the net worth of the individual agent leading to a higher
demand for durables by wealthy households.
17
Comparable to the MPC we an dene
a marginal propensity to onsume durables MPCDt.
Note that in ontrast to the normal MPC the values of MPCDt are not onstrained,
vary in time, and an be even greater than one (levered purhases). We assume that
there is a total MPCD in the market at eah time t, whih derives from the dierent
trading strategies and their weights wkt . Consistent with the well-established literature
on heterogeneous agent nanial market models we assume three trading strategies,
namely (1) fundamental trading, (2) hartism, and (3) noise trading (p. e.g., Westerho
(2008), De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006)). The weights of the dierent strategies vary
14
The funtion is given as follows: U(Wt) =
W 1−γt
1−γ .
15
In Fisher and Riedler (2014), we take a slightly dierent approah to target a spei ratio in
the balane sheet At+1 =
E(Pt)(qi,t+di,t)
E(Wi,t+1)
leading to di,t = At+1
Wi,t
E(Pt)
− qi,t. Qualitatively, the result
presented in this work, however, is similar, with demand being proportional to the produt of urrent
net worth and targeted ratio of risky assets. By disregarding the eet of already aumulated assets
qi,t, in the long-run we only have ωt > At sine in the long-run the prie equals its fundamental
value E(Pt) = Ft = 1.
16
In the simulations, we take the simplifying assumption that the produt of risk aversion and market
volatility is onstant and exogenous to avoid further non-linear feedbak eets between markets
and demand for assets. Furthermore, we normalize the variane σ2R = 1.
17
For a CARA utility funtion the demand for assets would be independent of the urrent wealth
position. We explore this topi in more depth in setion 5.5.2.
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in time, depend on the attrativeness of a ertain strategy Akt , and are derived using a
Multinominal Logit Model as presented in Manski and MFadden (1981):
wkt =
eΓA
k
t∑n
i=1 e
ΓAkt
. (5.10)
The appliation of the Multinominal Logit Model as a strategy swithing model was
introdued in Brok and Hommes (1997), whilst its appliation in the nanial mar-
ket ontext dates bak to Brok and Hommes (1998). Due to the onstrution of the
equation, the individual weights sum up to one. The parameter Γ presents a degree of
rationality in hoosing a strategy. In the ase for whih Γ equals zero, the weights of
the groups are onstant and amount to 1/n. The other extreme ase with Γ onverg-
ing to innity represents the ase in whih all individuals hoose the optimal foreast.
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) therefore interpret this parameter as a model of the
behavioral eet of Status Quos Bias as presented in Kahneman et al. (1991). This eet
implies that individuals nd it diult to hange a deision rule they used in the past.
In a more general way, this parameter an also be onsidered as a value for bounded
rationality in the sense of Simon (1955). Due to the limited resoures of time and money,
individuals use suboptimal rules.
The weight of a strategy wkt in the market is evaluated by its attrativeness A
k
t in a
period t. This parameter is modeled in the following way:
Akt =
Ekt (pt − pt−1)− rt−1
γ
· (pt − pt−1 − rt−1) + ΛAkt−1. (5.11)
This parameter measures the preision of preditions made by a given strategy. Note
that a strategy beomes more attrative in the ase for whih durables are bought when
returns are higher than risk-free returns, or risky assets are sold when their return is
lower than the return of the risk-free asset. One might also onsider the attrativeness
as a measurement of orret market timing. The parameter 0 < Λ < 1 represents the
memory of the agent. If it is set to zero, myopi traders who only value the very last
suess of the strategy are onsidered. The ase in whih Λ = 1 represents the ase of
perfet memory. This modeling approah enables us to investigate the eet of short-
term fousing. The parameters Γ and Λ are therefore the key to measuring the degree
of irrationality in markets.
Fundamental traders know the true fundamental log-value of an asset ft and expet
the pries to onverge to it. Their expetations an therefore be modeled in the following
way:
EFt (pt+1 − pt) = βF (ft − pt). (5.12)
The parameter βF > 0 measures the speed at whih fundamentalist traders expet
pries of durables to onverge to their true underlying value. Their ation ontributes
to higher market eieny. We assume that the fundamental value is onstant in time
and normalized to one (Ft = 1↔ log(Ft) = ft = 0).
Chartists on the other hand do not onsider fundamental pries, but derive order sig-
nals from past pries. Chartism is espeially important for short-term foreast horizons
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and is often also referred to as Tehnial Trading, sine it derives its trading signals
from lear rules that an be automated. For this reason it is also very easy to implement
these rules in a ABM. We use a simple trend-following strategy:
ECt (pt+1 − pt) = βC(pt − pt−1). (5.13)
The important feature of this rule is that it shows Momentum behavior by generating
buying signals in ase of inreasing pries and selling signals in ase of dereasing pries.
The parameter βC > 0 measures the aggressiveness with whih the hartist traders take
positions in the market.
The last trading strategy is noise trading. Aording to Blak (1986), noise traders
trade on noise as if it were information. Noise trading dnoiset is modeled as an independent
and identially distributed (i.i.d.) proess with mean zero and variane σ2i . This is
onsistent with the onsideration of Shleifer (2000) that noise should, on mean, anel
itself out. The noise trading in our ontext an also aount for durable onsumption
that is not related to market timing but to exogenous eets suh as buying a house when
a hild is about to be born. In ontrast to the hartists and fundamentalist strategy, we
assume that the market weight of noise trading does not hange over time. Therefore,
we an summarize the marginal propensity to onsume durables as follows:
MPCDt =
∑
k
wkt
Ekt (pt+1 − pt)− rt
γ
=
1
γ
[
wCt E
C
t (pt+1 − pt) + wFt EFt (pt+1 − pt) + dnoiset − rt
]
.
(5.14)
Basially this assumes that, even though there are N agents, agents swith between
only three investment strategies, and agents all follow the same strategy mixture in the
market. This is surely a strong simpliation mixing up real heterogeneity (onerning
inome and wealth) and weak heterogeneity (onerning durable onsumption strategies)
is hosen to keep the already ompliated model analytially tratable.
If omparing the modeling of the durable and non-durable onsumption, we follow
two dierent paradigms. While the non-durable onsumption is modeled as a rule-
of-thumb-strategy
18
, non-durable onsumption follows a miro-founded approah with
heterogeneous expetations. This is arguable sine households, when deiding to buy
durables suh as houses, ars, or even stok shares, deliberate more deeply. This is
espeially the ase sine these goods entail high monetary osts requiring to lever the
purhase. The debt aversion of households therefore also ontributes to a more rational
and sober deision. Non-durable goods (espeially food and lothing) are goods of every
day onsumption and the proess of onsuming them is more a proess of habit without
deeper ognitive involvement. One potential shortoming of our model is surely that
we introdue relative onsumption only for durables. As already disussed, non-durable
goods (espeially houses and ars) are highly positional and therefore subjet to relative
onsumption. This eet is not aounted for in the model.
18
As already put forward in setion 4.2, this Keynesian approah an, however, also be mirofounded.
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Eah households' ativity an be summarized in a ash-ow equation, for whih neg-
ative terms on the right hand side of the equation represent ash-outow and positive
ash-inow. In this ase Dt represents the stok level of debt at time t:
Di,t+1 −Di,t = −Yi,t + Ci,t + Ptdi,t + rtDi,t. (5.15)
This is similar to the budget onstraint, even though this budget does not really onstrain
sine agents have the opportunity to inrease debt (Di,t+1−Di,t ≡ D˙t > 0). In fat, this
is the instantaneous budget onstraint, rather than the intertemporal budget onstraint
as emphasized in setion 4.1 (f. equation 4.3). A negative term for dissavings (D˙t <
0) represents savings and thereby leads to the lassi relation that disposable inome
(Yi,t−rtDi,t) an be split into onsumption and savings. Sine we assume that households
are the only ators in our model, the savings have to be redistributed amongst them.
This is ertainly a strong assumption sine a lot of atual savings go to rms reinvesting
it. Note that we impose a negative denition of debt. Negative debt, however, an be
interpreted as apital Ki,t = −Di,t > 0. If we onsider Yi,t as labor inome, apital
inome rtKi,t an only be generated by supplying redit to other private households due
to the lak of rms in the model. It is, moreover, important to point out that there are no
diret links between agents in a network sense, but all debts and assets are treated as a
ommon pool. This is eventually a good representation of the strutured produts seen
in the reent nanial risis for whih inome streams resulting from mortgages were
pooled in ommon marketable seurities whih one again were tranhed into piees
and sold to other individuals holding the mirror position. Thus - and in ontrast to
individual ontrats e.g. persisting in relationship banking - idiosynrati risk is hedged
away. Nevertheless, all agents are exposed to the same ommon risk. The presene of
this abstrat relationship also allows us to disregard nanial institutions as autonomous
ators in our model as they originate and redistribute rather than originate and hold.
19
Starting from the ow equation, we an also derive the stok equation of wealth. Sine
by denitionDi,t > 0 represents debt, Di,t < 0 an be thought of as aumulated savings,
also dividing the households into net debtors and net lenders (see gure 5.2).
The net worth Wi,t is dened as follows:
Wi,t = Ptqi,t −Di,t. (5.16)
By requiring qi,t ≥ −di,t, we an model a short-sale onstraint linking ows to stoks.
On the other side, we impose a ollateral onstraint in the sense of Geanakoplos (2003)
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) that onstrains the ability of households to inrease
debt. The maximum debt level depends on the amount of durable onsumption good
qi,t evaluated at its urrent prie Pt and a required equity ratio m:
(1−m)Ptqi,t ≥ Di,t+1. (5.17)
The parameter m an also be thought of as a hairut on seurities or a margin and gives
a maximum ratio of net worth to seurities. This parameter depends on the risk-sharing
19
By not having skin in the game, this, however, imposes a severe inentive problem when sreening
redits.
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Figure 5.2.: Balane sheets for net lenders and debtors
ability of nanial markets. Sophistiated and evolved nanial markets are expeted to
exhibit low values for m. In the model the parameter is given exogenously and not the
result of the optimization of a nanier. In setion 5.4.1, we, however, disuss fators
that should be aounted for by an optimizing entity when setting the optimal level of
equity requirement. Stok and ow an now be linked as follows:
(1−m)Ptqi,t ≥ −Yi,t + Ci,t + Ptdi,t + (1 + rt)Di,t. (5.18)
This ondition is more binding in depressed markets for durables (low pries Pt) and for
households with low level of wealth qi,t.
Another important insight from the previous equation is that lenders only deide on
lending based upon the presented ollateral. The use of debt therefore does not matter.
Lenders in our model simply do not are whether the debt is used for buying durables, net
worth dereasing onsumption of non-durables or even to pay interest on past debt. A
mirofounded view of this modeling approah ould be that there is non-observability of
the use of debt on the side of lenders. This is espeially the ase - as already emphasized
- if there is no diret relation between lenders and debtors (e.g. in the form of house
bank relation), but debt seurities are traded in an anonymous market (a market-based
system) as it was the ase with Mortgage-Baked-Seurities in the urrent risis.
After households have formed their plans for onsumption and onsumption of durables,
they try to exeute them. If neessary, they therefore employ debt. Problem arise when
these households are now ollateral onstrained and would like to borrow up more than
they are allowed to do. As presented in gure 5.1, the simulation will present dierent
options for the ollateral onstrained households and investigate their results on nanial
stability and the whole maroeonomy.
Firstly, they an redue their onsumption. We label this the Austerity-ase. These
households are fored to save by redit market onditions. In the ase in whih pries
for ollateral Pt drop signiantly or households have already piled up high amounts of
debts, this might fore some household to onsume less than subsistene level of on-
sumption. If we further do not impose a non-negativity ondition on onsumption this
might eventually lead to unrealisti result that households engage in negative onsump-
tion.
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A seond option for these households would be selling their durables and using the
proeeds for onsumption. This is not as painful as the rst possibility, but only a short-
term solution. By selling their assets they redue their stok of ollateral and eventually
aggravate their problem. Furthermore the re sales might eventually redue the pries of
assets and thereby worsen not only their very own situation, but also impose a negative
externality on other agents in reduing their ability to borrow up.
20
This rule of thumb based behavior an be niely implemented in a software-ode sine
it follows the if-then-else logi of a omputer algorithm. The details will be presented
in the simulation setion 6.
At the very ending of eah period pries hange aording to market onditions. We
follow the rationale of standard nanial market ABMs and model the prie reation
with a market maker mehanism (e.g., Chiarella et al. (2006), Westerho (2008)). Even
though this approah is still very simplied, it omes loser to prie determination in
atual markets. The key idea here is that an institution named market maker takes an
osetting long or short position to assure that exess demand in period t equals zero.
In the next period, the Market Maker announes a new log-prie pt+1 to redue exess
demand:
pt+1 = pt +
µ
N
N∑
i=1
di,t = pt +
µ
N
N∑
i=1
MPCDtWi,t. (5.19)
The parameter
µ
N
an be thought of as the illiquidity of the market.
21
In illiquid times
pries show high volatility. The formulation using log-pries pt is made in order to avoid
negative pries.
22
The learing of the debt/savings market is made in a similar way:
rt+1 = rt · exp
(
µr
N
N∑
i=1
D˙i,t
)
. (5.20)
High demand for redit leads to the fat that interest rates inrease and vie versa. We
assume that these markets are more liquid and therefore impose µr < µ.
At the end of eah simulation period aggregate results omparable to results of stan-
dard homogeneous maroeonomi models an be alulated. The national inome Yt
an be thought of the as the inome of all N agents within a ertain period t:23
Yt =
N∑
i=1
Yi,t = Ct + Ptdt − D˙t + rtDt. (5.21)
20
Another important option whih, however, will not be onsidered in this model is the option of default
- being the most drasti option. The default on debt by low-inome households poses a negative
externality on the high-inome agents holding the mirror position.
21
Note that we normalize the illiquidity by means of the number of agents N . This is done in order to
make the prie reation independent of the number of market partiipants N and thereby the model
results independent of the number of assumed agents.
22
The equation an also be reformulated as follows: Pt+1 = Pt · exp
(
µ
N
∑N
i=1MPCDtWi,t
)
.
23
This results from the ow equation 5.15.
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The national inome (whih is exogenously determined by the growth of wages and whih
in turn depends on the labor produtivity) an be deomposed as follows: the rst two
terms apture onsumption for non-durables and durables. The third term represents
hange in exess savings (−D˙t) that an be thought of as a urrent aount surplus.24
In a soiety whih has a balaned urrent aounts at any time (i.e. demand for savings
always equals its supply and aggregate debt is zero
∑N
i=1Di,t = 0) the least term is
zero. In a ountry that aumulated deits in the past(Dt > 0), the last term presents
interest payments that are a transfer from domesti debtors to foreign lenders and vie
versa for a ountry with a history of a surplus. If we onsider Yt as inome out of labor,
in the aggregate a positive share of apital inome an only be sustained if we argue in
a surplus eonomy Kt = −Dt > 0. Nevertheless, even in a balaned eonomy (Dt = 0),
some agents reeive apital inome (rtKi,t = −rtDi,t > 0) while others pay interest on
debt (rtDi,t > 0).
Usually in models with small open eonomies, ountries pay a world rate of interest
that is exogenously given. In the long-run, the urrent aount is balaned by means of
the alignment of the exible exhange rate. Conretely, a urrent aount surplus leads to
appreiation of the exhange rate deteriorating the terms of trade, whih rebalanes the
urrent aount. Vie versa, urrent aount deit ountries ahieve balaned aounts
by means of urreny devaluation. In our model, we onsider a large eonomy that
eventually inuenes the world interest rate by its supply and demand of savings. The
argument of the exible exhange rate also does not hold for the ases we aim to model
(the pair: USA and China, the European Monetary Union), in whih the exhange
rates are de fato respetively even de jure xed. In a regime with xed exhange
rates the devaluation of the urreny an be stopped by the intervention of the entral
bank. Conretely, the entral bank an sell foreign reserves in order to ounterat the
devaluation pressure of the urreny persistent in a urrent aount deit environment.
This ativity, however, is limited by means of their foreign reserves. In ontrast to
that, a urreny appreiation an always be impeded by the entral bank by issuing new
domesti urreny resulting from their monopoly of issuing legal tender. This monetary
expansion, however, also omes at the ost of national ination. The latter is espeially
problemati if the ountry is indebted in foreign urreny. As will be disussed more
thoroughly in setion 5.4.1, the balaning of the urrent aount is ahieved by means
of the interest rate mehanism and depends ruially on the existene of onsumption
out of net worth (cw > 0).
In the ase of a deit ountry the latter terms redue the amount of aggregate demand
(AD = Ct + Ptdt). As put forward in Biggs et al. (2009) for the ase of a steady state
with no tehnologial progress (Y˙ = 0) growth in aggregate demand ( ˙AD > 0) an only
be ahieved by an inrease in the growth rate of debt (D¨ > 0) whih is aompanied
by further apital aount deterioration. Meanwhile for Y˙ = 0 even with growing debt
(D˙ > 0), a derease in the growth rate (D¨ < 0) an already lead to a derease in
24
This an be attributed to the fat that in this simple model we only onsider private households
and no rms. The abstration from investment (I = 0) thereby simplies the ow equation to
St ≡ −D˙t = EXt − IMt with EX being exports and IM imports.
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aggregate demand. This surprising result onerning the seond-order derivative of debt
is due to the fat that debt is a stok, but GDP a ow quantity.
In ontrast to standard homogeneous agent models we an also alulate distributional
measurements of ow (e.g. inome, onsumption) and stok (e.g. net worth, asset
holdings) sizes in dierent forms (oeient of variation, Gini oeient). This will be
presented more foused in the following setion.
If one ritially reviews this model, it is important to state that the model emphasizes
partiular ativities in the eonomy and an even be onsidered a partial model of the
eonomy. Sine we fous on the role of private households, the model an be onsidered
a Keynesian model.
25
In fat, we do not model private rms, whih, however, are nally
owned by (other) private households and therefore do not require expliit modeling in a
heterogeneous agent eonomy. The government setor is also not onsidered expliitly.
We assume that the government satises a balaned budget. We dwell more thoroughly
on this issue in setion 7.2, where we assume that the government inome out of taxes
(mostly imposed on high-inome households) is equal to the transfers to low-inome
households and thereby zero-sum. If the budget of the government was not balaned the
dierene between aggregate supply and demand for debt D˙t 6= 0 oneived as urrent
aount imbalanes ould also onsidered as an unbalaned government budget.
26
Moreover, we do not onsider labor markets expliitly and assume that the labor
- and in partiular its distribution - is exogenous. Furthermore, agents supply labor
inelastially. We also onsider markets for durable goods only from a demand side
perspetive. Essentially, this implies a vertial Phillips-urve in the ination-output
domain representing a onstant aggregate supply (AS) urve as emphasized in the RBC-
literature. The latter also implies that - at least for onsumption deisions - money is
only a veil and has no real eets.
In the following, we dig deeper into the outomes of the model presented so far. Closed-
form solutions of models are desirable sine they an deliver insights about the existene
and stability of equilibria as well as the models dynamis. Rather than (seemingly arbi-
trary) tunings, global onditions for variables an be derived allowing for eonomially
meaningful interpretation. However, due to the omplexity of the non-linear intera-
tions of this model losed-form solutions beyond a ertain level are virtually impossible
making it neessary to rely on simulations as provided in setion 6.
Firstly, setion 5.2 disusses the role of an exogenous given distribution funtion on
measurements of inequality. Afterwards, we give a general overview of the workings of
the model fousing on the dierent lasses of households. We espeially onsider the im-
portant issue of nanial stability and its drivers in setion 5.4. We distinguish between
two forms of stability - stability of debt (setion 5.4.1) and durable pries 5.4.2 as well as
25
Some other modelers (e.g. Dosi et al. (2010)) also emphasize the role of the entrepreneur and label
the latter feature as Shumpeterian.
26
More formally, if EXt − IMt ≡ 0, we have D˙t = Tt − Gt, for whih Gt is government onsumption
(e.g. in the form of transfers) and Tt is aggregate tax inome. Exess private savings −D˙t < 0 in
a losed eonomy (EXt − IMt = 0) thereby have to go along with exess government onsumption
(Gt > Tt) buying the produed goods and vie versa. In fat, the part of equalizing the exess
supply or demand of savings is shifted from foreign ountries to the government.
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their interation (setion 5.4.3). Moreover, we derive some important general maroeo-
nomi properties. While we assume the distribution of labor inome to be exogenously
determined the funtional distribution and the distribution of net worth are determined
endogenously. The relation between in personal and the funtional distribution of inome
are onsidered in setion 5.5.1, whereas the setion 5.5.2 analyses the fators driving the
distribution of net worth and the neessary onditions for onvergene.
5.2. Relation between Inome Distribution and
Measurements of Inequality
Inome inequality in our model is treated as an exogenous proess. The measuring of
inequality is far from trivial sine it requires to making a statement about a distribution
in the form of an easy to interpret salar. Therefore, in this setion we present our
modeling approah for the initial onditions and relate it to some ommon indies of
inequality and also disuss the impliations of this approah.
We assume that pries in the beginning (t = 0) equal fundamentals (P0 = F ≡ 1).
Furthermore, we presume that all agents are born without debt (Di=1;··· ;N,0 = 0). Also
note that our model impliitly assumes innite-living agents or at least lans that transfer
intergenerationally.
27
We assume that agents are not born bare-handed but are endowed
with an initial stok of assets as a heritage of their parent generation. This amount qi,0
is unequally distributed, implying wealth inequality.
We assume that both the initial wealth qi,0 as well as the initial wage Yi,0 are distributed
log-normally.
28
This assumption has two major advantages. First, it aounts for the
non-negativity ondition.
29
Furthermore, it represents one of the most simple forms
of positive skewed-distributions reeting the eet of inequality. Moreover, the log-
normal distribution is also easy to justify from a theoretial point of view. In a world in
whih labor is paid aording to its marginal produt, to make a statement about the
distribution of inomes we have to make a statement about the distribution of skills or
abilities. If we assume that general ability is a funtion of several omplementary
30
input
fators ej,i suh as language, mathematial, and soial skills, Ai =
∏k
j=1 ej,i in whih all
ej,i are i.i.d. Using the entral limit theorem, it is easy to verify that log(A) is normally
27
Yet, our model does not take into aount the age struture of agents. In fat, we impliitly assume
that all agents are of the same age. As emphasized in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) low savings
emerge for a high amount of young agents (due to low-inomes at the beginning of a areer) as well
as high amount of retirees drawing on their savings. In this ase it is also important to note on the
dierent age struture in growing eonomies and developed eonomies. These important fators are
left to further researh. Hene, the age distribution also has an important impat on the distribution
of wealth. This aspet is emphasized in the OLG-models.
28
This approah was proposed e.g. in Cowell (2000).
29
This means Yi,0 ≥ 0 for Yi,0 ∼ L(µ, σ2y). The same result holds for qi,0.
30
The notion of omplementarity requires that no fator an be ompletely substituted. If, for example,
a partiular agent posses a large amount of programming skills but does not have any soial skills,
he ends up with zero (aggregate) ability.
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distributed and A and thereby wages Y are log-normally distributed (Aithison and
Brown, 1957). We assume the following distribution for the initial labor inome Yi,0:
31
Yi,0 ∼ L(µ, σ2y) = L(log(Y¯ ), σ2y). (5.22)
The median of this distribution equals exp µ = Y¯ . The rst moment (mean), however,
is larger than the median and a funtion of the parameter σy indiating a right-skewed
distribution (Evans et al., 2000):
E(Y ) = Y¯ exp
(
1
2
σ2y
)
. (5.23)
The ratio of the two indies is larger than one and ompletely ontrolled by the parameter
σy:
E(Y )
Y¯
= exp
(
1
2
σ2y
)
> 1. (5.24)
The seond moment (variane) often taken as measurement of inequality an be de-
sribed by the following equation:
V ar(Y ) = Y¯ 2(exp(σ2y))(exp(σ
2
y)− 1). (5.25)
The variane as an index for inequality therefore inreases with higher values of σ2y . As
presented in Atkinson (1970) the oeient of variation (CoV ) whih is the ratio of
standard deviation and mean of a distribution is another frequently used measurement
of inequality also being sale-invariant - i.e. independent of the median Y¯ . In the
log-normal ase this is also only a funtion of σy:
CoV =
√
V ar(Y )
E(Y )
=
√
exp(σ2y)− 1. (5.26)
The same holds true for the third moment (skewness) whih is independent of the median
inome:
32
Skew(q) = (exp(σ2y) + 2)
√
(exp(σ2y)− 1). (5.27)
We an also ondut a study of the quantiles that will be important sine we model the
subsistene level of onsumption to be a funtion of the underlying inome distribution.
Figure 5.3 shows the evolution of the quantiles as a funtion of the distribution parameter
σy for the ase of Y¯ = 1. Consistent with the alulation the median equals Y¯ = 1, in
whih the non-monotonous behavior an be attributed to the nite number of 10,000
draws from the funtion. While quantiles nj with j > 0.5 inrease with inreasing σy the
opposite is the ase for j < 0.5.33 The important eet on the inome distribution will
31
The same assumptions also apply for the initial distribution of assets qi,0.
32
Similar behavior is visible for the exess kurtosis indiating fat tail behavior for positive values for
σ2y : Exc Kurt(Y ) = exp(σ
2
y)
4 + 2 exp(σ2y)
3 + 3 exp(σ2y)− 6.
33
Formally the quantiles of the log-normal distribution lj an be related to the quantiles of the standard
normal distribution nj as follows: lj = Y¯ exp(nj · σy). Therefore, as presented in gure 5.3 they are
an exponential funtion of the standard deviation in whih for j < 0.5 nj < 0.
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Figure 5.3.: Quantiles of the log distribution for dierent values of σy
be disussed in the following setions. Apart from that it is important to point out that
the mean value grows following an exponential proess (as shown in the theory) and due
to the positive skewness of the distribution funtion not only exeeds the median but
even higher quantiles.
The ratio of quantiles are also frequently used measurements of inequality Cowell
(2000). They an be diretly related to the single variable σy. Consider e.g. the frequent
ase of the 90% to 10% quantile:
Y90
Y10
= exp([n0.9 − n0.1]σy). (5.28)
As presented in gure 2.5 another widely used index for inequality is the variane of
log-wages. Sine we assume that wages Yi,t follow a log-normal distribution, log-wages
follow a normal distribution. The standard deviation of this distribution is diretly given
by the variable σy reating a diret link to this measurement of inequality.
There is also a strong relation between the variable σ2y and the Gini oeient, whih
is probably the most important and ommonly used index of inequality. It equals twie
the area between the equal distribution and the Lorenz urve. It ranges between 0
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Figure 5.4.: Relation between standard deviation of log distribution σy and Gini oe-
ient for 5,000 agents
(omplete equality) and 1 (maximum inequality) (Dagum, 2008).
34 35
Figure 5.4 shows
simulation results for the Gini oeient for dierent values of σy.
36
It is learly visible
that the Gini oeient inreases with σy and for low values of σy an furthermore be
well approximated by the linear t Gini = 0.5 · σy. This result, however, does not hold
for high levels of σy sine the Gini with an upper bound of 1 enters a saturation area. If
we take a rst-order Taylor approximation for small values of σy the relation an even
be approximated with Gini = 1√
π
σy.
37
The presented omputations showed that inequality - as measured by dierent proxies
- is ompletely determined by the single value σy. If all inome distribution follows a
log-normal distribution this allows us to unambiguously rank distributions as the Lorenz-
urves do not ross (Cowell, 2000). This, however, does not have to be the ase in reality.
If two ountries e.g. exhibit the idential Gini oeient, their onrete distributions
an be ompletely dierent if the log-normal assumption does not hold. In partiular,
the share of dierent quantiles might be ompletely dierent, yet - by hane - lead to
the same aggregate quantity (here: the Gini oeient). The reader therefore should
34
The Gini oeient is given by the following integrals (Atkinson, 1970): Gini = 12E(Y )
∫ Ymax
0 [Y F (Y )−
E(Y )Φ(Y )]f(Y )dY . In this ase, Ymax is the highest value of the distribution and E(Y ) equals
the mean. f(Y ) represents the Probability Density Funtion (PDF) and F (Y ) the Cumulated
Probability Distribution Funtion (CPDF): F (x) =
∫ x
0 f(Y )dY . The Lorenz urve is given as
follows: Φ(x) = 1E(Y )
∫ x
0
Y f(Y )dY .
35
Note that the ase for the inome (or wealth) is uniform (implying that there is an equal number of
people in any inome ategory), the Gini oeient is
1
3 .
36
In this simulation, we assumed 5,000 agents. With a high number of agents the law of large numbers
holds and the presented relation emerges. The result is independent of the median q¯. As already
presented, higher median values q¯ only inrease the variane of the distribution requiring for a higher
number of draws to make the law of large numbers apply.
37
The proof for this result is presented in the appendix A.4.
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keep in mind this aveat when interpreting empirial data, but also aknowledge that
this shortoming does not apply to our abstrat model world.
All in all, the log-normal distribution has some very intriguing properties. On the
other hand, it fails to mimi the behavior of the very top inome distribution. As
e.g. put forward by Diamond and Saez (2011), top inomes are better desribed by a
Pareto-distribution, for whih the probability density funtion is given by:
f(Y ) ∼ Y −(a+1), (5.29)
with a > 1 being the Power-law exponent, for whih smaller values indiate fatter tails
and thereby more unequal distributions. Empirial literature onrms a value of approx.
a = 2 for the USA (Jones and Kim, 2014).38
There are also some formal models that are able to apture the Pareto-distribution.
Formally a Pareto-distribution emerges for two onditions holding (Jones and Kim,
2014): (1) the underlying variable governing the distribution of inome must be expo-
nentially distributed and (2) the proess linking the underlying variable and the level of
inome is an exponential growth proess. A natural andidate for the underlying variable
is age whose distribution is well-desribed by an exponential distribution (Blanhard,
1985). As widely doumented in the empirial literature (Miner, 1958) inome grows
with age, resulting in the fat that a Pareto-distribution emerges. In order that this
proess does not explode in the long-run (implying a Gini of 1) Jones and Kim (2014),
furthermore, introdue reative destrution. Due to the latter mehanism suessful em-
ployees are displaed one a new variety emerges (e.g. a worker is replaed by a robot).
The literature frequently also emphasizes the span of ontrol as a mehanism ontribut-
ing to a Pareto-distribution of inomes espeially allowing top-managers to sale their
ativities. Gabaix and Landier (2008) shows that the distribution of rm-sizes an also
explain the ross-ountry heterogeneity in inome distribution (e.g. CEO-ompensation
in Germany and the USA).
The problem with this type of distribution is that it only aptures the right tail of the
total distribution.
39
The reader should therefore keep in mind that by the assumption
of the log-normal distribution we essentially underestimate the role of very top inomes
on the overall dynamis. Future researh ould take the model at hand and replae the
pure log-normal distribution with log-normal distribution with a fat tail to study the
aggregate impats.
We assume that wage inome Yi,t evolves over time. The future inome is a funtion of
urrent inome, implying that there is a strong autoorrelation in inome mimiking that
those with a better eduation get better jobs, get better areer opportunities, leading
to even better jobs in the future. If we assume a uniform wage growth-rate for the
whole population the Gini oeient of wage remains unhanged. We therefore present
38
The Pareto- distribution also has the nie property that the Gini is given as
1
2a−1 . The share of
quantile x [in perent℄ as emphasized e.g. in the work of Atkinson et al. (2011) an be omputed by(
x
100
)1− 1
a
(Jones and Kim, 2014).
39
For the wealth distribution it is sometimes argued that it follows a double Pareto-distribution in
whih both tails are given by Power-law behavior (Benhabib et al., 2014).
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a formulation in whih the growth rate of inome depends on the size of inome itself
resulting in higher inequality:
Yi,t+1 = (1 + gineq log(Yi,t)) · Yi,t. (5.30)
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Figure 5.5.: Level of Gini oeient over time for dierent values of inequality growth
gineq
Growing inequality is related to the fat that high-inomes have high inome-growth
rates, while lower-inome households might have low or even negative inome growth
rates as doumented in empirial results (Ekstein and Nagypál, 2004).
40
The newly in-
trodued parameter gineq sales the omplete model. In the presented ase, the individual
growth rate is given as follows:
gi,t =
Yi,t+1 − Yi,t
Yi,t
= gineq · log(Yi,t). (5.31)
As shown in Evans et al. (2000) applying the log-operator to values of a log-normal
distribution results in a normal distributed funtion. Following Gibrat's Law a vetor
whose growth rate obeys a normal distribution results in a log-normally distributed
variable (Sutton, 1997).
41
Thereby, the assumption of log-normality is onserved in the
growing inequality senario. Moreover, the Gini-ratio an be approximated as follows:
42
GiniT = (1 + gineq)
TGini0. (5.32)
40
The latter is formally the ase for Yi,t < 1.
41
This result is easy to verify. If we assume xt− xt−1 = gtxt−1 for small normally distributed values of
gt in a rst-order approximation the following result holds: log(xt) = log(x0) + g1 + g2 + · · · + gt,
implying a log-normal distribution for xt (Sutton, 1997).
42
The proof for this is presented in appendix A.5.
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Figure 5.6.: Aggregate output Yt, inequality Gini(Yt), and aggregate growth gt
For low values of gineq · T results an be further simplied as follows:
GiniT = T · gineq ·Gini0. (5.33)
This quasi-linear behavior is doumented in simulation results as presented in gure 5.5.
These analytially appealing features resulting from the harateristis of the log-normal
funtion help to tune the model.
We an also ompute the aggregate growth rate:
gt =
∑N
i=1 Yi,t+1 −
∑N
i=1 Yi,t∑N
i=1 Yi,t
=
Yt+1 − Yt
Yt
=
gineq
Yt
N∑
i=1
log(Yi,t) · Yi,t. (5.34)
It is important to point out that the aggregate growth rate depends amongst others
43
on
the distribution of inome as aptured by the fator σy. In partiular, aggregate growth
inreases with inequality. Thereby, this result only aptures the left part of the Kuznets
urve, suggesting a positive orrelation between growth and inequality. As the modeling
leads to the fat that inequality inreases in time, the growth rate also inreases in
time. The latter behavior is displayed in gure 5.6 showing a quasi-linearly inreasing
growth rate and an exponential growth proess.
44
Note that modeling does not follow
from an underlying formal mirofounded model but is of an ad-ho nature to apture a
43
It also unambiguously inreases with the growth rate of inequality gineq and the median inome Y¯ .
44
For the numerial simulation we hose the values σy = 1 and Y¯ used in the benhmark simulations
in setion 6 as well as gineq = 10
−3
.
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rising inequality. It is, however, in line with empirial evidene. Campos-Vazquez et al.
(2013) using data from the World Top Inome Database show that inome of wealthy
individuals exhibits a higher growth rate than the inome of lower inome agents.
45
They
summarize their ndings in the way that growth is (really) good for the (really) rih.
It is important to point out that in our model we do not impose noise shoks on
the inome proess. Impliitly we assume that an insurane or a soial seurity system
exists that is able to insure against any form of idiosynrati inome risk. In ontrast
to that, the presene of uninsurable idiosynrati shoks is the key building blok of
Bewley-type models. Introduing uninsurable inome risk would further inrease the
level of inome inequality not only amongst agents but also for every partiular agents
during his life-span.
5.3. General Mehanisms of the Model
To illustrate basi simulation results, we assume a simplied version of the model. To
get rid of non-linearities we also presume a urvature of the onsumption funtion of
ε = 1 resulting in the standard linear Keynesian onsumption funtion as presented in
equation 4.1. Furthermore, we assume that there is perfet orrelation between wealth
and inome. In the general instane, it was superimposed that wealth and inome
were independently distributed. To onnet stok and ow we assume a linear relation
between the two desribed by a variable H > 1 for heritage, whih an be interpreted
as the number of annual inomes that is passed on from the parent generation:
qi,0 = H · Yi,0. (5.35)
This is ertainly a strong - yet not unrealisti - assumption sine it entails the idea that
individuals born rih an aord a better eduation, leading to higher future inomes,
whih in partiular an be rationalized by the presene of redit onstraints (Galor
and Zeira, 1993). Besides eonomi heritage, there an also be biologial heritage for
whih high ability (positively orrelated with earnings) is transmitted by means of genes
(Piketty, 2000). In the rst instane, we also disregard interest on debt (r = 0) and
thereby exlude the Ponzi ase. We will dwell intensively on this issue in setion 5.4.1.
The main workings of the model an now be presented in gure 5.7 in the stati ase.
The left panel shows the total onsumption funtion (Ci + diP ) and the distribution of
inome. The intersetion of the total onsumption funtion (Ci+Ddi) with the 45-degree
line divides the households into borrowers (left side) and savers (right side).
46
Starting
from this, the right panel plots the dissavings (D˙i = Ci + diP − Yi) as well as the redit
45
As we will elaborate more thoroughly in setion 5.5.2 onsidering wealth inequality, the existene of
a growth rate that positively depends on urrent level leads to the fat that inequality diverges to
maximum inequality (Gini = 1).
46
Debtors an be lassied as households with an inome Y < YII/III , while lenders have an inome
Y > YII/III with YII/III =
c¯
1−cy−H(cw+MPCDt)
. For speial long-run ase of E(MPCD) = 0 we
have
c¯
1−cy−Hcw
.
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Figure 5.7.: Consumption and durable onsumption (C+Pd) as funtion of labor inome
Y (left panel); dissavings D˙ as funtion of labor inome Y (right panel)
onstraint (D˙max = H ·P · (1−m)Yi 47). The left panel in gure 5.7 therefore represents
a stok quantity while the right one onsiders ow.
This allows us to split the population into three soial groups. Group III (the high-
lass) engages in savings that are redistributed to lower inome households. Individuals
who have an inome within the group II interval (the medium-lass) inrease their debt
but are not subjet to a ollateral onstraint sine they have enough assets to borrow
against. The most important group driving the systems dynamis are group I members
(the low-lass). They also would like to borrow, but fae a restriting ollateral on-
straint. For a given inome distribution Yi,t, group III (the high-inome group) inreases
in size for low subsistene levels of onsumption c¯, low marginal propensity to onsume
cy as well as cw and to onsume durables MPCDt. Note that the ranking of individuals
aording and to lasses is idential. While the assignment to a spei inome group
is determined by the level of inome (measured in a monetary unit), the assignment to
lass is dened funtionally by means of onduting spei ativities.
Moreover, there is also a movement from group I to II for high pries of ollateral
P and low equity requirements m. The latter reets the Amerian story : Due to a
47
Sine we assume that initially the debt is zero (Di=1;··· ;N,0 = 0), the maximum ow level in this
ase equals the maximum stok level of debt (D˙max = Dmax). With this assumption the inome
whih splits ollateral onstrained and non-ollateral onstrained households is given as follows:
yI/II =
c¯
H(P (1−m)−cw−MPCDt)+1−cy
. This ratio, however, only holds in the rst simulation period
in whih no agent has aumulated debt so far.
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Figure 5.8.: Dissavings as a funtion of inome in the ase of a strong boom
boom in real estate pries and nanial innovation (requiring for lower levels of m) the
individuals who formally were part of the lower-lass ould transform into middle-lass.
If we assume that ε > 1 and thereby suppose a low elastiity of onsumption, the
savings of high-inome households will be more aentuated. This might lead to the
fat that redit markets do not lear (
∑N
i=1 D˙i,t 6= 0) and a urrent surplus emerges.
As presented in setion 4.4, the onave onsumption is emphasized if we assume a
strong love of wealth motive modeled by higher risk aversion for onsumption than
wealth (γc > γw) in whih agents aumulate wealth in order to protet against possible
adverse future inome shoks. Hene, a andidate explanation for the strong urrent
aount surpluses witnessed in ountries suh as China and Germany ould be higher
risk aversion.
A speial ase an be presented if we assume that there is a high MPCDt. As
presented in equation 5.14 this boom situation an emerge beause of low interest rates,
good fundamentals, or even a self-sustaining trend-following strategy of traders. Low
market volatility and low risk aversion as experiened in the Great Moderation also
ontribute to this very behavior. If we assume that H · cw + MPCD > 1 − cy the
right panel of gure 5.7 an be redone as presented in gure 5.8. Note that group III
disappears in the boom situation beause the dissavings funtion has a positive slope
resulting in a positive relation between inome and debt aumulation. The positive
slope, however, an also emerge due to strong heritage H ombined with strong MPC
out of wealth cw and a strong MPC out of inome cy. The positive slope of the dissavings
funtion eventually represents a negative savings ratio. Thus, in a strong boom situation
no domesti savings are provided and it will be naned via a urrent aount deit.
112
If we assume ε = 1, we end up with a simple linear onsumption funtion of the
Keynesian type. As, however, presented in the right panel of gure 5.7 the dissavings
funtion has a kink leading to the fat that the aggregate behavior loses its linear prop-
erties. The latter an be attributed to the existene of the ollateral onstraint. If we
disregard heterogeneity in an eonomy with a binding ollateral onstraint we end up
being subjet to the fallay of omposition (e.g. Caballero (1992), Kirman (1992)).
48
While the representative agent onept is feasible to provide a general idea about the
workings of the model, maro behavior should not be onfused as the behavior of a
representative agent multiplied by the number of agents. The non-linear behavior as
well as the omplex interation with distributional features makes it neessary to rely on
simulation results sine elegant analytial solutions are not feasible. The seond reason
why heterogeneity matters is the onavity of the onsumption funtion as emphasized
in Carroll (2001). Or put inversely, if onsumption funtions were linear - implying an
underlying homotheti utility funtion - and nanial market would not onstrain, the
ations of the representative agent (with mean inome) multiplied by the number of
agents perfetly desribe the evolution of the total eonomy. In fat, the behavior of the
omplete eonomy an be desribed by the rst statistial moment making distributional
issues (desribed by higher moments suh as the variane or skewness) irrelevant. We
disuss this statement more thoroughly in appendix A.2 and provide formal onditions.
In the following, we give some intuition on the eets of the ollateral onstraint in
a dynami environment. This does not supersede the simulation results presented in
setion 6, but aims at providing a learer insight into the underlying mehanisms.
If we onsult our onsumption/dissavings-diagram, positive ow rates of dissavings
D˙t, inrease the stok level of debt and thereby redue the ollateral onstraint urve
(see gure 5.9). However, by denition, this ollateral onstraint annot fall below zero,
sine this would imply that agents would hold a higher ratio of debt (respetively a
lower ratio of equity) than allowed by the market requirements m. In fat, the ase for
a ollateral urve equal to zero represents the ase for agents who have strethed their
debt holding to the maximum. Not surprisingly, low-inome individuals are the rst
to reah this level due to their lower holding of ollateral. We also have to distinguish
between debt for durables and non-durables.
If an agent attains redit in order to buy a durable - suh as a house or a ar - and
times this purhase to the market, this inreases her net worth, eventually leading to a
higher nanial sope. Consider an agent with a stok qt of assets deiding to buy or sell
the amount of dt ≡ ∆qt assets. The purhase prie is given by the urrent market prie
Pt while the asset is ativated in the balane sheet at the market prie in the subsequent
period Pt+1 already aounting for the eet of the trading. To nane the purhase of
this asset employs a ertain debt ratio 0 ≤ l ≤ 1 (leverage). The net worth evolves as
follows:
49
Wt+1 −Wt ≡ ∆Wt = (Pt+1 − Pt)qt + Pt+1dt − Pt · l · dt, (5.36)
48
An overview of the subjet dating bak to the seminal paper of Sonnenshein (1972) is given in Stoker
(1993).
49
Note that this simple omputation assumes that the equity part of the purhase is ompletely naned
by means of urrent ash-ow not onsidered in the stok. If a purhase touhes another ative
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Figure 5.9.: Dissavings in the dynami ase
for whih the rst term aptures the apital gains (or losses) of the given balane sheet,
the seond term ativates the asset on the balane sheet, and the third term aptures the
derease in net worth due to the employment of debt. The equation an be summarized
as follows:
∆Wt = ∆Pt(qt + dt) + Ptdt(1− l) = ∆Pt(qt + dtl) + Pt+1(1− l)dt. (5.37)
First of all, if agents do not trade (dt = 0), a bull market (∆P > 0) always inreases
net worth as the previously aumulated assets have a higher value (∆Wt = ∆Ptqt).
Another extreme ase emerges if the purhase is ompletely naned by external apital
(l = 1):
∆Wt = ∆Pt(qt + dt), (5.38)
for whih the trade only inreases net worth if the trader taking the long position or-
retly antiipated a prie inrease (dt∆Pt > 0). As a result, the lower the leverage, the
higher the gain when buying (dt > 0) an asset (
∂∆Wt
∂l
= −Ptdt < 0) as the eet of the
net worth dereasing debt also has to be aounted for.
We an also onsider the ase of no prie hanges (∆P = 0↔ Pt+1 = Pt ≡ P ):
∆Wt = Pd(1− l), (5.39)
in whih any long position (d > 0) inreases the net worth. The only exeption emerges
for the ase for whih the purhase is ompletely naned by external apital (l = 1)
balane sheet position (e.g. ash), the trade itself would only alter the struture of the balane sheet
but not its size (balane sheet sum).
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and the higher ative position is ompletely aneled out by debt of the same amount
(∆Wt = 0).
Going short (dt < 0) an be written as follows:
∆Wt = Wt+1 −Wt = Pt+1(qt + dt)− Ptdt − Ptqt = ∆Pt(qt + dt), (5.40)
making it idential to the ase with a ompletely leveraged transation for the long ase.
The latter is, however, the ase sine the omplete proeeding of the sale inreases the
net worth. In fat, in the seond period t+1 a new ative position (i.e. ash) is reated
by the sale of the existing asset (−dtPt+1 > 0 for dt < 0). For no prie hanges (∆Pt = 0)
the trade would have no eet on net worth and only alter the omposition of the ative
side of the balane sheet (∆Wt = 0).
To implement a omplete stop-loss strategy - also absorbing the losses of the existing
stok of assets qt - for the ase in whih agents always orretly predit the market results
(∆P∆q > 0), would require selling all assets in a bear market (∆qt = −qt ⇒ ∆Wt = 0).
This extreme strategy, however, is hardly feasible due to the lumpiness of the investment.
This result, however, does not hold for the ase of leveraged non-durables purhases.
While inreasing the amount of debt, non-durables do not ontribute to net worth,
sine they are onsumption goods in the more immediate sense being destroyed in the
proess of onsumption.
50
Therefore, redit for non-durables always dereases net worth
narrowing the nanial sope of agents. This phenomenon is most important for low-
inome agents espeially in a ontext of the soial eet of onsumption.
In our model ontext, levering up always satises the ondition that the fatual equity
ratio is higher or equal to the required equity ratio m. However, we an onsider shoks
that destroy this relation. In the ontext of the model we an identify two shoks: a
poliy shok inreasing the required ratio of equity apital mt+1 > mt would lead to
fored savings or deleveraging. In ontrast to this exogenous shok we an also onsider
a shok that is endogenous to our model, in the form of a bust in the market for durables
(Pt+1 < Pt). Sine assets are valued at urrent market pries, whereas debt is given in
nominal terms and thereby not ination indexed, a prie shok dereases net worth.
One again, this espeially hits the low-inome group. Rather than having only a lass I
we reate a lass 0 that are fored to save (D˙ < 0) (see gure 5.10). This lass onsists of
those agents already leveraged up to the (former) maximum as well as some agents that
still had some nanial sope in the former ase. Moreover, some middle-lass agents
(lass II) annot realize their onsumption desires and therefore also fall into lass I.
The omposition of the upper-lass, however, is unaeted.
The reation of the group 0 to their nanial dire strait is important. Finally, we
therefore ompare re sales and the Austerity-ase. In the stati ase, allowing for re
sales an inrease the size of the middle-lass, sine - in the short-run - households
an take the proeeds from the sale of the housing asset for non-durable onsumption.
Tehnially, for one single period the ollateral onstraint is given by a urve with the
slope HP rather than HP (1 − m). Sine m < 1 the size of the middle-lass inreases
as presented in gure 5.11. This eet is even more pronouned if households already
50
The most tangible example for this ase is food.
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Figure 5.10.: Dissavings in the dynami ase with a positive shok to equity requirements
and negative shok to pries
aumulated high amounts of debt, shifting the ollateral onstraint urve downward
(as seen in gure 5.9) further dereasing the size of the middle-lass. This re sale an
ontribute to a delay of onsumption derease for a ertain group of households for one
single period. If, however, this group already piled up debt, in a dynami ase this leads
to overindebtedness sine the debt is not baked by any ollateral, resulting in fored
savings through a onsumption derease. In summary, re sales are only a desperate
measure with some short-run gains that in the long-run, even aggravate the problem.
This stylized analysis emphasized the reation funtion of the very low-inome agents,
however, not aounting for aggregate eets. The negative externalities of re sales or
onsumption dereases for the aggregate eonomy are more preisely onsidered in the
setion presenting the numerial simulations (setion 6).
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Figure 5.11.: Comparison of the ases with debt aumulation (bottom) and re sales
(top)
5.4. Finanial Stability
The major topi of this dissertation is to rationalize a theoretial link between inequality
and nanial stability. The latter an be separated into stability of debt (ruling out Ponzi
shemes, see setion 5.4.1) and stability of the durable market (ruling out ever growing
positive or negative bubbles, see setion 5.4.2). It is also important to point out that
while debt is a nominal asset (we abstrat from ination-indexed debt ontrats), the
durable is a real asset. The two asset lasses, however, are interonneted by means of
the ollateral onstraint. As we show in setion 5.4.3, there are ommon fators that
stabilize one market at the expense of destabilizing the other and vie versa.
5.4.1. Dynamis of Debt
In this setion, we analytially shed some light on the stability of the debt level (D) in
a slightly simplied version of the model. This also gives insights into the dynamis of
interest rates and urrent aounts (D˙) as well as the neessary assumptions. In fat we
ombine the key equations presented in setion 5.1 to derive a master equation governing
the aggregate dynamis. In partiular, we onsider whether nanial instability an
prevail in the form of Ponzi shemes. Thus, this setion is also losely related to setion
4.2 where we disuss general onditions for the (non)-existene of Ponzi shemes. This
setion, however, provides a more onrete piture for the model as developed in our
work. The major dierene of our model as ompared to the ase presented in setion
4.2 is the variability of the rate of interest. In partiular - and in line with empirial
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evidene - the rate of interest inreases if a high amount of debt is already aumulated.
A high amount of debt dereases the distane to default
51
and thereby leads to the
fat that the mirror party holding the laim requires a higher rate of interest for risk
ompensation purposes. This, however, indues an unstable equilibrium for whih the
level of debt inreases the rate of interest, requiring more debt, inreasing the rate of
interest even more and so forth.
Using the equation for dissavings eq. 5.15 and onsumption based upon disposable
inome eq. 5.2 we an derive the following result:
52
D˙ = −Y + C + dP + rD = c¯+ cy(Y − rD) + cwW − Y + dP + rD. (5.41)
The MPCD an be deomposed into two fators depending on the return expetation
of the risky asset and the interest rate in the market for debt/savings leading to the
following result:
D˙ = −Y +C+dP+rD = c¯+cy(Y −rD)+cwW−Y +P ·E(∆p)
γ
W−P · r
γ
W+rD. (5.42)
For sake of simpliity we assume that the stok of durables is onstant (
∂(Pq)
∂t
= P˙ q+P q˙ =
P˙ q + Pd ≡ 0). As presented in appendix A.6, the long-run distribution of wealth is
onstant. This leads to the fat that net worth only hanges if indebtedness hanges:
W˙ = −D˙. (5.43)
By integrating with the initial onditions that all households are born without debt
holdings (D0 = 0) but with a heritage of durables (P0q0 = HY
53
) we nd the following
relation between debt and net worth:
W = −D +H · Y. (5.44)
This very simple equation provides some deep eonomi insight. In the model, we have
two soures of wealth: real assets HY and monetary assets −D = K. While real assets
are exogenously given, monetary assets an be reated by agents. We might onsider
the real assets as a form of land whose size is determined and not subjet variation in
time. Despite some temporary valuation gains or losses, whih, however, are nil in the
long-run (E(P˙ ) = 0), the total amount does not hange. Agents an only hange their
individual endowment with the real asset by means of trading. In ontrast to that the
agents, however, an reate monetary assets D˙ representing laims to one agent D < 0
and debt to another agent D > 0. In a losed eonomy, these assets should amount
51
The latter term was oined by Merton (1974) and nowadays is a ommon index for omputing the
nanial soundness of a banking institution (e.g. in the form of a stress test).
52
Note that we remove the time index t sine we now argue in a ontinuous time region rather than
a disrete time thereby replaing dierene equations with dierential equations. This approah
already provides an interesting insight into the workings of the model. This, however, does not
inorporate the non-linear behavior of the ollateral eet.
53
This result is derived by assuming P0 = F0 = 1 and q0 = HY0.
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to zero. In an open eonomy the supply of redit to foreigners D˙ < 0 is aompanied
by a urrent aount surplus whih in turn reates laims against them and inreases
national wealth (W˙ = −D˙). The reation of redits is made by agents who reap a larger
amount of fruit than they are apable of digesting. The mirror position is the ase for
agents who eat the redit.
54
Formally, this an be aptured by the following dierential equation in whih we insert
the last equation into eq. 5.42:
D˙ = c¯+cy(Y −rD)+cw(HY −D)−Y +P ·E(∆p)
γ
(HY −D)−P · r
γ
(HY −D)+rD. (5.45)
Using the market learing ondition for the savings market (eq. 5.20) this results in the
following non-linear dierential equation:
55
D˙ = Y (−1 + cy) + Y Hcw + Y P E(∆p)
γ
H + c¯
+r0exp(µrD)
[
−HY P
γ
+D
(
1− cy + P
γ
)]
−D
(
cw +
E(∆p)
γ
P
)
.
(5.46)
The rst term is always negative sine we assume a positive savings ratio s = 1− cy > 0
due to cy < 1. The seond term - representing onsumption out of wealth - is always
positive. The third term is time-varying in whih the sign depends on the expetation
about future pries. The fourth term, aounting for subsistene onsumption, is always
positive and thereby inreases debt. We will subsume these terms as the primary deit
K.
If we take the simplifying assumption that long-run demand for durable is zero
(E(∆P ) = 0), we an also ompute a simple long-run ondition for a primary surplus.
A surplus is reahed if the following onditions hold:
56
K = −Y s+ Y Hcw + c¯ < 0↔ 0 < c¯
Y
< s−Hcw. (5.47)
This implies that the primary surplus inreases for low onspiuous onsumption
c¯
Y
, high
savings ratios s, low onsumption out of wealth cw and low heritage H . The latter seems
somewhat surprising. However, one should keep in mind that a high level of heritage
inreases the level of wealth available for onsumption purposes. If we onsider no
onsumption out of wealth (cw = 0), heritage H does not matter. Without onspiuous
onsumption eets (c¯ = 0), the ondition simplies even more to:
Hcw < s. (5.48)
Note that this ondition is less restritive than the ondition presented in the penultimate
equation, implying that an eonomy with onspiuous onsumption does not have to be
stable only if the last equation is satised.
54
This athy phrase was oined by Rajan (2010).
55
This result an be omputed as follows: rt+1 = rt exp(µrD˙t) = rt−1 exp(µrD˙t−1) exp(µrD˙t) =
rt−1 exp(µr[D˙t−1 + D˙t]) = r0 exp(µr[D˙t−1 + · · ·+ D˙t]) = r0 exp(µrDt).
56
This is also the ondition separating middle from high-lass households for the ase without durable
onsumption (MPCD = 0) as shown in footnote 46.
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Figure 5.12.: Phase diagram for the ase without zero lower bound and wealth eet
To analyze this result we rstly assume no onsumption out of stok (cw = 0). By
using the exponential funtion in determining the market interest rate, we implemented
a zero lower bound. A more simple approah also allowing for negative interest rates
would be to assume a linear relation r˙ = µrD˙ whih for the given initial onditions yields
r = µrD. This would simplify the funtion to the following form:
57
D˙ = Y (−1 + cy) + Y P E(∆p)
γ
H + c¯
+µrD
[
−HY P
γ
+D
(
1− cy + P
γ
)]
−D
(
E(∆p)
γ
P
)
= K˜ +D2µr
(
1− cy + P
γ
)
+D
(
−µrHY
γ
− E(∆p)
γ
P
)
≡ K˜ +D2A+DB.
(5.49)
This is the lassi Saddle-Node-Bifuration (Strogatz, 2001). For the ase with a primary
deit (K˜ > 0), there is no equilibrium and a debt bubble emerges. For the ase with
a primary surplus (K˜ < 0), this yields two equilibria as presented in gure 5.12. The
lower equilibrium at a negative level of debt orresponding to a situation where an
eonomy holds laims against foreigners is stable. One the equilibrium has surpassed
57
In this ase we assume for the modied primary deit K˜ = K − Y Hcw.
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a threshold level D∗ 58 - graphially depited as the intersetion of the phase urve and
the D-axis (D˙ = 0) - the destabilizing Ponzi mehanism sets in. Paying the interest on
debt requires new debt, thereby inreasing the interest rate further, and aggravating the
debt problem. This results in innite debt growth with steadily deteriorating urrent
aounts. The stability of the lower equilibrium, however, ruially depends on the
possibility of negative interest rates. Inreased savings resulting in laim positions (D <
0), derease the interest rate. One the interest rate has fallen to a negative ratio, the
ow of interest payments from debtors to lenders is reversed. The fat that lenders now
have to pay a fee to invest their savings, inreases their demand for debt and dereases
their savings. This mehanism is stabilizing.
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Figure 5.13.: Phase diagram for the ase with zero lower bound and no wealth eet for
primary surplus (K < 0, left panel) and deit (K = −F > 0, right panel)
If we, however, assume the zero lower bound, the dierential equation without on-
sumption out of stok is given as follows:
D˙ = K˜ + r0exp(µrD)
[
D
(
1− cy + P
γ
)
− HY P
γ
]
−DE(∆p)
γ
P. (5.50)
If we further assume that there is no expeted prie hange for durable goods (E(∆p) =
0), the lower stable equilibrium disappears (see gure 5.13 59). Besides the already
58
This amounts to D∗ = − B2A +
√
B2
4A2 − KA . For the ase with B = 0 there is no ight eet and no
net worth eet for durable onsumption. These two eets that inrease the level of stable debt
will be overed later.
59
For the gure 5.13 we dene F ≡ −HY Pγ and K˜ ≡ K.
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disussed Ponzi eet for the ase with a primary surplus (K˜ < 0) there is an onverse
ase with ever inreasing lending. This an be explained by the fat that agents do not
onsume (neither durable nor non-durables) out of wealth and keep inreasing savings,
leading to a deterioration of the interest rate to zero. The annual urrent aount surplus
D˙∞ onverges to the annual savings surplus K˜.
On the other hand, in this eonomy without onsumption out of wealth a primary
deit (K˜ > 0) an be sustainable. This eet an be attributed to nite market liquidity
(µr <∞) and the ight eet. The latter is aptured by the value (−exp(µrD)HY Pγ ) in
the previous equation leading to a global minimum of the funtion in the phase diagram
at Dmin =
HY P
γ(1−cy)+P − 1µr .60
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Figure 5.14.: Phase diagram for the ase with zero lower bound and wealth eet
For the ase without the ight eet (γ → ∞), the loal minimum as presented in
gure 5.13 is at Dmin = − 1µr amounting to D˙min = K˜ − r0seµr lowering the amount of
debt in the equilibrium. Therefore, the existene of the ight eet an ontribute to a
stable equilibrium with a high amount of debt. The missing ight eet also restrits
the primary deit to a level of 0 < K˜∗ < r0s
eµr
. If this restrition is not met, there would
be no equilibrium sine D˙ > 0 for all D. Translated into eonomially meaningful terms,
this implies that only the Ponzi ase ould persist, for whih any primary deit beyond
the omputed one K∗ would result in a viious debt yle.
60
This result is derived by setting
∂D˙
∂D
!
= 0.
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The ase is even stronger if we furthermore assume an innite interest rate adjustment
speed (µr → ∞) making any primary deit unsustainable sine ∂D˙∂D > 0 and D˙ > 0
for all D. Moreover, for this situation with a primary surplus K˜ < 0 there would only
be one unstable equilibrium leading to either a Ponzi growth of debt or an unstoppable
growth of laims. The extreme ase of µr →∞ an be onsidered the Walrasian ase, for
whih an exess demand/supply for savings would lead to a prompt onvergene of the
interest rate to zero/innity. Or put positively, the existene of nite market adjustment
speed allows maintaining a stable amount of debt in the ase of a primary deit.
The ight eet works, sine an inrease in onsumption inreases demand for debt,
inreases interest rates, thereby making savings - rather than onsumption - attrative.
This is a stabilizing mehanism. Besides this ight to quality, there is also a ight to
risk for whih inreased savings, lower the interest rate, thereby inrease the demand
for risky assets (being the durable onsumption good), resulting in lower savings. A
high level of debt, therefore, an be sustainable for strong swithing in the portfolio,
as indiated by low risk aversion γ.61 This an be onsidered the period of the Great
Moderation. Lastly, it should be mentioned that the ight eet also has a destabilizing
element whih further promotes the Ponzi eet. Tehnially, this eet is aptured by
the fator r0exp(µrD)
P
γ
. To put it verbally, this fator ats through net worth. High
debt dereases net worth and thereby lowers the ight to quality reation to inreased
interest rates. While slightly promoting the Ponzi ase, this, however, annot outdo the
stabilizing ight eet.
62
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Figure 5.15.: Comparative statis for the ase with onsumption shok for whih the
debt level A still onverges while the level B implies innite growth of debt
61
This also holds true for low market volatility, whih in our model is normalized to 1.
62
Tehnially, this is ensured due to the ondition HY > Dmax = (1 − m)HY with 0 < m < 1
forbidding purhases that are ompletely naned by debt.
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Introduing onsumption out of wealth (cw 6= 0), leads to an inrease in primary
deit. In gure 5.14, we label this eet as the wealth onsumption eet. This
inrease in primary deit ontributes to the emergene of a seond stable equilibrium.
On the other side there is also a stabilizing eet represented by the very last term in
the following equation:
D˙ = K + r0exp(µrD)
[
D · s− P
γ
(HY −D)
]
−D
(
E(∆p)
γ
P + cw
)
. (5.51)
The latter eet one again passes through net worth. Inreased wealth inreases on-
sumption, inreases debt, whih in turn dereases net worth lowering onsumption. This
is a stabilizing mehanism. In gure 5.14, the latter is introdued as the net worth eet.
In the resulting phase diagram, we an perform some omparative statis. Strong
heritage H inreases the primary deit through the onsumption eet while also in-
reasing the level of the equilibrium debt through an inreased ight eet.
63
Tehnially,
this moves the urve upwards (primary deit) and to the left (inreased ight eet).
The inrease in subsistene level of onsumption c¯, marginal propensity to onsume (out
of wealth and inome, cy and cw) as well as positive trend pereption in the market
for durables leads to an upward shift of the urve (E(∆p) > 0). This an lead to the
fat that markets onverge to a new higher stable equilibrium value of debt (starting
from level A in gure 5.15). On the other side, a debt level B that formerly would have
onverged to a stable equilibrium now leads to a debt explosion. The latter is espeially
the ase when trend-following trading in the market for durables leads to a series of
self-enforing positive shoks aompanied by an upward shift of the urve.
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Figure 5.16.: Phase diagram for debt dynamis
63
This analysis, however, does not take into aount the important ollateral eet of strong heritage
for low-inome households.
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Figure 5.17.: Numerial solution for the minimum equity ratio for variation of savings
rate s (left panel) and risk aversion γ (right panel)
To prevent the Ponzi eet lenders require ollateral. By setting an equity ratio m,
the maximum debt level is impliitly set to Dmax = (1−m)HY . As presented in gure
5.16, the equity ratio m an be hosen in suh a manner that Dmax is always smaller
than the value of the unstable equilibriumD∗. Using the omplete non-linear dierential
equation presented in equation 5.51 and taking the numerial values of our simulation
(refer to table 6.1 ) we an ompute a numerial solution of D∗. For the threshold ase
D∗ = Dmax we an use this ase to derive a minimum equity requirement mmin following
from:
mmin = 1− Dmax
HY P
. (5.52)
Note that for the benhmark tuning the ratio would be as high as mmin = 50%. In gure
5.17, we provide omparative statis for a variation of risk aversion γ and the savings rate
s ≡ 1−cy. The gure shows that an inrease in risk aversion γ lowers the strength of the
ight eet and thereby inreases the possibility of Ponzi shemes prevailing. Despite
high rate on interest lenders would not be willing to supply redit - as e.g. witnessed
in the European debt risis - strengthening the hazard of Ponzi shemes. As a result,
lenders should set higher values of mmin to ounterat these eets. Conversely, higher
savings ratios s lower the amount of onsumption and thereby the employment of debt
and thereby derease the hazard of Ponzi eets. The lender thereby an harge lower
equity ratios mmin.
64
Note if savings fall below a spei threshold we end up with a
primary deit (K > 0) that would lead to omplete instability.65 To rule out this ase,
64
We also omputed the reation to variations of onsumption out of net worth cw, expeted prie
hange E(∆P ), and heritage H . Not surprisingly, in all three ases the minimum equity ratio
inreases with the parameters sine all ases promote stronger onsumption aompanied by an
inreased demand for debt. We spare the results for lak of spae.
65
Furthermore, savings inrease apital, also inreasing disposable inome, leading to stronger on-
sumption and thereby debt.
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theoretially an equity ratio mmin > 100% would be required. This ase is not depited
in gure 5.17 for the purpose of readability.
This simple analysis does not take inome heterogeneity into aount. In fat for the
numerial results presented in gure 5.17 we assumed the mean agent with an inome
of E(Y ) = Y¯ exp
(
0.5σ2y
) ≈ 8.24. Albeit delivering some important insights into the
mehanisms leading to (in)stability, the results annot be imposed on the total model
without being subjet to the fallay of omposition (f. setion A.2). While the interest
on debt r is a uniform market-wide variable determined by the aggregate level of debt,
the demand and supply of debt are determined on an individual level. Lower inome
is aompanied by a lower primary surplus (or even a deit) graphially shifting the
urve in the phase diagram upwards (e.g. refer to gure 5.15). As will be presented
in more detail in setion 5.5.1, low-inome agents have an equilibrium holding of debt,
whereas high-inome agents hold laims (or apital) whih furthermore inreases with
the level of debt. The interation between the groups determines the level of the interest
rate. As a result, the Ponzi eet is ruial for indebted low-inome households while
the stabilizing ight to quality is important for high-inome households. The overall
result therefore depends on the distribution of inome amongst agents, whih will be
disussed based upon simulation. Moreover, the presented analysis impliitly assumed
that E(∆p) = 0 and P = const for the market for durables letting us fous on the
market for savings. In the following setion we take the inverse position by onsidering
the market for durables independently.
5.4.2. Dynamis of Pries of Durables
This setion investigates the market for durables espeially onsidering the stability
issues. The dynamis of the log-pries p are given as follows:
pt+1 − pt = µ
N
N∑
i=1
MPCDt ·Wi,t = µ ·MPCDt · E(Wt). (5.53)
In this ase, E(Wt) represents the mean net worth. Using the onstrution of theMPCD
we an arrive at the following result:
pt+1 − pt = µ
γ
[
wCt E
C
t (pt+1 − pt) + wFt EFt (pt+1 − pt) + dnoiset − rt
]
E(Wt). (5.54)
Following Fisher (2012), this non linear dierential equation an be linearized by as-
suming Γ = 0. This is the extreme ase in whih agents totally stik to one strategy.
More tehnially, the weights of hartists and fundamentalists do not vary in time and
are of equal size wCt = w
F
t = 0.5. Transforming the dierene equation into a ontinuous
time dierential equation results in the following equation:
66
p˙ =
µ
γ
[
βF
2
(f − p) + βC
2
(p˙− p¨) + dnoiset − rt
]
E(W ). (5.55)
66
For the details of this transformation the reader is referred to Fisher (2012). It is important to point
out that the bakward-looking behavior of hartists results in a seond-order dierential equation.
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After transforming this equation into the frequeny domain the following transfer fun-
tion an be derived:
67
p(s)
dnoise(s)− r(s) =
2
βF
s2 βC
βF
+ s
(
2γ
µE(W )βF
− βC
βF
)
+ 1
. (5.56)
This funtion gives the log-prie eet on a positive shok in noise trading or a negative
shok in interest rates. If we would assume that interest rates are solely determined
by the entral bank, this yields the strong result that an expansionary monetary shok
an not be distinguished from a positive noise trading shok both leading to a boom in
asset pries. However, in the basi representation of this model noise trading is assumed
to follow a stohasti proess while the interest rate is determined endogenously. As
setion 6 will show, an inrease in inequality an also lead to a derease in the interest
rate (as suggested by the global savings glut hypothesis) resulting in a prie boom for
assets. Therefore in our model we an link inequality and asset bubbles.
The omputed transfer funtion resembles the so-alled PT2 transfer funtion:
F (s) =
K
1
ω20
s2 + 2D
ω0
s+ 1
. (5.57)
The fator K ≡ 2
βF
determines the peak to an impulse shok. In our ase, this eet is
lower for high values of βF indiating strong fundamental trading. The given funtion
has the following eigenvalues
68
:
s1/2 = ω0(−D ±
√
D2 − 1). (5.58)
The stability onditions requiring the real part of the eigenvalue to be negative (Re{si} <
0) yields the following ondition:69
D =
2γ
µE(W )
√
βFβC
−
√
βC
βF
> 0⇒ γ > 0.5µE(W )βC . (5.59)
This ondition implies that if the risk aversion falls below a spei threshold the durable
market beomes unstable. The rationale for this is that low risk aversion empowers
strong trading that in the presene of hartist traders (βC 6= 0) results in boom/bust-
yles. This result is also interesting in the light of the results of the previous setion.
Low risk aversion an help to maintain a stable amount of debt due to the ight eet.
67
The transformation of a funtion into the frequeny domain is given by the solution of the Fourier
integral: y(s) =
∫
∞
0 y(t)e
−stdt. For an introdution to the tehniques of disussing dierential
equations in the frequeny domain the reader is referred to Franklin et al. (1998).
68
Note that the imaginary part of the eigenvalues also gives the length of the yle in the nanial
market.
69
This is only a lower bound. The exat threshold value is even higher sine the non-linear destabilizing
eet resulting from the swithing to the hartist strategy (negleted in our analysis by setting γ = 0)
kiks in.
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Meanwhile, this is aompanied by high prie volatility. This in turn ats through the
ollateral onstraint and an promote (unsustainable) debt growth (in time of asset
bubbles) and debt-deation dynamis (in times of asset prie busts). The stabilizing
eet of low risk aversion for debt markets therefore an be outdone by the destabilizing
eet on asset markets.
Another fator ontributing to market instability is a high value of market illiquidity µ.
Illiquid markets (for instane housing market) reat severely on exess demand ausing
strong prie utuations that are further amplied by hartist traders. This result also
holda in the market for savings for whih strong illiquidity ontributed to instability.
Finanial volatility is haraterized by high absolute returns in the market for durables.
Starting from equation 5.19 in a rst-order approximation, absolute returns an be
desribed as follows:
|pt+1 − pt| = µ
N
N∑
i=1
|MPCDt| · |Wi,t| = µ · |MPCDt| · |E(Wt)|. (5.60)
This implies that high mean levels of absolute net worth |E(Wt)| lead to high nanial
volatility.
Opposed to the results of Fisher (2012), (impliitly) assuming CARA traders rather
than CRRA traders, the mean net worth E(Wt) (whih in a rst approximation is as-
sumed to be onstant in time) also ontributes to market instability. High net worth
allows traders to massively engage in trading in the market and therefore has the ana-
log eet of low risk aversion. In our simulations, we assume that agents start with
zero debt. However, as simulation time progresses low-inome agents will lever up to
nane onsumption while high-inome agents, as a mirror image, hold the resulting
laims. For low-inome households the debt redues net worth, while inreasing debt
for high-inome households. The inequality of net worth thereby inreases. Yet, in net
this is a zero-sum game not hanging the mean. However, in open eonomies with in-
ome inequality haraterized by an exess supply of savings rih households hold laims
against foreigners. This eet is further amplied by underdeveloped nanial markets
posing strong ollateral onstraints on low-inome households, thus not enabling them to
lever up. An unbalaned urrent aount thereby inreases mean net worth and thereby
makes nanial markets more unstable. This ase emerges for a urrent aount surplus
eonomy.
5.4.3. Interation between the Market for Durables and the
Market for Debt
Summarizing the two preeding setions, we derive an argument for more equality on a
domesti and a world-wide level. A primary deit an lead to a Ponzi style debt bubble.
On the other side, a primary surplus through the hannel of net worth an ontribute
to high volatility and even instability in the market for durables. Our model framework
traes bak both fators to inome inequality and nanial markets.
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In eet, nanial stability in our model has two speiations. Stability of debt - i.e.
the absene of Ponzi shemes - and stability of durable markets - implying the absene
of unsustainable asset prie booms. Both markets are interonneted by means of the
ollateral onstraint. Thus, they have ommon fators. These ommon fators, however,
at in inverse diretions.
Low risk aversion γ promotes the ight eet leading to stable markets for debt.
On the other side, low risk aversion an enhane speulation in markets for durables.
Therefore, times of low risk aversion (e.g. the subprime risis) aused by new-era thinking
or by the introdution of new hedging instruments an go along with asset prie bubbles.
Opposed to that, times of high risk aversion (e.g. the urrent European sovereign debt
risis) an lead to prevailing Ponzi shemes.
Another inverse eet an be seen for the equity ratio m. While high levels of eq-
uity ratio help to stabilize the market for debt by restriting the amount of debt to a
manageable level, they negatively impat the market for durables. Strong onstraints
in the presene of inome inequality lead to a urrent aount surplus aompanied by
inreased mean net worth feeding bak into destabilizing asset market speulation. More
generally, the equity ratiom an also be onsidered as a proxy for nanial development,
whereas high values an be interpreted as times of nanial repression.
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While the lat-
ter helps to maintain debt manageable (not only for the government, but also for private
households), it promotes speulation in durable markets.
In the presented analysis of the market for debt, we did not onsider the eet of
booms in the market for durables (E(∆p) > 0). As already presented in gure 5.8, an
asset prie boom is mostly naned via a urrent aount deit (as seen in Ireland,
USA, and Spain)
71
. A urrent aount deit lowers the mean net worth, eventually
stabilizing the market for durables, although this eet may not be suient to stabilize
markets in times of growing pries, allowing for higher indebtedness. Hene, an asset
prie boom is frequently followed by a debt risis (as seen in the reent risis) rather
than being in the reverse hronologial order.
5.5. The Funtional Inome Distribution and the
Distribution of Wealth
The last setions disussed the issue of nanial stability in the framework of our model.
In the following, we onsider the issue of wealth inequality. In the presented model, we
annot make a statement about inequality of labor inome as we exogenize all deisions
in the domain of the labor market. The distribution of wealth, however, endogenously
evolves in our model. As emphasized in the previous setions rather than the distribution
of inome, the distribution of wealth matters for the issue of nanial stability. Therefore,
in this part we disuss the funtional distribution of inome (the split between labor and
70
The return of this phenomenon in the reent years is doumented in Reinhart and Rogo (2011).
71
For more rigorous empirial evidene the reader is referred to Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009). The
authors show that real estate pries are a key driver of urrent aounts.
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apital inome) as well as the distribution of wealth. These two onepts are losely
intervened as apital inome is merely the produt of aumulated apital multiplied by
the urrent rate of interest. In partiular, we investigate onditions of stability. Note
that a divergene of wealth inequality also leads to inreased nanial instability.
5.5.1. Relation between Personal and Funtional Distribution of
Inome
The existing empirial literature (e.g. Atkinson et al. (2011)) fouses on the personal
distribution of inome. In ontrast the Post-Keynesian literature has always foused on
the funtional distribution of inome dierentiating between inome out of labor and
apital. As already put forward in setion 3.2, there has been some reent evidene
reported in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) showing that there has been a long-run
deline of the labor share. As put forward by Milanovi (2014), the ausality ould run
from an inrease in the apital share to an inrease in inome inequality.
To verify this statement onsider the following thought experiment. We have two
forms of inome - labor inome Y and apital inome rK - and mix them without
hanging the aggregate level of inome. Total inome X is given by the sum of labor Y
and apital inome rK:72
X = Y + rK ↔ 1 = Y
X
+
rK
X
= (1− α) + α, (5.61)
for whih α desribes the share of apital inome.
Taking a sale invariant inequality measurement (ineq(X))73 has the eet that the
(uniform) rate of interest does not have an impat on the funtional distribution of api-
tal inome for a given distribution of apital. Furthermore, assume that the distribution
of inome and apital are not negatively orrelated:
74 75
ineq(X) = ineq([1 − α]Y + αrK) ≈ (1− α)ineq(Y ) + α · ineq(rK)
= (1− α)ineq(Y ) + α · ineq(K), (5.62)
72
Note that our annotation is in disaord with the traditional literature in whih Y does not signify
labor inome, but total inome being the sum of labor and apital inome. For sake of onsisteny,
we, however, keep the notation from our work.
73
For this ase, a saling of the underlying measurement - e.g. in the form of urreny onversion - does
not hange the reported level of inequality. Amongst others, the popular indiators Gini oeient
and oeient of variation satisfy this ondition.
74
For the unrealisti ase that inome and apital are negatively orrelated - implying that agents with
a high inome have a low level of wealth and vie versa - an inrease in the apital share would lead
a derease in the personal distribution of inome. In this bak of the envelope omputation, there
is no orrelation between inome and wealth. As we, however, show in the following, in line with
empirial evidene labor inome and wealth are positively orrelated.
75
For some readers it might seem surprising to ompute the following equation from the previous
equation. To grasp the result onsider the following simple analogy. Consider mixing a oktail out
of two ingredients, a non-aloholi beverage and a liquor. The total amount of oktail X is given
(e.g. 0.3 l). Properties of this oktail - in partiular the total alohol ontent - an be derived from
the share of the aloholi ingredient. In fat, the total share of alohol is the produt of the share
of the spirit 0 < α < 1 and its aloholi ontent A: αA.
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with the result:
∂ineq(X)
∂α
= −ineq(Y ) + ineq(K) !> 0↔ ineq(K)
ineq(Y )
> 1, (5.63)
whih always holds, sine - as widely doumented in the empirial literature - the stok
measurement (apital) is more unequally distributed than the ow measurement (in-
ome).
76
However, the eet an also go in the opposite diretion - implying that higher inome
inequality is followed by higher apital ratios. The rest of this setion disusses this
diretion of ausality - whih we onsider to be more relevant - in the framework of our
model.
77
Using the ow of debt equation, we an ompute between stok and ow. Starting
from equation 5.46, the stok level of debt (D = −K) in the steady-state (D˙ = 0) an
be derived:
D˙ = Y (−1 + cy) + Y Hcw + Y P E(∆p)
γ
H + c¯
+r0 exp(µrD)
[
−HY P
γ
+D
(
1− cy + P
γ
)]
−D
(
cw +
E(∆p)
γ
P
)
!
= 0,
(5.64)
with s ≡ 1 − cy, no demand for durable assets (γ → ∞)78 and the interest rate being
set exogenously r0 exp(µrD) ≡ r leading to:79
Y (Hcw − s) + c¯ = D(cw − rs), (5.65)
and resulting in:
K = −D = Y cwH − s
rs− cw +
c¯
rs− cw . (5.66)
We an present this result in a funtion as depited in gure 5.18. The funtion is of
the general type:
K = kyY + k0. (5.67)
For the ase without onsumption out of wealth (cw = 0), the ase boils down to the
Keynesian ase (f. gure 4.1) in whih the level of inome splitting net savers and
indebted households is given by Y ∗ = c¯
s
.
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For the speial ase in whih ow and stok level share the same degree of inequality (ineq(Y ) =
ineq(K)), a hange in the funtional distribution would not have an impat (∂ineq(X)∂α = 0).
77
The numerial results presented in setion 6.2.2, show that there is no lear ut relationship. The
underlying mehanisms that trade-o are disussed in detail in the mentioned setion.
78
This ruial assumption shuts down the eet of demand for durables. Sine we are interested in a
long-run relation, this assumption is justiable sine the long-run demand for durables is zero and
does not impat on wealth inequality. For a formal argument refer to setion 5.5.2.
79
Another way of deriving this result would be to solve the dierential equation of 5.46 leading to
D(t) = D0 exp([rs− cw]t)− Y (cwH−s)+c¯rscw . For the initial ondition of no debt D0 = 0 the same result
is derived. Furthermore, for the ase of rs − cw < 0 the exponential term onverges to zero if time
goes to innity - leading to the same steady state.
Figure 5.18.: CapitalK as a funtion of labor inome Y in the labor dominated eonomy
(Hr < 1) and in the eonomy without onspiuous onsumption (c¯ = 0)
Note that the ratio of apital (monetary assets) to labor inome Ψ ≡ K
Y
depends on
the level of inome, if we assume the presene of a relative inome motive (c¯ 6= 0):
Ψ =
K
Y
=
cwH − s
rs− cw +
c¯
Y (rs− cw) . (5.68)
In fat, the ratio of apital to inome inreases with inome:
∂Ψ
∂Y
= − c¯
rs− cw
1
Y 2
> 0, (5.69)
as long as:
rs < cw, (5.70)
is satised, sine Y > 0 and c¯ > 0. This ondition was already required for a onvergene
of apital for a non-zero initial debt (D0 6= 0) (f. the disussion in footnote 79). To
speak in eonomi terms, the ondition requires that the return of saved inome is lower
than the onsumption of wealth, implying that the level of apital does onverge.
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Meanwhile, for the ase without subsistene onsumption (c¯ = 0), the apital inome
ratio is idential for all agents:
Ψ(c¯ = 0) =
s− cwH
cw − rs . (5.71)
80
As put forward more thoroughly in the following setion, this also implies a negative real interest
rate net of depreiation.
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In this ase, a hange in the personal distribution of inome would not have an eet on
the aggregate funtional distribution of inome. Or, to argue in the negative diretion,
the presene of onspiuous onsumption leads to the fat that hanges in the personal
distribution of inome also lead to hanges in the funtional distribution of inome.
Besides the ondition cw > rs previously introdued, we have to assume:
s > cwH, (5.72)
to generate a positive amount of apital for high-inome agents (limY→∞Ψ = ky =
s−cwH
cw−rs
!
> 0) rather than debt. In ontrast to the rst ondition, impating on the stok
quantity debt respetively apital (see equation 5.70) the latter relates to the ow Y .
The ondition requires that agents save more than they onsume out of the ow inome.
As will be disussed in the subsequent setion, the same onditions are also required for
a onvergene of wealth.
The two onditions are also neessary to onstrut a realisti ratio between apital
and inome as presented in gure 5.18. The ondition 5.70 - inuening the oset k0 of
equation 5.66 - ensures that low-inome agents are indebted in the presene of relative
onsumption eets. Meanwhile, the ombination of the two onditions - driving the
slope ky of the urve desribed in equation 5.66 - ensures both that apital inreases
with inome and high-inome agents hold apital (rather than debt).
We an also ombine the two onditions yielding a third ondition:
s
H
> cw > rs→ Hr < 1↔ H < 1
r
. (5.73)
Keeping in mind that heritage H is dened as initial endowment with assets (P0q0
Y
= H),
the ondition impliitly requires that the initial endowment with assets is lower than the
present value of human apital:
81
P0q0 <
Y
r
. (5.74)
This is a very interesting result as it implies that the majority of wealth should ome
from human apital and thereby from one's own labor rather than inherited wealth. As
summarized in the survey of Davies and Shorroks (2000), there is major disagreement
in the empirial literature about the level of self-made wealth as a share of total wealth.
However, there is a slight onsensus that in the US self-made wealth (i.e. non-inherited
wealth) dominates and that its share of total wealth amounts to approximately 60%
(Davies and Shorroks, 2000, p. 656). In the term of our model, this would imply
Hr = 2
3
< 1.82
The ratio of apital to labor inome is a funtion f of the following inputs:
Ψ(c¯ = 0) = f(s[+], r[+], cw[−], H [−]), (5.75)
81
The subjet of human apital was already onsidered in setion 4.2.
82
This is the ase sine total wealth is given by W = Yr +HPY =
Y
r +HY with P = P0 = 1 making
the share of self-made wealth 0.6 = 11+Hr → Hr = 23 .
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for whih the symbols in brakets indiate the diretion of the marginal eet if ondi-
tions 5.70 and 5.72 hold. While a higher savings ratio s and a higher rate of interest
r inrease the level of apital, higher onsumption out of wealth cw - ating like a de-
preiation on wealth - derease the apital ratio. Somewhat surprisingly a high level of
heritageH dereases the equilibrium value of the ratio of apital to labor inome Ψ. This
an be explained by the fat that this variable always works together with onsumption
out of wealth cw adding to the depreiation of apital.
We an also ompute the relation between net worth - i.e. apital and durable assets -
and inome. By assumption P0q0 = HY and - as shown in A.6 - this result is also stable
in the long-run implying that inequality of assets is only driven by initial onditions.
83
Thus, we have:
W = Pq −D = HY + Y cwH − s
rs− cw +
c¯
rs− cw = Y
s(rH − 1)
rs− cw +
c¯
rs− cw . (5.76)
For the ase of no subsistene onsumption (c¯ = 0), the net worth to labor inome ratio
Ω ≡ W
Y
is of a funtional form h:
Ω(c¯ = 0) ≡ lim
Y→∞
Ω =
s(1− rH)
cw − rs = h(s[+], r[+], cw[−], H [−]), (5.77)
for the onditions given in equation 5.70 and 5.72 holding. Idential to the ase of
apital to labor inome the input fators have the same eet. Furthermore, the ratio
that would prevail in a senario without onspiuous onsumption (c¯ = 0) for all agents
is only reahed for the rihest agent in the relative onsumption ase (c¯ 6= 0). The
ase without the relative onsumption eet (c¯ = 0) is also depited in gure 5.18.
It is important to point out that in this ase inequality of wealth equals inequality of
inome (ineq(K) = ineq(Y )). This is the ase sine wealth and inome in this ase are
just saled by a uniform fator Ω. This result is learly at odds with empirial evidene
showing that wealth is onsiderably more unequally distributed than the ow quantity of
inome (e.g. Davies and Shorroks (2000)). Thereby, our model requires a onspiuous
onsumption eet to generate realisti features of wealth inequality.
Moreover, the fator Ω is in line with the apital oeient as omputed in Piketty
(2014) and also referred to in setion 4.2 as κ, whih inludes both nominal apital
(already aptured in the fator Ψ) as well as real assets. The latter are in xed supply
in our model and are transferred to agents by means of inheritane. This ratio, however,
is a bit more ompliated than the simple ratios disussed in setion 4.2. The underlying
fators, however, have the same marginal impat regarding their sign.
Using aggregate data Piketty (2014) omputes a total apital to total inome of approx.
4.5 for Germany in 2010.
84
Using data from Bundesbank (2013) we an reapitulate the
83
The following setion elaborates more on this topi onsidering neessary assumption and pratial
impliations.
84
This value an also be interpreted in the way that it take 4.5 years to produe the amount of apital
already aumulated.
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Figure 5.19.: Mean net worth as a funtion of mean net annual inome [Euro℄ (Data
soure: Bundesbank (2013))
result from an individual perspetive
85
(see gure 5.19). We onrm the negative oset -
whih in theory is rationalized by the presene of a minimum onsumption level - and a
slope of Ωy ≈ 6. Note that the average or aggregate apital inome ratio (ΩY = Ωy + k0Y )
is lower than the individual ratio Ωy =
s(1−rH)
cw−rs due to the presene of the relative
onsumption term c¯ 6= 0 making k0 < 0. Hene, these miro results are in line with the
aggregate or maro results of Piketty (2014).
The aim of this setion is to ompute a losed-form version of individual prot share
depending on individual inome and resulting from the given onsumption funtion. We
an start by relating the apital inome rK to labor inome:
rK
Y
=
r(cwH − s)
rs− cw +
rc¯
Y (rs− cw) . (5.78)
85
The underlying data ome from the HFCS miro survey. In Bundesbank (2013), however, only 6 data
points are presented representing the average net worth respetively inome of 6 bins.
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If this ratio exeeds one, apital inome has a larger share. The prot share an be
omputed as follows:
α ≡ rK
rK + Y
=
[
1 +
(
rK
Y
)−1]−1
=
(
1 +
Y (rs− cw)
Y r(cwH − s) + rc¯
)−1
=
Y r(cwH − s) + rc¯
rc¯+ Y cw(Hr − 1)
(5.79)
This implies that the individual apital share is a funtion of inome. In partiular,
there exists a threshold level of inome under whih the ratio turns negative, implying
that these agents are net debtors. This level is given by (also ompare with gure 5.18):
Y <
c¯
s− cwH (5.80)
In eet, the aggregate apital share (α =
∑N
i=1 α(Yi)) an be positive, negative or
even zero depending on the distribution of inome Y . Note that in the ase onsidered
in our model an aggregate apital share of zero is aompanied by a balaned urrent
aount, whereas a positive (negative) apital share is the signal of a series of urrent
aount surpluses (deits) aompanied by laims (debt) to foreigners. Consider the
following thought experiment: there is a given distribution of inome, for whih there
is immigration into the eonomy of very high-inome individuals with a positive apital
share. This inreases the level of inequality and the aggregate apital share. However,
the onverse an be the ase. Assume that for a given distribution of inome there
is immigration of low-inome agents who are net debtors. While - one again - the
inequality inreases the apital share dereases. As a result, there is no lear-ut relation
between personal inome distribution and the aggregate share of apital inome.
It is important to point out that - given that onditions 5.70 and 5.72 hold - the indi-
vidual apital share inreases with total inome, implying that rentiers are individuals
with high (total) inomes and workers agents with low inome. This is eventually in line
with the empirial results as presented in (Piketty, 2014, gure 8.4 and 8.10 for Frane
and the USA).
One again, for high levels of inome the measurement onverges to the level we would
pereive without a relative onsumption eet:
limY→∞α = α(c¯ = 0) =
r(s− cwH)
cw(1−Hr) = h(s[+], r[+], cw[−], H [−]) > 0, (5.81)
sine the eet of relative onsumption beomes negligible. To speak in eonomi terms,
this implies that for a framework with relative onsumption only the rihest house-
hold reah the apital share any households would have in a senario without relative
onsumption eets (c¯ = 0). The input fators have the well-known marginal eets.
Furthermore, given the onditions 5.70 and 5.72, the ratio is always positive, implying a
urrent aount surplus eonomy. Moreover, this implies that the personal distribution
of inome does not impat on the apital share. This also repeats the argument - already
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presented - arguing that labor inome Y and apital K in this ase would follow the
same distribution, whih is at odds with empirial evidene. One again, the presene
of relative onsumption eets is ruial for deriving realisti features.
If we assume onspiuous onsumption (c¯ 6= 0) and, moreover, the spei ase rs =
cw, high-inome households extrat their total inome from apital rents (limY→∞ α = 1).
Other than that we have, limY→∞ α < 1.
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Up to this point we disussed the ase in whih onditions 5.70 and 5.72 hold and
showed that this generates realisti results. In partiular, in this ase low-inome agents
hold debt and high-inome agents are lenders. As a result, the individual apital share of
inome αi inreases with non-apital inome Yi as well as total inome (Xi = Yi+ rKi =
rk0 + (1 + rky)Yi) as the two are positively orrelated.
87
We also showed that the
onditions - whih will also reour as neessary onditions for onvergene of wealth
(f. setion 5.5.2) - implied that the prime share of agents' wealth results from labor
inome and therefore from human apital rather than inherited wealth (P0q0 <
Y
r
).
In his ontroversial work, Piketty (2014) argues that we are urrently witnessing a
turning point in history and he foresees a return of Patrimonial apitalism, for whih
the prime soure of wealth and inome is not labor but (inherited) apital. In the terms
of our model this implies:
P0q0 >
Y
r
. (5.82)
It is easy to show that this implies a reverse of the onditions 5.70 and 5.72:
s
H
< cw < rs→ 1 < rH → 1 < rP0q0
Y
→ Y
r
< P0q0. (5.83)
This ase is depited in gure 5.20. One again, individual apital Ki inreases with
individual labor inome Yi. However, in this ase, agents with zero labor inome even-
tually hold apital rather than debt:
K(Y = 0) =
c¯
rs− cw > 0, (5.84)
sine rs > cw. Thereby, all agents are net lenders and we have a urrent aount surplus
eonomy. The eonomi impliation of this ondition - onerning the stok - is that
agents earn a higher return on apital than onsuming out of stok. As a result, the
stok of apital is ever inreasing. Going along with the underlying assumption that
the aggregate level of inome is onstant the apital ratio κ diverges.88 The seond
ondition - onsidering ows - neessary to sustain this result requires s < cwH . This
ondition implies that the agents onsume more than they save out of their ow inome.
Nevertheless, agents do aumulate wealth due to their high inherited wealth. The latter,
however, also implies that the apital to inome ratio dereases with inome:
∂Ψ
∂Y
=
c¯
cw − rs
1
Y 2
= − k0
Y 2
< 0. (5.85)
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This follows diretly from the ondition 5.70 requiring cw > rs.
87
This is the ase sine ky > 0.
88
As will be disussed in setion 5.5.2, this also implies a divergene in wealth inequality.
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Figure 5.20.: Capital K as a funtion of labor inome Y in a soiety dominated by
inheritane
The same result holds true for the apital share α. This implies that those agents with
a low level of urrent labor inome have a high share of apital inome. Or put more
bluntly, we have poor rentiers and wealthy workers - in disordane with the empirial
evidene presented in Piketty (2014). This is ertainly not the ase for the working
population. However, this result an prevail for pensioners. In fat, the rentier soiety
foreseen by Piketty (2014) might eventually just be a result of demographi problem. As
the labor market partiipation rate dereases sine - for a given legal age of retirement - in
a world with dereasing fertility and inreasing longevity, a large share of the population
must rely on apital inome rather than labor inome to earn a living. If we redo our
thought experiment, this implies that an eonomy with a given distribution of labor
inome Y experiening migration of very high-inome agents inreasing the inequality of
labor inome eventually witnesses a derease in the apital share. Vie versa, a migration
of agents with low labor inome leads to the fat that the apital share inreases.
As a result, we onsider the inheritane dominated soiety (with Hr > 1) an interest-
ing thought experiment, but not a realisti desription of reality. Moreover, we feel that
the emphasis on the funtional distribution of inome is interesting and simple (mainly
relying on a two agents ase with workers and apitalists), although it fails to apture
important underlying features. Therefore, in the following setion we onsider the ase
of wealth inequality with N agents.
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5.5.2. Inequality of the Distribution of Wealth
This setion disusses the neessary onditions for a onvergene in wealth inequality,
implying that there is no ever-expanding path for whih the rih always get riher but
in the long-run all agents are equal or at least that inequality onverges to a nite level
(Gini < 1). In a nutshell, we emphasize two onditions. Firstly, dereasing returns
to apital lead to the fat that the wealth distribution onverges to total equality.
89
The seond ondition requires a dereasing savings ratio for rih individuals. In the
following, we will formalize these arguments, onsider them within the normative eo-
nomi literature and in the ontext of our model. We also relate the results to empirial
evidene.
Our review follows the maroeonomis and nane literature to explain wealth in-
equality. We, however, do not onsider the important aspet of inheritane and intergen-
erational transfers whih is at the heart of the rationale of Piketty (2014) and disussed
in the literature of family eonomis.
Key results of the literature of family eonomis (f. e.g. Davies and Shorroks (2000))
are that wealth inequality inreases in time if wealth and fertility are negatively orre-
lated - implying that low net worth agents split their wealth amongst a large number of
desendants.
90
Assortative mating in the marriage market leads to inreased wealth in-
equality. The onrete ways of inheriting also matter: As emphasized in Stiglitz (1969),
primogeniture - the tradition of only bequeathing the oldest (male) ospring - inreases
wealth inequality. In ontrast, Beker and Tomes (1976) emphasize that bequests even-
tually derease wealth inequality as altruisti parents bequeath more to ospring with
less human apital, providing a form of insurane. This argument, however, only applies
within a partiular family, yet not amongst dierent families for whih abilities are far
more unequally distributed and therefore an be onsidered slightly awed.
Linear Savings Funtions
We follow the argumentation of Stiglitz (1969) using a standard neo-lassial growth
model. The rst ondition requires dereasing returns to apital k or negative sale
eets. This requires dereasing returns:
f ′′(k) < 0, (5.86)
respetively onvergene of returns to zero for high amounts of apital:
lim
k→∞
r(k) = lim
k→∞
f ′(k) = 0. (5.87)
This result is interesting, as the onvergene of the omplete eonomy to a steady state
requires the same onditions as the onvergene of the distribution of wealth. Or put
89
In this ontext, it is interesting to point out that Marx assumed that dereasing returns to apital
lead to a ollapse of the apitalist system. As shown here, apitalism leads to a form of soialism -
in the sense that all individuals hold the same level of wealth.
90
As noted by MCloskey (2014) the extreme ase where wealthy individuals have no desendants,
however, leads to the fat that rih dynasties ompletely die out.
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dierently, in the analytial framework of a neolassial growth model, a non-growing
eonomy is haraterized by an equally distributed wealth.
Note that in this ase, we argue from a neo-lassial perspetive in whih apital is
paid aording to its marginal produt. Another way of formalizing this argument would
be:
∂ k˙
k
∂k
< 0. (5.88)
In eonomi terms, it requires the growth-rate of apital to fall with the amount of
invested apital.
The ondition an also be presented as follows:
lim
k→∞
k˙
k
< 0. (5.89)
To aount for the seond argument of dereasing savings ratios, we have to make an
assumption about the onsumption funtion. However, initially we have to desribe the
ow of apital. For an individual agent, it is given as follows:
k˙ = y − c = f(k)− c. (5.90)
We normalize the equations and in partiular apital in eetive labor terms (k = K
AN
).
Input fators are assumed to be paid aording to their marginal produtivity:
y = f(k) = rk + w = f ′(k)k + w. (5.91)
Let us assume a simple linear onsumption funtion of the type:
91
c = c¯+ cyy + cwk. (5.92)
Note that due to the existene of a subsistene level of onsumption c¯ 6= 0 the savings
ratio inreases with inome.
92
Dening s = 1− cy this implies:
k˙ = s(f ′(k)k + w)− c¯− cwk = srk + sw − c¯− cwk, (5.93)
leading to:
k˙
k
= sr − cw + sw − c¯
k
. (5.94)
Condition 5.89 relates to the stok of apital. If we disuss the previous equation in this
light, this makes a statement about the rst two terms. We require:
lim
k→∞
k˙
k
= lim
k→∞
(sr − cw) = lim
k→∞
(sf ′(k)− cw) < 0, (5.95)
91
The notation in this ase is kept similar to the onsumption funtion employed in our ase. We
however, employ small ase letters in order to signify variables in eetive labor terms.
92
The latter part is more thoroughly disussed in setion 4.3.
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whih holds for dereasing returns (limk→∞ f
′(k) = 0) together with onsumption out
of apital:
cw > 0. (5.96)
If we have no sale eets for apital
93
, implying that all individuals earn the same rate
of return on apital r, long-run onvergene requires:
sr < cw. (5.97)
As pointed out in Bertola (2000), onsumption out of apital cw > 0 in a standard Solow-
type growth models is modeled via depreiation of apital cw = sδ (Solow, 1956), for
whih δ is equal to the geometri rate of depreiation. Therefore, the latter ondition is
equal to the ondition requiring a negative real interest rates net of depreiation r−δ < 0,
implying the ase in whih long-run apital onverges to a nite level.
Following the example presented in Carroll (1998) we an make a very striking om-
putation. Consider Bill Gates, who at the time of writing this text is laimed to be the
rihest single person in the world, as doumented by the Forbes List with a net worth of
approximately 82.5 billion US$ (Forbes-Magazine, 2014). If he would only onsume out
of his net worth and not of inome (s = 1), a onvergene of his inome level in nom-
inal terms would require r = cw (the knife-edge ondition). For the ase of an interest
rate of 3% this would result in an amount of non-durable onsumption of roughly 6.8
million US$ daily. Reall the fat that most luxury goods (e.g. jewelry or yahts) are
durables and thereby only lead to a reomposition of the balane sheet and thus do not
ontribute to the attempted redution of wealth. Yet, there are luxury goods that an
be onsidered non-durables, suh as vaations to exoti plaes or VIP-tikets to sports
or ultural events. However, the working rih in ontrast to the idle rih in the times of
Keynes and Marx do not possess the neessary time to enjoy this sort of onsumption.
The new aste of entrepreneur rih rather than rentiers thereby also implies a stronger
persistene of wealth inequality.
It might also be interesting in reoniling the onvergene of wealth ondition rs < cw
with the results of the optimal ontrol problem as presented in setion 4.2. In this
setion, we showed that for an eonomy without inome growth (g = 0) the result is
easy to transform into a standard Keynesian ase with c¯ = cw = 0 and cy =
ρ
r
. Inserting
this result in the stability ondition yields:
rs < cw ↔ r(1− cy) = r
(
1− ρ
r
)
< cw = 0→ r < ρ, (5.98)
implying that equality of wealth only emerges for the urrent aount deit ase - in
whih in the long-run agents onsume an amount of zero and hold debt. This is also
straightforward from intuition sine it implies that - sine all agents hold zero net worth
- they are all idential in terms of wealth.
94
93
Formally this implies f ′′(k) = 0 and f ′(k) = r for all k > 0.
94
It is, however, notieable that all agents hold a heterogeneous level of debt idential to their human
apital Yi/r.
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Figure 5.21.: Parameter region of dynami (in)eieny and wealth (in)equality
We an also disuss the ase of a growing eonomy g > 0. (Deaton, 1991, p. 1237, eq.
26) argued that a onvergene in wealth inequality (Gini(W∞) < 1) only emerges if the
following ondition holds:
β/RE(G−γ) < 1. (5.99)
In this ase E represents the expetation operator95 and γ the risk aversion of a CRRA-
type utility funtion. One an reformulate this equation to make it apply to the ase
derived in setion 4.2. As we assume that inome growth does not ontain a stohasti
omponent (E(g) = g) , the following result an be derived:96 97
r − ρ < γg. (5.100)
It is important to emphasize that this ondition is less restritive than the ondition
g > r emphasized for the onvergene of the apital ratio κ in the work of Piketty
(2014) for all ρ > 0 and γ ≥ 1.
For the speial ase of an isoelasti utility funtion (γ = 1) disussed in setion 4.2
the ondition reads as follows:
r − ρ < g. (5.101)
95
Note that this equation argues with ertainty equivalents (the rst moment) and does not aount
for noise in the inome proess also playing an important role in shaping the distribution of wealth.
96
Furthermore, the derivation implies the standard log-linearization with G = 1 + g and log(β) −
log(R)− γ log(G) < 0→ −ρ+ r − γg < 0.
97
It is also important to note that the ase without growth of inome (g = 0) is a speial ase of this
one requiring r < ρ.
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We an ompare this ondition with the ondition of dynami eieny requiring r > g.
The onvergene of wealth equation r−ρ > g does not make a statement about dynami
(in)eieny per se. Yet, a ase with diverging wealth inequality (r − g > ρ > 0) is
always dynamially eient. In ontrast, the ase of wealth onvergene r − g < ρ an
be dynamially ineient. The relation between the two onepts is presented in gure
5.21.
As already shown in equation 4.64 there is a losed-form solution to the evolution
of debt respetively apital.
98
Following Fisher (2014) we take the ratio of apital
zt =
Ki,t
Kj,t
as a measurement of inequality between two agents with dierent labor inome
and inherited wealth. If this onverges to one in the long-run, we have total equality
(limt→∞ zt = 1). Otherwise we an have a nite level of inequality (limt→∞ zt < ∞) or
total inequality (limt→∞ zt =∞), implying a Gini oeient of 1.99
First, we disuss the ondition emphasized by Deaton (1991) (r−ρ < g). In this ase,
we have:
lim
t→∞
zt = lim
t→∞
(
Yi
r−g −Di
)
exp([r − ρ− g]t)− Yi
r−g(
Yj
r−g −Dj
)
exp([r − ρ− g]t)− Yj
r−g
=
−Yi
−Yj . (5.102)
As a result, all agents have zero net worth and aumulated a level of debt that is
equivalent to their human apital (
Yi
r−g respetively
Yj
r−g ).
The knife-edge ase (r− ρ = g), emphasized by asset priing theory (f. setion A.3),
yields:
lim
t→∞
zt =
−Di
−Dj . (5.103)
In this ase, the inequality only depends on the inherited apital or debt. Labor inome
does not matter sine it is ompletely onsumed as cy =
ρ
r−g = 1. This is the ase
emphasized by Piketty (2014). Or put dierently, if there was no inheritane (Di =
Dj = 0), there would also be no wealth inequality for this ase.
The third ase - the onverse ondition of Deaton (1991) - r − ρ > g leads to the
following result:
lim
t→∞
zt =
Yi
r−g −Di
Yj
r−g −Dj
. (5.104)
One again there is a nite level of inequality, this time, however, depending on both
an unequal ow of labor inome and inherited stok of apital. Moreover, the level of
inequality is growing in time (
dzt
dt
> 0 sine r − ρ − g > 0). Note that the ase of the
non-growing eonomy (g = 0) is nested within this ase. The knife-edge ase is r = ρ
and the ases of onvergene (divergene) are r < ρ (respetively r > ρ).
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It is important to point out that this losed-form solution only holds for the ase of dynami eieny
r > g. In the onverse ase, the growth rate of labor inome would always exeed the interest level
on apita, implying an innite value of human apital posing no onstraint on aquiring debt.
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To better grasp the ratio zt as a measurement of inequality it is important to note that it is related
to the Gini oeient in the following manner: Ginit =
zt−1
zt+1
for zt > 1 with Ki,t > Kj,t. Thereby,
we have Gini(z =∞) = 1 as well as Gini(z = 1) = 0.
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In general, these results also onrms the general trade-o between eieny and
equality (Okun, 1975). In an eonomy with positive aumulated apital, agents are
heterogeneous in terms of apital measurable in wealth inequality. On the other hand,
an eonomy in whih all agents are idential laks aumulation of apital.
The stability ondition is also in line with our Keynesian onsumption funtion as
presented in setion 4.2. For the onsumption funtion assumed for the growth ase we
require:
100
r − g < c¯w, (5.105)
for a onvergene to total equality (Gini(W∞) = 0). For the omputed value of c¯w = ρ,
we have the well-known ondition:
r − g < ρ. (5.106)
We an also ompare this result to the work of Piketty (2014) who argues that wealth
diverges in the long-run if r > g. Impliitly he assumes that ρ = 0. This assumption is
aompanied by the other impliit assumptions that there is no onsumption of wealth
(c¯w = ρ = 0) and the fat that all urrent inome is saved (s = 1 − c¯y = 1 − ρr−g = 1).
Thus, Piketty (2014) overestimates the region in whih wealth inequality prevails (also
f. with gure 5.21). On the other hand, if one follows Piketty (2014) - making the
assumption of ρ = 0 - in partiular as its value is not diretly observable in empirial data
- the onditions of dynami ineieny and onvergene of wealth inequality oinide in
the equation r < g (also f. with gure 5.21).
To summarize, in all ases inequality onverges to a nite level. For the ase in whih
r − g < ρ (deit eonomy) in the long-run all agents hold zero wealth and thereby
are idential. The level of debt, however, depends on their individual human apital.
For the inverse ase (r − g > ρ), wealth inequality onverges to a nite level depending
on both human apital and inherited wealth. For the knife-edge ase in the growing
eonomy (r − ρ = g), wealth inequality onverges to a nite level only depending on
initial onditions (i.e. inherited wealth). Note that we assumed a uniform rate of time
preferene ρ. As already shown in Beker (1980), if agents have heterogeneous time
preferenes in the long-run, all wealth is held by the single agent with the lowest time
preferene ρmin having the highest growth rate of apital gK = r− ρmin > 0. As already
shown a high rate of time preferene ρ implies a high savings ratio leading to the fat
that in a senario with heterogeneous savings rates the rihest agent is the agent with
the highest savings ratio (Bernardo et al., 2014).
Piketty (2014) - seeing himself in a tradition of eonomists suh as David Riardo and
Karl Marx - laims to have found a fundamental ontradition in the apitalist system -
where the dominant senario r > g leads to a long-run divergene in wealth inequality.
This bold laim sparked a large amount of omments by other eonomists trying to
proof him wrong. Nevertheless, all ommentators agreed with the fat that high levels
of interest rate r and low growth rates g ontribute to a high level of wealth inequality.
100
This is easy to verify if we keep in mind that debt-inome ratio (
D
Y ≡ −KY ) grows with r− g while it
is depleted by onsumption out of wealth c¯w.
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The simple relation r > g, however, holds only under very spei and unrealisti
assumptions. In partiular, he takes the unrealisti assumption of zero onsumption out
of wealth as well as urrent inome (cw = cy = 1 − s = 0). In result the fundamental
law of apitalism r > g of Piketty (2014) does not inevitably lead to omplete wealth
inequality.
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Commentators referring to the Post-Keynesian literature - in partiular to inuential
work of Kaldor, Kaleki, and Pasinetti - ause Piketty (2014) of onduting a fallay
of omposition error by equating the eonomi wide prot rate with the growth rate
of individual wealth growth (Bernardo et al., 2014). The Post-Keynesian literature
argue in a framework with two agents - the apitalists apturing total prots and the
worker apturing the residual wage inome - with heterogeneous saving rates out of ow
inome
102
(sc > sw
103
with c for apitalists and w for workers). In this ase the ondition
for ever inreasing wealth inequality is only determined by the apitalist scr > g.
104
As
in equation 5.97 this emphasizes the savings out of apital inome. Nevertheless, for
any realisti savings ratio sc < 1 this is less restritive than the ase of r < g brought
forward by Piketty (2014).
In this part, we assumed onsumption funtions without subsistene onsumption
(c¯ = 0). As already put forward in the previous setion, the latter, however, plays a
ruial role in determining the distribution of wealth. To inorporate the subsistene
onsumption eet we have to onsider ondition 5.88 fousing on the ow of inome.
Using this ondition we derive:
∂ k˙
k
∂k
= −sw − c¯
k2
< 0→ sw > c¯ (5.107)
This requires a positive degree of net savings. All households not aounting for this
ondition will onverge to a steady state of zero apital. It is also important to point
out that this ondition is always satised for the standard Solow-ase assuming no sub-
sistene onsumption c¯ = 0 and 0 < s < 1. In fat, this ondition refers to the last two
terms of equation 5.94 and thereby aounts for the ow terms - in ontrast to the rst
ondition derived from equation 5.89 making a statement about the stok terms.
We an also apply this rationale to our model. Therefore, we onsider our onrete ow
equation (see equation 5.46) in the light of ondition 5.88. Note that debt and apital
101
If one reads the work of Piketty (2014) preisely (inluding online tehnial appendix), he himself is
more modest. Nevertheless, the latter simple relation is easier to sell to a large audiene and even
works as a print on a t-shirt or a grati on a wall.
102
Note that this literature does not apture onsumption out of wealth impliitly assuming cw = 0.
103
This assumption is neessary to rule euthanasia of the rentier as oined in the last hapter of Keynes
(1936) implying a long-run onvergene of the apital share to α = 0 (Taylor, 2014).
104
Taylor (2014), furthermore, adds that r should be replaed by the eetive rate of interest exluding
taxes on apital and apital inome as well as depreiations.
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are mirror images k = −D leading to the following ow equation for an exogenous rate
of interest r:
k˙ = Y s−HcwY − c¯− Y HPE(∆p)
γ
− r
[
−HY P
γ
− k
(
s+
P
γ
)]
−k
(
cw +
PE(∆p)
γ
)
.
(5.108)
The ondition is of the form:
k˙
k
= A+
B
k
, (5.109)
for whih the neessary ondition for onvergene are (resulting from ondition 5.88:
105
)
− ∂
k˙
k
∂k
= B > 0, (5.110)
and (resulting from ondition 5.89):
lim
k→∞
k˙
k
= A < 0. (5.111)
The onrete values are:
A = r
(
s+
P
γ
)
− cw − PE(∆p)
γ
= rs− cw + P
γ
[r − E(∆P )], (5.112)
and:
B = −c¯+ Y
[
s+H
(
−cw + P
γ
[r − E(∆p)]
)]
, (5.113)
with the stability ondition satised if:
B > 0→ c¯
Y
< s+H
(
−cw + P
γ
[r − E(∆p)]
)
, (5.114)
and:
A = rs− cw + P
γ
[r −E(∆P )] < 0 (5.115)
For the speial ase of no Flight eet or Portfolio eets (γ → ∞) already assumed
in the previous setion, the rst ondition is the ondition for a primary surplus (see
equation 5.47):
∂ k˙
k
∂k
< 0→ c¯
Y
< s−Hcw. (5.116)
This implies that all households that earn beyond a spei level - guaranteeing them
to aumulate a surplus - onverge to the same nal level of apital.
105
This is the ase sine
∂k˙/k
∂k = − Bk2 < 0. with B 6= f(k).
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For innite risk aversion (γ → ∞) the seond ondition onverges to the already
derived ondition:
lim
k→∞
k˙
k
< 0→ rs < cw. (5.117)
In fat, these onditions are similar to the onditions 5.70 and 5.72 of the previous
setion. In this setion we presumed that interest rate is exogenous and no ight eets
prevail (γ →∞). The ondition 5.70 leading to a negative apital ratio for low-inome
households (k0 < 0) and an inreasing apital to labor inome ratio for inreasing inome
(ky > 0) is idential to the ondition 5.117 requiring a onvergene of net returns to a
negative level for high inomes.
Condition 5.72 argues from a ow rather than a stok perspetive and ensures that
apital rather than debt is aumulated. This ondition boils down to ondition 5.116
for the ase without relative onsumption eets (c¯ = 0). The ondition is neessary to
assure dereasing returns to apital in an environment without onspiuous onsumption
eets (c¯ = 0) . If there is no relative onsumption eet, all households maintain a
sustainable amount of onsumption without debt, the eonomy has a surplus, and all
households onverge to the same level of wealth as the savings and onsumption out out
wealth ratio is balaned (f. with gure 5.18).
Non-linear Savings Funtions
Up to this point, inreasing savings ratios were modeled via a linear Keynesian meha-
nism of subsistene onsumption. As already put forward in Stiglitz (1969), the behavior
beomes more omplex for a non-linear savings ratio. Let us assume a general non-linear
savings funtion s(k) depending on the level of apital k. The ow equation reads as
follows:
k˙ = s(k)↔ k˙
k
=
s(k)
k
. (5.118)
Condition 5.88
106
requires:
∂ k˙
k
∂k
=
s′(k)k − s(k)
k2
< 0→ s′(k)k < s(k), (5.119)
whih is equivalent to s′′(k) < 0, implying a onave savings funtion, respetively a
onvex onsumption funtion.
However, we an also follow the modeling of Carroll (1997) assuming buer stok
savings. Following the rationale presented in setion 4.4 we an model onsumption as a
funtion out of ash-on-hand being the sum of urrent (ow) inome and urrent stok
of wealth (y + k):
c = (y + k)θ. (5.120)
106
We an also ompute the result using ondition 5.89 requiring limk→∞
k˙
k = limk→∞
s(k)
k < 0. Using
the rule of l'Hpital this leads to limk→∞ s
′(k) < 0 idential to s′′(k) < 0.
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For 0 < θ < 1 this funtion is onave and the savings funtion is onvex, implying that
the savings ratio inreases for high inomes. The savings funtion is given as follows:
k˙ = s(k) = y − c = y − (y + k)θ = f(k)− [f(k) + k]θ. (5.121)
Using the ondition for the seond partial derivative with respet to apital yields:
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s′′(k) ≡ ∂
2s(k)
∂k2
< 0→ f ′′(k)
(
− [f(k) + k]
2−θ
θ
+ [f(k) + k]
)
> (1− θ)(f ′(k) + 1).
(5.122)
For the simple ase of a onstant return to sale tehnology (f ′′(k) = 0) - as also
prevailing in our model - this results in:
θ > 1, (5.123)
in diametrial result to the empirially onrmed onvex savings funtion (f. setion
4.4). As a result, in a senario were all agents earn the same uniform return on apital,
a onvex savings funtion leads to the fat that wealth inequality diverges. In the very
long-run (t→∞), the distribution of wealth onverges to a Gini of one.
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Figure 5.22.: Consumption Ct as a funtion of ash-on-hand (Xt = Yt+Wt) for dierent
degrees of risk aversion
In ontrast, the ondition θ < 1 implies a savings ratio that dereases with inome and
wealth thereby ontributing to a onvergene of wealth to a Gini of zero. Consider the
optimization problem presented in setion 4.4 adopted from the work of Carroll (1997).
It was assumed that utility annot only be derived from urrent onsumption Ct but
also from future wealth Wt+1, leading to the following utility funtion:
U = u(Ct) + v(Wt+1) =
C1−γct
1− γc +
W 1−γwt+1
1− γw . (5.124)
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The rst partial derivative is
∂s(k)
∂k = f
′(k)− θ[f(k) + k]θ−1(f ′(k) + 1).
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The assumption γc > γw made in setion 4.4 implies that agents derive higher utility
from wealth than from onsumption. This is the ase beause - for a given level of
onsumption (or wealth) - the level of marginal utility diminishes if the risk aversion
inreases. The optimization problem is subjet to a ow onstraint:
Wt+1 = (1 + r)(Wt + Yt − Ct), (5.125)
resulting in the following optimality ondition:
Cγct =
(Yt +Wt − Ct)γw
(1 + r)γw−1
. (5.126)
Let us now assume - onversely to the ase presented in setion 4.4 - that agents derive
more utility from onsumption than from wealth, with the oeients being γw = 1 >
γc = 0.5, leading to the following onsumption funtion:
Ct = 0.5(1 + 2(Wt + Yt)−
√
1 + 4(Wt + Yt)). (5.127)
The resulting onsumption funtion is depited in gure 5.22. Not only is the onsump-
tion level always lower than ash-on-hand (Xt = Yt+Wt), depited by the 45-degree-line
in gure 5.22), but it is also a onvex funtion of ash-on-hand. This implies that - in the
ase in whih agents prefer onsumption relative to wealth - the savings ratio dereases
with inome (and wealth). This is idential to a value of θ > 1 and thereby satises
the ondition of a onvergene of wealth. As a result, the presene of a love of wealth
motive in the utility funtion per se does not imply higher savings ratios for high-inome
individuals. The latter is only the ase if agents derive more utility from wealth than
from onsumption.
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Consider a more simple ase, in whih the savings ratio is given as follows:
109
s(y) = y1/θ, (5.128)
only depending on urrent inome y. Assume that prodution tehnology evolves a-
ording to a standard Cobb-Douglas type speiation (y = f(k) = kα); this leads
to:
s(k) = kα/θ, (5.129)
with the neessary ondition for stability:
∂2s(k)
∂k2
=
α
θ
(α
θ
− 1
)
k
α
θ
−2 < 0→ α < θ. (5.130)
For a sale-free tehnology (α = 1) this ondition holds for any θ > 1, implying a
onave savings funtion. A standard Cobb-Douglas type tehnology with dereasing
108
It is also important to note that if agents assign the same risk aversion to onsumption and wealth
γc = γw, onsumption is a linear funtion of ash-on-hand, even if heterogeneous weights are assigned
to the dierent soures of utility.
109
This rationale follows a similar argument presented in Fisher (2014).
149
returns to sale (0 < α < 1) allows for a onvex savings funtion 1 > θ > α up to a
ertain extent going along with an inreasing savings ratio for high-inome households.
The opposed ase with a positive sale tehnology α > 1 only allows for onave savings
funtion 1 < α < θ. Note that in this ase - opposed to the results presented earlier -
the onditions for equality of wealth are weaker.
As already shown, the standard Solow-type framework with c¯ = 0 and 0 < s < 1 leads
to a onvergene of wealth for dereasing returns. The impat of dereasing returns is
elaborated more thoroughly in Fisher (2014).
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The basi idea is the following. Assume
that apital evolves aording to the following prodution funtion:
kt+1 − kt = y − c = sy = sf(kt) = skαt . (5.131)
For the ase of 0 < α < 1, this is the standard Cobb-Douglas prodution tehnology
with dereasing returns to sale. Assume two individuals, one rih individual (index r)
with a high level of initial apital and a poor individual (index p) with a low level of
apital (kr,t > kp,t). We rewrite the ratio of the two levels of apital as zt ≡ kr,tkp,t > 1
implying the following reursive prodution funtion:
zt+1 = z
α
t , (5.132)
whih boils down to:
zt = z
αt
0 . (5.133)
For α < 1, in the long-run this onverges to total equality:
lim
t→∞
zt = lim
t→∞
zα
t
0 = z
0
0 = 1 = lim
t→∞
kr,t
kp,t
. (5.134)
The eonomi rationale is also straightforward: bigger investments projets yield a lower
return to investment, implying a lower growth of apital. Considering this idea from
a long-run growth international growth perspetive implies that for a given available
prodution tehnology all ountries will onverge to a well-dened level of apital inde-
pendent of the initial onditions. The latter would also lead to the fat that inequality
in living standards between ountries would disappear.
Portfolio Deision
So far we argued from a (standard) maro-perspetive drawing on the properties of
an aggregate prodution funtion to make statements about wealth inequality. In this
setion, we take the perspetive of nane whih explains the heterogeneous returns
on apital as a result of (risky) portfolio ompositions. In partiular, we draw on the
normative result of portfolio optimization as presented in Merton (1969). When deiding
on the level of leverage l > 0 (equivalent to the ratio of risky assets in the portfolio)
and therefore on the portfolio omposition between risky assets R ∼ N(µR, σ2R) with
110
This paper features a far more sophistiated model also overing other important aspets. In parti-
ular, we disuss the N agent ase rather than the simplied N = 2 agents ase.
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µR > rf and risk-free asset rf ∼ N(rf , 0), - as already presented in setion 5.1 - an
optimal portfolio struture is given by:
l = − U
′
U ′′W
µR − rf
σ2R
. (5.135)
The portfolio return is given by:
rp = lµr + (1− l)rf = rf + l(µr − rf). (5.136)
For the speial ase of CARA utility.
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the following results an be derived:
l =
1
η ·W
µR − rf
σ2R
, (5.137)
implying that wealthy individuals have lower portfolio returns as emphasized in this
setion as neessary ondition for onvergene of wealth to total equality.
112
However -
as already put forward in the original paper of Merton (1969) - it seems highly unre-
alisti that wealthy individuals hold less risky portfolios. Moreover, it is at odds with
empirial evidene. Yitzhaki (1987) and more reently Bivens and Mishel (2013) show
that wealthier investors have a higher return on investment.
In fat, positive sale eets for investments are not irrational. In ontrast to very
onservative investment produts suh as life insuranes, riskier investments - for exam-
ple hedge funds yielding a higher return - require a high level of minimum investment
not available to low-inome households. One again level eets matter: wealthier indi-
viduals have a higher buer and thereby an have a larger speulative share.
In this work, we take the standard assumption of CRRA utility. For the standard
ase of CRRA utility
113
this yields:
l =
1
γ
µR − rf
σ2R
. (5.138)
implying portfolio omposition and thereby return is independent of wealth W . This is
the ase we assume in this work. Thus, the growth of the portfolio (i.e. the rate of return
given the assumption that agents do not onsume out of their portfolio) is idential for
all agents.
We an disuss the evolution of debt in a similar manner as presented in the part
starting from equation 5.132. For the CRRA ase we have a onstant sale tehnology
α = 1, implying that:
lim
t→∞
zt = lim
t→∞
zα
t
0 = z
1
0 = z0. (5.139)
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Formally, this an be aptured by a utility funtion of the type U(W ) = − exp(−ηW )η for whih we
have − U ′U ′′W = 1ηW .
112
Or to use the terminology of an aggregate prodution funtion, the portfolio omposition derived
from a CARA utility funtion an be desribed as a prodution funtion of the type for whih
Wt+1−Wt
Wt
∼ 1Wt ↔Wt+1 ∼ ln(Wt).
113
Formally, for the ase in whih utility from wealth W is given by U(W ) = 11−γW
1−γ
, we have
− U ′U ′′W = 1γ .
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Cash or Bonds or stok Private Real
ash-equivalents market equity business estate
Return and Low Medium High Medium
riskiness
Liquidity High Medium Low Low
Tangibility Medium Low Low High
Ination Low Medium High High
protetion
Funtion Inreasing Inreasing Dereasing Inverse
of age u-shape
Funtion Dereasing Inreasing Inreasing Inverse
of wealth u-shape
Table 5.1.: A qualitative analysis of the households portfolio omposition
In this ase, as a result of the portfolio struture wealth inequality does not inrease
in time. On the other hand, it also does not onverge to equality. In fat, it remains
at the very level of initial inequality. In this ase, a soial planner ould inuene the
distribution of wealth by intervening a single time, namely at the point of heritage at
whih the initial endowment is determined. We disuss this result more formally in A.6
also showing that - in the presene of ollateral onstraints - the inequality of wealth is
inreases in times of inreasing pries and vie versa.
It is important that we assumed that there is no idiosynrati portfolio risk. Fernholz
and Fernholz (2014) take a similar model in whih agents have CRRA preferenes,
but are also subjet to an idiosynrati uninsurable risk. In this ase, long-run wealth
distribution onverges to total inequality.
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It is also important to point out that
for CARA preferenes the model would onverge to a nite level of inequality, (0 <
Gini(W ) < 1) in whih the level of inequality is a funtion of the level of idiosynrati
risk.
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The empirial literature also disusses the portfolio omposition of households. Shorroks
(1982) onduts a thorough analysis of household portfolios under dierent harater-
istis. In general, the author nds a positive orrelation between age and the level of
wealth. We summarize these ndings in table 5.1. Shorroks (1982) identies four major
ategories with dierent harateristis: (1) ash or ash-equivalents, (2) bonds or stok
market equity, (3) private business, (4) real estate whih also orrelates with debt. One
an summarize these ndings that both poor and old agents hold liquid assets. High net
worth agents hold (risky) assets yielding high returns - ontributing to inreased wealth
inequality. With inreasing age these agents, however, shift the portfolio weight to more
liquid positions also yielding lower returns. In partiular, as individuals get older they
pass on their real estate and their private business to their ospring generation. Glover
114
More tehnially, the presene of idiosynrati risk leads to the fat that the variane - and thereby
inequality - grows without bounds.
115
The latter result is more thoroughly disussed in Fisher (2014).
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et al. (2011) formally - based upon on an optimization problems - show that the share
of risky assets should deline with age and onrm this with data.
116
The rih tend to hold intangible assets, whereas low and middle-inome agents prefer
tangible assets. In our ase, ash is rather tangible sine it an be easily onverted into
onsumption. Real estate, by means of serving as a ollateral, an also be onsidered
tangible. Moreover, self-used real estate serves the purpose of a pure onsumption good
making it highly tangible. Old and poor agents severely lose from ination due to their
strong ash holdings.
A more reent analysis drawing on the newly established Household Finane and
Consumption Survey (HCFS) for the Euro area onduted under the umbrella of the
European Central Bank is presented in Arrondel et al. (2014) espeially disussing the
key role of real estate. They nd that real estate - in partiular self-used real estate
- is the major asset for private households. Dierent average partiipation rates in
real estate an rationalize dierent median wealth levels. Espeially, the low average
partiipation rate in Germany is a andidate explanation for Germany being the Euro
ountry with the lowest median wealth in the sample. Moreover, inheritane is important
sine households that reeived an inheritane also exhibit a higher probability of holding
real estate. Interestingly, highly eduated - in general also having a higher inome and
higher wealth - hold a lower share of their portfolio in real estate, potentially reeting
their higher mobility. In general, marriage status also has an important impat on the
portfolio omposition. Singles hold a higher share of risky nanial assets ompared to
those married with hildren, for who real estate is of importane.
A Short Summary on Wealth Inequality
This setion summarized the onditions for a onvergene of wealth inequality. In parti-
ular, onvergene depends on the relation between savings ratio and inome respetively
wealth as well as the return on savings resulting from a portfolio deision. In a onstant
return to sale framework - impliitly imposed by the assumption of the homotheti
CRRA utility funtion - wealth onverges in a non-growing eonomy if the ondition
sr < cw holds. In ontrast to the framework of Piketty (2014) - for whih equality of
wealth is only ensured for r < 0 in a non-growing eonomy - the presene of onsumption
out of wealth cw 6= 0 leads to the fat that wealth levels also onverge. We also showed
that for fairly general onditions the onsumption ratio of net worth an be desribed
by the time preferene of agents (cw = ρ). Note that the rate of interest is not onstant
and exogenous. As we will disuss more thoroughly in our simulation results, in our
model the long-run return of interest dereases in time and with the amount of reated
redits. This is not the result of an exogenously assumed aggregate prodution funtion
with negative sale eets, but follows from dereasing demand for debt by low-inome
agents due to binding ollateral onstraint in the presene of a onstant supply of savings
by high-inome agents. As the rate of interest dereases, in the long-run the stability
116
It is important to note that they ategorize real estate - being the the key asset position of private
households with a delining share as a funtion of age - as being risky.
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ondition rs < cw is satised for a given savings ratio s and onsumption ratio out of
wealth cw.
In the presene of subsistene level eets c¯ 6= 0 - as assumed in our model - two
groups of agents emerge: low-inome agents being debtors and high agents being lenders
ontributing to a substantial net worth inequality. Eah group of agents, however,
onverges to a onstant wealth to inome ratio. In the ase of non-linear savings funtion
(resulting from the fat that agents derive a high utility of wealth), also supported by
empirial data (f. setion 4.4) wealth inequality also diverges.
154
6. Simulation Results
The map is not the territory [...℄
The only usefulness of a map
depends on similarity
of struture between the empirial
world and the map.
(Korzybski, 1933, p. 6)
The previous setion has already provided an insight into the workings of the model.
To apture the full model dynamis, however, we, have to rely on numerial simulations.
One of the major hallenges when working with ABMs is the alibration of the models.
Sine the model involves several mutual interations amongst dierent variables in a
non-linear fashion, omplex, even haoti, dynamis may emerge. We assume that one
simulation period equals one year. In partiular, this implies that the omputed rate
of interest is an annual rate of interest.
1
Some parameters an be observed in business
reality whilst other (espeially the behavioral parameters) are hard to measure and
therefore leave a lot of spae for tuning. As already disussed, the dynamis, moreover,
depend severely on the oping mehanism of the low-inome lass. Therefore, we present
dierent simulations for the Austerity-ase (setion 6.1) and the re sales ase (setion
6.3).
After omparing the model results with empirial evidene, we an also point to the
underlying rationale for the stylized fats we are able to reprodue. Moreover, our model
allows us to produe ounterfatuals - in partiular a variation of inequality - in order to
quantify the maroeonomi impat of inequality. The model itself and its benhmark
alibration presented here will be further employed to ondut some poliy experiments
as disussed in setion 7.
6.1. Simulation Results of the Complex Model in the
Austerity-Case
In this setion we disuss the ase in whih onstrained households reat by utting bak
on their onsumption whih we label the Austerity-ase. Setion 6.1.1 disusses the
1
The model is run for T = 500 years. Note that agents do not represent single individuals but omplete
dynasties. There is no general onsensus when modeling the disrete time steps. While some ABM-
modelers interpret a disrete time step as being a year (Dosi et al., 2006), other interpret is as
months (Deissenberg et al., 2008).
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onrete modeling of this ase, whereas setion 6.1.2 presents the assoiated simulation
results. Note that the robustness heks as disussed in setion 6.2 are also based upon
this version of the model.
6.1.1. Modeling the Austerity-Case
As already disussed, the reation of the ollateral onstrained households has a de-
isive impat on the dynamis of the model. In this setion, we start by presenting
the Austerity-ase for whih ollateral onstrained households deide to derease their
onsumption as opposed to their initial plan ditated by their onsumption funtions.
We assume that agents lever up as muh as possible in order not to fall short of their
onsumption plans:
D˙maxi,t = D
max
t+1 −Di,t = (1−m)Pi,tqi,t −Di,t. (6.1)
If, however, this is not suient, agents start by refraining from taking positions in
the market for durables (di,t = 0).
2
As presented in setion 5.3, if households already
aumulated debt, there might be fored savings or more preisely deleveraging (the
group 0 as presented in the shemati gure 5.10). This eventually an lead to the
unrealisti result of negative onsumption. Sine at this point we disregard the possibility
of private bankrupty, the notion of negative onsumption and delevarging an ensure
positive net worth households. While both ases - negative net worth and negative
onsumption - are unrealisti to a ertain extent we prefer allowing negative net worth
for households indiating delay in ling for bankrupty. This is modeled as follows for
the hange in debt:
D˙i,t = max{D˙maxi,t , 0}, (6.2)
and the onsumption:
Ci,t = max{D˙i,t + Yi,t − rtDi,t, 0}. (6.3)
The latter equation implies that low-inome agents faing their ollateral onstraint
reat by spending all disposable inome - i.e. all available labor inome less interest on
outstanding debt.
Both modeling approahes introdue strong nonlinearities that feed bak into the
model eonomy, espeially if a lot of agents belong to the last group. Moreover, if the
eonomy is dominated by lower-lass households, trading in the market for durables
breaks down.
3
6.1.2. Basi Simulations
In this setion, we show simulation results of the omplex model. Rather than per-
forming an eonometri alibration we deided to rely on a reasonable tuning of the
2
It would be more reasonable to only refrain from taking long positions di,t = min{0,MPCDt ·Wi,t}.
This would lead to a downward pressure. However, at this point we ontrol for this eet. In the
latter in whih we also disuss re sales this will be of importane.
3
For the extreme ase we have d→ 0 leading to P = P0 ≡ F .
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model allowing it to generate realisti features. The model not only requires making
assumptions about the value of parameters but is also sensitive to the assumed initial
onditions. Our tuning heavily relies on the losed-form solutions onduted in setion
5. The hosen parameters are summarized in table 6.1.
Category Symbol Desription Value
Distribution
Y¯ Median labor inome 5
σ2y Inequality of labor inome 1
H Heritage 20
Durable market
βF Aggressiveness of 1
fundamental traders
βC Aggressiveness of 1
hartist traders
Γ Rationality 1
Λ Memory 0.98
γ Risk aversion 20
σ(dnoise) Standard deviation of noise trading 0.05
Consumption
j Quantile of 0.2
subsistene onsumption
cy Marginal propensity to 0.5
onsume out of inome
cw Marginal propensity to 0.01
onsume out of net worth
ε Curvature of the 1
onsumption urve
Collateral onstraint m Equity requirement 0.2
Markets
µ Market illiquidity 0.01
for durables
µr Market illiquidity 0.005
for durables
Initial onditions
r0 Initial interest rate 0.02
Di,0 Initial debt for all agents 0
P0 Initial prie level in durable market 1 ≡ F
Table 6.1.: Benhmark simulation parameters and initial onditions
For the distribution parameter we assume an arbitrary value of Y¯ = 5 and σ2y = 1.0,
leading to a Gini oeient of roughly 0.5, broadly onsistent with US data for inome
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distribution before redistribution.
4
We run the simulation for N = 1, 000 agents and
T = 500 periods.
The behavioral parameters of the model for durable onsumption are set aording to
several well-established models explaining the behavior of nanial markets by means
of a model with fundamental and hartist traders (p. e.g., De Grauwe and Grimaldi
(2006)). The noise demand operates with a xed random seed to ensure reproduibility
of the results. The assumed risk aversion γ = 20 >> 1 is rather high, but in line with
the literature rationalizing the high equity premium respetively the low risk-free rate of
interest. The value is atually the value assumed to rationalize the equity premium for
the US by means of the Consumption Capital Asset Priing Model (CCAPM) (Semmler,
2007, p. 123).
The most important parameters are those governing the onsumption deision. We
present and rationalize a feasible benhmark parametrization. In setion 6.2.1, we fur-
thermore ondut a numerial robustness analysis in a eteris paribus fashion. First of
all, we set the level of the minimum onsumption quantile to j = 0.2. For the given dis-
tribution of inome, this implies a ratio of
c¯
E(y)
≈ 0.25. For heritage we assume a rather
high value of H = 20, implying that eah agent is initially endowed with an equivalent of
20 years of annual inome. Thereby the share of self-earned wealth amounts to approx.
71 %.
5
As disussed in setion 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 a model that aims at deriving a realisti pattern
of apital and debt aumulation as well as a long-run onvergene of wealth inequality
has to obey some restritions. The rst restrition is cwH < s, whih is satised for
the hosen alibration. The seond ondition requires rs < cw. This ondition is not
satised for the initial ase with r = r0 and holds as an identity rs = cw, implying a
knife-edge alibration. Yet, the interest rate is a model endogenous variable hanging
in time. One the interest rate dereases relative to the initial ondition rt < r0, the
ondition rs < cw also holds. As we will disuss in the following, this will emerge for our
simulations. Moreover, the latter ondition implies that in a model with a zero lower
bound on the rate of interest - as impliitly assumed in our model - a positive degree of
onsumption of apital (cw > 0) is neessary - espeially to guarantee a onvergene in
the distribution of wealth.
The equity ratio is set to m = 0.2 being lower than the value of m ≈ 0.47 depited in
gure 5.17 being the minimum equity ratio for the representative household with mean
inome. This implies that in the simulations the Ponzi ase is not totally ruled out by
assumption.
4
Note that if we ondut eteris paribus analyses in the following we presume the exat same distri-
bution of inome. This is made in order to ahieve omparability as we only have a nite draw of
N = 1, 000 elements of the distribution.
5
As presented in setion 5.5.1, this ratio is derived by
1
Hr+1 impliitly assuming innitely living agents
making labor inome - and thereby human wealth
Y
r . Our model even overstates the true ratio of
self-made inome amounting to approx. 60% (Davies and Shorroks, 2000).
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Figure 6.1.: Mean as well as 5% and 95% quantile of total inome, wealth, debt, and net
worth
First of all, we an look at the quantiles of dierent quantities as presented in gure
6.1.
6
The distribution of total labor inome is assumed to be idential in time. As
the agents, however, aumulate debt and laims, there is apital inome, allowing top
labor inome individuals to inrease their total inome and vie versa for low-inome
individuals. The inrease for the top quantile is more pronouned as they also export
savings abroad and reeive interest payments by foreigners. As the level of apital
K = −D onverges to a well dened steady-state, so does the inome out of apital rK
and thereby also total inome.
Meanwhile, wealth is volatile in time due to hanging expeted prospets for the
durable market (MPCDt). In units of pries the volatility is higher for wealthier indi-
viduals. This, however, is due to the fat that demand in unit of assets is saled by the
value of net worth. While some agents hold debt - whih is xed at a rather onstant
level owing to the initial endowment of pledgeable ollateral and the onstant required
equity ratio - other agents hold a substantial amount of apital (D < 0). This, more-
over, varies in time as the agent (de)levers to go long (short) in the durable market. The
ombination of wealth and debt reates net worth. While the net worth of the lowest
quantile is basially zero, top quantile agents hold a substantial amount of net worth.
If we ompare the three forms of stok - assets, debt, and net worth - the level of net
6
Note that these are not the quantiles of the umulative density funtion as e.g. presented for empirial
data in gure 2.2 or 2.6, but the quantiles of the density funtion. Hene, the value of a ertain
perentile is presented but not its overall share of the aggregate. Note also that all reported gures
are in prie rather than quantity units.
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Figure 6.2.: Gini oeient in time and Lorenz urve in last period (t = 500) for labor
inome, onsumption, wealth and net worth
worth shows the smallest variation in time as the inrease in debt is diminished by an
inrease in asset holding and vie versa.
In our model, the labor inome as initial soure of inome inequality is onstant in
time (see gure 6.2). Wealth inequality varies in time, on mean, however, takes the
same level as the Gini of inome. This an be linked to the fat that - in a CRRA
world - portfolio struturing is independent of the level of wealth together with our
assumption that the initial distribution of wealth is diretly related to the distribution
of inome.
7 8
Yet, there is a positive orrelation between the overall prie level and
wealth inequality as presented in gure 6.3, implying that booms inrease inequality of
wealth. A formal proof for the latter is presented in A.6. In a nutshell, the underlying
rationale is that high-inome individuals - not being in debt - have a higher equity ratio
allowing for a stronger partiipation in booms. Low-inome individuals fae a binding
ollateral onstraint not allowing them lever up. Only near the peak of the yle, when
pries are already high and the ollateral onstraint is very lax, low-inome individuals
are able to go long in the asset market. However, by being amongst the last to jump the
7
The exat proof for this relation is presented in appendix A.6.
8
By our assumption of a perfet orrelation between inome and inherited apital P0q0 = HY we
impliitly assume that both follow the same distribution. The empirial literature, however, onrms
that inherited wealth is more unequally distributed than self-made wealth (Davies and Shorroks,
2000). The latter an (amongst others) be attributed to the existene of primogeniture (Stiglitz,
1969).
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Figure 6.3.: Inequality of wealth and pries are positively orrelated
bandwagon they also suer the most from reevaluation losses in the subsequent bust.
9
This is in line with the empirial evidene of Roine et al. (2009) showing that inequality
inreases in times of high asset pries and vie versa.
Due to the initial ondition of zero debt, the Gini for net worth starts at the idential
level as wealth, however, inreases to a higher level due to the mutual aumulation of
debt and laims. As suggested by empirial ndings, the inequality of net worth (stok)
is higher than the inequality in inome (ow) (p. e.g., Davies and Shorroks (2000)).
In fat, in the reent risis the Gini of net worth for the USA inreased to a level of
0.87 (Wol, 2013), implying that our model even understates the true level of inequality
(f. gure 6.2). The evolution of net worth inequality is an emergent behavior in the
model propagated by debt. In line with empirial evidene (e.g. (Davies and Shorroks,
2000)), the nanial assets in ontrast to the real assets are very unequally distributed
explaining a vast amount of the inequality of net worth. If we have a loser look at the
Lorenz urve, the urve for net worth exhibits a slope lose to zero in the lower end
suggesting a large amount of agents with net worth lose to zero.
10
We an also make a statement about non-durable onsumption inequality. The Gini
of onsumption C is always below the Gini of total inome X , in line with empirial
9
Glover et al. (2011) argue that the nanial risis mostly hurt older individuals holding a large
amount of wealth in housing. In a alibrated OLG-model they show that while young agents were
also subjet to the negative shoks in the labor market, they ould partly neutralize these welfare
losses by means of buying housing assets at re sale pries from older individuals. As a poliy result
they onlude that therefore programs that shift welfare weight from young to old individuals - suh
as inreased government debt - might be favorable.
10
It is also interesting to emphasize that the Lorenz urves do not interset allowing us to make the
statement of Lorenz-dominane between labor inome and onsumption as well as wealth and net
worth.
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evidene (Krueger and Perri, 2006), in the long-run still both measurements of inequality
onverge to the same value given by the inequality of total inome (f. gure 6.2). This
is the ase sine low-inome individuals fae a binding ollateral onstraint and thereby
only onsume hand to mouth as suggested by equation 6.3, while the subsistene level
rarely matters for the other agents. In the early simulation phase the Gini of onsumption
is even below the Gini of labor inome. This basially an be attributed to the presene
of the subsistene level of onsumption (c¯ 6= 0). If we assumed cw = 0, the Gini of
onsumption C eventually would always be below the Gini of labor inome Y in the
presene of onspiuous onsumption:
11 12
Gini(Y )−Gini(C) =
2
n
[∑N
i=1 Yi · i
nE(Y )
−
(
cy
∑N
i=1 Yi · i+ 0.5c¯(N2 +N)
N(cyE(Y ) + c¯)
)]
=
c¯
n
(
2
∑N
i=1 Yi · i− E(Y )(N2 +N)
NE(Y )(cy(E(Y ) + c¯)
)
> 0.
(6.4)
Or put dierently, if there was no subsistene level of onsumption (c¯ = 0) inome
and onsumption inequality would be idential. Yet, in this ase net worth inequality
diverges (i.e. it does not onverge to a nite level of inequality limt→∞Gini(Wt) < 1)
as the ondition rs < cw = 0 is never fullled for positive rates of interest. Moreover,
the interest rate would onverge to a very low, yet always positive level.
13
As net worth now, however, also aets onsumption, this leads to the fat that on-
sumption inequality in a dynami proess inreases to a level above inome inequality.
One ould say that a onvergene in net worth inequality omes at the ost of a on-
sumption inequality higher than labor inome inequality. The latter an also be formally
proven using a similar argument as the preeding one. The dierene between net worth
and inome inequality an be omputed as follows:
Gini(W )−Gini(Y ) =
2
N
[
−
∑N
i=1 Yi · i
NE(Y )
+
(
Ωy
∑N
i=1 Yi · i+ 0.5k0(N2 +N)
N(ΩyE(Y ) + k0)
)]
=
−k0
N
(
2
∑N
i=1 Yi · i− E(Y )(N2 +N)
NE(Y )(Ωy(E(Y ) + k0)
)
> 0,
(6.5)
with W = ΩyY + k0.
14
For the ase of no relative onsumption c¯ = 0 we would have
k0 = 0 and thereby Gini(W ) = Gini(Y ). As a result, the presene of the relative
11
Keep in mind that the Gini an be omputed by: Gini(x) = 2n
(∑N
i=1 xi·i∑
N
i=1 xi
− N+12
)
or for a nite
sample (espeially important for small samples in whih the upper bound would otherwise be given
by
n−1
n ): Gini(x) =
2
n−1
(∑N
i=1 xi·i∑
N
i=1 xi
− N+12
)
12
Also note that this omputation does not aount for possibly binding ollateral onstraints presenting
a non-linearity.
13
For a simulation treatment of the speial ase with cw = 0, the reader is referred to Fisher (2013).
14
Following from setion 5.5.1, the values are given as follows: Ωy =
s(1−rH)
cw−rs
> 0 and k0 =
c¯
rs−cw
< 0.
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onsumption motive c¯ 6= 0 ontributes to low onsumption inequality at the expense of
high net worth inequality.
One an also take a broad long-run perspetive on gure 6.2 and rank dierent forms
of inequality. The exogenously assumed distribution of labor inome Y has the lowest
inequality. By the assumption of perfet heritage (P0q0 = HY ) the distribution of
wealth Pq exhibits the same level of inequality. The inequality of total inome X is
higher than labor inome inequality due to more unequally distributed apital inome.
The inequality of onsumption C is always below the inequality of total inome. Yet,
this gap narrows in the long-run. The stok quantity of net worthW exhibits the highest
level of inequality.
Despite the long-run onvergene of onsumption inequality to inome inequality, on-
sumption inequality shows negative seasonal peaks. The latter an be attributed to asset
prie booms (ompare gure 6.2 and gure 6.4) relaxing the redit onstraints for low-
inome households allowing for debt-naned onsumption of non-durables. A similar
result showing that onsumption inequality is ounterylial (i.e. low in booms and vie
versa) is presented in the theoretial work of Airaudo and Bossi (2014). The neessary
building bloks of their model are the presene of limited asset market partiipation
(in our ase in form of the ollateral onstraint) and trikle-down onsumption (here:
c¯ 6= 0).15
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Figure 6.4.: Market onditions for savings/debt market and durable market and ompo-
sition of household groups
15
They also argue that these two fators lead to the eet that monetary poliy beomes more eetive,
sine - tehnially - the Phillips-urve beomes atter shifting more weight to the output rather than
the ination objetive.
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The real rate of interest in the simulations is approximately 0.7% (see gure 6.4).
In standard models without aggregate growth (as in our ase) the rate is r = ρ or in
Bewley-types it is even r < ρ. As presented in setion 4.2 in the Keynesian model we
use one an approximate this (opaque) measurement of time preferene by ρ ≈ cw, whih
for the onrete parameter setting is cw = 1% > 0.7% oming to a omparable result as
the Bewley-type literature.
We now hange our fous from the distribution and the individual to the total outome.
In the aggregate, there are two entral eets (see gure 6.4): rstly and as already
disussed in setion 5.4.1, the inreased debt holdings lead to a urrent aount surplus
aompanied by a onvergene of the interest rate in the savings market to a low, but
positive, stable level. Note that in our model the interest rate is also the mehanism
required to balane the urrent aount as we (impliitly) assume a xed exhange
rate regime.
16
One the interest rate onverged to a stable level the (exess) savings -
presented as a grey area in the upper panel of gure 6.5 - also disappear.
Moreover, sine the other part of the wealth is invested in the market for durables,
the prie volatility in this market inreases in time. The inreasing urrent aount
surplus is aompanied by an inreasing mean net worth (see also gure 6.5), whih, as
doumented in equation 5.60, feeds bak into higher prie volatility for durables. The
number of lenders and debtors (stok) is relatively onstant while lenders represent the
majority ontributing to the urrent aount surplus. Formally, in the long-run for whih
demand for durables is zero (E(MPCD) = 0), lenders are all households that earn a
lower labor inome than:
Y < Y ∗ =
c¯
s−Hcw . (6.6)
For the given tuning, we have
Y ∗
E(Y )
≈ 0.833.
Seondly, the number of ollateral onstrained and unonstrained agents varies through-
out time (f. gure 6.4). This an be linked to the onditions in the market for durables.
Prie booms in the market for durables relax the ollateral onstraint, thereby reduing
the number of low-lass agents and vie versa in the ase of busts. Yet, the omposition
of high and middle-lass households varies even stronger in time. This an be attributed
to the fat that purhases in the market for durables an be onduted with redit. As
suggested in gure 5.8, an asset prie boom leads to the fat that the upper-lass sup-
plying debt temporary disappears. While all agents inrease their debt, for net lenders
this only means that - in stok terms - they lower their level of laims.
Figure 6.5 deomposes GDP (ow) and aggregate balane sheets (stok) for whih
one again values are given in the unit of pries. While total labor inome is exogenous
16
In a oating exhange rate regime, the exhange rate leads to a onvergene of the urrent aount
to zero, for whih surplus ountries fae a devaluation of the urreny and vie versa. In a xed rate
regime, a entral bank intervention an inuene the exhange rate and thereby the urrent aount.
For a deit ountry, this requires selling foreign reserves to strengthen the domesti urreny. This,
however, is onstrained by the available amount of aumulated reserves. In ontrast to that,
a urrent aount surplus (if desired) an be easily eliminated by issuing domesti urreny and
thereby devaluating the domesti urreny.
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Figure 6.5.: Deomposition of GDP (aggregate ow) and aggregate stok
and assumed to be onstant, its omposition varies massively in time.
17
Firstly, the
inreased volatility in demand for durables beomes obvious. Due to the fat that
inome is onstant, onsumption only shows little variane whih an be attributed to
temporary binding ollateral onstraints. The sum of onsumption and savings exeeds
GDP sine the eonomy is net lender to foreigners and reeives interest payments from
abroad. It is important to aknowledge that, in our onsumer-only eonomy, apital
inome an only emerge if net laims to foreigners are established. In a losed eonomy,
there would be no apital inome sine every apital inome is aompanied by interest
on debt of the same height resulting in the fat that the eonomy in terms of apital is
zero-sum in the aggregate.
Total wealth - as already proved in appendix A.6 - osillates around a steady state (f.
gure 6.5). Note that even though we have a urrent aount surplus, domesti debt
level inreases in time.
18
Sine we assume an initial ondition of zero debt, households
lever up until they fae their ollateral onstraint leading to a dereasing growth rate of
domesti debt. We an interpret the simulation starting with zero debt (and therefore
an equity ratio of m = 1) to m = 0.2 as the result of nanial liberalization. The
onave shape of the evolution of domesti debt an be attributed to the dereasing
number of middle-lass households. As shown in gure 6.4, the unonstrained agents
(the middle-lass) disappear after having levered up to the maximum resulting in a
17
The blak area over the gains or losses (above or below the zero line) from the trades in the durable
market. The mirror position (to make it zero sum) ours to an unmodeled market maker entity.
18
To only ompute net positive debt the following approah is used: DomesticDebtt = 0.5(
∑N
i=1 |Di,t|+∑N
i=1Di,t).
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bipolar soiety. In the steady state, the (ow quantity of) urrent aount surplus
measured by exess savings vanishes. As gure 6.5 shows, in terms of stok this leads
to a onstant negative debt level representing a laim to foreigners. As the foreigners,
however, pay an interest on their debt in the long-run there is an inow of apital inome
of
−r∑Ni=1Di∑N
i=1 Xi
=
∑N
i=1Xi−
∑N
i=1 Yi∑N
i=1Xi
≈ 14.5%.
We an also make a statement about the ratio between stok and ow - in the onrete
form of total earned inome (X ≡ ∑Ni=1Xi = ∑Ni=1[Yi + rDi]) and total net worth
(W ≡∑Ni=1Wi =∑Ni=1 Pqi−Di) amounting to approx. 49 in the long-run. As disussed
in Piketty (2014) the empirial literature presents a muh lower value of 4-6 for developed
eonomies.
19
By our assumption of H = 20 we already overstrethed this ratio. Future
work might try to nd a more reasonable alibration.
The strength of the given model is that it - not only - an make a statement about
aggregates, but also about individual levels. In fat, the only underlying - yet persistent
- inequality we assumed is inequality in labor inome. In the following, we map other
outomes to the underlying driver of labor inome.
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Figure 6.6.: Net worth to labor inome ratio Ω and apital share of total inome α as a
funtion of labor inome Y (time averages)
We start with the individual net worth to labor inome ratio Ωi =
Wi
Yi
presented in
gure 6.6. This ratio shows an s-shape with a positive slope, implying that the net
worth ratio grows with underlying labor inome. Hene, individuals with a high labor
inome not only have a high level of apital in absolute terms but also in relative terms
measured by the ratio between wealth and labor inome. As disussed in setion 5.5.1,
the inreasing ratio an be attributed to the diminishing eet of minimum onsumption
c¯. In fat, high-inome households have a higher value than the average value of approx.
42.
20
The left end of the urve an be rationalized by the existene of the ollateral
onstraint. Low-inome households only hold the minimum required equity ratio
Wmin
Y
=
mHY
Y
= mH = 4.
19
Also refer to gure 5.19.
20
As shown in setion 5.5.1, their value is eventually given by Ω = s(1−rH)cw−rs = 60 for r = 0.5%.
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In line with the empirial evidene of Piketty (2014), the individual apital share
of total inome (αi =
−rDi
Yi−rDi ) inreases with (labor) inome (refer to the lower panel of
gure 6.6).
21 22
One again we have an s-shaped pattern in whih low-inome individuals
eventually have a negative value of αi due to the fat that they are indebted. The
inetion point (α = 0) emerges for Y = Y ∗ being the level that separates lenders and
debtors.
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Figure 6.7.: Mean of non-durable onsumption, savings, durable onsumption, debt level,
wealth and net worth as funtion of mean inome (time averages)
We an also relate other measurements to the underlying heterogeneity of inome.
Figure 6.7 shows that the highest amount of debt (stok) is held by middle-lass house-
holds orresponding with the lowest (negative) savings (ow). This is broadly in line
with empirial evidene. Doepke and Shneider (2006) argue that debt - in partiular
in the form of mortgages - is a middle-inome phenomenon. Low-inome households
hold lower levels of debt and furthermore have other types of debt - namely onsumer
debt rather than mortgages. The theoreti rationale presented in this paper is that low-
inome households have little wealth to borrow against onstraining their ability to lever
21
Note that Yi ∼ Xi = Yi − rDi = Yi + r(k0 + kyYi) with r > 0 and ky > 0 (f. setion 5.5.1). Hene,
there is a simple and positive relation between labor and total inome allowing us to state that the
apital inome ratio α not only inreases with labor inome Y (as presented in gure 6.6) but also
with total inome X .
22
We, however, fail to reprodue the high levels of apital inome share for the top inome whih Piketty
(2014) quanties as 60% respetively 70% for the USA and Frane in the reent years. Our value
onverges to α = r(s−cwH)cw(1−Hr) = 16% for r = 0.5%. This is the ase sine - as already put forward - in
our model aggregate apital an only be reated by reating laims against foreigners.
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up. The latter is also onrmed by the analysis of the new dataset for 15 Euro oun-
tries labeled Household Finane and Consumption Survey (HFCS) (Bover et al., 2014).
Moreover, the authors show that while onsumption debt is high for low age individuals
(16 to 34 years), mortgage debt is highest amongst middle aged (34 to 44 years) and a
middle level of eduation (being orrelated with inome). Moreover, Bover et al. (2014)
doument a wide disparity of the overall level of debt in the dierent ountries overed
in the study. The highest levels are reported for Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands.
In their eonometri analysis they are able to link this to a lower repossession period -
being the time the reditor an all the ollateral. In our model this ould be aptured
by a lower value of m.
In the model, wealth remains onstant on mean, in whih the ratio of wealth and labor
inome is given by the initially assumed value for heritage H (f. gure 6.7).23 Total net
worth (Wi = Pqi −Di) is a hokey-stik shaped funtional form of inome. Eventually
the lower end is not at (as in a real hokey stik funtion), but has a slope of Hm
indiating that low and middle-lass households only hold market required equity ratios.
High-inome households hold no debt at all but are net laim holders.
Interestingly, the onsumption is above the 45-degree line and exhibits a onvex shape
(f. gure 6.7). Note that on the absissa we only plot labor inome. However, agents
above a ertain labor inome level hold laims rather than debt, thereby additionally
reeiving apital inome. In the presene of positive interest rates, this makes a onvex
relation between onsumption C and labor inome Y .24 In the aggregate, the dierene
between onsumption and labor inome for high-inome households are in fat transfers
from foreigners in the form of interest payments on debt that are employed for non-
durable onsumption. This behavior is also presented in gure 6.5 in whih the total
onsumption and savings exeed the level of labor inome Y .
Another intriguing result emerges in the market for durables for whih high-inome
households on mean provide long positions (d > 0) while low and middle-inome agents
go short (one again refer to gure 6.7). The strongest downward pressure is applied
by medium-inome households. The rationale for this is that by selling their durables,
households an enhane their onsumption possibilities for non-durables. The range for
going short is strongest amongst the middle-lass (as opposed to low-lass households)
due to their higher initial endowment. It is important to point out that in this model the
short-bias for low and medium-inome households is not inorporated via a deleveraging
mehanism but by the fat that these agents do not partiipate in the boom sine they
annot due to their binding ollateral onstraint and therefore have to refrain from
the market in this part of the yle. In fat - and as already disussed - low-inome
households tend to jump on the bandwagon near the end of the yle exposing them to
higher reevaluation losses.
In the model desription in setion 5.1, we have been vague about the nature of the
durable asset. However, it an be onsidered as real estate rather than stok market
shares. As presented in Wol (2013), trading in stok markets is an ativity mostly only
23
Or put dierently, the slope of the urve equals H = 20.
24
The proof for this ondition is presented in appendix A.9.
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observable for high-inome households. The latter behavior is also doumented in table
5.1 showing that while low-inome agents hold ash, medium-inome agents prefer real
estate, whereas high-inome agents hold nanial assets and private business.
Glaeser and Nathanson (2014) summarize other important features of housing mar-
kets dierentiating this asset lass from nanial market produts. Houses are non-
standardized and very heterogeneous and the most important asset for private house-
holds espeially families (in ontrast to singles holding large amount of their net worth
in nanial market produts). In fat, the market is dominated by amateurs. While it
is only rational to hold a bond or a stok shares is to ash on annual interest payments
or dividends (an equivalent ase for housing would be the rental feed), housing entails
maintenane osts but also provides diret utility being a onsumption good. Fators
that hinder eient prie disovery suh as short sale onstraints or limits to arbitrage
are highly prevalent for the housing market making it prone to prie bubbles.
25
More-
over, housing markets are very opaque and entail high transation osts (e.g. fees for real
estate agents). Furthermore, housing is illiquid, indivisible or lumpy, and infrequently
traded (Davis and Nieuwerburgh, 2014). As doumented in Glaeser and Nathanson
(2014) house pries exhibit a short-run momentum ombined with a long-run mean
reversion of pries, whih an be well repliated in fundamentalist-hartist models.
26
Finally - and very important for our model - real estate trading is usually onduted
using a strong leverage resulting from several of the above mentioned features (in par-
tiular the lumpiness and the strong partiipation of medium-inome individuals). In
ontrast to that trading in the stok market mostly onduted by unonstrained high-
inome households) does not involve (strong) leveraging. Wol (2013) shows that the
inrease in net worth inequality between 2007 and 2010 an be attributed to reevaluation
eets of real estate despite the fat that both real estate and stok markets experiened
similar plummeting. This an be traked to the massive usage of leverage in real estate
trades.
6.2. Robustness Cheks
So far we presented a benhmark simulation that was able to generate a large number of
stylized fats and already hinted at some interesting poliy impliations. As, however,
already emphasized the parameters presented in table 6.1 were not hosen based on an
eonometri alibration, but result from the losed-form solutions of a simplied model
we disussed in setion 5. The following setion aims at providing robustness heks of
the results as well as quantifying the exat impat of the parameters on several outomes.
25
On the other hand - and in ontrast to nanial market produts - the supply of assets is rather
elasti. This feature is not aptured in our model only modeling the demand and thereby (impliitly)
assuming a xed supply of housing assets. When modeling nanial markets the latter is denitely
a reasonable assumption, yet a strong aveat when onsidering housing markets.
26
Glaeser and Nathanson (2014) desribe other - more standard - approahes to rationalize real estate
bubbles being searh fritions, underpriing of default options, ageny problems, and ognitive
limitations suh as spatial benhmarking or usage of rule of thumbs.
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We proeed by onduting a eteris paribus analysis - basially assuming the pa-
rameter values as presented in table 6.1 but varying a single parameter to quantify its
marginal eet. As most model outomes are two-dimensional - N agents and T time
periods - we have to aggregate to present readable results. Therefore, in most of the
ases we not only aggregate among the dimension of agents but also ompute the mean
in time.
27
Moreover, we only ondut simulations for surplus eonomies, for whih in
partiular the ondition s > cwH holds. As we will disuss more thoroughly in the
following, the seond neessary ondition cw > rts - being time varying due to the en-
dogenous nature of the interest rate rt - also holds most of the time. Thereby, we also
have realisti distributions of net worth and debt (f. setion 5.5.1) and a onvergene
of wealth inequality to a nite level (f. setion 5.5.2). Formally, the deit eonomy is
not sustainable. In this ase, all agents would lever up to the maximum resulting in the
fat that debt is provided by foreigners. The interest rate would inrease in time. In
the medium-run, all agents belong to the lower-lass, employing their labor inome for
paying the interest on their debt and (if available) using the residual for onsumption of
non-durables. In this ase, the market for durables ompletely breaks down.
Firstly, we disuss the parameters of our Keynesian onsumption funtion in setion
6.2.1 to later go to the parameters of risk aversion and espeially heritage as well as
inequality (setion 6.2.2), whih also yield some very interesting poliy results.
6.2.1. The Role of the Consumption Funtion
The onsumption funtion is of key importane in our model. In fat, ourmaroeonomi
model onsists of little else but the onsumption and savings deision of heterogeneous
households negleting other important building bloks suh as the investment deision
by rms or the labor market dimension. Moreover, the interest rate on debt rt is jointly
determined by the onsumption funtion and the distribution of inome amongst agents
in a omplex manner.
We start by varying the marginal propensity to onsume out of (disposable) inome cy.
Note that the onsumption funtion itself is uniform for all agents. The input fators -
disposable inome and net worth - however are heterogeneous for all agents. In general,
an inrease in cy is aompanied by an inrease in onsumption. Or to speak in the
terms of gure 5.7, the slope of the onsumption funtion inreases. To nane this
onsumption a higher aggregate amount of debt is employed. As depited in gure 6.8,
the number of debtors, the amount of aggregate debt as well as the interest rate on debt
thereby inreases. It is important to point out that we remain in the ase for whih
the aggregate debt is negative and the eonomy aumulates redit (rather than debt)
to foreigners. This urrent aount surplus ase is guaranteed sine we only simulate
the ases in whih the ondition cy < 1 − cwH = 0.8 is satised. The other ondition -
related to the ow quantity - requires rs < cw ↔ cy > 1 − cwr ↔ r < cw1−cy = 0.011−cy . The
latter ondition requires a higher interest rate for higher values of cy ranging from 0.01
27
For instane, we take the mean in time of total durable onsumption being dened as E(ctot) =
1
T
∑T
t=1
∑N
i=1 ci,t.
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Figure 6.8.: Household omposition, market for durables and savings for parameter vari-
ation of MPC out of inome cy
to 0.05 as cy varies from 0 to 0.8. As beomes obvious in the panel of gure 6.8 depiting
the interest rate as opposed to the exogenous fator cy, this ondition is always satised.
Note also that there is a negative relation between the mean prie in the asset market
and the rate of return (see gure 6.8). Tehnially, this follows from the portfolio forma-
tion of the agents as given in equation 5.9, for whih low interest inrease the demand
for durables and vie versa. We also labeled this eet the ight eet.
If we onsider the lass distribution of agents (f. gure 6.8), a higher propensity to
onsume leads to fewer high-lass agents - supplying debt (or debt reduing as labeled
in the gure) - and more lower-lass agents - levering up to the maximum (labeled as
onsumption dereasing in the gure). The amount of middle-lass agents - inreasing
their debt without being subjet to a binding ollateral onstraint (labeled as debt
inreasing in the gure) - is ambiguous. They witness both an inow from former upper
lass agents as well as an outow to lower lass agents. In the aggregate, the middle-
lass reation to a variation of cy is an inverse u-shape. This result, however, should
not be onfused with an optimal medium level of cy leading to a maximum number of
middle-lass agents, as the inrease in cy leads to the fat that all agents are worse o
lass wise - being a Pareto inferior situation.
On the other hand, as most inome is now employed for durable onsumption less is
available for speulating on the durable market, aompanied by a lower prie volatility
in the durable market (f. the panel of prie volatility in gure 6.8). Thus, as already
emphasized in setion 5.4, higher onsumption leads to the fat that stability of debt
dereases, yet the stability of durable markets inreases. Moreover, as the interest rate
disounting ash ow of durables inreases, the prie level of durables dereases.
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Figure 6.9.: Inequality for parameter variation of MPC out of inome cy
The aggregation of debt and laims has important eets on the distribution of inome
and assets. As presented in gure 6.9 the inreased domesti debt is aompanied by
inreased net worth inequality as some agents hold debt (Di > 0) and others hold laims
(Dj < 0). This also hanges the total inome on the ow level, sine some agents
reeive apital inome (rDj < 0) while others pay interest on debt (rDi > 0). Thereby,
an inrease in the (general) marginal propensity to onsume is aompanied by higher
inequality.
Lastly, we onsider the aggregate impat on total onsumption and the funtional
distribution of inome (f. gure 6.10). First of all, the stronger use of debt dereases
the aggregate apital to inome ratio. The total apital share, however, reats in the
form of an inverse u-shaped funtion to a variation of cy. We dwell more thoroughly on
this point sine in one of his key points, Piketty (2014) omes to a dierent result.
For Piketty (2014) the relation between the funtional distribution (in partiular the
apital share α = rK
X
with X = rK + Y being total apital and labor inome) and the
apital ratio is just the result of an aounting identity for whih:
28
α ≡ r · K
X
= r · κ, (6.7)
holds. Hene, an inrease in the apital ratio κ should go along with an inrease in the
apital share α and vie versa. As our simulations - presented in gure 6.10 - however
show the relation is non-monotonous. Despite the unambiguous derease in the net
worth ratio Ω, the funtional form of the apital share α is given by an inverse u-shape.
The key rationale lying behind is the reation of the interest rate. Due to a higher
amount of debt, the interest rate rises for an inrease of cy (f. gure 6.8). Thus, the
28
This point is more thoroughly disussed in setion 4.2.
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apital share is determined by two opposing fores: for low values of cy the prie eet
dominates for whih a higher interest on apital inreases its share, while for higher
values a volume eet dominates for whih the total share of apital dereases due to
the lower volume of apital.
In the standard (neo) lassial literature the equilibrium prie of apital - being the
interest rate - is determined by the marginal produt of apital. Hene, we have to
dene a prodution funtion. The partial derivative with respet to apital in this
ase represents the equilibrium interest rate. Moreover, the assumption of negative
sale eets (fkk < 0) rationalizes a negative demand funtion for apital. A very
general prodution funtion is the so-alled Constant Elastiity of Substitution (CES)
prodution funtion:
Y =
(
α¯K−ρ + (1− α¯)N−ρ)− 1ρ , (6.8)
with the inputs apital K and labor N as well as a pseudo-apital share of 0 < α¯ < 1.
We an normalize this funtion with apital and inome per apita (k = K
N
respetively
y = Y
N
) leading to:
y ≡ f = (α¯k−ρ + (1− α¯))− 1ρ , (6.9)
for whih ρ > −1 an be transformed to the elastiity of substitution σ = 1
ρ+1
> 0 ↔
ρ = 1−σ
σ
. The apital share is determined as follows:
α =
kf ′(k)
f
, (6.10)
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whih - using the Constant Elastiity of Substitution (CES) prodution funtion - results
in:
α =
α¯
α¯ + (1− α¯)kρ . (6.11)
We an now ompute the hange of the funtional distribution α with respet to the
level of apital k:
∂α
∂k
=
α¯(α¯− 1)ρkρ−1
(α¯ + (1− α¯)kρ)2 . (6.12)
The pleasant feature of the CES funtion is that several - more standard - ases are
nested within this funtion. In partiular for ρ = 0 (σ = 1), the funtion boils down to
the standard Cobb-Douglas prodution funtion (Y = K α¯N1−α¯), for whih the apital
share is onstant (α = α¯) and does not vary with the level of apital (∂α
∂k
= 0) (Cobb and
Douglas, 1928).
29
This is the workhorse model in basially any maroeonomi model
and implies the strong assumption that the funtional distribution is a stylized fat not
varying in time or with hanges of the level of apital.
Piketty (2014) (impliitly) assumes a ase in whih the elastiity of substitution is
larger than one (σ > 1 respetively −1 < ρ < 0) - implying an elasti demand funtion.
In this ase, the volume eet dominates and an inrease in apital leads to an inrease
in the apital share (
∂α
∂k
> 0). In fat, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) - disussing
the evidene of a long-run derease in the labor share - estimate a level of σ = 1.25 > 1.
This ase is sometimes also referred to as the apital-biased ase (Giovannoni, 2014)
for whih apital and labor are substitutes. Moreover, this type of prodution funtion
an rationalize the general inrease in the apital share in an environment of inreasing
apital as measured in the data and e.g. presented in gure 4.5.
The inverse ase would emerge for 0 < σ < 1 (0 < ρ < ∞) presenting an inelasti
demand funtion for whih the prie eet prevails and inrease in the level of apital
would derease the funtional share of apital (
∂α
∂k
< 0). This ase an be labeled
the labor-biased ase for whih apital and labor are omplements (Giovannoni, 2014).
Most of the empirial literature onrms this ase (Aemoglu, 2003). In fat, the Cobb-
Douglas ase is just the extreme iso-elasti ase (σ = 1) for whih prie and volume
eets exatly oset eah other.
The CES prodution derives its name from the property of assuming that the elastiity
of substitution is independent of the level of k and thereby onstant. In eet, the sign
of the partial derivative of the apital share with respet to apital (
∂α
∂k
) is independent
of the level of k. This, however, is not the ase in our model as we have an inverse
u-shaped funtion. Consider a simple ad-ho demand funtion of apital:
r = r0 − rkk, (6.13)
with r0 > 0 and rk > 0. This funtion is elasti (σ > 1) for a low level of k <
r0
2rk
and
inelasti (σ < 1) for a high level of k > r0
2rk
. In fat, we have a apital share that is
29
For the other extreme ase of σ →∞ (ρ = −1) the funtion boils down to a linear prodution funtion
Y = α¯K + (1 − α¯)N . In this ase there are no sale eets and the return to apital is onstant.
Moreover, the apital share inreases with apital (
∂α
∂k > 0).
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Figure 6.11.: Shemati determination of the equilibrium rate of interest in our model
an inverse u-shaped funtion of the level of apital k with a loal maximum at k = r0
2rk
going along with σ = 1.
As a result, the relation between the level of apital (proxied by the net worth ratio
Ω) and the apital share is ambiguous. The standard assumption of a CES prodution
funtion presumes a lear-ut relation being either positive or negative. In our model,
for low values of apital there is a positive relation (as predited by Piketty (2014) for
the apital-biased ase), whereas the labor-biased ase persists for high values of apital.
In our model, the equilibrium rate of interest is determined by the interation of the
(uniform) onsumption funtion and the distribution of inome and wealth rather than
by the himera of an aggregate prodution funtion.
30
In fat, the market is mainly
driven by the supply: if the equilibrium level of apital dereases, the equilibrium rate
30
The assumption of the aggregate prodution funtion - explaining the funtional distribution of inome
by means of an exogenous tehnology - was also one of the key points ritiized by the member of
Cambridge, UK in the Cambridge apital ontroversy. For a thorough depition of the debate the
reader is e.g. referred to Burmeister (2000).
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of interest inreases (also see the shemati gure 6.11
31
). The demand of apital
is given by a ombination of the onsumption funtion - in partiular the minimum
onsumption level c¯ -, the initial endowment with ollateral (driven by heritage H) and
the equity requirement m whih is xed in the long-run. Meanwhile, the number of well-
endowed individuals - supplying the apital - has a strong impat on the equilibrium
level of interest. Thus, the top inome households - despite only representing a small
share of total agents - have a strong maroeonomi impat on the equilibrium interest
rate. In the past literature disussing inequality foused on the low-inome households
fousing on issues suh as poverty traps. As already shown in setion 2.2, the urrent
inequality in the developed ountries in partiular results from the inreased role of very
high-inome individuals. This, however, of maroeonomi importane sine they have
a major impat on the market for savings.
The total non-durable onsumption also shows a similar behavior as the apital share
- i.e. an inverse u-shaped - to a variation of cy (see gure 6.10). The rationale is also
similar. For the higher values of α the total inome
∑N
i=1Xi = X = Y − rD inreases,
as there is a higher inow from foreigners.
32
The non-durable onsumption, however,
peaks at higher values of cy. The latter is due to the diret impat of cy inreasing
non-durable onsumption. Yet, for higher values the indiret eet (dereased urrent
aount) prevails leading to the presented inverse u-shaped funtion.
We proeed by varying the relative onsumption level c¯. As already put forward in
setion 5.1 as well as 5.2, we dene the relative onsumption level as a funtion of the
inome distribution c¯ = quantilej(c). To get a variation, we therefore hange the level
of j.33 In ontrast to cy, there is no threshold value to derive a surplus.
34
We hose to
simulate for values of 0 < j < 0.5, implying that the relative onsumption level is always
below the (labor) inome level of the median household.
35 36
First of all, and as depited in gure 6.12, omparable to the ase of cy the inreased
onsumption results in a higher level of debt, higher interest rates, as well as lower
volatility and prie levels in the durable market. The lass distribution of agents looks
slightly dierent. One again, we have fewer lower-lass agents and fewer higher-lass
agents. In this ase, the middle-lass, however, also dereases. In ontrast to the in-
31
To put our model in a ontext of the history of eonomi thought it an be related to the Loanable
Funds Theory dating bak to the late Dennis Robertson (Tsiang, 2008) arguing that the rate of
interest is determined by demand and supply of loanable funds emphasizing the ow aspet. The
equilibrium is mainly determined by investment opportunities, depreiations, the relation between
urrent (ow) inome and onsumption expenditures, and liquidity onsiderations.
32
Keep in mind that α > 0 in the aggregate in our model an only emerge for a surplus eonomy for
whih
∑N
i=1Xi >
∑N
i=1 Yi.
33
Note that in the gures we refer to this as cmin.
34
The only unambiguous ase is j = 1, for whih the minimum onsumption level would be equal to the
labor inome of the individual with the single highest inome. Hene, all (but one) would require
debt to exeute their onsumption desires resulting in a urrent aount deit.
35
As put forward in setion 7.2.2 the minimum onsumption level is also frequently dened as a ratio
(< 100%) of median inome.
36
As we will argue more preisely in setion 7.2.4 a moderate inome tax has the same eet as an
inrease in the minimum onsumption.
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Figure 6.12.: Household omposition, market for durables and savings for parameter
variation of minimum onsumption quantile cmin
reases of cy aeting all agents equivalently, the inreases of j in partiular hits the
middle-lass and ontributes to their disappearane. The underlying rationale is that
the minimum onsumption level is of partiular importane in dening whether an agent
is low or middle-lass.
One again, the aumulation of debt inreases the inequality amongst agents regard-
ing total inome and net worth (f. gure 6.13). It is important to point out that the
gap between total inome and onsumption inequality inreases with c¯ 37 implying that
onsumption inequality grows at a slower pae than inome inequality. The variation
of minimum onsumption c¯ on apital share α, the net worth ratio Ω and the total
durable onsumption are qualitatively idential to the ase in whih cy is varied (f.
gure 6.14). Total apital dereases and total non-durable onsumption as well as total
apital share exhibit an inverse u-shaped behavior. Compared to the variation of the
marginal propensity to onsume, aggregate results are less sensitive to the variation of
c¯.
37
This also beomes lear from our omputations presented in equation 6.4, in whih the gap diretly
depends on the level of c¯.
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Figure 6.15.: Household omposition, market for durables and savings for parameter
variation of MPC out of net worth cw
Next we vary the MPC out of net worth cw.
38
Qualitatively, the results are idential
to the results with a variation of cy (f. gure 6.15). The debt inreases, the interest
rate inreases, volatility and prie of durables derease. We have more lower-lass and
fewer upper-lass households, whereas the number of middle-lass households exhibits
an inverse u-shaped reation to a variation of cw.
The inequality inreases with cw due to the extended use of debt (f. gure 6.16).
39
The apital share α, the net worth ratio Ω, and the total non-durable onsumption also
reat in a omparable manner as with the variation of cy (f. gure 6.17).
38
Note that one again we only simulated the surplus ase for whih cw <
s
H = 0.025 holds. The seond
(time-varying) ondition reads cw > rts = 0.5s↔ rt < 2cw. As shown in gure 6.15 in the panel in
whih cw and r are related this ondition does not bind for low values of cw / 0.0025. This gure
is, however, slightly misleading as it only plots the time average of rt. As detailed simulations for
the ase cw < 0.0025 onrmed the ondition cw > rs is always satised in the long-run in whih
the interest rate onverges to small enough values to satisfy this ondition.
39
The gure suggests that onsumption inequality is very low for low values of cw / 0.0025. In
partiular, it is lower than inequality of labor inome (exogenously given with Gini(Y ) ≈ 0.52).
As already put forward in the previous footnote this is deeptive and is reversed in the long-run in
whih the ondition cw > rs holds.
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Our basi simulation argued based upon a linear onsumption funtion impliitly
assuming ε = 1. As already presented in setion 4.4 empirial evidene points to the
fat that the onsumption funtion is onave, implying that wealthy individuals have a
higher savings ratio. As moreover already disussed in setion 5.5.2, this property leads
to the fat that wealth inequality does not onverge in the long-run.
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Figure 6.18.: Household omposition, market for durables and savings for parameter
variation of urvature of onsumption funtion ε
We vary the level of 1 < ε < 1.5, implying a onave onsumption funtion. In fat, the
results an be ompared to a derease in the minimum onsumption level. As the supply
of apital inreases, interest rates fall, volatility and pries of durable markets inrease.
We have fewer lower-lass agents, but more higher-lass agents. The inrease in the high-
lass agents, however, dominates, resulting in the fat that the middle-lass dereases.
This is the ruial dierene to the ase of a variation of minimum onsumption. While
a higher level of minimum onsumption dereases the middle-lass at the expense of the
lower-lass, a higher ε - implying higher savings ratios of the wealthy - ontributes to
a lower middle-lass sine more agents turn high-lass. In ontrast to all situations in
whih the onsumption was inreased (inrease in cy, c¯, and cw), all agents are better o
lass-wise for a higher level of ε. In fat, an inrease in ε does little else but inrease the
(non-linear) savings propensity. This, however, omes at the ost of inreased nanial
instability.
As the overall level of debt dereases the level of inequality also dereases (see gure
6.19). In partiular, the inequality of onsumption dereases substantially. This is
the ase sine the onsumption funtion is now onave, dereasing the inequality of
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Figure 6.19.: Inequality for parameter variation of urvature of onsumption funtion ε
onsumption for a given level of labor inome inequality.
40
Somewhat surprisingly, the
inequality of net worth also seems to derease. This, however, is deeptive. For the nite
run (T = 500) the eet of the derease in debt dominates. The inequality of wealth,
however, inreases in time. Thus, in the long-run - as already presented in setion 5.5.2
- wealth inequality diverges (limT→∞Gini(WT ) = 1).
We an also disuss the eet on the other aggregate variables as presented in gure
6.20. Due to the high savings the aggregate net worth ratio inreases. Nevertheless, the
aggregate apital share dereases, as the eet of the dereased interest rate (f. gure
6.18) dominates. Or to speak in the words of the CES prodution funtion, this is the
ase of an ineleasti apital demand funtion. In ontrast to the ase assumed by Piketty
(2014) the inrease in apital does not inrease the apital share in the eonomy.
One ould interpret the inrease in ε as a depition of the global savings glut hy-
pothesis in whih the exess supply of savings of ountries suh as China and Germany
inreased their urrent aounts, resulting in debt for other ountries. Moreover, this
put downward pressure on the world interest rate and inreased the fragility of durable
markets. In our stylized model, investor only an invest in domesti durables. In reality,
however, apital was frequently invested in foreign ountries. In fat, ountries with ur-
rent aount deits (suh as the US or Spain and Ireland) witnessed real estate booms
and busts naned with foreign apital.
Finally, we wrap up the main ndings. Fators that inrease onsumption make agents
worse o lass-wise. The inreased use of debt leads to higher inequality. The high level
of debt also makes the emergene of Ponzi shemes more likely. Meanwhile, the stability
of durable markets inreases. In ontrast to that a higher desire to save dereases interest
rates and destabilizes durable markets.
40
A formal proof for the latter is presented in the appendix A.9.
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onsumption for parameter
variation of urvature of onsumption funtion ε
Moreover, there seems to be an optimal level of the parameters in the onsumption
funtion to ensure a maximum level of total onsumption. If the propensity to onsume
is too low, there is too little onsumption, whereas for the inverse ase too muh is
onsumed and too little apital is aumulated. In the latter ase, aggregate onsumption
ould be inreased by refraining from onsumption in the short-run and lending resoures
to foreigners. These laims yield future interest payments that enhane total inome
X = Y +rK. When the overall level of inome inreases, so does aggregate onsumption
in the long-run. It is important to note the similarities to the lassi ase of dynami
eient eonomy (Phelps, 1961) as disussed in setion 4.2. In this popular theory, there
exists an optimum savings level s = 1−cy = s∗. For the ase of too little savings (s < s∗,
respetively too muh urrent onsumption), aggregate apital is below its steady state
k < k∗ and the rate of interest is above the rate of growth r > g. Suh an eonomy is
labeled a dynami eient eonomy. As already shown, this prevails in the data (also
f. gure 4.5). The onverse ase is onsidered dynamially ineient.
Speaking in terms of lasses as introdued in our model, a large middle-lass on-
tributes to high aggregate onsumption. Note that due to the subsistene level of
onsumption the average propensity to onsume dereases with wealth and inome.
However, the agents with low inome and espeially wealth fae a binding ollateral
onstraint hindering them from onsuming. As a result, the middle-lass is the group
with the strongest onsumption propensity. We only onsidered aggregate onsumption.
It is, however, important to note that the speiation of the onsumption hanges the
onsumption level of dierent lasses. A low value of marginal propensity to onsume
attens the onvex onsumption funtion of labor inome as presented in gure 6.7 in
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the long-run, implying that onsumption inequality dereases.
41
Hene, lower values of
marginal propensity to onsume lead to less onsumption inequality and more onsump-
tion of middle-lass households. For the inverse ase, the bulk of aggregate onsumption
results from the onsumption of high-lass individuals.
Opposed to that, a large number of high-lass agents lead to the fat that nanial
stability in the market for durables dereases. As these agents - rather than onsuming
their high-inome - use it for reating laims to foreigners, the net worth of the eonomy
inreases. This high net worth favors speulation in the market for durables and thereby
inreases nanial fragility.
Finally, one might point to the fat that the (nominal) apital in our model pre-
senting a debt to another agent by assumption is a bad rather than a good as it is
solely employed for naning unsustainable debt resulting from the relative onsump-
tion motive or onduting speulative ativity as we do not onsider produtive apital
(usually modeled by means of a prodution funtion). Thereby, any derease in apital
is welfare-enhaning in our model. This is denitely a very gloomy piture of apital.
However, we think that the role of apital lies between the one presented here and the
very enthusiasti piture presented in the standard growth literature.
6.2.2. Risk Aversion and Inequality
In the following we vary other important parameters that annot be lassied as belong-
ing to the onsumption funtion.
We start by the general risk aversion γ whih sales the demand for durables - leading
to a higher demand for durables for low values and vie versa.
42
As already extensively
disussed in setion 5.4.1, a low value of γ promotes the ight eet stabilizing the
market for debt. On the other hand, this dereases the stability of the durable market
(f. setion 5.4.2). The latter behavior beomes learly visible in the panel of gure
6.21 that depits the variane of durable pries. Other variables show little reation to a
variation of the risk aversion. However, the risk aversion impats on the distribution of
agents. In general, a lower risk aversion inreases the number of middle-lass households
due to the already presented ight eet. There is an inow of both low and high-inome
agents in the middle-lass. In partiular in booms, all agents are middle-lass: former
lower-lass agents do not fae a binding ollateral onstraint and an lever up, while
even high-lass agents ondut levered purhases with debt.
41
The fat that onsumption inequality is higher than labor inome inequality is due to the fat that
onsumption as a funtion of labor is onvex. The inverse ase would emerge for a onave funtion.
For a simple linear funtion, both onsumption and labor inome inequality would take idential
levels. The onvexity itself emerges as a result of the presene of the ollateral onstraint. For
details the reader is referred to appendix A.9.
42
We simulate a value ranging from 5 to 50. The formal stability ondition (as derived in equation 5.59)
requires γ > 0.5µrE(W )β whih for the given values boils down to γ > 0.5. Note that the ondition
is only a lower bound by not inluding non-linear eets. Thus, our searh halts at parameter of
γ = 5 > 0.5.
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Figure 6.21.: Household omposition, market for durables and savings for parameter
variation of risk aversion γ
We also did a eteris paribus variation ofm. However, it turned out that quantitatively
it has little impat.
43
In a qualitative manner all expeted eets are observed. In
partiular, high levels of equity requirement impede the aess of households to redit
resulting in a higher number of lower lass households. In eet, the equilibrium level of
debt and interest rate is lower.
44
Moreover, the inequality of net worth is redued, also
reduing the inequality of total inome and onsumption. Interestingly - and onversely
to theoretial ideas brought forward in setion 5.4.3 - the prie volatility of durables
also dereases as the leveraged speulation in durable markets is also disouraged. As a
result, higher equity requirement always inrease nanial stability.
We an also vary the level of heritage H . Note that a higher level of heritage leads to
the fat that the share of self-earned wealth dereases. We ran the simulation for values
of H < s
cw
= 50 satisfying the surplus eonomy ase. In fat, the role of heritage is very
similar to the role of MPC out of net worth cw sine - as detailed in setion 5.5.1 - they
always ome as twins.
A higher level of heritage inreases the level of assets and thereby total net worth
available for onsumption. The higher onsumption inreases debt, interest rates and the
prie level in the durable market (see gure 6.22). Class-wise we have more lower-lass
and fewer higher-lass agents. The middle-lass exhibits an inverse u-shaped reation
43
For the latter reason, we spare the depition of the onrete simulation results. They, however, are
available on request.
44
In the logi of gure 6.11 the demand funtion of apital shifts to south-west.
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Figure 6.22.: Household omposition, market for durables and savings for parameter
variation of heritage H
to an inrease in heritage H . The latter is more pronouned than in the ase of cw and
an be attributed to the seond property of heritage - namely the ollateral eet. By
initially endowing agents with more net worth available as ollateral to borrow against
fewer agents fae a binding ollateral onstraint and therefore there are less agents
qualied lower-lass.
The key dierene between the aggregate reation to an inrease in the MPC out of
net worth cw and the inrease in heritage H , however, lies in the market for durables.
Strong heritage inreases net worth and thereby inreases the available amount in the
market for durable saling up the prie variane in this market. As a result, strong
heritage inrease the instability in durable markets (see gure 6.22).
As heritage inreases debt, inequality inreases (f. gure 6.23). In this ase, it is
important to point out the speial ase with zero heritage (H = 0). In this ase, all
agents are born without an initial endowment of assets serving as a potential ollateral.
As a result, there are no domesti agents in debt and thus there is no domesti debt
at all (f. gure 6.22 as well 6.23). Moreover, the inequality of wealth is idential to
the inequality of net worth. There is little ativity in the durable market aompanied
by the fat that the durables in fat are overvalued on mean (E(P ) > F = 1).45 In
the ase without heritage (H = 0), the middle-lass are high-lass households that
45
The more preise rationale for the latter is that agents temporarily reate a positive amount of durable
assets at an initial prie of P = F = 1. When selling they, however, fae a short-selling onstraint
of leading to the fat that the lower bound of pries is always P = F = 1 and thereby E(P ) > 1.
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Figure 6.23.: Inequality for parameter variation of heritage H
temporarily lever up in order to nane durable purhases. In the long-run, there is a
lear bisetion in lower and higher-lass households presenting agents that annot realize
their onsumption desires and agents that are net savers. Note that for zero heritage,
the number of lenders and debtors does not add up to the total number of 1,000 agents
as now there is a third group of agents holding neither assets nor debt. The latter is
also the explanation of the inreased wealth inequality depited in gure 6.23. We will
treat this issue more thoroughly in the setion 6.3.2 devoted to re sales in whih similar
behavior emerges.
Figure 6.24 presents the eet of a variation of heritage H on the variables apital
share α, net worth ratio Ω and total onsumption. First and foremost, it is notieable
that the net worth ratio inreases. This is somewhat surprising as we argued that an
inrease in heritage H an be onsidered equivalent to an inrease in the MPC out of
net worth cw suggesting that the net worth ratio would atually derease. The eet of
inreased onsumption requiring more debt and therefore lowering the aggregate apital
exists. However, it is dominated by a prie eet. As presented in setion 5.5.1 the net
worth ratio (for the simplied ase without relative onsumption) is given by:
Ω =
W
Y
=
s(1− rH)
cw − rs = h(s[+], r[+], cw[−], H [−]), (6.14)
implying that it dereases with H . However, an inrease in r - whih emerges for higher
values of H as doumented in gure 6.22 - leads to an inrease in the net worth ratio.46
In the aggregate, the latter eet dominates leading to a (slight) inrease in the net
worth ratio for an inrease in heritage H .
46
Formally, the latter is the ase sine
∂Ω
∂r =
s(s−Hcw)
(cw−rs)2
> 0, sine in the surplus ase we have s > Hcw.
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Figure 6.24.: Capital share, net worth ratio, and non-durable onsumption for parameter
variation of heritage H
The aggregate apital share α one again exhibits an inverse u-shaped behavior owing
to the trade-o of more debt (less apital) and higher interest rates (f. gure 6.22).
47
The inverse u-shaped behavior of the total non-durable onsumption - similar to the ase
of cw - reets the trade-o between higher onsumption propensity and lower aggregate
apital available for onsumption.
One also might onsider H as a poliy variable. In partiular, a lower level of H an
be ahieved by imposing a tax on the stok level of wealth. In fat, a simple lowering of
H would onstitute an extreme form of a tax poliy with total leakage - implying that
proeedings from the tax are not redistributed to low-inome individuals but ompletely
destroyed. Note also that heritage H determines the value of real assets. An example
of a destrution of real assets would be the world wars in the 20th entury whih - as
empirially shown in the work Piketty and Zuman (2014) - led to massive redution of
the stok value of wealth. Eventually, in the ontext of the model ould be onsidered
welfare enhaning as both total inome and net worth inequality would be redued.
Moreover, all agents would be better of lass-wise. Furthermore, the nanial stability
would be enhaned as a lower amount of real assets - serving as ollateral - bind the
ability to reate (artiial) nanial assets that an ontribute to nanial instability. A
47
For high values of heritage H the aggregate apital share is eventually negative. When disaggregating
in the time dimension we nd that this results from a temporary primary deit that, however, in
the long-run is reversed, implying limt→∞ αt > 0.
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very high tax, however, would have an adverse impat on non-durable onsumption.
48
Finally, the net worth ratio would be lowered.
As a result, our poliy maker faes a trade-o. While a soiety might not be prone
to nanial instability or issues of inequality, it is poor in wealth. This result an be
ompared to the left arm of the Kuznets urve for whih inequality (as well as its related
problems) and development are oniting goals.
The most interesting variation, however, onerns the role of inequality. As intensively
disussed in setion 5.2, we assume an exogenously given distribution of labor inome
that an be ompletely ontrolled by its standard deviation σy ontrolling for the degree
of inequality.
49
We an take our model to simulate an exogenous hange to inequality - in
a eteris paribus manner - and disuss its aggregate maroeonomi eets. In empirial
disussions (f. setion 2.2) quantifying the eet of inequality is very diult as it is
interspersed with a variety of dierent fators that feed bak in various diretions. A
natural experiment - satisfying the eteris paribus assumption - is also hard to imagine
in this domain, making the theoreti disussions still the most valuable tool for analyzing
the eet of inequality.
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Figure 6.25.: Household omposition, market for durables and savings for parameter
variation of labor inequality σy (80% quantiles)
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Regarding non-durable onsumption lowering heritage H in our model is an impliit form of lowering
the value of onsumption out of net worth cw as the two always ome as twins in the non-durable
onsumption funtion.
49
Reall, that as presented in setion 5.2 and derived in setion A.4, there is a positive relation between
the level of σy and the Gini. For small values it is furthermore well approximated by Gini ≈ 0.5σy.
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It is important to note that we only have a nite sample of N = 1, 000 agents. As
already put forward the draw from the distribution an vary severely. To ontrol for this
eet, we simulate eah ase various times and also aggregate along this dimension.
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Figure 6.26.: Inequality for parameter variation of labor inequality σy
First of all, higher inequality hanges the distribution of agents with respet to lass
(see gure 6.25). More inequality leads to more higher-lass agents. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, we have fewer lower-lass agents and more middle-lass agents. The latter fator
an, however, be explained by the hanging value of the relative onsumption level. As
depited in gure 5.3, a higher inequality dereases the relative onsumption level if
j < 0.5. Sine in our ase we assume j = 0.2 this level dereases making the eet of an
inrease in inequality similar to a derease in minimum onsumption already disussed
earlier.
In eet, less debt is aumulated, interest rates derease, but the pries in the market
for durables inrease and - this is a key result of this thesis - the instability in durable
markets inreases. The aumulation of apital available for speulative purposes due
to a strong share of high-inome individuals is the driving fore behind this result. Note
also that we nd a diret negative relation between inequality and the equilibrium level
of interest rates. The rationale - as already presented in gure 6.11 - is that the market
50
We take R = 20 repetitions. The reported values in this ase not only aggregates in the time
and agent dimension but also in the dimension of repetitions (e.g total durable onsumption now
is E(Ctot) =
1
R
1
T
∑R
r=1
∑T
t=1
∑N
i=1 Cr,i,t. We, however, also provide the 80% ondene interval.
Another approah would be to just inrease the number of agents to ome lose to a law of large
numbers.
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for debt is mainly driven by supply whih inreases with higher inequality. Note that for
very low values of inequality - for the given onsumption funtion - we eventually end
up in a deit eonomy. In this ase, we have very little high-lass individuals. Their
soial role is supplying the debt. As they disappear for low inequality, debt has to be
imported from foreigners. More tehnially, it should also be noted that for high levels
of inequality the ondene bands of the simulation inrease. In eet, the simulation
beomes very fragile for high inequality, implying that while a ertain (nite) draw of
the given inome distribution might still lead to a stable aggregate result, another draw
is aompanied by high instability.
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Figure 6.27.: Capital share, net worth ratio, and non-durable onsumption for parameter
variation of labor inequality σy
We assume an exogenous inrease in the inequality of labor inome. As initial asset
endowment is assumed to be perfetly orrelated the inequality of wealth equals the
inequality of labor inome. As predited in setion 5.2 the relation between ontrol-
ling parameter σy and the inequality is well-desribed by a linear funtion Gini(Y ) ≡
Gini(Pq) ≈ 0.5σy. Other forms of inequality, however, grow at a dierent pae. As
agents aumulate debt and laims net worth and total inome inequality inrease to a
higher level (f. gure 6.26). This also feeds bak to inequality of onsumption whih,
however, is always (slightly) below inequality of total inome. We an rank dierent
eonomi gures aording to their inequality:
Gini(W ) > Gini(X) > Gini(C) > Gini(Y ) = Gini(Pq), (6.15)
with net worth being the most unequal measurement and the (exogenously assumed)
fator of wealth and labor inome are most equally distributed.
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Comparable to the ases of dereasing MPC of disposable inome as well as net worth
(cy respetively cw) and espeially the relative onsumption level c¯, an inrease in in-
equality leads to an inverse u-shaped reation of the apital share (see gure 6.27
51
).
While the the net worth ratio inreases for higher inequality (sine we have both an in-
rease in the mean inome
52
and a derease in c¯), the interest rate dereases (see gure
6.25). Both eets work against eah other leading to the inverse u-shape of the aggre-
gate apital share. As a result - and as already argued in setion 5.5.1 following a more
theoretial rationale - higher inequality in the personal distribution of labor inome does
not have to go along with a higher funtional share of apital. The simulation results,
however, beome very noisy for high values of inequality. Due to the inrease in the
general level of inome, aggregate non-durable onsumption unambiguously inreases
for inequality.
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Figure 6.28.: Gini oeient in time and Lorenz urve in last period (t = 500) for labor
inome, onsumption, wealth and net worth for growing labor inequality
(gineq = 10
−3
)
The general model so far is a stati model as we have no aggregate growth. In setion
5.2, we already presented an approah to model an eonomy in whih both inequality and
total labor inome inrease in time. In fat, we model the left part of the Kunznets urve.
Figure 6.28 shows the Gini oeients for dierent eonomi variables. By onstrution,
the inequality of labor inome inreases in a linear manner.
53
Due to the well-desribed
51
Note that we only present the ondene intervals for the ase of total durable onsumption. The
other fators are highly sensitive for high values of inequality.
52
This an be learly shown by the mathematial identity for whih Ytot = nE(Y ) unambiguously
inreases with σy as: E(Y ) = Y¯ exp(0.5σ
2
y).
53
For the underlying rationale the reader might want to refer to appendix A.5.
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argument the inequality of net worth osillates around a onstant steady state equal to
the initial distribution of labor inome. Following the upward trend of labor inome
inequality and the aumulation of debt and laims, net worth inequality, total inome
inequality and onsumption inequality, however, all inrease in time.
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Figure 6.29.: Market onditions for savings/debt market and durable market and om-
position of household groups for growing labor inequality (gineq = 10
−3
)
The higher inequality in time also has an interesting impat on the lass-wise distri-
bution of agents (see gure 6.29). As the relative onsumption level falls and, moreover,
some very high-inome agents emerge the number of debtors dereases in favor of the
number of lenders. Flow wise we have more higher-lass agents and fewer lower-lass
agents. As usual the middle-lass disappears in the long-run. The high supply of laims
also applies downward pressure on the interest rate.
As already presented in setion 5.2 (in partiular in gure 5.6) the growing inequality
- by assumption - is aompanied by an exponential growing output. In total, this is
aompanied by higher aggregate onsumption (both of non-durables and durables) and
an inreasing total balane sheet that - in the surplus eonomy - mainly onsists of laims
against foreigners (see gure 6.30). Interestingly, in later simulation periods - with higher
values of inequality - the level of domesti debt falls. This an be rationalized by the
fat that the lowering level of relative onsumption c¯ requires a lower level of debt and
thereby allows low-inome agents to (slightly) deleverage.
In eet, higher inequality eventually seems desirable from this aggregate standpoint.
Not only does the standard of living - measured by total onsumption - inrease, but also
the lass-wise distribution of agent (debtors vs. lenders) is improving as the number of
indebted households dereases. Thus, the problem of nanial instability in the market
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k for growing
labor inequality (gineq = 10
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)
for debt - as extensively disussed in setion 5.4.1 - resulting from Ponzi games is redued.
This almness, however, is deeptive.
We redo the simulations with a higher growth rate of inequality (gineq = 2 · 10−3).
Figure 6.31 an be onsidered as an exemplary anatomy of a nanial risis. As more
and more net worth is aumulated, the stability ondition in the market for durables
(detailed in setion 5.4.2) given as γ > 0.5E(W )µβC) eases to hold. Due to some
negative noise trading shok amplied by hartists trading an extreme strong ight to
risky assets aompanied by a high demand for debt is reated leading to an extreme
inrease in interest rates.
54
Thus, for a short period of time, all agents beome debtors.
As no domesti agents are willing to supply any debt, the interest inreases to an extreme
level.
55
Eventually, this is the situation presented in the illustrative gure 5.8. Now,
however, all agents are over indebted and fall into the group of low-lass agents. Trading
in the market for durables ompletely halts and all labor inome is employed primarily
for paying interest on foreign debt. A potentially existing residual is taken for non-
54
The reader should note the sale of the prie diagram ranging up to 5 · 1014.
55
In the mathematial model it diverges to innity.
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Figure 6.31.: Market onditions for savings/debt market and durable market and ompo-
sition of household groups for fast growing labor inequality (gineq = 2·10−3)
durable onsumption.
56
One might want to interpret this as a Minsky moment (Minsky,
1986).
It might also be interesting to ompare this breakdown with the well-disussed break-
down known as a sudden stop (Calvo, 1996). The latter problem ourred in Latin
Amerian eonomies in the 1980s as well as in the Asian Crisis in the 1990s in par-
tiular in emerging eonomies. Basially, foreign investors that naned the eonomi
expansion - due to some noisy unfavorable signal about future prospets - deided to
suddenly stop their inow of apital into the ountry also aompanied by a reverse of a
massive urrent aount deit into a (slight) surplus and a depreiation of the domesti
urreny. As the emerging ountry, however, held debt nominated in foreign urreny
this devaluation made paying interest on foreign debt (merely) impossible leading to the
breakdown of the eonomy.
Our ase bears some similarities but, however, also some large dierenes. First
of all, the episode of the sudden stop only ours during a very limited time as the
simulated eonomy was in a large urrent aount surplus for a long period of time. This
aumulated net worth, however, favored speulative ativity in asset markets. Due to
some noisy signal about good future prospets in the asset market, all agents want to
56
This paragraph presented a more narrative approah. Tehnially, one the instability property is
rossed pries grow without bound. Formally, the movement of pries (respetively interest rates) is
desribed by a sine wave (as the eigenvalue has an imaginary part apturing the length of the yle)
as agents quikly reshift their portfolio between the asset lasses. The envelope of this urve is given
by a growing exponential proess (sine the real part of the eigenvalue is positive). This behavior is
independent of whether the initial noise trading shok was positive or negative.
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partiipate in the asset market, implying that no domesti naning is available leading
to a massive inrease in the interest rate. As we have no exhange rate mehanism
this is similar to the depreiation of domesti urreny inreasing the eetive rate of
interest on foreign debt witnessed in the lassi sudden stops. Note that in our ase the
foreigners are ompletely passive. The sudden stop of supply of apital in our ase thus
does not fall within the responsibility of the foreign agents but is due to the behavior of
the (rih) domesti agents suddenly turning from lenders to debtors.
This result an also be ompared to the empirial work of Atkinson and Morelli (2011),
arguing that the hange of inequality does not have an impat on nanial stability. This
result is onrmed by our simulations. Rather than the hange of inequality, the absolute
level of inequality matters. In the model, there is a threshold level of inequality going
along with a spei aumulated level of laims leading to a breakdown in the market for
durables. The growth rate of inequality only matters by leading to a faster onvergene
to this threshold level of inequality. In eet, the nanial meltdown would also our
in the model with the lower growth rate of inequality gineq = 10
−3
, however, at a later
period of time (t > T = 500).
6.3. Simulation Result for the Case with Fire Sales
As already put forward in setion 5.3, Austerity an be very painful for low-inome
households whih have to suppress their onsumption level for a prolonged time. In the
previous setion, we made the unrealisti assumption that agents refrain from trading in
the market for durables and thereby hold their stok level of wealth onstant. However,
this behavior annot be observed in real data. Selling their assets provides a ash
inow for ollateral onstrained households and therefore an enhane their onsumption
possibilities at least in the short-run. Yet, this has the eet of a negative externality
on other agents by depressing the pries for durables serving as ollateral and thereby
inreasing the number of ollateral onstrained households. This very argument is at the
heart of debt-deation argument by Fisher (1933) and the nanial aelerator literature
dating bak to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). We disuss this eet in the framework of
our model in the following.
Comparable to setion 6.1, we proeed by rst presenting the onrete modeling of
this ase (setion 6.3.1) to afterwards disuss the simulation results in setion 6.3.2.
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6.3.1. Modeling the Case with Fire Sales
To model this eet we have to make a statement about the behavior of the lower lass
households. We assume that these households generate the desired ash-ow to fulll
their onsumption desire by selling a part of their assets:
Ptdi,t = D˙
max
i,t − D˙i,t = D˙maxi,t − (−Yi,t + Ci,t + Ptdi,t + rtDt)⇒
di,t =
1
2Pt
(
D˙maxi,t − (−Yi,t + Ci,t + rtDt)
)
=
1
2Pt
((1−m)Ptqi,t + Yi,t − Ci,t − (1 + rt)Dt) < 0
(6.16)
It is important to note that in an inter-period ontext, agents rst show ollateral to
the nanial markets in order to lever up as muh as possible and afterwards sell part of
this ollateral to generate further ash-ow. The re sale, moreover, has a double rent
in the short-run:
57
it not only provides ash-ow but also redues demand for durables.
This possibility nevertheless is limited with the short-sale onstraint. One agents have
reahed their short-sale onstraint (−dt,i ≤ qt,i) agents are one again fored to derease
their onsumption (the Austerity-ase).
We assume that these agents exhaust their shorting potential to the maximum by hit-
ting the short sale onstraint di,t = −qi,t. This time we furthermore require delevaraging
of over indebted agents.
58
Yet, we still do not allow negative onsumption. Formally,
the onsumption of onsumption-dereasing agents is modeled as follows :
Ci,t = max
{
Yi,t − rtDi,t + D˙maxi,t , 0
}
. (6.17)
6.3.2. Basi Simulations
In this setion, we present simulation results when allowing low-inome agents employing
a re-sale heuristi. Apart from this hange of rules we keep all parameters inluding
random seeds idential to the ase with wealth onsumption presented in setion 6.1.2
allowing for a diret omparison between the two results.
The eet of the re-sale heuristi diretly sets in at the beginning of the simulation.
In partiular, low-inome individuals start by re selling their assets in order to (tem-
porarily) inrease their onsumption (see gure 6.32). This downward pressure in the
market for durables is piked up by hartist agents further emphasizing this trend (see
gure 6.33). Low-inome agents sell their assets until short-selling onstraints bind -
implying that they have an amount of zero assets available. Furthermore, fundamental
traders begin to dominate the market and bring the pries bak to fundamentals (see
gure 6.33). The upturn, however, essentially ours to the benet of the high-inome
agents who hold the suient amount of net worth to lever up. Therefore, the bust
aets all agents, while in boom times high-inome agents disproportionately prot. In
57
Hene, the fator 2 in the previous equation.
58
Formally, we spare the ondition D˙i,t = max
{
D˙maxi,t , 0
}
introdued in setion 6.1.
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Figure 6.32.: Mean as well as 5% and 95% quantile of total inome, wealth, debt, and
net worth for the ase with re sales
eet, assets are redistributed within the rst 100 simulation periods from low-inome
individuals to high-inome agents severely altering the wealth distribution - in the sense
of making it more unequal.
A strong aveat with regards to the simple version presented in setion 6.1 was that the
distribution of wealth was assumed to be exogenous. Moreover, by assumption it had the
same degree of inequality as the distribution of labor inomes. This is not the ase in the
model with re sales. The higher inequality of wealth feeds bak into higher inequality
of net worth W , total inome X , and onsumption C (see gure 6.34). Moreover - and
in line with empirial evidene (e.g. Wol (2013)) - the dierent eonomi variables an
be put into a realisti ranking with respet to inequality:
Gini(W ) > Gini(Pq) > Gini(X) > Gini(C) > Gini(Y ). (6.18)
Most importantly, stok variables are more unequally distributed than ow variables as
this time Gini(Pq) > Gini(X) and not the other way round as in the previous simula-
tions. Moreover, the exogenously assumed distribution of labor inome Y is eventually
the resoure whih is distributed in the most equal manner. All variables evolving in
the ourse of the simulation are distributed in a more unequal manner.
As also presented in gure 6.33, besides net debtors and lenders a strong group of
agents emerges representing no debt agents. Sine these agents sold all of their initial
endowments, they lak ollateral to borrow against, exluding them from apital markets.
By allowing for re sales the model endogenously reates agents that not only have little
inome (ow) as a result of underemployment but also annot provide assets (stok) and
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Figure 6.33.: Market onditions for savings/debt market and durable market and om-
position of household groups for the ase with re sales
therefore an be titled NINJAs (No Inome No Job No Assets) as seen in the reent
nanial risis. In eet, a low-inome agent with zero wealth is always also an agent
with zero net worth as it does not own assets available as ollateral to borrow against.
Finaning the durable asset purhases by means of ow inome is also not possible due to
the fat that the prior-ranked onsumption of non-durables exeeds the urrent inome.
The zero wealth agents also beome observable in the Lorenz urve of wealth whih now
- and in ontrast to the Austerity-ases presented in gure 6.2 - exhibits a zero slope at
the lower end (see gure 6.34).
As also shown re sales still persist in the latter part of the simulations. This is in
partiular the ase in downturns in whih they further exaerbate the trend as proposed
by the Debt deation theory (Fisher, 1933). More tehnially, they introdue a further
non-linearity in the durable trading, adding a further instability.
This non-linear behavior also beomes obvious in the market for domesti debt as
presented in gure 6.35. In ontrast to the onsumption derease ase, whih exhibited
a onstant growth behavior in domesti debt, in the re-sale ase the market shows up-
and downward movements. This behavior an be related to the situation in the market
for durables, allowing for strong absolute debt holding in upturns or even requiring
deleveraging in downturns.
We an also onsider the individual apital share αi as well as the individual net worth
ratio Ωi as depited in gure 6.36. Regarding the net worth ratio, we see that very low-
inome agents have a ratio of zero, implying that they do not own any apital. As they,
however, an also not borrow up they also do not hold debt. Hene, they neither have
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Figure 6.34.: Gini oeient in time and Lorenz urve in last simulation period (t = 500)
for labor inome, onsumption, wealth and net worth for the ase with re
sales
to pay interest on debt nor reeive apital inome, implying that their apital share of
inome αi is zero. In ontrast to that, agents with a medium size labor inome have
a negative apital share, implying that they pay interest on debt. As the wealth is
now distributed more unequally both the apital share and the net worth ratio for the
individuals with the highest labor inome also inrease ompared to the ase without
re sales (f. gure 6.6).
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Figure 6.35.: Deomposition of GDP (aggregate ow) and aggregate stok for the ase
with re sales
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Figure 6.36.: Net worth to labor inome ratio Ω and apital share of total inome α as
a funtion of labor inome Y (time averages) for the ase with re sales
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Figure 6.37.: Mean of non-durable onsumption, savings, durable onsumption, debt
level, wealth and net worth as funtion of mean inome for the ase with
re sales (time averages)
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It is important to disuss the inome funtion as shown in gure 6.37. The very low-
inome individuals do not save, and hold neither wealth nor net worth nor debt. On
the other side, the demand for durables shows a negative spike for the lowest inome
households due to their re selling ativities. A seond negative spike one again emerges
at a medium size inome as also presented in the Austerity-ase from gure 6.2 due to the
fat that these households aused by their ollateral onstraint only tend to partiipate
in bear markets.
For this ase we refrain from presenting the variation of the parameters as exeuted
in setion 6.2 for the Austerity-ase. Eventually, similar results as in the latter ase
emerge. However, the re-sales promote higher fragility making the graphs less lear-ut.
Small hanges in the exat form of the inome distribution as well as in the stohasti
proess of the noise trading alter the results of the durable market massively. Due to the
ollateral onstraint (for the low inome) as well as the portfolio omposition (for the high
inome) this feeds bak into the market for (domesti) debt. Besides that, the re-selling
pressure for a given inome distribution leads to more lower-lass individuals without
wealth holdings. This feeds bak into higher wealth inequality as well as onsumption
inequality.
So far we presented the model's results and showed how the model reats to hanges of
the underlying parameters. As the parameters are exogenously determined, this analysis
had the harater of a robustness hek. In the following setion we slightly extend the
model introduing parameters that an be subjet to exogenous poliy variations. In
partiular, we investigate poliies aiming at redistributing ow and its aggregate eets.
203

7. Redistribution in the Model
Eonomy
I think the government solution
to a problem is usually as bad as
the problem and very often
makes the problem worse.
(Friedman, 1975, p. 6)
In the previous setions, we presented a theoretial rationale linking inome inequality
and subsequent net worth inequality reating the danger of nanial instability. Sine
the latter is an undesirable result, redistribution ould lead to a welfare improvement.
This is a fator not widely disussed in the literature. However, there are several other
fators that motivate redistribution while others speak against it. We review these
arguments and ounterarguments in setion 7.1. We ontrast a simple at tax system
with a minimum inome with a true progressive system and show its aggregate and
distributional onsequenes in the ontext of the model.
7.1. The Role of Redistribution as a Poliy Goal
The want to redistribute eonomi resoures arises from an initial disontent with the
prevailing distribution. A normative question that emerges in suh a ontext would
be: what is the best distribution of eonomi resoures? Normally, this question is
onsidered as being beyond the usual sope of eonomis. However, the basi tools of
eonomis already give some very far-reahing answers to this important question.
One an onsider the ase of a soial planner trying to maximize the aggregate utility
in an eonomy dened as the sum of individual utilities for homogeneous preferenes
(i.e. all agents have the same underlying utility funtion). For any standard utility
funtion with dereasing marginal utility - also indiating risk aversion - total equality
is the optimal distribution of inome. This very strong result is easy to grasp if we
onsider the fat that - due to the dereasing marginal utility (U ′′ < 0) - eah unit
of resoures the soial planner takes away from a highly endowed individual and gives
to an agent with lower amount of resoures, inreases the total welfare dened as the
sum of individual utilities. In ontrast to that, for an underlying onvex utility funtion
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(U ′′ > 0) - implying risk-loving individuals - total inequality would eventually be soially
desirable.
1 2 3
On the other hand, in a standard ase, any redistribution onstitutes a Pareto inferior
situation as at least one agent (the high inome faing the taxes) is worse o than under a
senario without redistribution. More pratially, any form of redistribution undermines
the (legal) onept of property rights allowing eah agent to keep the fruit of her own
work. Another standard point put forward against (a omplete) redistribution is that
within the proess of redistribution goods eieny losses emerge - implying that not
all that is taken away from wealthy individuals eventually reemerges for low-inome
individuals. This argument is often referred to as the leaky buket argument (Okun,
1975). In the presene of a leaky buket, the optimal distribution emerges as a trade-o
between the leakiness and the risk aversion γ of the soiety. Note that low risk aversion
is aompanied by a strong love of onsumption and vie versa. Higher leakiness and
lower risk aversion go along with a more unequal equilibrium distribution of resoures.
As already put forward in Arrow (1973) for the ase of maximum risk aversion γ →∞,
implying no marginal utility of inreased onsumption (U ′ = 0), total equality is the
optimal distribution.
4
The latter is also the result of the so-alled maxi-min priniple of
Rawls (1974) arguing that the welfare of the worst-o individual should be maximized.
This onept an be understood under the veil of ignorane, desribing a tion in whih
agents an hoose a soiety they want to live in before being born.
The key theoretial argument against redistribution is a loss of eieny and a negative
inentive argument. We will treat both more thoroughly and dierentiated in setion
7.2 in whih we show how dierent onrete forms of redistribution distort individual
deisions.
The presented argument so far was highly abstrat. However, there are also more
onrete arguments in favor of redistribution. As low-inome individuals are assumed
to have a higher marginal propensity to onsume a redistribution to the bottom should
result in higher aggregate onsumption. This argument is frequently emphasized in the
Post-Keynesian literature.
5
As put forward in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012), redis-
tribution an also be welfare enhaning if a high amount of debt is already aumulated.
In line with the lassi Fisherian debt-deation, the deleveraging of the low-inome
agents an have negative aggregate onsequenes. In this ase, a redistribution an
eventually be a Pareto improvement for all agents - inluding those high-inome agents
1
It is also interesting to point out the parallels to the work of Beker et al. (2005), who, following
the work of Rosen (1997), introdue a status onern that leads to inreasing marginal utility of
onsumption and, therefore, to risk-loving individuals that reate an equilibrium demand for lotteries
and lead to the fat that an unequal distribution an eventually be soially optimal.
2
For the speial ase of risk neutrality (U ′′ = 0), the soial planner would be indierent to any form
of distribution. This is the ase sine redistribution does not hange total welfare.
3
The argument is also presented based on a more formalized reasoning in the appendix A.7.
4
The latter is presented based upon a formal argument in appendix A.7.
5
For a detailed review of the arguments the reader is referred to Kurz and Salvadori (2010). The
argument is also presented in setion 4.3.
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that lose in the short-run - sine an unfavorable equilibrium is ruled out.
6
In our dis-
ussions of the simulations results (f. setion 7.2.4), we will also onsider the aggregate
onsumption eet.
(a)
(b)
Figure 7.1.: Inome level and inome redistribution (Data soure: OECD (2012))
In setion 2.2, we already presented empirial evidene about the state of redistribu-
tion. In partiular, in gure 2.4 we reported a trend of lower redistribution in Anglo-
6
The major ounterargument - not inluded in our analysis, but put forward in Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2012) - is the problem of time-inonsisteny, in whih ex-ante the poliy maker has to
ommit not to redistribute in order to rule out moral hazard problems only to afterwards engage in
redistribution.
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Saxon ountries (espeially the US) and Sandinavia.
7 8
Sometimes this is referred to
as a paradigm shift of more deregulation and less redistribution (Piketty et al., 2014).
Using OECD data, Fitoussi and Saraeno (2010) relate the phenomenon of low redis-
tribution to a derease in maximum tax rate in Europe and the US as well as the derease
in labor employment protetion as measured in the employment protetion legislation
(EPL) index.
9
The derease in redistribution an be explained in a beggar-thy-neighbor
setting in whih ountries ompete for the mobile fators labor and (espeially) apital
by means of taxes leading to a rae to the bottom in taxes. Therefore, inreased in-
equality not only has exogenous auses but also is supported by a lower sovereign will
to redistribute.
A simple linear regression on the presented ountries suggests a positive relation be-
tween median inome and redistribution (see gure 7.1(a)). The rationale for this is,
that, if the overall size of the pie is larger, a soiety is more generous in sharing it. In
the theoretial literature it is even argued that redistribution is a luxury good (Bén-
abou, 1996). However, this result is severely dependent on the developing ountries in
the sample (i.e. Turkey and Mexio) and the European ountries with a strong favor
for redistribution (Sandinavia, Germany and Frane). If these ountries are removed
from the sample, a negative orrelation emerges prediting lower redistribution for high-
inome ountries (see gure 7.1(b)).
Our simple univariate regression does not onsider other underlying auses and espe-
ially does not rule out reverse ausality issues. In a reent paper by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), Ostry et al. (2014) - using reent data for OECD ountries - dwell
thoroughly on the old growth vs. equality ontroversy emphasizing the transmittane
eet between the two by redistribution. One an argue that higher inequality leads to
higher redistribution thereby dereasing growth by dereasing inentives to work
10
and
imposing an ineient government system (Okun, 1975). In this ase, high inequality
leads to high redistribution resulting in low growth. On the other side - as frequently
emphasized in the literature of growth (e.g. Galor and Zeira (1993)) - redistribution an
promote growth by supporting the aumulation of human apital. Deomposing the
data, Ostry et al. (2014) show that while in a diret eet inequality dereases growth,
7
The latter, however, are still at a far higher level of redistribution than the Anglo-Saxon ountries
by means of our proxy.
8
As emphasized by Bénabou (1996), redistribution does not have to impat on the dierene between
pre and post transfer Gini. Other forms of redistributive measures inlude minimum wages, land
reform, eduation subsidies to build up human apital, trade protetion (proteting low-inome work-
ers from foreign ompetition), and (very important in our ontext) stronger regulation of nanial
markets (Bénabou, 1996).
9
The employment protetion in Anglo-Saxon ountries USA, UK, and Ireland as measured by the EPL
eventually leveled or even inreased. However, the overall level is far below the level of European
ountries. One again, this suggests that inreased inequality in Europe is more a problem of the
lower living onditions for the poor while in the Anglo-Saxon ountries it is driven by an inreased
share of the top inome lass.
10
The problem is sometimes also referred to as the Samaritan's dilemma (Kumar, 2014), in whih the
presene of redistribution leads to moral hazard problem resulting in the problem that agents have
little inentive to provide eort in the rst plae and to aumulate (human) apital.
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the resulting redistribution (partly) alleviates these negative eets making stronger re-
distribution eventually favorable for growth. However, they also argue that there are
limits to redistribution, implying that for an already high degree of redistribution fur-
ther redistribution might be harmful to growth. Based upon their data analysis they
identify (amongst others) Frane, Germany, and the Netherlands as being part of the
latter group.
The dominating literature in politial eonomy predits a positive relation between
inequality and redistribution (Bénabou, 1996). As the median voter beomes poorer in
unequal soieties, governments opt for more redistribution. However, this is only the ase
under populist (left-wing) regimes. In fat, the reverse ould emerge. In elitist or wealth
biased (right-wing) regimes the rih have more power, opting for lower redistribution
(Bénabou, 1996). This an take the form of lobbying, lower demorati partiipation by
low-inome individuals, or even the buying of votes. The elitist ase is popularized by
Piketty (2014), presenting a dystopia of a soiety in whih eonomi suess and politial
power go hand in hand. The rent seeking of the rih (Tullok, 2008) is espeially strong
if property rights are not well enfored (Bénabou, 1996). Eventually, the wing of a
politial party is idential to the side of the inome distribution (left or right of the
median) they aim to politially represent. On the other hand, even the rih have an
inentive to redistribute to the poor in order to avoid politial turmoils.
11
While the latter results from a rather misanthropi Weltanshauung, we an also
take a more positive perspetive arguing that individuals are altruisti. In this ase,
transferring goods not only provides utility to the reipient but also to the donor leading
to a Pareto improvement (Boadway and Keen, 2000). However, rather than installing
a fored system of redistribution by means of taxation, a subsidy of gifts and harity
should be advisable based upon this underlying onept (Boadway and Keen, 2000).
As already presented in setion 2.1, a large number of theoretial models (e.g. Ga-
lor and Zeira (1993) or Banerjee and Newman (1993)) presenting persisting inequality
also aompanied by negative eets on aggregate growth rely on the underlying notion
of imperfet redit markets. In these models, private insurane markets (partly) do
not exist due to imperfet information resulting in moral hazard and adverse seletion.
Publily provided mandatory insurane markets an (partly) ompensate for that. More
extremely, the models in the Bewley-tradition (f. setion 3.3), even require the pres-
ene of uninsurable idiosynrati risk - being an imperfetion of the nanial market to
generate inequality in the rst plae. Following from that one ould argue that nanial
liberalization reduing restritions on nanial markets an eventually be favorable. In
fat, the 1980s saw a paradigm hange in whih the publi redistribution was ut bak
and replaed by nanial liberalization (Rajan, 2010).
To some extent redit is a private and voluntary form of temporary redistribution from
high-inome individuals to low-inome individuals with onsumption wishes that exeed
their urrent inome. While tax payers do not have any entitlement to a servie in return,
11
The latter argument is sometimes labeled as Disraelian Conservatism named after the strategy of
British politiian Benjamin Disraeli (Boadway and Keen, 2000).
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a redit is an expliit ontrat that requires a repayment with interest.
12
Thereby, and
as extensively presented in the previous setions, this short-term solution, however, may
lead to negative long-term eets. Or to put it more metaphorially, the redit ats like
a painkiller treating the symptoms, being high onsumption inequality due to inome
inequality. In the short-run, the presene of redit redues onsumption inequality,
however, leading to inreased net worth inequality that might lead to nanial instability.
In essene, this painkiller erases the pain in the short-run and makes the patient fell well-
o and overstreth her resoures (being the budget onstraint). The underlying disease
(inome inequality) still remains the same. In ontrast to this, redistribution an try to
envision this underlying problem diretly. While redit is a form of a private solution,
redistribution by means of taxation an be onsidered the government solution. However,
the aggregate result, ruially depends on the onrete design of the tax system, whih
will be subjet of the subsequent setion.
7.2. Taxation in Unequal Soieties
In this setion, we disuss the eet of the tax system as a form of redistribution. The
taxation model and its impliations are presented in the following setion while its eets
on the dynamis are disussed based upon simulation results in setion 7.2.4. Before we
do so, however, we review the very wide literature on taxation.
7.2.1. Literature Review
The rst question put forward by the literature on taxation is whether taxation is needed
in the rst plae. If a perfet eient market exists with the First Welfare Theorem
holding - stating that every market outome is Pareto eient - the presene of taxa-
tion would only lead to distortions away from eient outome. Hene, to rationalize
taxation, some form of market failure is neessary. In partiular, nanial markets are
onsidered to be ineient by not allowing to (fully) insure against idiosynrati risks
due to fators suh as redit onstraints. Thereby, the tax system and espeially the
soial insurane system provides an insurane against inome risks resulting from ad-
verse shoks out of health, disability, and longevity not available on the private market.
A predition resulting from this theoretial thought is that ountries with less evolved
nanial markets in whih individuals exhibit a strong risk aversion, should provide a
larger soial insurane system. This an be thought of as a rationale why Anglo-Saxon
ountries (in partiular the USA) have less evolved publi soial seurity systems.
Aording to the Seond Welfare Theorem, the questions of eieny and equity an
be separated. In partiular, the role of the government boils down to inuening the
initial endowment of agents that is soially aeptable. Starting with this endowment
a Pareto eient outome will be reahed in the market eonomy. The endowment in
this ase is the ability of the agent. As argued in Piketty and Saez (2013b) the labor
12
Note that a similar argument was put forward in setion 2.2 disussing the issue of Riardian equiv-
alene.
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inome is driven by four omponents. It an result from (1) abilities given at birth, (2)
aquired skills atively aumulated in life-time, (3) heterogeneous tastes, or (4) pure
luk. Whereas the rst fator and the last fators are beyond individual ontrol, the other
fators are endogenous to eah agent and given by ative deisions (2) or preferenes (3).
The idea is that the tax system should not only - and as already put forward - provide
insurane against idiosynrati shoks of bad luk (4), but also against bad starting
onditions (1). An example for the latter would be being born with a physial or mental
disability. Thus, the latter argument is very lose to the rationale of the Rawlsian veil
of ignorane. Furthermore, the government should provide an environment in whih one
an atively build up human apital (2). More onretely, this requires for a subsidy
of eduation. Eduation is usually onsidered a publi good. Any form of publi goods
- suh as national defense, infrastruture, or polie - are also a standard rationale for
taxation. On the other hand, the eonomi literature emphasizes that heterogeneous
tastes (3) should not be aounted for by the tax system. A liberal soiety (in ontrast
to a paternalisti) should tolerate individual tastes - in partiular a high taste for leisure
as opposed to work - however not atively subsidy them. The key problem of the tax
system is that it an only impreisely monitor whether a partiular outome is result of
tastes (3) or abilities (1). If heterogeneous earnings are only the result of heterogeneous
tastes, a progressive inome tax system would not be desirable.
13
The transfer to private households an our in various forms. The already mentioned
form of publi goods an be onsidered a demogrant (Piketty and Saez, 2013b) dened
as as an aess to a good regardless of the individual inome situation. In fat, and as
will be more preisely disussed in setion 7.2.2, the presene of a demogrant onstitutes
a progressive tax system. Another question that emerges is whether the transfers should
be onduted in terms of money or as in-kind transfers (i.e. in the forms of goods)
(Piketty and Saez, 2013b). A rationale for the latter would be that individuals have a
tendeny to invest the money in demerit goods suh as alohol or igarettes. The general
literature, however, favors transfers in terms of money from a liberal or anti-paternalisti
motive.
While the onrete design of transfers will not be subjet of this work
14
, we disuss
the design of the tax system. Taxation an be lassied in broad ategories. We present
these ategories in table 7.1 and give onrete values and speiations for the ase of
the German tax system.
15
Firstly, inome an be taxed. In this ase, we an further
deompose funtionally into labor and apital inome. The government, however, an
also tax the use of inome in the form of onsumption. While the mentioned ategories
13
We present this in a more formal argument in setion A.8.
14
Note, however, that the transfers are granted in form of money transfers rather than in-kind allowing
individuals to independently deide its use.
15
The data originates from the German Treasury (Bundesnanzministerium, 2014) . This summary
does not inlude taxes imposed on rms and thereby indiretly on private households as it is unlear
whether they will be transfered to onsumers by means of higher pries or to workers or rentiers by
means of lower wages or rents. In partiular, our data does not inlude the Gewerbesteuerumlage
and the Köpershaftssteuer imposed on rms. We, however, apture 94% of total tax.
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tax ow variables, government an also impose a tax on stok (i.e. on aumulated
apital). In the following, we disuss eah ategory separately.
We also ompute values of average tax rates dened as the ratio of taxes Ti to tax
basis for dierent taxable fators xi (τi =
Ti
xi
). All taxable fators an be related to the
national inome Y by means of a spei multiplier Mi making the average tax rate
τi =
Ti
MiY
. Labor inome is related to national inome by means of the labor share 1−α,
whereas onsumption is related by means of the onsumption ratio cy = 1 − s.16 The
value of apital to national inome (κ = k
y
) originates from the study of Piketty and
Zuman (2014).
The highest average tax rate is imposed on onsumption. This rate, however, is
smaller than the standard VAT of 19%, implying that the eet of lower taxes on speial
goods of 7% outweighs the eet of higher taxes on demerit goods suh as tobao.
17
We also nd that the average tax on apital inome is (slightly) higher than the average
tax on labor inome. Yet, the average tax rate on apital inome is way below the at
tax level (Abgeltungssteuer) of 25%, indiating the presene of strong tax exemptions.
18
The taxation of stok is very modest in Germany.
19
The most important ategories are
land purhase tax (Grunderwerbssteuer) and inheritane tax (Erbshaftssteuer), whih,
however, only our at time of transation. Our bak of the envelope omputation
assumes that total apital is transferred annually and thereby underestimates the applied
tax omputed to be at a very low level of 0.15%. All in all, it is also worth noting that
the aggregate average tax rate τ = T
Y
is higher than all individual levels τi =
Ti
MiY
as the
total national inome is taxed at various times being at its formation as ow inome, its
employment by means of onsumption, as well as its storage as stok of apital.
Taxation of Consumption
In our survey of the taxation forms, we start with the tax on onsumption, sine in
Germany it is the ategory with the highest revenue. Most of the inome stems from
the Value Added Tax (VAT). From a distributive point of view, a VAT, however, is
undesirable sine in a senario with a subsistene onsumption motive it is regressive
- implying that is mostly imposed on low-inome individuals. Consider a Keynesian
onsumption funtion with a subsistene level c¯ and a marginal propensity to onsume
out of inome 0 < cy < 1. The tax rate τC is imposed on all goods identially:
TC = τC · C = τC(c¯+ cyY ). (7.1)
16
These values originate from the Federal Statistial Oe (Statistishes Bundesamt) Statistishes-
Bundesamt (2014).
17
Moreover, the result is also highly sensitive to the savings ratio.
18
The average tax on a taxable soure xi in a system with a at marginal tax τi and an exemption
level x¯i is:
Ti
xi
= τi
(
1− x¯ixi
)
. For the onrete ase of taxes on apital inome this implies a level of
x¯i
xi
≈ 44%.
19
In fat, there are negative ows from estate taxes.
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Major Categories [1,000 Euro℄ Share Multiplier Average Tax τi
Tax Revenue
Consumption VAT, diverse taxes on spei
goods (tobao, alohol, of-
fee,. . . )
299,991,162 55.61% 1-s 0.90 15.68%
Wealth Land purhase tax, inheritane
tax,. . .
3,026,655 2.41% κ 4.00 0.15%
Capital Inome Abgeltungssteuer 50,943,903 9.44% α 0.33 14.14%
Labor Inome Wage tax 175,457,046 32.53% 1− α 0.67 12.39%
Sum 539,418,766 100.00%
National Inome Labor, apital inome 2,118,790,000 25.46%
Table 7.1.: Taxes in Germany 2013 (Data soure: Bundesnanzministerium (2014))
2
1
3
The average tax rate (ATC =
TC
Y
) inreases with inome due to the existene of the
subsistene level (c¯ 6= 0):
TC
Y
=
τC c¯
Y
+ cyτc ↔ d(TC/Y )
dY
= −τC c¯
Y 2
< 0, (7.2)
implying a regressive system. The problem ould eventually be solved by allowing a
tax free level of onsumption equal to the subsistene level of onsumption. Besides
the problem of onrete implementation
20
, there would be issue of the determination of
the level of c¯. As intensively disussed in setion 4.3, the subsistene onsumption is
hard to disentangle from relative onsumption onerns leading to a potential arm's rae
situation.
Note that up to this point - and in line with a standard VAT - we assumed a uniform
tax rate. Another solution to the problem would be imposing heterogeneous tax rates
on heterogeneous goods. This an take two forms: luxury goods ould be subjet to
higher tax rates. The other option would be to impose a lower tax on inferior goods in
the miroeonomi sense. In Germany a lower VAT applies to goods suh as groeries
(in stores and not in restaurants) or publi transport. This dierentiated tax, however,
is dismissed by eonomi theory, arguing that the government should not distort the
vetor of market pries (e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)). Nevertheless, heterogeneous
taxation of dierent goods is ommon pratie in Germany. Beside the general VAT,
there are spei taxes on goods onsidered demerit (suh as aloholi beverages, to-
bao, oee, lotteries and ars due to the pollution aspet). In this ase, however, one
again the anti-paternalisti rationale applies as a ounterargument.
Taxation of Labor Inome
The seond most important ategory of tax revenues in Germany is taxes on labor
inome. Moreover, it is also the most ontroversially debated omponent in eonomi
theory. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) in partiular argue that labor inome should be
the only soure of inome subjet to taxation.
21
The key idea derives from the Seond
Welfare Theorem. Labor inome is a proxy for abilities. The tax system should impat
on the distribution of labor inome to generate equal opportunities. All other market
pries will adjust, aordingly reating a Pareto eient outome.
The seminal model disussing taxation of labor inome is Mirrlees (1971). As already
presented in setion 7.1 from both a utilitarian and Rawlsian perspetive equally dis-
tributed inome would be soially optimal. In a at tax regime with a minimum inome
(f. setion 7.2.2), this would imply a at tax rate of τL = 100%. The other extreme
result would emerge for a representative agent model: any form of taxation distorts the
optimal market outome and thereby redues the utility of the (representative) agent.
22
20
A feasible solution would be a sort of food stamps that allow individuals to buy a ertain amount of
goods tax-free.
21
The model result of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), however, relies on spei assumptions. In fat,
agents have homotheti preferenes, ruling out the ase of luxury goods. Moreover, leisure hoie l
is assumed to be separable from onsumption hoie c ( ∂
2U
∂l∂c = 0).
22
The latter is presented based upon a formal argument in the appendix A.8.
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In a heterogeneous agent model, the entral problem of a tax on labor is that it has
adverse eet on the supply of labor. The key ontribution of Mirrlees (1971) is trading
o the equity onern against the labor supply - being the eieny onern - in order
to design an optimal tax system.
Note that in our model we do not model labor supply deisions by assuming a onstant
labor whih thereby is totally inelasti. This is a major aveat of our analysis. Thus,
theoretially the τL = 100% result would be soially optimal. In our simulations in
setion 7.2.4, we, however, put forward another argument against this extreme tax. One
might think of as our model as a very long-run model. As emphasized in Piketty and
Saez (2012), the long-run labor supply is very inelasti. Despite a large inrease in
overall inome in the last 100 years labor supply only reated very modestly.
23
However, we do not want to fully ignore the important issue of labor supply. As it,
however, is not entral to our argument we hose to treat it separately and based on
formal arguments in appendix A.8. The key insights, however, are the following: taxes
on labor lead to a substitution eet of labor in favor of leisure. This an be in the form of
an extensive margin (a ontinuous variable measuring the onrete level of labor supply)
or in an intensive margin (a binary variable determining whether supply labor at the
market is provided at all). The latter eet is of partiular importane for low-inome
individuals deiding on whether to supply labor in the rst plae. This issue is frequently
addressed by speial subsidies for low-inome workers rather than non-workers (Piketty
and Saez, 2013b). The presene of the substitution eet also limits the optimal level of
taxation even when the single target is maximization of government revenue (the well-
known Laer-urve relation). Meanwhile, a very fat tailed labor inome distribution
alls for high marginal tax rates for very high-inome individuals (Diamond and Saez,
2011). A progressive tax system - more severely disouraging labor supply of high-inome
agents - leads to a ompression of inequality even if government does not redistribute
tax revenues to low-inome agents due to a pure labor supply eet. It is therefore
preferable to a at tax system that only leads to a labor supply ompression as a result
of heterogeneous tastes.
24
On the other hand, the progressive inome system an have
adverse long-run eets on labor supply by disenouraging the aggregation of human
apital (Heathote et al., 2014). The majority of agents refrain from aumulating skills
in the form of eduation, generating a huge wage premium for high skill agents in line
with the preditions of the skill-biased tehnologial hange (Aemoglu and Autor, 2012).
Taxation of Capital Inome
A very ontroversial subjet is the taxation of apital inome. In fat, the established
literature argues for a zero tax on apital inome (τrK = 0). Following the argument
laid out in setion 4.1 savings are only made in order to provide for future onsumption.
23
This is also subjet of a olletion disussing the preditions of Keynes (1930) regarding growth
and labor supply (Pehi and Piga, 2008). While Keynes (1930) made a rather good predition of
eonomi growth, he wrongly predited a large derease in labor supply. One key rationale brought
forward is the existene of relative onsumption eets emphasized in this work.
24
However, the progressive system also impats on the taste parameter.
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In the rationale of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), a tax system that taxed apital inome
would thereby disriminate between future and urrent onsumption in favor of urrent
onsumption. As already presented the setion on taxation of onsumption, a heteroge-
neous tax rate on dierent forms of onsumption is not desirable. Moreover, Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976) emphasize that labor inome is the ultimate soure of inome. By
also taxing apital inome, labor inome would be taxed multiple times: one when it is
earned (in the form of a tax on labor) and various times when the saved labor inome
in the form of aumulated apital generates apital inome. This multiple treatment is
onsidered unneessary.
Comparable to the taxation of labor inome, the tax on apital inome distorts a
partiular eonomi deision. For the ase of labor this is the deision about labor
supply, in the ase for tax inome it is the savings/onsumption deision as usually
treated in the Euler-equation (f. setion 4.1).
Assume a tax rate
25
on apital inome is imposed (TrK = τrK · r · K). The welfare
osts of tax distortion are given by:
26
dC(t)/C(t)
dτrK/τrK
= −τrK rt
γ
+
τrK
1− τrK +
r(1− γ)τrK
ρ− r(1− τrK)(1− γ) , (7.3)
or for the speial ase of log-utility (γ = 1):
dC(t)/C(t)
dτrK/τrK
= −τrKrt+ τrK
1− τrK (7.4)
This term gives the perentage hange of onsumption at a ertain time t as a re-
sult of a perentage hange of the tax rate. First of all - in the very long-run - taxes
lead to an innite loss of onsumption (limt→∞
dC(t)/C(t)
dτrK/τrK
= −∞). Furthermore, lower
levels of risk aversion γ 27 and higher levels of interest rate r 28 lead to the fat that
the taxation of apital inome is ineient. Higher risk aversion is aompanied by a
lower Intertemporal Rate of Substitution (IES) implying that individuals exhibit lower
elastiity to interest rate hanges. As put forward by Guvenen (2006), the IES is lower
for individuals with low levels of wealth making them suer little from taxation. Or put
25
Note that we label τrK somewhat impreisely as the tax rate. For a simple at rate regime without
exemptions this rate equals both the marginal and average tax rate. If we, however, as done in
the literature, assume that individual agents have heterogeneous tax rates τrK,i depending on their
underlying features, they also have heterogeneous (marginal respetively average) tax rates. The
latter in partiular depends on the underlying tax basis riKi.
26
The result an be derived assuming a onrete onsumption funtion in equation 4.52 in setion 4.2
amounting to C(t) = ρ−r(1−τrK)(1−γ)γ
(
Y
r(1−τKr)
)
exp
(
r(1−τrK)−ρ
γ t
)
for the ase with apital inome
without initial endowment (D0 = −K0 = 0).
27
This is straightforward for the rst term. On the other hand there is a short-run gain due to
a substitution eet as aptured in the third term for whih onsumption is preponed for lower
eetive interest rates. Formally, the partial derivative of this term - given by
−ρrτrK
[ρ−r(1−τrK)(1−γ)]2
< 0
is always negative.
28
The rst term is obvious and unambiguous. The partial derivative of the third term is given by
(1−γ)τρ
[ρ−r(1−τrK)(1−γ)]2
whih is positive for low levels of risk aversion 0 < γ < 1.
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dierently, low-inome agents with a lower IES (higher γ) an be imposed a higher tax
rate τrK . Hene, this simple idea hints at higher taxes of low-inome agents eetively
alling for a regressive tax. The result is also straightforward from intuition beause
high-inome agents utilize apital markets in a more intense way to smooth onsump-
tion they would experiene stronger welfare losses if these markets were subjet to an
ineieny resulting from a tax on apital inome. Basially, this is the rationale put
forward by Chamley (1986) arguing that in the ase of innitely living agents, taxation
of apital inome leads to a innite onsumption loss in the very long-run. Atkeson et al.
(1999) furthermore show that this result also holds in when ertain strong assumptions
of the original work of Chamley (1986) are relaxed. The result in partiular holds in any
form of innitely living agent model. They also show that under ertain assumptions
the result is also sustained in an OLG-model in whih agents have a nite life span.
On the other hand, analyzing equation 7.3 in the short-run yields other valuable
insights. In partiular there is a time t∗ below whih the tax atually allows for inreasing
onsumption:
t < t∗ =
γ
r
1
1− τrK +
(1− γ)γ
ρ− r(1− τrK)(1− γ) , (7.5)
or for the log-ase (γ = 1):
t < t∗ =
1
r(1− τrK) . (7.6)
The positive short-run eet of the tax on onsumption stems from the seond term
and third term in equation 7.3. The seond term aptures the eet the tax has on
the long-run human apital
Y
r(1−τrK) . Eventually an inrease of the tax rate lowers the
eetive disount rate inreasing the human apital. In the short-run, this permits for
higher borrowing ativities and higher onsumption. The third term aptures a short-
run gain for low risk aversion (0 < γ < 1).29 This eet omes from the prevailing
substitution eet leading to a higher level of onsumption in the short-run for a lower
level of real interest rate. It is only in the long-run that higher taxes, by lowering the
eetive interest rate, hinder savings for future onsumption and thereby derease it.
If we further analyze the ondition 7.6 for the log-ase, it beomes evident that the
period t∗, in whih taxes eventually inrease onsumption, itself inreases with the tax
rate τrK and dereases with the interest rate r. Low values of r furthermore emphasize
the positive eet of taxes as a tax does not distort apital inome signiantly sine
the rate of interest is already at a low level.
Another seminal work in this eld is Judd (1985) also arguing for a zero long-run tax
in an environment with innitely living agents. He models an eonomy with apitalists
and workers. The key idea is that workers would prefer a tax on apital inome as it is
imposed on the other group of agents. Nevertheless, as Judd (1985) shows, the tax on
apital inome depresses investment and output leading to adverse aggregate eets for
all agents inluding workers. In the original paper of Judd (1985), a one time tax rate
29
Note that formally the ondition ρ > r(1 − τrK)(1 − γ) also has to hold whih, however, is always
the ase for the realisti ase of ρ > r prevailing in Bewley-type models. It does also hold for the
standard assumption r = ρ with γ < 1.
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equal to the maximum τrK(t = 0) = 100%
30
and a long-run zero tax rate τrK(t) = 0 for
all t > 0 are optimal.
The famous result of a zero tax on apital inome - well summarized in the work
of Atkeson et al. (1999) - however is hallenged by several theoretial papers. Their
arguments are, however, frequently fundamentally dierent and at times even rely on
diametrial reasons.
The rst major hallenge to the zero tax result on apital inome was put forward
by Aiyagari (1995). He argues in a Bewley-type model (f. setion 3.3) in whih dy-
nami ineieny an be an equilibrium outome. In this ase, due to the presene of
uninsurable idiosynrati risks, the equilibrium rate of interest is below the rate of time
preferene r < ρ and the eonomy overaumulates apital above the golden-rule level.
The tax on apital inome ounterats this ineient overaumulation of apital. On
the other hand - as argued by Atkeson et al. (1999) - the problem of market ineieny
(in the market for insurane) is ounterated by implementing another market ine-
ieny (a tax). A more liberal argument would be to redue the original ineieny.
This rationale was frequently put forward in favor of deregulating nanial markets.
Lansing (1999) disusses a speial ase of Judd (1985) in whih the utility funtion
is of the log-speiation (a CRRA utility funtion with γ = 1) showing that the result
of a zero optimal apital inome tax eases to hold. The log-speiation has the eet
that inome and substitution eet perfetly anel eah other out (also p. setion 4.1),
implying that future interest rate hanges have no eet on the optimal onsumption
path of agents being ompletely determined by the rate of time preferene ρ and given
by c = ρk. Lansing (1999), moreover, shows that the optimal level of taxation inreases
with the welfare weight on workers assigned by the soial planner, the level of inequality
(proxied by the apital share in total inome α as an index of the funtional distribution),
and inreases with the time preferene rate ρ of apitalists. As he furthermore shows the
diret link between the level of apital k and onsumption c is broken one government
bonds as well onsumption taxes on apitalists are introdued implying that in the latter
ase the zero optimal tax result would be preserved. Or put dierently, the welfare
enhaning eets of tax an be ahieved by other measures suh as government debt or
onsumption taxes.
A very reent ritique by Straub and Werning (2014) losely follows the original ar-
gumentation of Chamley (1986) respetively Judd (1985) and further generalizes the
rationale of Lansing (1999). In partiular, they show that the optimal tax rate is not
zero in the model of Judd (1985)
31
for the ase of an IES smaller than one (respetively
a high risk aversion γ > 1). In this ase, the tax rate inrease in time to a positive level,
as the inome eet prevails and a derease in the eetive rate of interest inreases
savings of apitalists. The optimal level of taxation negatively depends on the level of
government onsumption indiating a trade-o. For the inverse ase with 0 < γ < 1
there is a short-run positive taxation of apital yet in the long-run it is zero. Conerning
30
The ondition r ≥ 0 equivalent to τrK < 1 must be satised in order to provide apitalists to rent
out apital in the rst plae.
31
It is important to keep in mind that in the framework of Judd (1985) workers onsume in a hand-to-
mouth manner leading to the fat that the tax on apital inome only applies to apitalists.
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the model of Chamley (1986), Straub and Werning (2014) show that the zero tax result
implies the absurd result of a zero level of wealth - implying a zero tax base - or a labor
tax of zero, already implying the existene of a rst-best solution.
Saez (2013) also takes the rationale for a zero apital inome tax in an innitely living
agent setup seriously. He, however, argues that a positive tax on apital inome an be
desirable if it is only imposed for a nite time. In partiular, the agents are exempt from
the tax one they underut a ertain threshold of apital. Thereby, in the long-run all
agents fall below this level and no agents are eventually taxed. The rationale for the tax
in his model is an equity onern. The proposed tax - eventually being progressive due
to the exemption level - trunates the wealth distribution. In the work of Saez (2013)
this equity onern has to be traded-o against the hazard of overonsumption. The
trade-o goes in favor of the tax if the ondition
a
γ
< 1 holds, for whih a represents
the tail index of the wealth distribution.
32
In eet, the tax an be eient for highly
unequal wealth distributions (low values of a) and low IES (high values of γ) restating
an argument put forward in the previous stanza.
A taxation of apital inome does little else but redue the eetive rate of interest
r(1−τrK) and thereby is omparable to expansive monetary poliy. As already presented
in setion 4.1 in a standard framework in whih the utility funtion is of the CRRA-type
the impat of an interest rate hange on the savings propensity ruially depends on
the level of γ apturing the risk aversion. The level of the latter has to be quantied
by empirial studies. The ase of a prevailing substitution eet (taitly assumed in
standard undergraduate textbooks) leads to a standard savings funtion with a positive
slope. A survey of the empirial literature, however, also onrms this eet (Oener,
2008). Table 7.2 summarizes the eets and some empirial literature whih are also
of importane for the ase of apital taxation.
33
Note that in our model the partial
derivative is given by −dCi
dr
= dSi
dri
= Di
34
and thereby depends on the fat whether
individuals are debtors or lenders. If they are debtors (Di > 0), agents have a (standard)
positive sloped savings funtion and vie versa.
Note that in the disussion of the literature we foused on work arguing from a soial
planner's perspetive deriving a soial optimum. In ontrast to this, the politial eo-
nomi literature argues that taxation of apital inome will always prevail. Sheuer and
Wolitzky (2014) for instane show that in a diret demoray (i.e. one in whih all laws
are diretly deided by voters by referendum) the tax rate on apital inome is u-shaped
presenting the lowest burden for middle-inome agents at the expense of poor and rih
agents onrming Diretor's Law (Stigler, 1970). In ontrast to that, in representative
32
The distribution in this ase follows a density funtion of the type f(Y ) ∼ Y −(a+1).
33
Note that this table only summarizes the standard approah detailed in setion 4.1. For the buer
stok theory an inrease in the rate of interest does not per se aet the saving propensity, but only
leads to a larger equilibrium level of the buer stok level of wealth (Carroll and Tohe, 2009). If
agents were to maintain a onstant buer level of wealth higher interest rates would require lower
levels of savings implying a negative slope.
34
Formally, this results from the disposable inome eet, neessary to guarantee a stable level of debt
as thoroughly disussed in setion 4.2.
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Coeient of risk Denition 0 < γ < 1 γ = 1 γ >> 1
aversion (low) (log-utility) (high)
(CRRA utility) Eet on savings
ds
dr
> 0 (substitution> ds
dr
> 0 (substitution = ds
dr
< 0 (inome>
inome eet) inome eet, substitution eet)
pure wealth eet)
Empirial evidene Variation with eduation Low eduation High eduation
(Cagetti, 2003)
Intertemporal Elastiity Denition (
1
γ
) IES>1 (strong reation to IES=1 IES<1 (little reation
of Substitution monetary shoks) to monetary shoks)
Empirial Evidene Variation with wealth Wealthy individuals Individuals poor
(and inome) (Guvenen, 2006) in terms of wealth
Cross-ountry variation Developed nanial markets Low nanial development
(Havranek et al., 2013)
Eet for apital Critique of Judd (1985) τrK,∞ = 0
dτrK,t
dt
< 0 τrK,∞ > 0
dτrK,t
dt
= 0 τrK,∞ > 0;
dτrK,t
dt
> 0
inome taxation by Straub and Werning (2014) (Lansing, 1999)
Table 7.2.: Empirial evidene for the shape of the utility funtion and theoretial impliations
2
2
0
demoraies in whih politiians have the opportunity of onduting a surprise politial
reform the tax rate will inrease with inome.
While the previous arguments are highly theoretial, one an also put forward more
hands-on arguments in favor of a tax on apital inome. As emphasized by Piketty and
Saez (2013b), not taxing apital inome allows for massive tax avoidane opportunities.
In partiular, top management an reshift or (even only) relabel their inome from labor
to apital inome being paid out in stok options. As shown in Piketty and Saez (2012)
for the ase in whih both labor and apital inome are virtually indistinguishable -
whih they label as omplete fuzziness - both should be taxed at the very same rate to
ounterat tax avoidane.
One an ounterat this very hands-on argument with another very pratial argu-
ment. In ontrast to labor that is very immobile - e.g. due to ultural barriers and
family ties - apital is very mobile. In the presene of bank serey laws, the latter
reates a strong tax ompetition between ountries that an eventually even result in a
beggar-thy-neighbor result in whih there is a rae to the bottom in the tax rates on
apital inome. Piketty and Saez (2012) also predit that smaller ountries will have
lower taxes on apital as their labor fore is reuqired to be more mobile due to a narrow
loal labor market.
We an also ompare this result to the result of our model in partiular onerning the
distribution of inome. Consider a simple ase in whih both apital and labor inome
are subjet to a simple at tax without exemption (τy > 0 and τrK > 0). As shown in
setion 5.5.1, in our model apital and labor inome are positively orrelated. In fat
the level of apital Ki for a partiular labor inome Yi is given in the following form:
Ki = kyYi + k0, (7.7)
with ky > 0. We furthermore showed that under the realisti senario in whih human
apital dominates inherited wealth, low-inome households eventually are indebted (k0 =
c¯
rs−cw < 0). The total tax is given as follows:
T = τyY + τrKrK = τrKrk0 + Y (τy + τrKrky), (7.8)
in whih the average tax hanges with inome in the following manner:
d(T/Y )
dY
= −τrKrk0
Y 2
. (7.9)
The latter term is positive - indiating a progressive tax system - for the realisti ase
of k0 < 0. Thereby, in our ase a progressive tax system an simply be implemented by
imposing a at tax on apital inome τrK > 0.
35
The progressivity of this tax inreases
with level of the at tax τrK . It is furthermore worth notiing that the system ollapses
to a neutral tax system (neither progressive nor regressive) if there is no subsistene level
of onsumption (c¯ = 0→ k0 = 0). Thereby, the ondition that makes a VAT regressive,
is the same ondition that makes the tax on apital inome progressive. In a senario in
35
Note that apital inome is subjet to a at tax in Germany.
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whih inherited wealth dominates labor inome - as emphasized by Piketty (2014) - we
have k0 > 0.
36
As a result, the tax on apital inome would eventually ontribute to a
regressive tax system (
d(T/Y )
dY
< 0).
The literature labeled New Dynami Publi Finane presents arguments in the favor of
a positive (yet moderate) tax on apital inome. Their reasoning is, however, diametrial
to the arguments already put forward. In partiular, Golosov et al. (2003) argue that the
presene of saving - as a form of insurane against adverse future labor shoks - imposes
a moral hazard problem. Agents who posses a high amount of savings are disouraged
of providing eort in future periods. Thus, they argue for a tax on apital inome as it
- in ontrast to the tax on labor inome - inreases (future) labor supply. In a another
paper, Golosov et al. (2013) - following the empirial results of Cagetti (2003) - assume
that savings is a good preferred by individuals with higher ability. As shown by Cagetti
(2003)
37
, highly eduated agents - being the ones with the highest abilities as well as the
higher inome - are more patient and thereby save more. As abilities - in ontrast to
tastes - should be taxed a tax on apital inome is desirable. In their alibrated model,
Golosov et al. (2013) show that the optimal tax rate is, however, u-shaped and at a
very modest level. The high tax rate for low-inome individuals is introdued in order
to prevent low-inome individuals from high savings - i.e. overonsuming the luxury
good. Given the empirial evidene that the poor tend to undersave in any ase (e.g.
Fulford (2012)), this proposal, however, seems highly questionable. Golosov et al. (2013)
estimate that for very high-inome individuals the rate should only be as high as 4.5%.
One again, the tax rate is very sensitive to the risk aversion γ respetively the IES 1/γ.
A low level of risk aversion requires for low taxes.
Taxation of Wealth
As presented in table 7.1, the pure wealth taxes in Germany only represent a very small
share of total tax revenues and the taxable base is only treated with a very low tax
rate. On the other hand, one should keep in mind that in ontrast to all other taxes
onsidered so far this form of taxation is (diretly) imposed on a stok quantity rather
than a ow quantity. Given the multiplier relationship (
K
Y
> 1) the average tax rates are
not diretly omparable. As the empirial evidene - also onrmed for other developed
ountries (Kopzuk, 2013) - shows, the tax on wealth only plays a very minor pratial
role as there are some very strong objetions against it. In a maroeonomi sense, a
tax on wealth lowers apital aumulation and thereby the steady state of apital and
output.
38
First of all, the tax imposes - so to speak - an artiial depreiation on apital and
therefore the wealth tax is often opposed by arguing that it presents a form of expro-
36
For details of the derivation of the result the reader is referred to setion 5.5.1.
37
And as already put forward in setion 4.1.
38
In their alibrated model for the US eonomy, Castaneda et al. (2003) test the maroeonomi impat
of an abolishment of the estate tax. Due to its very low level, it only inreases wealth inequality
marginally and has little impat on total output (inrease <1%).
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priation. In fat, it is very similar to the ow tax on apital inome. The two forms of
taxation an be related in the following manner:
39
τK = τrK
r
1 + r
↔ τrK = 1 + r
r
τK , (7.10)
with r being the return on apital. Thus, to generate the same tax revenue for the
government a lower tax on wealth ompared to the tax on apital inome is needed. In
fat, the two forms of taxation an be distinguished by the fat that the wealth tax not
only taxes the returns on apital, but also the underlying prinipal. This, however, is
also a major problem with a uniform tax rate on wealth as it subsidizes agents with high
returns in favor of agents with low returns. This is easy to show if we onsider agents
with dierent returns rh > rl (high h and low l) on apital who otherwise, however,
are ompletely idential. Assume the government deides to abolish the tax on apital
inome in favor for a pure tax on wealth. The design is made aording to the previous
equation assuming the low rate of interest rl:
τK ≡ τrK rl
1 + rl
, (7.11)
implying that agents reeiving the low rate of interest are equally well-o under both
regimes. We an, however, also ompare the taxes of agents with high returns rh > rl
under both regimes:
TK,h
Trk,h
=
τK(1 + rh)K
τrKrhK
=
1 + rh
rh
rl
1 + rl
< 1, (7.12)
being smaller than one sine:
1 + rh
rh
<
1 + rl
rl
↔ 1
rh
<
1
rl
↔ rh > rl. (7.13)
Thus, the tax on wealth deteriorate the position of agents who made a low return on
apital. In partiular, a wealth tax is even imposed if losses are made (r < 0). If
this is the result of an idiosynrati shok, the system would eventually go against its
original motive of providing an insurane. Moreover, it is well-known that high net-
worth individuals earn higher returns (Yitzhaki, 1987), thus the system eventually has
an implied regressivity.
The tax on wealth an at times, however, be desirable to implement extreme poliies.
Sometimes it an be desirable to ahieve a negative real rate of interest. If the standard
monetary mehanisms ensuring theses results are hampered (e.g. due to a binding zero
lower bound on nominal interest), this an eventually be ahieved by the government
by means of taxation. If only apital inome is taxed, this, however, would require for a
tax rate τKr > 100% whih would never be politially feasible. The tax on wealth would
only require:
τK >
r
1 + r
. (7.14)
39
This result is easy to grasp using the denitions: Tt,K = Kt−1τk(1 + r)
!
= TrK = Kt−1rτrK .
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In partiular, if the topi nominal rate of interest r is already low this would be easy to
attain. For example for a nominal interest rate of 1% this would only require a tax of
τK > 0.99%.
Note that in equation 7.10 we impliitly assumed that the tax on wealth is imposed
annually, e.g. in the form of permanent taxes on estate. In fat, the tax on wealth
mostly emerges at ertain events, in partiular when wealth is transferred. The most
ommon form of wealth taxation is the taxation of inheritane. To lose the loop hole
of esaping the tax by means of inter-vivo gifts, frequently large gifts are also subjet to
taxation. Moreover, the purhase of large assets, in partiular real estate, is also taxed
in whih the tax base is given by the urrent market value of the transfered good.
40
Consider that the transations only our one in the length of a generation G > 1. To
satisfy equivalene between both forms of taxes the following equation must hold for a
onstant return on apital r:
(1 + (1− τrK)r)G != (1 + r)G(1− τK). (7.15)
Using the exponential approximation
41
the following result an be derived:
τrK =
− ln(1− τK)
rG
. (7.16)
This not only - one again - shows that for a given tax on apital inome τrK the
equivalent tax rate on wealth τK falls with the level of the interest rate r, but also that
the same relation holds for longer holding periods G. The latter is straightforward as
longer holding times imply that the number of taxable events is redued. For the value of
τrK = 14.14% reported in table 7.1 and a long-run return on apital assumed to be 4.5%
(Piketty, 2014) and a length of a generation G = 30 (Piketty and Saez, 2012), using the
previous equation an equivalent tax on the stok of wealth as high as τK = 17% > τrK
an be omputed. The key argument for this high value is that the taxable events only
happen very infrequently.
One again returning to the seminal result of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) one an state
that - if aumulated wealth results from labor inome - it does not require for a spei
tax. Wealth an be attained in two ways: (1) aumulating wealth in the form of savings
out of labor inome during life time or (2) inheriting wealth from parent generations.
In our model, we take the strong notion that inheritane is perfetly orrelated with
future labor (P0qi,0 = HYi). Thereby, following Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), our model
does not provide a rationale for taxing the stok quantity wealth. Piketty and Saez
(2013a), however, argue that there are two distint forms of apital aquisition, thus
also two forms of taxes - (1) a tax on labor and (2) a tax on inheritane - are neessary.
Their key rationale is that in a non-aristorati soiety wealth should not depend on
the ability of parents, arguing in a tradition of the veil of ignorane requiring similar
starting onditions for all agents. If we, however, think that the ability of parents is
40
Note that in some legislation there are standard values for real estate to irumvent the problems of
unequal taxation in boom and bust yles.
41
This assumes that (1 + r)G ≈ exp(rG) sine G ln(1 + r) ≈ Gr for low values of r.
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ompletely transfered by means of biologial inheritane, there is also no need to tax
eonomi inheritane. A tax on inheritane not only hits those about to inherit but also
the parent generation and thereby disourages great inheritanes. In their alibrated
model, Piketty and Saez (2013a) ompute values for the inheritane tax as high as high
as 50-60%. Meanwhile, they argue that higher taxes on inheritane an be ompensated
by lowering the tax rate on labor inome. Interestingly, the tax rate dereases for very
high net-worth individuals to a negative level eventually presenting a subsidy. This is
the ase if the soial planner puts a high weight on reeivers of the bequests.
In this respet, the result of Piketty and Saez (2013a) is idential to the result in the
literature of New Dynami Publi Finane by Farhi and Werning (2010). The latter
argue that bequests are a positive externality to the ospring generation and thereby
should be treated with a Pigouvian subsidy rather than a tax. Besides providing wealth
to the hildren generation the parent generation also inurs a utility gain if we assume
a Warm Glow motive. Moreover, it is important to point out that the altruisti Joy
of Giving motive and the Love of Wealth motive
42
are virtually indistinguishable in a
theoretial framework despite the fat that from an ethial perspetive they should be
treated very dierently. Empirial evidene, showing that individuals without ospring
also leave sizable bequests, points to the fat that bequeathing wealth to hildren is
not the major driver of aumulating wealth (Kopzuk, 2013). Yet, another reason for
providing bequests is that parents want to ompensate hildren for providing grandhil-
dren or nursing to their parents. Farhi and Werning (2010) thereby argue with fairness
between generations and not within a generation of heterogeneous agents. One might
therefore ritiize them for supporting an aristorati soiety (Piketty and Saez, 2013a).
It is, however, important to point out that a positive tax on apital an eventually be
optimal under some onditions in their model. Due to a general equilibrium eet, the
tax on apital lowering the urrent value of the assets an inrease the future return
fatually subsidizing apital. It is also interesting to ompare this result to the seminal
result of Stiglitz (1978), who argues in a similar vein. In his framework, there an be
unintended onsequenes to estate taxes that eventually ountervail the targeted goal of
dereasing wealth inequality. The estate tax lowers apital aumulation and inreases
return on apital and thereby an nally lead to an inrease in the apital share and an
inrease in wealth inequality.
43
If one follows the argument of Piketty and Saez (2013a)
and Piketty (2014) fearing a return of patrimonial apitalism, a tax on inheritane and
a subsidy on harity - i.e. on donations outside the family sphere - an lead to welfare
enhaning results.
In the following, we summarize other major (more pratial) pros and ons regarding
a tax on the stok quantity of wealth. The estate tax is frequently refused. However,
and in ontrast to a simple tax on apital inome, this tax is able to apture unrealized
apital gains. A pratial problem of a permanently installed estate tax onstantly
taxing the stok level of wealth, however, is nding the orret valuation of the assets.
42
One might also label this a Srooge MDuk-motive for whom the aumulation of wealth is the nal
goal.
43
As already disussed in setion 6.2.1, this eet prevails in a senario with a CES prodution with a
dominating prie rather than a volume eet (ρ < 1).
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If a market valuation is hosen, the tax is very sensitive to boom-bust-yles. As an
avoidane of the tax, agents ould try to sell assets on the market one the taxation
event ours, leading to negative re-sale externalities.
Mostly taxes on transfers of wealth, in partiular on bequests, are disussed. Com-
parable to savings, bequests are a luxury good. A tax on inheritane thereby an lead
to the desired progressive taxation. The eonomi literature usually diers between
planned and aidental bequests aused by sudden death, arguing that the latter should
be severely taxed (Kopzuk, 2013). In pratie, however, it is diult to learly distin-
guish the two motives. In pratie, bequest taxes are subjet to a high tax exemption
only posing a tax on very high net worth individuals in whih the aumulated wealth
does not primarily stem from preautionary savings (Carroll, 1998). The exemption level
being xed in nominal terms, however, is subjet to a braket reep. This is espeially
important as durable assets - as also emphasized in this work - are subjet to a strong
temporary form of ination (asset prie booms).
There are, however, more pratial ounterarguments against a tax on wealth. Be-
quests also play an important role in transferring family business. A tax on inheritane
would virtually lead to the arving-up of family-owned rms (being of signiant im-
portane in Germany). Moreover, this tax thereby imposes an (impliit) subsidy on
other legal forms in partiular joint stok ompanies. The key onern of Piketty (2014)
fearing a return of a wealth dominated soiety is - at least at this point of time - not
aounted for by the data. A simple test - proposed by Kopzuk (2013) - is looking at
the Forbes list of the wealthiest individuals. If wealth is mostly inherited, one would
expet a an approximately equal number of male and female individuals on the list - in
line with the distribution amongst the overall population. The list, however, is highly
dominated by male individuals propping the hypothesis of self-made billionaires.
44
Summary
The last setions presented major views about taxation of dierent soures of inome.
This setion summarizes the key results and states a normative onlusion applied to
our model in order to justify our subsequent approah. We foused on the theoretial
literature in eonomis. While most models provide interesting and elegant toolboxes,
some of the results are highly quixoti.
Taxes on onsumption are problemati as they - in partiular the VAT - are regressive.
A progressive taxation of labor inome is supported by a high number of eonomists, yet
the onrete size is subjet to a large debate. The major onern with the progressive
taxation of labor inome is its adverse eet on labor supply. There is a long-run tradition
in the eonomi literature opposing any tax on wealth. However, in the more reent
literature there is a slight onsensus of imposing a tax on apital inome not least due to
the massive possibility of tax avoidane if one major inome ategory remains untaxed.
However, the onrete values span from very modest (Golosov et al., 2013) (max. 4,5%)
44
This simple does however not aount for gender dierenes in inheritane. In partiular, the presene
of primogeniture (inherting the total wealth to the rst born male ospring) should be taken into
aount.
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to strong progressivity (Saez, 2013) (up to 73%). Following the argument of Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976), in the framework we disuss a tax on wealth is never desirable as all
inequality stems from labor inequality. For the tax on wealth, there exists no onsensus
in the aademi literature. Yet, there are some very strong arguments against it - in
partiular its (impliit) regressivity and its adverse eets on family business.
7.2.2. A Tax System with a Flat Tax and a Minimum Inome
In this setion we present a highly stylized tax system that is aimed at redistributing
inome making it fatually a ombined system of taxation and transfers lose to the
negative inome tax system of Friedman and Friedman (1962). In the subsequent setion,
we ontrast this framework with a more realisti progressive tax system.
Figure 7.2.: Relation between market and post-tax inome
We assume that taxes are only imposed on labor inome whih we assume to be the
exogenous soure of inome inequality. The relation between market inome Yi and
inome after taxes and transfers Zi is given as follows:
Zi = (1− τ)Yi + Ymin. (7.17)
We assume a at tax rate τ and a minimum inome Ymin. In the publi eonomis
literature, the level Ymin is also referred to as the demogrant, being a minimum inome
level that is guaranteed to all individuals regardless of their respetive labor inome.
The relation between market and post-tax inome is presented in gure 7.2. To ban
perverse labor supply inentives (
∂Zi
∂Yi
= 1− τ !> 0), this system only requires the at tax
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to be below τ < 100%. In fat, a tax of τ = 100% would lead to a maximal ompression
oiniding with a totally egalitarian soiety (Yi = Ymin). One interpretation of this
system is that every agent pays a at tax τ while being guarantee a basi inome Ymin.
Another interpretation would be that tax is only paid on inome exeeding a ertain
threshold that an be thought of as being tax-free (YTF ≡ Yminτ ):
Zi = (1− τ)(Yi − YTF ) + YTF = (1− τ)
(
Yi − Ymin
τ
)
+
Ymin
τ
. (7.18)
While the marginal tax rate is onstant (MT = ∂(Yi−Zi)
∂Yi
= τ), the average tax rate
(AT = Yi−Zi
Yi
= τ − Ymin
Yi
= τ
(
1− YTF
Yi
)
) is positive for inome above a ertain threshold
(Yi >
Ymin
τ
= Y TF ) and negative below this threshold, signifying that these individuals
are net transfer reeivers. For high inome the average tax rate onverges to the marginal
tax rate (limYi→∞(
Yi−Zi
Yi
) = τ). By denition a at tax is not progressive. The existene
of a minimum inome level (Ymin 6= 0), however, introdues progressivity in the system.
We an also ompute the average inome-weighted marginal taxes:
N∑
i=1
MT (Yi)
Yi∑N
i=1 Yi
=
1
Y
N∑
i=1
τYi = τ, (7.19)
with total inome of the eonomy being
∑N
i=1 Yi = Y . As the marginal tax rate is
idential for all individuals, the average inome-weighted marginal tax rate also equals
τ . We will use this result to ompare this system with a progressive system disussed in
the subsequent setion.
We an also quantify the degree of progressivity. A well-known index of progressivity
is the elastiity of average taxes to inome hanges (εAT,Yi =
dAT/AT
dYi/Yi
) whih yields:
εAT,Yi =
Ymin
τYi − Ymin , (7.20)
whih is positive for an inome above the tax free level Yi > YTF =
Ymin
τ
. In fat,
the highest progressivity is measured at the inetion point Yi = YTF where agents
hange from being net reeivers to being net tax payers. For high inomes progressivity
onverges to zero (limYi→∞ εAT,Yi = 0).
If the tax system shall generate an inome G for the government in a soiety with N
heterogeneous agents, it must be overed by an aggregate tax revenue T > 0:
G
!
= T =
N∑
i=1
(Yi − Zi) =
N∑
i=1
(τYi − Ymin) = τY −NYmin = N(τE(Y )− Ymin). (7.21)
In this ase, Y =
∑N
i=1 Yi is the total inome, whereas E(Y ) =
Y
N
is the mean inome.
To make the system self-naning the following ondition for the at tax rate τ must
hold:
45
τ =
G+NYmin
NE(Y )
=
G
Y
+
Ymin
E(Y )
. (7.22)
45
A similar disussion in a at tax rate regime in whih poverty level is a funtion of mean post-tax
inome is presented in Thompson (2010).
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The naning ondition links the tax rate τ and the minimum inome Ymin and thus
only leaves one degree of freedom for shaping the tax system. If there is no government
inome generating motive (G = 0), a pure Robin Hood tax (Bilbiie et al., 2013) emerges
for whih the only motive of the taxing authority is inome redistribution, leading to an
even simpler ondition for the at tax:
τ =
Ymin
E(Y )
. (7.23)
The intuition of these equations is that the naning motive of the government inreases
the level of the at tax with the amount of the government expenditure ratio
G
Y
. In the
Robin Hood ase, the tax-free level YTF furthermore equals the mean inome (YTF =
E(Y )). If the tax also has an inome generating purpose for the government (G > 0),
the tax-free level falls below the mean inome level. A positive level of G > 0 an also
be interpreted in the sense of Okun (1975) as a leaky buket for whih the total amount
of transfers is lower than the total taxes. By setting G = 0, we impliitly disregard the
leaky buket eet. In the following we only onsider the Robin Hood ase, implying
that the only motive of the government to install a tax and transfer system is to ahieve
redistribution between agents and thereby inome generation (G > 0) or other motives
(e.g., inuening the onsumption of demerit goods) do not matter.
It is important to note that the given system hanges if we assume that the minimum
inome level - being the demogrant - is set to zero (Ymin = 0). As all agents have to pay
taxes (the tax-free inome is zero; YTF =
Ymin
τ
= 0) the government is net beneiary of
the system (G = τY > 0). Moreover, this system loses its progressivity sine marginal
and average tax rates are idential (AT = MT = τ).
The minimum inome Ymin is usually motivated in order to prevent poverty. Poverty
itself normally is not dened in absolute terms but rather in relative terms making
it - similar to onsumption in the Duesenberry (1949) sense - a positional bad. This
implies that poverty depends on the overall inome per apita level.
46
If we dene the
poverty level as a proportion α of the mean inome, the following at tax an lead to
redistribution:
τ =
αE(Y )
E(Y )
= α. (7.24)
This implies that the tax rate equals the poverty ratio (dened as a relative value of
mean inome).
In poliy debates, the level of poverty is frequently dened as a proportion of median
inome. Sine the inome distribution is right-skewed, the median is lower than the
mean inome leading to lower poverty levels. Sine we assume a log-normal distribution,
a losed-form relation between median Y¯ and the mean E(Y ) is given as follows:
E(Y ) = Y¯ exp
(
1
2
σ2y
)
. (7.25)
46
Similar to the disussion about the subsistene level of onsumption presented in setion 4.3, poverty
depends on the overall level of inome. Poverty in a low-inome ountry might be lassied as
restrited aess to food or basi shelter, whereas the lak of a TV set or a omputer in a developed
ountry might rank an individual as poor.
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Figure 7.3.: Poverty level α as a funtion of Gini oeient and at tax τ
Inserting this result into the self-naning ondition (for G = 0, f. eq. 7.23) yields the
following at tax rate
τ =
αY¯
Y¯ exp
(
1
2
σ2y
) = α exp(−1
2
σ2y
)
. (7.26)
For a log-normal distribution (in a rst-order approximation) we an derive a relation
between the Gini oeent and the standard deviation of the distribution:
47
Gini(Y ) ≈ σy√
pi
, (7.27)
leading to the following relation between market inome Gini, at tax rate τ and poverty
ratio α:
τ ≈ α exp
(
−pi
2
Gini(Y )2
)
. (7.28)
Figure 7.3 plots a relation for realisti parameter values. The latter equation omputes
a relation between an exogenously given distribution (Gini(Y )), a desired poverty level
(α), and a resulting poliy parameter (τ). Interestingly, soieties with higher levels of
inequality require lower levels of at tax rates τ to ahieve a ertain poverty ratio α,
due to some very high-inome individuals
48
.
47
The proof for this is presented in appendix A.4.
48
It is also interesting to relate the linear tax rate to the results of Uhlig and Ljungqvist (2000). In their
work, the authors assume a relative onsumption eet and ompute an optimal tax ratio that is able
to outdo the negative externality resulting from the onspiuous onsumption eet. The optimal
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If we want to evaluate the redistributive eet of the tax, we an relate the market
inome Gini (GBT ) to the post-tax Gini (GAT ). Given the rst-order approximation of
a linear relation between Gini and the standard deviation (Gini ∼ σy), we an perform
a bak of the envelope alulation for the redistributive eet:
49
GAT
GBT
=
σ(Z)
σ(Y )
=
σ[(1− τ)Y + Y min]
σ[Y ]
= (1− τ)σ(Y )
σ(Y )
= (1− τ). (7.29)
This, however, is an approximated alulation.
50
A real losed-form solution an be
derived for the oeient of variation whih is also frequently used to measure the eet
of inequality:
CoV (Z)
CoV (Y )
=
σ(Z)
E(Z)
· E(Y )
σ(Y )
=
(1− τ)σ(Y )
(1− τ)E(Y ) + Ymin ·
E(Y )
σ(Y )
=
(
1 +
Ymin
(1− τ)E(Y )
)−1
.
(7.30)
Using, the equation for the self-naning of the Robin Hood tax (eq. 7.23), the idential
result as for the approximated alulation for the Gini emerges:
CoV (Z)
CoV (Y )
=
(
1 +
τ
1− τ
)−1
= 1− τ. (7.31)
The total redistribution via a omplete redistributive tax (τ = 100%) leading to an egal-
itarian soiety results in both a Gini and a oeient of variation of zero. Moreover, we
have a simple linear relation between inequality before and after redistribution desribed
by the redistribution parameter τ .
The presented system therefore not only has some appealing analytial properties but,
furthermore, as put forward frequently in favor for a simple tax system, the administra-
tion osts and the tax evasion opportunities are minimized.
level is given by τ∗ = c¯E(C) and thereby inreases with the level of relative onsumption. This makes
the minimum inome level Ymin = τE(Y ) = c¯
E(Y )
E(C) . For an eonomy that is balaned in the aggregate
(E(C) = E(Y )) this implies Ymin = c¯ aompanied by the fat that the minimum onsumption level
c¯ an be sustained by any agent as it equals the level of minimum inome. In ontrast to our model
the minimum onsumption level c¯ does not hange after redistribution. Another important result
of Uhlig and Ljungqvist (2000) is that taxes should be proylial (i.e. high in booms and low in
busts). This very Keynesian result relies on the notion of the relative onsumption problem and
thereby follows from a ompletely dierent argument than the standard Keynesian literature.
49
Another way of putting it would be log(GBT/GAT ) = − log(1− τ) ≈ τ.
50
Due to the minimum inome assumption the post-tax distribution is left-ensored at a level of Ymin
whih (in ontrast to Fisher (2013) assuming an exogenous variation of the labor inome dis-
tribution) does not onserve the log-normal distribution assumption. Hene, the approximation
Gini ∼ σy (whih is a rst-order approximation for the log-normal distribution anyhow) does not
hold.
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7.2.3. A Combined System with Progressive Taxation and
Transfers
We ontrast this simple linear inome tax system with a progressive inome system, as
implemented in most developed ountries. Following the rationale of Bénabou (1996),
the disposable inome after taxes and transfers is modeled as follows:
Zi =
(
YTF
Yi
)τ
Yi = Y
1−τ
i Y
τ
TF . (7.32)
Note that we use the parameter τ one again, even though it has a dierent meaning as
in the previous hapter in whih it was at tax rate. As we will disuss more thoroughly
in the following the measures are highly omparable as they imply a similar degree of
redistribution. As before, perverse labor supply eets are ruled out:
∂Zi
∂Yi
= (1− τ)
(
YTF
Yi
)τ
!
> 0, (7.33)
for all τ < 1. As in the linear system, the speial ase of τ = 1 implies an egalitarian
distribution for whih post-tax inome is equal for all agents and equals the given minimal
inome (Zi = YTF ).
In a progressive system, the marginal tax rate is always higher than the average tax
rate. The marginal tax rate (MT ) is given as follows:
MT =
∂(Yi − Zi)
∂Yi
= 1− ∂Zi
∂Yi
= 1− (1− τ)
(
YTF
Yi
)τ
, (7.34)
whereas the average tax rate (AT ) amounts to:
AT =
Yi − Zi
Yi
= 1− Zi
Yi
= 1−
(
YTF
Yi
)τ
. (7.35)
The ondition of average tax rate being lower than marginal tax rate is satised for:
51
τ > 0, (7.36)
imposing the seond restrition on the value of τ . For the speial ase of τ = 0 there
is no eetive tax system (Zi = Yi). Moreover, a value of τ < 0 is aompanied by
marginal taxes that are higher than average taxes resulting in a regressive system.
For the ase of τ > 0, it is furthermore important to point out that both marginal
and average tax rates grow with inome, yet marginal taxes at a lower pae (0 < ∂MT
∂Yi
=
τ(1 − τ)
(
YTF
Yi
)τ
1
Yi
< ∂AT
∂Yi
= τ
(
YTF
Yi
)τ
1
Yi
). Thereby, we an dier this system from the
at tax system with a demogrant in the previous setion, in whih only the average taxes
grew with inome. Moreover, both average and marginal tax rate onverge to a rate of
51
This is easy to verify: AT < MT ↔ (1− τ)
(
YTF
Yi
)τ
<
(
YTF
Yi
)τ
→ 1− τ < 1.
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one for high inomes, implying that only for the unrealisti ase of innite inome, the
inome after taxes is zero (limYi→∞MT = limYi→∞AT = 1).
We also an ompute the level of tax-free inome YTF for whih pre- and post-tax
inome are idential:
Yi ≡ Zi ≡ YTF =
(
YTF
YTF
)τ
YTF . (7.37)
Below this level the average tax rate is also negative, implying that agents reeiving
market inome below this level are net transfer reeiver.
52
The tax elastiity as an index of progressivity is equal to:
εAT,Yi = τ
(
Y τTF
Y τi − Y τTF
)
. (7.38)
As in the at tax ase, this is positive for all inomes above the tax-free level (εAT,Yi > 0
for Yi > YTF ) and onverges to zero for high inomes (limYi→∞ εAT,Yi = 0).
In the model, we assumed that inome follows a log-normal distribution. This allows us
to ompute the redistributive eet of the tax. Note that post-tax inome is distributed
as follows:
Zi ∼ Y 1−τi , (7.39)
yielding the following ratio between standard deviations is proportional to the Gini-
values (the formal proof is presented in appendix A.4):
σ(Z)
σ(Y )
≡ Gini(Z)
Gini(Y )
= 1− τ. (7.40)
It is important to point out that this result is idential to the result for the ase of a
linear tax, for whih redistribution solely depends on the variable τ . Therefore, both
types of taxation lead to similar redistributive eets.
We still have a degree of freedom, sine our tax system has two parameters YTF and
τ . To onnet them we one again impose a self-naning ondition of the system:
N∑
i=1
Yi
!
=
N∑
i=1
Zi = Y
τ
TF
N∑
i=1
Y 1−τi , (7.41)
leading to:
YTF =
( ∑N
i=1 Yi∑N
i=1 Y
1−τ
i
) 1
τ
. (7.42)
For the speial ase of the log-normal distribution this yields:
53
YTF = exp[τ log(Y¯ ) + 0.5σ
2
y(1− (1− τ)2)]
1
τ , (7.43)
52
Note that for the speial ase of zero inome Yi = 0, this situation would not hange under the
tax system as Zi(Yi = 0) = 0, implying that under this system no minimum subsistene level is
sustained. In ontrast to that for the simple linear system we have Zi(Yi = 0) = Ymin > 0.
53
This result is easy to verify if we keep in mind that
∑N
i=1 Yi = N ·E(Y ) = NY¯ exp(0.5σ2y) and due to
the transformation property of log-normal distributions
∑N
i=1 Y
1−τ
i = N · exp([1− τ ] log(Y¯ ) + (1−
τ)20.5σ2y).
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whih in logs equals:
log (YTF ) = log(Y¯ ) + 0.5σ
2
y(2− τ). (7.44)
For the speial ase of total redistribution (τ = 1) the minimum inome equals the
mean inome; as in the ase of the linear tax system. However, in the progressive the
minimum inome dereases with the degree of redistribution τ . To grasp this surprising
result, we an ompare the two tax systems.
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Figure 7.4.: Average tax rates in the linear (blak) and progressive (blue) tax system
with variation of inequality and redistribution
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One again - following Heathote et al. (2014) and also using the result for the tax-
free inome YTF in a self-naned system - we an ompute the average inome-weighted
marginal tax rate:
54
N∑
i=1
MT (Yi)
Yi
Y
=
1
Y
N∑
i=1
Yi − (1− τ)Yi
(
YTF
Yi
)τ
=
1− (1− τ)
N∑
i=1
Y τTF
Y
Y 1−τi = 1− (1− τ) = τ.
(7.45)
It is important to aknowledge that in both ases - the progressive system and the linear
tax system with a demogrant - both take the same value. Therefore, both system an
be easily ompared if we keep the same value τ .
In the following we ompare both systems by means of numerial simulation. To do
so we set an environment of N = 1, 000 agents in whih inome is log-normal distributed
with log(Y¯ ) = 1. We vary both the initial inequality and the level of redistribution.
We disuss the ase of high and low initial inequality (Gini(Y ) ≈ 0.35 respetively
Gini(Y ) ≈ 0.28 55). In gure 2.4, we presented empirial evidene for redistribution,
whih we measured as:
Redist = log(GBT )− log(GAT ) = log
(
GBT
GAT
)
. (7.46)
This ratio is easy to transfer to our model, for whih:
log
(
GBT
GAT
)
= log
(
1
1− τ
)
≈ τ. (7.47)
In partiular we assume τ = 0.2 - reeting ontinental European ountries with high
redistribution - and τ = 0.1 mimiking the behavior of low redistribution ountries (es-
peially the USA). Heathote et al. (2014) estimate a progressive system in the Bénabou
(1996) tradition using PSID-data and derive a value of τ = 0.151 for the USA.
log(Gini(Z))− log(Gini(Y )) τ = 0.2 τ = 0.1
Linear Progressive Linear Progressive
Gini(Y )
0.352 0.223 0.210 0.105 0.099
0.282 0.223 0.216 0.106 0.102
Table 7.3.: Redistributive eet with dierent forms of initial inequality and taxation
poliies
As already put forward and doumented in table 7.3 both systems ahieve similar
means of redistribution. Nevertheless, the two systems are ompletely dierent. The
54
It is important to point out that this result holds without making spei assumptions about the
distribution of inome.
55
Both results from log-normal distributions with σy =
2
3 respetively σy = 0.5.
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YTF/E(Y )
τ = 0.2 τ = 0.1
Linear Progressive Linear Progressive
Gini(Y )
0.352 1.000 1.180 1.000 1.205
0.282 1.000 1.110 1.000 1.125
Table 7.4.: Tax-free inome as a ratio of mean inome with dierent forms of initial
inequality and taxation poliies
YTF/Y¯
τ = 0.2 τ = 0.1
Linear Progressive Linear Progressive
Gini(Y )
0.352 1.234 1.456 1.234 1.487
0.282 1.144 1.270 1.144 1.287
Table 7.5.: Tax-free inome as a ratio of median inome with dierent forms of initial
inequality and taxation poliies
relevant gure of the average tax rate is visualized in gure 7.4 as a funtion of underlying
inome. The average tax rate in fat give the ratio of taxes to inome (ATi =
Ti
Yi
= Yi−Zi
Yi
).
If the ratio is negative, agents are net transfer reeivers. Not surprisingly, the average tax
rate for high-inome households inrease in a senario with progressive inome taxation.
Thus, rih individuals are worse o in a progressive taxation senario. Moreover, the
transfer rates for low-inome individuals also inrease - i.e. the ratios are less negative
and low-inome individuals reeive a lower level of transfers and thereby are also worse
o under this senario. The higher taxes on high-inome individuals and the lower
transfers to low-inome individuals, however, are not gains for the government, but are
redistributed to the middle-inome agents, who are the net winners under this senario.
Middle-inome agents in partiular gain for higher inequality - allowing for a higher tax
base of rih individuals - and lower progressivity as measured by τ . In fat, the urvature
for the average tax rate is lower for the progressive senario.
This eet beomes evident if we ompare the level of tax-free inome as presented in
table 7.4 and 7.5. As put forward earlier, for the ase of a linear tax the ratio of tax-free
to the average inome equals one, implying that the household with medium inome
is exatly at the knife-edge ase of zero taxes nor transfers.
56
If we ompare it to the
median inome - as usually done in poverty analysis - this ratio is slightly higher (due to
the eet that in an unequal soiety median inome is lower than mean inome). This
implies that the median household is always a net reeiver. This is also important as it
is in line with the median voter theorem of politial eonomy.
A dierent senario emerges for the progressive tax. The tax-free inome is above the
mean inome. Thus, the mean inome household is atually a net reeiver. We an even
ompute a losed-form relation for the log-normal ase:
YTF
E(Y )
=
exp(log(Y¯ ) + 0.5σ2y(2− τ))
exp(log(Y¯ ) + 0.5σ2y))
= exp(0.5σ2y(1− τ)) > 1, (7.48)
56
It is important to point out that this result does not require a speied distribution of inome.
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respetively:
YTF
Y¯
=
exp(log(Y¯ ) + 0.5σ2y(2− τ))
exp(log(Y¯ ))
= exp(0.5σ2y(2− τ)) >
YTF
E(Y )
> 1. (7.49)
As beomes evident, this ratio one again inreases for higher inequality, but dereases
for higher progressivity. In this ase, the middle-lass prots from high inequality as it is
aompanied by a higher base of taxation allowing for more transfers to the middle-lass.
The explanation for the eet of progressivity τ is as follows: higher values of τ inrease
the progressivity, whih is highest at the point Yi = YTF . Therefore, in a progressive
system the middle-lass suer most from an inrease in progressivity as their status an
turn from net transfer reeiver to net taxpayers. Or put dierently, in a progressive tax
system ompared to a at tax system middle-lass households are better o. However,
this position is very fragile. Only slight hanges in their inome or in the struture of
the system an hange them from net reeivers to net tax payers.
All in all, albeit similar redistributive eets progressive systems are more favorable
for middle-inome households, whereas high-inome and low-inome households would
prefer a linear tax system. In the following, we assess the impat in our omplete model,
that fouses on the eet of nanial stability.
7.2.4. Eet of Taxation
In this setion we present simulation results for the ase with a tax on labor inome
Y . It is important to point out that we only impose the tax on labor inome Y rather
than total inluding apital inome (X = Y + rK). First of all, a general tax on total
inome X would result in an idential tax on both labor and apital inome. In general,
apital inome is overed with a lower marginal tax rate.
57
In fat, a vast amount of the
theoretial literature summarized so far even favors zero taxes on apital inome. In our
modeling hoie, we follow this literature. However, a natural andidate for extension
would be to disuss a tax that also envisions stok quantities suh as a tax on wealth or
apital inome.
In this setion, we take the benhmark model for the Austerity-ase as presented
in setion 6.1 and vary the parameter τ in a eteris paribus fashion.58 We start by
disussing the at tax regime as presented in setion 7.2.2 and then ontrast it to the
progressive system as disussed in setion 7.2.3. For this setion, we assume that - rather
than being formed on the distribution of the market inome Yi - the subsistene level of
onsumption depends on the distribution of the post-tax inome Zi,t:
c¯ = quantilej(Zi,t). (7.50)
57
In Germany a at tax on apital inome of 25% is applied. The average tax on apital inome (also
having a lower average inome tax rate than 25%) is below 25% due to exemption levels. For very
high-inome individuals, the tax exemption does not matter in a signiant manner, yet the apital
tax rate of 25% is way below the maximal marginal tax rates for total inome ranging up to 45%.
58
To ensure exatly similar results, we one again assume the same noise trading vetor as well as the
exat same pik of the log-normal distribution for the wage inome distribution.
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This assumption is essential for the results. As the post-tax inome determines the
available inome for all agents, it also the underlying variable to derive the subsistene
level of onsumption. As shown in gure 7.5, an inrease of the tax level τ inreases the
inome level of the low-inome households also leading to a higher subsistene level of
onsumption. This is one of the entral problems in redistributing ow inome in the
presene of relative onsumption. The relative position of individuals does not hange,
while the minimum onsumption level even inreases. In fat, as also shown in gure 7.5,
the minimum onsumption level is always above the minimum inome
59
provided by the
tax system. Even though the gap between minimum inome and minimum onsumption
narrows, it still persists (only onverging to zero for an egalitarian soiety) requiring
debt naning of onsumption for some individuals.
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Figure 7.5.: Subsistene onsumption c¯ ≡ cmin and minimum inome Ymin as well as
total non-durable onsumption as a funtion of tax rate τ
Interestingly, the total level of non-durable onsumption (
∑N
i=1Ci) also falls ompared
to a soiety without redistribution (see gure 7.5) at odds with the Post-Keynesian ar-
gument that redistribution leads to higher overall onsumption. As, however, presented
in appendix A.9, this is only the ase for a onave onsumption funtion. As shown in
setion 6, in our model with debt and positive interest rates the onsumption funtion
is onvex, leading to a lower overall onsumption, albeit a higher level of minimum on-
sumption level. As formally proved in appendix A.9 the onvexity of the onsumption
59
Formally, the minimum inome level is given by: Ymin = τ · Y¯ · exp
(
0.5σ2y
)
. For a given level of
inome and initial inequality determined by Y¯ and σy , the minimum inome level inreases with the
at tax rate τ in a linear manner. The losed-form value of the minimum onsumption level is more
ompliated, yet has near-linear properties.
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funtion stems from the presene of the ollateral onstraint. Or - as already empha-
sized in setion 6.2.1 - the derease in the number of middle-lass households presented
in gure 7.6 ontributes to the deline of overall onsumption.
60 61
It is also interesting to ompare this result with the work of Foellmi and Oehslin
(2008). The authors assume a standard onave prodution funtion with negative
sale eets, implying that aggregate output will inrease with redistribution. As the
latter, however, also inreases the demand for redit, the interest rate inreases, making
the redit onstraint more binding for poor households. Thus, in result the eet of
redistribution is ambiguous. In our model, redistribution also inreases the demand for
redit and the interest rate making the agents lass-wise worse o. As a result, we have a
similar hannel. Note that we, however, do not have a prodution funtion but disuss a
onsumer-only eonomy. Moreover, in our ase onsumption C is a onvex funtion out
of labor inome Y resulting in a dereasing aggregate demand for redistribution (also
refer to appendix A.9).
As shown in gure 7.6, the Robin Hood tax redues the number of high-inome house-
holds by taking from the rih. The soial funtion of high-inome households in the
model ontext is to provide debt for lower inome households. As the high-lass house-
holds vanish, the supply of debt dereases, aompanied by a urrent aount deit and
high interest rates.
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The high interest rate furthermore lowers the disposable inome of
lower inome households leading to an atual inrease of low-lass households. There-
fore, and somehow surprisingly, in a soiety with relative onsumption, an inome tax
not only transforms high-lass into medium-lass households, but also leads to the fat
that medium-lass households turn into low-lass households. In result, the situation
with taxes lass-wise is Pareto inferior to a situation without taxes.
As presented in gure 7.6, moderate taxes redue prie volatility in durable markets
and derease pries for durables. This an be attributed to the eet that mean net
worth dereases with onvergene to a urrent aount deit leaving less budget for
nanial speulation and promoting a ight to debt.
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Another way of rationalizing is that with higher at tax rates the eonomy transforms into a deit
eonomy lowering the foreign inome that an be reemployed for onsumptive purposes.
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Athreya et al. (2014) disuss the eet of redistribution on aggregate onsumption within a alibrated
Bewley-type model and emphasize the role of labor supply not onsidered in our model. While they
put forward that due to the lower MPC of high-inome households a redistribution from rih to
poor inreases aggregate onsumption, they argue that it also ontributes to an aggregate derease
in working hours in favor of leisure (as well as investment). This eet outdoes the positive eet
of higher onsumption as the authors assume that leisure is a luxury good whose demand inreases
with inome. The latter, however, is in stark ontrast to the ndings presented in Pehi and
Piga (2008) arguing that we live in a time with (over)worked rih. Athreya et al. (2014), however,
also put forward that due to the more produtive working hours of high inome inreasing the
eetive working hours ontrat less than the atual hours slightly dampening the negative eet of
redistribution.
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This relation is not presented in gure 7.6. However, as shown in setion 5.4.1 we know that rt+1 =
r0 exp(µrDt), implying a lear positive relation between the level of aumulated total debt and the
level of the interest rate. The maximum level of debt is jointly determined by the level of assets and
the equity requirement and given by Dmax = (1 −m)H ·N · E(Y ) ≈ 1.31 · 105 whih for the given
values implies an interest rate of rt=T (τ = 1) ≈ 3.87%.
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Figure 7.6.: Agent omposition and market onditions in the market for durables and
debt with variation of the at tax rate τ
A speial region an be identied for tax values of approximately τ > 60%. In this
region, domesti savers disappear resulting in a urrent aount deit. While some
agents, due to their inherited initial endowment, are able to lever up in the short-run
making them middle-lass, in the long-run all agents fall into the lass of onsumption-
dereasing and low-lass agents. This an be attributed to the relation between the
distribution of post-tax inome and the hosen onsumption funtion.
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The inreased
pries and lower nanial volatility for the region τ > 60% should therefore not be
misinterpreted, but are rather a result of a breakdown in trading for the durable market
aompanied by a onvergene of prie to its fundamental and initially assumed value
(P0 = F = 1).
Finally, we an make a statement about dierent forms of inequality in the tax-regime
ase (see gure 7.7). As formally presented in the previous setions, the at tax rate
and labor inome inequality an be related in a simple linear manner. Inequality of
onsumption, however, is above labor inome inequality for a reasonable level of the
at tax rate (τ < 60%). In this region, the gap between these two forms of inequality
inreases due to onsumption out of net worth (stok) as well as the total inome in-
equality stemming from apital inome. This eet an be attributed to the higher net
worth (stok) inequality (doumented in the right panel of gure 7.7). While the tax is
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As shown in the robustness tests (see setion 6.2), fators that inrease onsumption (higher values
of cy, H , cw, and c¯ as well as lower values of ε) ontribute to a urrent aount deit. The same
holds true for a lower level of inequality as the number of high-inome households holding apital
(rather than debt) dereases. Future work should try to nd losed-form solutions in order not only
to identify but also to quantify the underlying fators leading to the urrent aount deit.
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Figure 7.7.: Dierent Gini oeients (mean in time) for variation of at tax rate τ
able to address the eets of ow inequality, the resulting inrease in mutual debt/redit
positions eventually inreases the stok value of net worth inequality.
One again, we have to note the dierent behavior for the urrent aount deit
situation (τ > 60%). As all agents in this ase end up being low-lass households, they
are all levered up to their maximum Dmaxi = (1−m)HYi. Thereby, the distribution of
net worth is ompletely determined by the distribution of wealth whih is exogenously
assumed to be distributed in the exat manner as labor inome. In result for the ase,
both distributions - net worth and wealth - onverge leading to the surprising result
that net worth inequality dereases for higher at tax rates in a urrent aount deit
senario. Moreover, the inequality of total inome and onsumption also inreases in this
region. To omprehend this surprising result it is important to point out that the tax
impats only on the ow quantity of labor inome. In result, agents with a high labor
inome Yi have a very high ratio of wealth (given by Wi = HYi) to post-tax inome
(given by Zi = (1 − τ)Yi + Ymin) and vie versa for agents with a low level of labor
inome. This fat allows high inome agents to aumulate a higher level of debt (also
relative to post-tax inome Zi). In eet the total inome Xi = Zi− rDi unambiguously
dereases with labor inome Yi respetively post-tax inome Zi. For very high inome
total inome is negative (Xi < 0) implying that they are in a Ponzi trap, for whih
interest on debt exeeds urrent available inome. As modeled in equation 6.3, there
is even a sub-ategory within the lower-lass households. Agents with negative total
inome are assumed to have zero onsumption, whereas the other agents at in a hand-
to-mouth manner also leading to the fat the eet of net worth on onsumption eases to
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exist.
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In result, the absolute level of onsumption dereases with the level of post-tax
inome. Moreover and as a result of the latter nding, for this region the redistribution
eventually (slightly) inreases aggregate onsumption as shown in gure 7.5. The key
of the analysis, however, lies in the domain of a urrent aount surplus (τ < 60%) for
whih the eonomy is not governed by strange topsy-turvy dynamis.
We an also ompare the eet of the at tax rate - being a poliy parameter - to
other parameters presented in the setion for whih we varied the exogenous parameters,
whih are beyond the ontrol of the poliy institution (f. setion 6.2).
First of all, the inrease of the at tax rate bears lose resemblane to an inrease in
the minimum onsumption level as doumented in setion 6.2.1. This is straightforward,
sine - as presented in gure 7.5 - the dereased inequality inreases the level of minimum
onsumption. In both ases, the inreased onsumption desire, however, is naned by
a higher level of domesti debt whih furthermore inreases the rate of interest (also
f. 6.12). As a result for both - an inrease in minimum onsumption cmin or the
at tax rate τ - all agents are worse o lass-wise. A pure inrease in the minimum
onsumption level inreases all forms of inequality as the inreased level of debt inreases
net worth inequality, whih inreases the inequality of total inome, also feeding bak
into inequality of onsumption (f. gure 6.13). The taxation ase - by onstrution -
lowers the level of labor inome inequality also lowering total inome inequality as well
as onsumption inequality. The level of net worth inequality, however, also inreases in
this ase due to the extended use of debt.
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Figure 7.8.: Class omposition of a progressive opposed to a linear tax system with
demogrant
Another natural andidate for omparison would be ontrasting the eet of the at
tax rate to an exogenously assumed variation of the inequality as aptured by the stan-
dard deviation of the inome distribution σy in our model and disussed in setion 6.2.2.
For the exogenous variation we not only lower the level of inome inequality, but also
the level of wealth inequality, whih we assume to be perfetly orrelated. One again,
all agents are worse of in terms of lass for lower inequality (lower values of σy), yet
64
Note that we do not illustrate these results in graphs due to spae onstraints. They are, however,
available on request.
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the variables of inequality derease. For an exogenous derease in inequality, the level
of net worth inequality also dereases (f. gure 6.26). This is beause the derease in
wealth inequality outdoes the inrease in debt inequality leading to an overall derease
in net worth inequality. For a lower level of σy, the level of debt and the rate of in-
terest inrease, whereas the volatility in asset markets dereases (f. gure 6.25). Note
that the lower level of overall non-durable onsumption for an exogenous variation of
inequality σy stems from a pure mathematial identity as we assume the median inome
to be xed, resulting in the fat that mean as well as the aggregate inome inreases
with inequality.
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In setion 7.2.3, we introdued a real progressive tax system, for whih - in ontrast
to the linear tax system with demogrant (introdued in setion 7.2.2) - the progressivity
not only resulted from the presene of the demogrant. Qualitatively, the progressive
tax system has the same properties as the linear tax system. Namely, all agents are
worse o lass-wise (f. gure 7.8), debt and interest rates inrease (f gure 7.9). The
demise of the middle-lass ontributes to the deline of aggregate onsumption (f. gure
7.10). Meanwhile, the volatility in durable markets is redued (f. gure 7.9). While the
inequality of onsumption dereases, inequality of net worth inreases (f. gure 7.9).
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Figure 7.9.: Variane of pries, total debt, Gini of net worth, as well as Gini of onsump-
tion in the progressive and the linear tax system
If we, however, make a quantitative assessment, the two type of taxes have dierent
outomes. As already presented in setion 7.2.3, both type of tax systems have the same
impat on the aggregate distribution and therefore are easy to ompare by means of the
variable τ . Their maroeonomi impat, however, is dierent as they imply dierent
65
Formally, this is beause of E(Y ) = Y¯ exp(0.5σ2y).
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Figure 7.10.: Aggregate non-durable onsumption and minimum onsumption in the pro-
gressive and the linear tax system
individual average tax rates (respetively transfer rates) for dierent agents (also f.
gure 7.4).
First of all, the point for whih the eonomy turns from a surplus into a deit eonomy
is reahed for a lower level of redistribution τ in the ase of the progressive tax system.
The following analysis, yet, fouses on reasonable and moderate levels of taxation with
domesti supply of redit (τ < 40%) for whih a urrent aount surplus eonomy
prevails.
As depited in gure 7.8, for a given level of redistribution given by τ , there are more
middle and high-lass agents as well as fewer low-lass agents under a progressive tax
system as opposed to a linear system with demogrant. As already put forward in setion
7.2.3, the middle-lass prots from a progressive tax system as ompared to a at tax
system. Hene, the aggregate onsumption level - being losely related to the number
of middle-lass households - is also higher for a progressive tax system (f. gure 7.10).
The key rationale for the dierent behavior of the linear tax system as ompared to the
progressive system lies in the dierene in the minimum onsumption level as depited
in the right panel of gure 7.10. For the linear ase, the minimum onsumption level is
always slightly above the level witnessed in the progressive ase. The fat that agents
are better o lass-wise is also reeted in a lower level of debt, furthermore resulting
in lower net worth inequality (f. gure 7.9). On the other hand, for a given level of
redistribution τ the volatility of asset markets is higher under the progressive system
owing to the higher number of high-lass agents.
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In eet, the progressive tax system an be onsidered a light-version of the linear
tax system. Both the negative eets (more debt, higher net worth inequality, lower
onsumption) as well as the positive eets (less volatility in durable markets) emerge,
yet are diminished. Regarding the fat, that besides inreasing stability in durable
markets, taxation has negative net eets, one might say that the progressive tax system
wins the horse rae between the two systems.
All in all, the redistributive tax is suessful in lowering inome inequality and thereby
also reduing the number of high-inome individuals that engage in potentially destabi-
lizing speulation in the markets for durables. On the other side, the tax an transform
a surplus eonomy in the presene of strong onspiuous onsumption into a deit
eonomy for whih debt is a soiety-wide phenomenon. Moreover, lower inome (ow)
inequality is aompanied by higher net worth (stok) inequality and therefore is aom-
panied by unintended onsequenes.
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8. Conlusion
Turn the light out,
say goodnight
No thinking for a little while
Let's not try to gure out
everything at one.
The National - Fake Empire (2007)
This dissertation presents a theoretial model in order to shed light on ertain as-
pets of the reent nanial risis. In partiular, the model links the issues of nanial
(in)stability and inequality for developed ountries.
The dissertation relies on the novel method of Agent-Based Modeling. This lass of
models has been very suessful in explaining boom-bust yles in asset markets.
1
As
these models emphasize the aspet of heterogeneous agents, it is also straightforward to
address issues of inequality within this setting. The latter issue, however, is only overed
sparsely in the existing literature.
2
In setion 3 we ompare this modeling paradigm
with other ompeting approahes and highlight advantages of the novel method but
also emphasize potential shortomings. As with any sophistiated model that relies on
numerial methods the underlying mehanisms are hard to understand. Moreover, the
question of the robustness of the (numerial) results arises. We try to aount for these
problems in setion 5 by presenting losed-form solutions and in setion 6 by performing
numerial robustness heks of the parameters. Moreover, this lass of models usually
assumes behavioral deision rules that are frequently ritiized for being of an ad-ho
nature. We address this issue in setion 4 by showing that the key deision in the model
(the onsumption deision) an be miro-founded.
As disussed in setion 4, a key omponent to explain the events surrounding the -
nanial risis is to argue on the basis of the theory of relative onsumption (Duesenberry,
1949), for whih the level of onsumption is determined in a proess of soial interation.
In partiular, low-inome individuals try to imitate the onsumption of high-inome in-
dividuals. The latter eet is fortied in times of high inome inequality as witnessed
in reent years and doumented in setion 2. In the simulations of our model (setion
6), we show that higher onsumption of low-inome individuals (temporarily) dereases
onsumption inequality to a level lower than labor inome inequality. The inreased
1
For exellent surveys the reader is referred to Hommes and Wagener (2009), Chiarella et al. (2009),
and Lux (2009).
2
A notable exeption is Dosi et al. (2013), fousing however, on the funtional rather than the personal
distribution of inome.
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onsumption was naned by means of redit both in the model and in the years leading
to the risis. The latter was provided by high inome domesti individuals as well as
foreigners (espeially for the USA and the European periphery) as reeted in urrent
aount data (f. setion 2). As a result, in the short-run the onsumption inequality
was able to derease relative to labor inome inequality. This, however, was aompa-
nied by higher net worth inequality (stok) and a disparity of urrent aounts. As a
result, the short-run derease in onsumption inequality also promoted an inrease in
net worth inequality (stok) and disparity of urrent aounts. Moreover, the redit
expansion fueled a real estate bubble. The burst of the bubble for this popular asset
led to severe adverse onsequenes espeially resulting from the problem of deleveraging.
We are able to reprodue these fats in the model (f. setion 6). Moreover, we show
that higher inome inequality an promote nanial instability. We deompose nanial
instability into asset prie bubbles (mostly driven by high-inome individuals employ-
ing a large share of their labor inome for nanial speulation) and Ponzi-shemes in
the debt market (driven by low-inome agents that are indebted) and disuss ommon
fators. Furthermore, the model is also able to explain the deline of the real interest
rate also disussed under the aspet of the global savings glut hypothesis as a result of
higher inequality.
While the major eonomies still struggle with the onsequenes of the risis, the publi
debate about nanial stability slightly abated. The disussion about eonomi inequal-
ity, however, gained a strong momentum after the publiation of the book of Piketty
(2014).
3
Similar to our work, Piketty (2014) emphasizes the distribution of stok rather
than ow quantities. This dissertation also ritially disusses some of the major theo-
retial laims of Piketty (2014). First of all, the role of debt is only sparsely overed in
his work. As emphasized in our theoretial work it is a major determinant for explaining
net worth inequality.
4
Piketty (2014) emphasizes that a dynami eient eonomy (in
whih the interest on apital r exeeds the total growth rate g) goes along with an ever-
inreasing wealth inequality. As laried in setion 5.5.2, this only holds for the strong
and unrealisti assumption of agents saving their total ow inome and not onsuming
out of their stok level of wealth. In ontrast, we emphasize other key determinants
for wealth inequality. Wealth inequality is mainly driven by saving ratios and rates of
returns that grow with the level of wealth.
5
We also oer some ritial thoughts on the
predition of Piketty (2014) of a soiety dominated by inherited wealth.
As a poliy onlusion Piketty (2014) advoates a global wealth tax in order to halt the
growth of wealth inequality also revitalizing the publi debate about redistribution by
means of a system of taxes and subsidies. We disuss this issue in setion 7 and show that
3
It is interesting to point out that the book was already published in its original Frenh version one
year earlier without attrating major publi reations. The English translation (also referred to in
this work) was able to get a massive press attration in the USA as well as worldwide.
4
A very reent empirial investigation by Saez and Zuman (2014) moreover arms that the higher
partiipation rates in real estate were more than oset by the inrease of debt leading to a deline
of middle-lass wealth ontributing to the inrease of net worth inequality.
5
As moreover disussed in the setion 5.5.2 the latter fators are also doumented by the empirial
literature.
248
redistribution an have unintended onsequenes. In partiular stronger redistribution
may have an arms' rae property
6
by raising the desired relative onsumption level. In
eet, the use of debt inreases, also promoting nanial instability in the form of Ponzi
shemes.
The model presented in this work an be modied and extended in several diretions.
First of all, the model does neither feature labor market deisions (important for labor
inome inequality) nor markets for investment goods. The latter extension would allow
to disuss the role of produtive apital in the sense of Piketty (2014). Furthermore,
there are important poliy questions that ould be addressed in extensions of the model.
So far we only introdued taxation of the ow level labor inome. As however, argued in
setion 7.2.1 taxes that aet stok levels are at the enter of the aademi and publi
debate. This not only inludes pure wealth taxes but also taxes on the ow of apital
inome. Finally, there has been an inreased interest in the eets of monetary poliy
on inequality
7
- whih are far from being well understood. The model developed in this
work may be a starting point to further investigate this question.
Both issues - inequality and nanial instability - are a bad and all for ations of
the poliy maker, yet are also neessary byproduts of a apitalist soiety that has
promoted growth in the standard of living in the last 100 years. This in partiular
beomes obvious when imagining the omplete opposite ase sometimes depited as a
soial utopia in popular omments. A soiety that ollets all individual inome and
redistributes it in an egalitarian manner - addressing inequality in the most radial
manner - provides no inentive to display eort in the rst plae. Meanwhile, a soiety
that would ompletely be absent of risk-taking nanial institutions - also not being
subjet to nanial instability - would also ompletely lak visionary entrepreneurial
ativities (Shumpeter, 1931). A balaned view trades o the opposing poles. As a result
a market eonomy requires lear rules (e.g. banking regulation) and instruments (e.g.
taxes and transfer systems) that are able to ontrol nanial stability and inequality
without restriting the ativity of visionary entrepreneurs. The role of eonomists is
to provide (quantitative) answers to design these rules for the given trade-o. This not
only involves testing measures ex-post in empirial frameworks, but also deriving ex-ante
ounter-fatual preditions by means of theoretial models.
6
The later issue is also brought up in more narrative work emphasizing the problems prevailing in
positional rae (Grolleau et al., 2012) posing the question of an satiation level in onsumption
(Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 2012).
7
Reent leading ontributions inlude Gorodnihenko et al. (2012) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2012).
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A. Additional Proofs
A.1. Derivation of the Optimality Condition for
Consumption
The optimal sequene of onsumption is derived by maximizing the following target
funtion:
max
Ct
∞∑
t=1
βtU(Ct), (A.1)
subjet to the intertemporal budget onstraint:
∞∑
t=1
RtCt = W0 +
∞∑
t=1
RtYt. (A.2)
The Lagrangian reads as follows:
L =
∞∑
t=1
βtU(Ct)− λ
( ∞∑
t=1
RtCt −W0 −
∞∑
t=1
RtYt
)
, (A.3)
with the following general rst-order ondition:
∂L
∂Ci
= βiU ′(Ci)− λRi != 0→ λ = β
i
Ri
U ′(Ci). (A.4)
Consider a period t and a later period t+ T . From the equivalene of the shadow prie
λ, we have:
βt
Rt
U ′(Ct) =
βt+T
Rt+T
U ′(Ct+T ), (A.5)
resulting in the standard optimality ondition (the Euler-equation):
U ′(Ct)
U ′(Ct+T )
=
(
β
R
)T
. (A.6)
For the speial ase of two subsequent periods t and t+ 1 (implying T = 1) this results
in:
U ′(Ct)
U ′(Ct+1)
=
β
R
(A.7)
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A.2. Conditions for the Fallay of Composition not
to Hold
As already presented in the text, we assume an eonomy with n agents where a spei
quantity (e.g. inome Y or asset holding q) follows a given distribution f(Y ) with a
minimum value Ymin, a maximum value Ymax
1
and a mean value E(Y ). In fat, the
value of f(Y ) gives the number of agents within the population, who have a spei
inome level Y . Therefore, for the whole sample the following results holds:∫ Ymax
Ymin
df(Y ) =
∫ Ymax
Ymin
f(Y )dY = [F (Y )]YmaxYmin = n, (B.8)
with F (Y ) being the ompounded density funtion (CDF). The value F (Y ) informs
about the number of agents reeiving inome not higher than a level Y . The latter
result is also depited in gure A.1. Moreover, the integral of the CDF - depited as a
grey area in gure A.1 - yields:∫ Ymax
Ymin
dF (Y ) =
∫ Ymax
Ymin
F (Y )dY =
∫ Ymax
Ymin
∫ Ymax
Ymin
f(Y )dY dY = E(Y )n, (B.9)
indiating the total inome or GDP of the eonomy as being the produt of the mean
inome E(Y ) with the number of agents n. Note that the gure shows the speial
ase of a distribution without skewness. In partiular, for this symmetrial distribution
the mean (E(Y )) equals the median (Y¯ ) inome (E(Y ) = Y¯ ). This, however, is not
the ase for distribution of inome exhibiting negative skewness with a fat right tail.
Nevertheless, by denition the integral - indiated as the grey area in gure A.1 - always
equals the produt of mean inome E(Y ) and the number of agents n.
Other eonomi variables (e.g. onsumption C or savings S) are funtional relations
of inome. Note that it is usually assumed - and also the ase in our model - that
onsumption of all agents follows the same funtional form, suh that the heterogeneous
outomes are solely owed to the dierent input variable, implying that there is no het-
erogeneity in preferenes. If we e.g. want to ompute the total onsumption we have to
solve the following integral:
Ctotal =
∫ Ymax
Ymin
C(Y )dF (Y ) =
∫ Ymax
Ymin
C[F (Y )]dY. (B.10)
Only for the ase of a linear funtion:
C(Y ) = cyY, (B.11)
we are not subjet to the fallay of omposition, implying:
Ctotal =
∫ Ymax
Ymin
C[F (Y )]dY = cy
∫ Ymax
Ymin
F (Y )dy = cy · E(Y ) ·N. (B.12)
1
To be more general and given the positive value nature of inome, the upper and lower bounds an
be replaed by 0 and ∞.
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Figure A.1.: Graphial solution of the integral of the CDF
More generally, in this ase, the aggregation operator (the integral) and the funtional
operator (in this ase represented by square brakets) an be swithed without aeting
the results:
C
[∫ Ymax
Ymin
F (Y )dY
]
=
∫ Ymax
Ymin
C[F (Y )]dY = Ctotal. (B.13)
Or put dierently, for the linear ase to desribe the aggregate behavior it is suient to
rely on the rst statistial moment being the expetation operator (E(·)). In partiular,
this is the ase for an underlying homotheti utility funtion suh as the CRRA funtion
(Chipman, 1974).
It is important that this result is independent of the onrete distribution f(Y ) allow-
ing us to derive aggregate results from aggregate variables - e.g. aggregate onsumption
from GDP.
Up to this point we hose a ontinuous formulation whih is frequently used in theoret-
ial papers aiming at deriving losed-form solutions. However, this is not very pratial
sine when using data we deal with disrete observations. Therefore, for the rest of this
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setion we use a disrete formulation. The last equation an be rewritten as follows in
a disrete senario:
C
[
N∑
i=1
Yi
]
=
N∑
i=1
C[Yi]. (B.14)
This also implies that the behavior of a single agent with mean inome is representative
for the whole eonomy. In fat, the aggregate behavior an be derived by multiplying
the behavior of the representative agent with the total number of agents in the system:
Ctotal = N · C[E(y)] = N · C
[
1
n
N∑
i=1
Yi
]
= N · cy
N
N∑
i=1
Yi
= cyY ≡
N∑
i=1
cyYi =
N∑
i=1
C[Yi].
(B.15)
Now let us assume a slight modiation of the onsumption funtion. While the
onsumption is still linear in its nature, we also allow for an oset:
C = c¯+ cyY. (B.16)
As extensively argued in setion 4.3, this an be thought of as reeting a relative
onsumption motive or a subsistene level. One again, the aggregate onsumption an
be dedued from the behavior of the representative agent multiplied by the number of
agents N with Y =
∑N
i=1 Yi:
Ctotal = N · C [E(Y )] = N · C
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
Yi
]
= N
(cy
N
Y + c¯
)
= cyY +N · c¯. (B.17)
However, in this ase the derivation of total onsumption from total inome is not
possible:
C[Y ] = C
[
N∑
i=1
Yi
]
= cyY + c¯ < Ctotal = cyY +N · c¯, (B.18)
as the onspiuous onsumption eet emerges for all agents. Thus, this derivation
underestimates total onsumption.
A.3. The Transversality Condition in the
Gordon-Growth Asset Priing Model
In setion 4.2 we presented a model with optimal onsumption and showed that for any
relation between the growth rate of onsumption r− ρ 2 and the growth rate of inome
2
Even more generally for a general CRRA utility funtion the following growth rate is reported
C˙
C =
r−ρ
γ . We fous on the isoelasti ase (γ = 1).
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g a stable outome emerges. For r − ρ < g we have onsumers who aumulate debt,
whereas agents with r − ρ > g aumulated assets or apital indenitely without the
transversality ondition being violated. For the margin-ase r − ρ = g, agents onsume
all disposable inome in a hand to mouth manner and aumulate assets (for the ase
of inherited apital −D0 > 0 and vie versa for inherited debt) growing at the same
rate as the inome r − ρ = g. In this setion we show that this borderline ase is the
only feasible ase for asset priing. Any non-zero value of r − ρ− g would lead to asset
bubbles.
We onsider an asset that provides an annual ash ow (i.e. a dividend dt). Fur-
thermore, we assume that the dividend-growth follows an exponential proess dt+n =
(1+ g)ndt. As usual, the future ash ow has to be disounted by means of an adequate
interest rate r, implying the following long-run valuation equation:
pt =
t+n∑
i=t
dt(1 + g)
i
(1 + r)i
. (C.19)
Following from the standard geometri series logi the long-run prie is given by:
pt =
t+∞∑
i=t
dt(1 + g)
i
(1 + r)i
= dt
1 + g
1 + r
1− (1+g
1+r
)∞
1− 1+g
1+r
, (C.20)
whih only onverges for r > g leading to:
pt =
dt(1 + g)
r − g , (C.21)
whih for small values of r and g equals:3
pt =
dt
r − g . (C.22)
Following Beker (2008), we an also write the total return of the asset ρ as the sum
of the dividend yield and the apital gain:
ρ =
pt+1 − pt
pt
+
dt
pt
, (C.23)
equivalent to:
pt+1 = (1 + ρ)pt − dt. (C.24)
Using the derivation of the previous stanza we know that the orret disount ratio is
(1 + ρ) = 1+r
1+g
↔ ρ = r−g
1+g
. For the subsequent period we therefore have:
pt+2 =
(
1 +
r − g
1 + g
)
pt+1 − dt. (C.25)
3
Note that pt =
∑t+∞
i=t+1
dt(1+g)
i
(1+r)i =
dt(1+r)
r−g
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We an reinsert the previous result, leading to:
pt+2 =
(
1 +
r − g
1 + g
)2
pt − dt
[
1 +
r − g
1 + g
]
. (C.26)
With reursion, we have:
pt+n =
(
1 +
r − g
1 + g
)n
pt − dt
n−1∑
i=0
[
1 +
r − g
1 + g
]i
=
(
1 + r
1 + g
)n−1
pt − dt
n∑
i=0
(
1 + r
1 + g
)i
,
(C.27)
whih - using the rules for geometri series - an also be written as:
pt+n =
(
1 + r
1 + g
)n [
pt − dt(1 + g)
r − g
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
bubble omponent
+
dt(1 + g)
r − g︸ ︷︷ ︸
fundamental omponent
. (C.28)
In fat, the latter equation an be deomposed into two omponents: the bubble ompo-
nent and the fundamental omponent. Any (even small) initial mispriing (pt 6= dt(1+g)r−g )
will perpetuate itself and is aompanied by a rational bubble. In partiular for the ase
of pt >
dt(1+g)
r−g ↔ ρ < r − g we will have a positive bubble (for all n > 0 pt+n > dt(1+g)r−g ).
For the inverse ase (ρ > r − g) a negative bubble will emerge (f. gure A.2). The
growth rate of the bubble is given by the orret disount fator (1 + ρ = 1+r
1+g
).
In fat, the transversality ondition for the asset priing model reads as follows:
lim
n→∞
pt+n
(
1
1 + ρ
)n−1
!
= 0. (C.29)
We an insert the result of the previous equation, leading to:
lim
n→∞
{
1 + r
1 + g
[
pt − dt(1 + g)
r − g
]
+
dt(1 + g)
r − g
(
1 + g
1 + r
)n−1}
!
= 0. (C.30)
The seond term onverges if the ondition r > g - already emphasized - is satised.
The rst term is zero only if there is no initial mispriing pt =
dt(1+g)
r−g .
To summarize, the neessary onditions for a orret asset priing are r > g (implying
dynami eieny) and the borderline ase ρ = r − g > 0.
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Figure A.2.: The evolution of a rational bubble out of an initial mispriing
A.4. Proof of the Relation between the Log-normal
Distribution and the Gini-ratio
As presented in Aithison and Brown (1957) the log-normal funtion and the Gini-ratio
an be related as follows:
Gini = 2Φ
(
σy√
2
)
− 1. (D.31)
In this ase Φ represents the Cumulative Probability Density Funtion (CPDF) of the
normal distribution. This funtion an be related to the error funtion (erf(x) =
2√
π
∫ x
0
exp(−t2)dt) as follows:
Φ(x) = 0.5 + 0.5 · erf(x/
√
2). (D.32)
Inserting this result and using the rst-order Taylor approximation for the error funtion
(erf(z) = 2√
π
(z +O(z3))) the following result an be derived:
Gini = 2[0.5(1 + erf(0.5σy))]− 1 = erf(0.5σy) = σy√
pi
≈ 0.5642 · σy. (D.33)
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As a rule of thumb we an therefore say that for suiently low values of σy the Gini-ratio
and the distribution parameter an be related with the fator 0.5.
A.5. Proof for the relation between Gini-ratio and
the Growth Rate of Inequality
We assume that in a soiety with growing inequality in a dynami senario inomes are
given as follows:
Yt+1 = (1 + gineq log(Yt))Yt. (E.34)
Log-linearizing the result using the rst-order Taylor approximation for the log operator
(log(1 + z) ≈ z), the following result an be derived:
log(Yt+1)− log(Yt) ≈ gineq log(Yt)⇒ log(Yt+1)
log(Yt)
= 1 + gineq. (E.35)
If a funtion is log-normally distributed (Y ∼ L) its logs are normally distributed
log(Y ) ∼ N (Evans et al., 2000) and the given ratio an be related to the ratio of
two normally distributed funtion:
log(Yt+1)
log(Yt)
= 1 + gineq =
N(µt+1, σy,t+1)
N(µt, σy,t)
. (E.36)
More speially, the following equation relates normal and log-normal distributions
(Evans et al., 2000):
log(L : log(µ), σy) ∼ (N : µ, σy) ∼ µ+ σy ·N(0, 1). (E.37)
This helps us alulate the seond moment:√
V ar(log(Yt+1)) = (1 + gineq)
√
V ar(log(Yt)). (E.38)
As already presented in setion 5.2, in a rst-order approximation there is a proportional
relationship Gini ∼ σy, leading to the following result:√
V ar(log(Yt+1))√
V ar(log(Yt))
=
Ginit+1
Ginit
= (1 + gineq). (E.39)
Furthermore, for a multi period approah the following result holds:√
V ar(log(Yt+T ))√
V ar(log(Yt))
=
Ginit+T
Ginit
= (1 + gineq)
T . (E.40)
Log-transforming leads to the following equation:
log(Ginit+T ) = log(Ginit) + T · log(1 + gineq). (E.41)
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For small values of gineq the following approximation holds:
Ginit+T = exp(gineq · T ) ·Ginit. (E.42)
For the even stronger assumption that the produt 0 < gineq · T << 1 is small the
following linear relation an be derived:
Ginit+T = gineq · T ·Ginit. (E.43)
A.6. Inequality of Wealth
In our model, wealth is dened as the urrent asset holding qt evaluated at urrent
market prie Pt. For the sake of readability we refer to this in this proof as Ai,t ≡ Ptqi,t.
In general holdings of assets evolve as follows:
Ai,t = Pt(qi,t−1 + di,t), (F.44)
where the demand for new assets is dened in equation 5.14. This leads to the following
equation:
Ai,t = Pt(qi,t +MPCDtWi,t). (F.45)
For the sake of illustration, we rstly assume that demand for new assets does not
depend on net worthWi,t but rather on total assets Ai,t leading to the following reursive
equation for total asset holdings:
Ai,t = Pt(qi,t +MPCDtAi,t−1) = Pt
(
Ai,t−1
Pt−1
+MPCDtAi,t−1
)
= Ai,t−1
(
Pt
Pt−1
+ PtMPCDt
)
.
(F.46)
The rst term in brakets aptures the hange in wealth due to reevaluation eets and
the latter due to ative buying or selling (for MPCDt > 0 respetively MPCDt < 0).
The equation an be reformulated as follows:
Ai,t = Ai,0
t∏
τ=1
Pτ
Pτ−1
+ PτMPCDτ . (F.47)
The evolution of assets aptured in the produt term is independent of any idiosyn-
rati eets. This an be easily veried if we ompute the ratio of assets between two
heterogeneous agents i 6= j for a spei time t:
Ai,t
Aj,t
=
Ai,0
∏t
τ=1
Pτ
Pτ−1
+ PτMPCDτ
Aj,0
∏t
τ=1
Pτ
Pτ−1
+ PτMPCDτ
=
Ai,0
Aj,0
. (F.48)
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The distribution of assets thereby only depends on the initial distribution. By assump-
tion (Ai,0 = HYi,0) this is totally determined by the inequality in inome (ow):
Ai,t
Aj,t
=
Ai,0
Aj,0
=
HYi,0
HYj,0
=
Yi,0
Yj,0
. (F.49)
Therefore, the asset distribution takes the same value as the distribution of inome
(Gini(A) = Gini(Y )). The speulative market, moreover, has the long-run prop-
erty E(Pt) = F = 1. This is also aompanied by the eet that mean demand
(E(MPCDt) = 0) as well as long-run returns are zero (E(1 + rt) = E
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
= 1).
Therefore, long-run wealth is idential to initial wealth:
Ai,t = Ai,0
t∏
τ=1
Pτ
Pτ−1
+ PτMPCDτ = Ai,0
t∏
τ=1
(1 + 0) = Ai,0. (F.50)
However, up to this point we disregarded the eet of demand being a funtion of net
worth and therefore also depending on individual debt Di,t. Equation F.46 therefore
hanges as follows:
Ai,t = Pt(qi,t +MPCDtWi,t−1) = Pt
(
Ai,t−1
Pt−1
+MPCDt(Ai,t−1 −Di,t)
)
. (F.51)
Now, we have to distinguish between two ases. In the long-run low and medium-
inome households only satisfy minimum equity requirements as given by the ollateral
onstraint (equation 5.17). This implies Wi,t = Ai,t − Di,t = mAi,t, resulting in the
following long-run equation:
Ai,t = Ai,0
t∏
τ=1
Pτ
Pτ−1
+ PτmMPCDτ . (F.52)
Meanwhile, high-inome households are net lenders, implying that Di,t < 0 and Wi,t >
Ai,t. As suggested in gure 6.7 the ration between laims and inome as well as the
ratio of inome and net worth are onstant. Without further speifying we assume that
0 <
Ai,t
Wi,t
=
Wi,t+Di,t
Wi,t
= k < 1.4 The evolution of their wealth therefore is desribed as
follows:
Ai,t = Ai,0
t∏
τ=1
Pτ
Pτ−1
+
Pτ
k
MPCDτ . (F.53)
This helps us relate the wealth of low-inome (index (l) to a high-inome households
(index h):
Ah,t
Al,t
=
Ah,0
Al,0
∏t
τ=1
Pτ
Pτ−1
+ Pτ
k
MPCDτ∏t
τ=1
Pτ
Pτ−1
+ PτmMPCDτ
=
Yh,0
Yl,0
∏t
τ=1
Pτ
Pτ−1
+ Pτ
k
MPCDτ∏t
τ=1
Pτ
Pτ−1
+ PτmMPCDτ
. (F.54)
4
Formally - and as shown in setion 5.5.1 - the value is given by
1
k = 1+
K
HY = 1+
ky
H +
k0
HY . For the
given alibration and the a long-run rate of interest of r ≈ 0.5%, it shows little reation to hanges
in labor inome Y . Thus, the value is given by k ≈ 0.66.
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For no demand MPCDt = 0 the ratio between low and high-inome households one
again is entirely given by the inome distribution (Gini(A) = Gini(Y )). This is also the
ase in the long-run, sine - as already shown - there we have E(MPCDt) = 0. Let us
now go to the short-run. Let us assume that
Ah,t−1
Al,t−1
=
Yl,0
Yh,0
:
Ah,t
Al,t
=
Ah,t−1
Al,t−1
Pt
Pt−1
+ Pt
k
MPCDt
Pt
Pt−1
+ PtmMPCDt
=
Yl,0
Yh,0
Pt
Pt−1
+ Pt
k
MPCDt
Pt
Pt−1
+ PtmMPCDt
. (F.55)
If trading rationale implies going long MPCDt > 0 inequality inreases, as
1
k
> 1 > m.
Going long also implies inreasing pries. Therefore, in upswings inequality inreases.
The reverse argument holds for short positions and asset prie dereases. Thus, inequal-
ity of wealth and asset pries are positively orrelated as depited in gure 6.3.
A.7. Optimal Distribution of Eonomi Resoures
This setion shows a utilitarian approah for determining the optimal distribution of
resoures. The soial planner's problem reads as follows:
max
x1,x2,··· ,xN
N∑
i=1
U(xi) = max
x1,x2,··· ,xN
N∑
i=1
[
1
1− γx
1−γ
i
]
s.t. x =
N∑
i=1
xi.
(G.56)
Soial welfare (the objetive funtion) is dened as the sum of individual utility. The
utility funtion itself is assumed to be of the CRRA type. The soial planner faes the
onstraint of a nite amount of resoures x.
The problem an be solved using the following Lagrangian:
L =
N∑
i=1
1
1− γx
1−γ
i,t − λ
(
xt −
N∑
i=1
xi,t
)
, (G.57)
with the following general rst-order ondition:
∂L
∂xi
= x−γi − λ = 0⇒ λ = x−γi . (G.58)
Using the shadow prie identity the following general ondition for i 6= j holds:
x−γi = x
−γ
j . (G.59)
For any γ, this ondition only holds for:
xi = xj, (G.60)
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implying total equality. We also have to ontrol the seond-order ondition to ensure a
loal maximum:
∂2L
∂x2i
= −γx−γ−1i
!
< 0, (G.61)
whih only holds for γ > 0 sine xi > 0. Therefore, for risk-averse agents (γ > 0),
the optimal distribution is total equality. For the inverse ase (γ < 0), the rst-order
ondition onstitutes a loal minimum. A maximum, however, is reahed when giving
one agent i all resoures (xi = x) and all other agents nothing (j 6= i xj = 0), thus
implying total inequality. For the general ase, the soial planner is indierent to whih
agent to distribute all resoures.
The results an be onrmed by inserting the optimal result into the target funtion.
For risk aversion (γ > 0, index RA) the target funtion for the optimal distribution
(xi =
x
N
) yields:
U~x∗ =
1
1− γ
N∑
i=1
( x
N
)1−γ
=
N
1− γ
x1−γ
N1−γ
≡ URA. (G.62)
For the ase of risk loving individuals γ < 0 for the optimal ase of total inequality the
utility funtion takes the following value:
U~x∗ =
1
1− γx
1−γ ≡ URL. (G.63)
The ratio between the two is given as follows:
URA
URL
=
N
N1−γ
= Nγ . (G.64)
For all N > 1 and risk averse agents (γ > 0) this ratio is larger than one (URA
URL
> 1),
implying that URA > URL and vie versa for risk loving individuals (γ < 0).
For the speial ase of a linear utility funtion with risk-neutrality (γ = 0), the total
objetive funtion reads as follows:
Utot,t =
N∑
i=1
Ui(xi,t) =
N∑
i=1
xi,t = xt. (G.65)
In this ase, distribution does not matter. Total utility an only be inreased by inreas-
ing the total resoures available xt, thus implying a soiety with growing resoures. The
ase of risk neutrality also implies URA = URL.
We, however, take a standard eonomi approah in summing up all individuals -
therefore trading-o the lower outome of one individual against the higher outome of
another. In this ase, an egalitarian soiety generally is not welfare optimal. This, how-
ever, is the ase due to the leaky buket problem (Okun, 1975). Rather than designing
a soiety from srath, redistribution involves an ineient government system where
total subsidies are lower than total taxes. It is feasible to only onsider the two agents
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at the edges of the distribution - namely the very poorest agent (index p) and the very
rihest agent (index r) - with a market inome Yi.
5
The government system is desribed
by a leakiness 0 < Φ < 1, where low values indiate higher leakage. In fat, the total
inome after taxes and subsidies Zi is lower than the sum of the market inome:
2∑
i=1
Zi = Zr + Zp = Yr − t + Yp + Φ · t =
2∑
i=1
Yi + (Φ− 1)t <
2∑
i=1
Yi, (G.66)
where t represents the taxes. The total loss is higher for low values of Φ indiating
stronger leakage. Let us optimize utility of total after tax inome:
maxt
2∑
i=1
U(Zi), (G.67)
with a standard utility funtion of the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) type
(U(•) = 1
1−γ (•)1−γ). The rst order ondition with respet to t yields:
(Yr − t)−γ
(Yp + Φt)−γ
= Φ =
(Zr)
−γ
(Zp)−γ
=
(
Zp
Zr
)γ
↔ Φ 1γ = Zp
Zr
. (G.68)
For the ase of no leakage (Φ = 1), the result breaks down to the very result presented in
the beginning of this setion, where total equality is optimal. Hene, the only obstale
hindering a egalitarian soiety being welfare optimal is the ineieny of the government
system aimed at onduting the redistribution. As furthermore shown in Arrow (1973),
for extreme risk aversion (γ → ∞) total equality is optimal - therefore mirroring the
Rawlsian ase - for any Φ, implying an egalitarian distribution. On the other hand, it
should also not be forgotten that any redistribution is Pareto ineient sine at least
one agent (the rih one) ends up worse o.
A.8. The Tax Eet on Labor Supply
The presene of adverse labor supply eets is the key argument put forward against
taxation of labor inome. This is not onsidered in our model, as we assume a onstant
and thereby inelasti supply of labor. In the design of our tax system, we only address
the problem of - as we all it - perverse labor supply eets - implying that higher pre-tax
inome should not result in lower post-tax inome.
Private Labor Supply Deision
Usually, the private labor supply deision is presented as the following simple optimiza-
tion problem of private households.
6
Households try to maximize a utility funtion that
5
A more general approah with N agents is e.g. presented in Stark et al. (2014).
6
Note that we only disuss the ase of the intensive margin with h being a ontinuous variable. For
the extensive ase (h being a binary), whih is very important for low-inome households, the agents
deide whether to work at all.
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inreases with the level of onsumption c and dereases with the amount of hours worked
h:
U = u(c) + v(h), (H.69)
with the properties vh < 0 and vhh < 0.
7
It is feasible to assume the following speia-
tion:
U =
c1−γ
1− γ − α
h1+
1
ν
1 + 1
ν
, (H.70)
subjet to the following budget onstraint:
z(h) = c, (H.71)
where z is the disposable inome as a funtion of hours worked. In the simple framework
with an hourly rate of w and linear tax system without demogrant this an be rewritten
as:
z(h) = w(1− τ)h = c. (H.72)
The solution of the problem leads to the following rst order ondition (FOC):
c−γw(1− τ) = αh 1ν . (H.73)
In fat, the left side of the equation aptures the marginal benet of working whereas
the right side summarizes the marginal disutility out of work resulting from a preferene
for leisure. In a at tax system (with or without demogrant) the marginal tax rate is
onstant. In a progressive tax-system with inreasing marginal tax rates - as disussed
in setion 7.2.3 - marginal taxes inrease with inome and with hours worked, implying
that the marginal benets of working derease with hours worked. The previous equation
also allows us to derive a losed-form solution of the labor supply funtion h:
h =
(
w(1− τ)
αcγ
)ν
. (H.74)
The variable ν is ommonly referred to as the Frish-elastiity of labor supply8 (f. e.g.
Heer and Maussner (2005)). The elastiity quanties the substitution eet of labor in
favor of leisure as a response to a tax hange:
dh/h
d(1− τ)/(1− τ) = ν. (H.75)
A more eonomi interpretation of ν is that it aptures the amount of disutility stemming
from a higher amount of work, where low values of ν signify that agents strongly despise
work. In equilibrium, agents with lower values of ν therefore exhibit lower values of labor
supply.
9
In our model, we impliitly assume ν = 0. Our model ould be onsidered a
7
The utility of onsumption funtion has the usual properties uc > 0 and ucc < 0 and is assumed to
be of the CRRA type.
8
The name omes from Ragnar Frish, the laureate of the very rst Nobel prize in eonomis.
9
The same result also applies to higher values of α.
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very long-run model, sine as empirially onrmed, the long-run labor supply is very
inelasti. The latter ould be explained by the relative onsumption eet, where agents
try to keep up with the Joneses and thereby do not derease labor-supply despite higher
standards of living (Stiglitz, 2008).
Using the First Order Condition (FOC) and the budget onstraint yields the following
optimal level of onsumption c∗ and hours h∗ :
h∗ = α−
ν
γν+1 (w[1− τ ]) ν(1−γ)1+γν , (H.76)
and
c∗ = α−
ν
γν+1 (w[1− τ ]) ν+11+γν . (H.77)
For the sake of simpliity, we onsider the isoelasti ase (γ = 1) yielding:
h∗ = α−
ν
ν+1 , (H.78)
and
c∗ = α−
ν
ν+1w(1− τ), (H.79)
For this ase, the following utility prevails:
U∗(c∗, h∗) = ln
(
(1− τ)wα− νν+1
)
− 1
1 + 1
ν
. (H.80)
In this ase, any tax inrease dereases the utility of the representative individual:
∂U∗
∂τ
=
1
τ − 1 < 0, (H.81)
for all τ < 1. This is the ase, sine higher taxes redue the disposable inome available
for onsumption purposes, thereby lowering the utility. However, in a heterogeneous
agent framework the soial welfare funtion taking into aount an equity onern in-
reases.
Tax Revenues and the Optimal Tax Rate
An argument frequently put forward in favor of higher taxes is that they inrease the
revenue of the government G available for redistribution. The latter, however, is also
limited by the labor supply. In fat, revenue is an inverse u-shaped funtion of the tax
rate, also often referred to as the Laer-urve (see e.g. Piketty and Saez (2013b)):
G = τh(τ). (H.82)
The loal maximum of tax revenue using the Frish-elastiity (f. equation H.75) an be
derived as follows:
dG
dτ
= h+ τ
dh
dτ
= h− τ dh
d(1− τ)
!
= 0↔ τ = d(1− τ)
dh
h =
1− τ
ν
↔ τ ∗ = 1
1 + ν
. (H.83)
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This implies that the maximum feasible tax rate inreases for low levels of the Frish-
elastiity. For the speial ase of ν = 0 it is equal to τ ∗ = 100%.
Note that this simple analysis does not take into aount the eet of tax avoidane.
In partiular, agents shift within inome ategories (from labor to apital inome), or
even migrate to a dierent jurisdition. Piketty and Saez (2013b) therefore predit that
the enouragement of labor mobility in the European Union will lead to tax ompetition,
resulting in lower taxes on labor. It is furthermore important to point out that espeially
very high-inome agents have a high mobility, onstraining the government in setting
their top inome tax rates.
Piketty and Saez (2013b) derive the optimal tax level also taking into aount the
Soial Welfare Funtion (SWF). In this ase, the optimal tax rate τ ∗ is given as follows:
τ ∗ =
1− g¯
1− g¯ + ν , (H.84)
with g¯ being the average welfare weight of the agents. For sake of illustration, we an
onsider the two most extreme ases. In the Libertarian ase
10
, all agents have the same
welfare weight making gi = g¯ = 1, leading to an optimal tax rate of zero τ
∗ = 0. In
the other extreme ase of a Rawlsian ase following the maxi-min-priniple, the soial
planner only adds a weight to the agent with the very lowest earnings and zero weight
to the other agents, making g¯ = 0. In this ase, the optimal tax rate is equal to the tax
rate maximizing the inome of the government: τ = 1
1+ν
.
As put forward in Piketty and Saez (2013b), if tax rates are deided on in a demorati
politial proess the welfare weight g¯ is determined by the median voter. In partiular
it is given by the ratio of median inome Y¯ to average inome E(Y ):
τ ∗ =
1− Y¯ /E(Y )
1− Y¯ /E(Y ) + ν . (H.85)
Note that if inome is given by a log-normal distribution we an eventually provide a
losed-form solution:
τ ∗ =
1− Y¯ /E(Y )
1− Y¯ /E(Y ) + ν =
1− exp(−0.5σ2y)
1− exp(−0.5σ2y) + ν
. (H.86)
In this ase the tax rate τ ∗ unambiguously inreases with the level of inequality ontrolled
by the parameter σy. Assume a standard value for the Frish-elastiity ν = 0.25 leading
to the following onrete values for two types of eonomies:
τ ∗
(
Gini ≈ 0.35, σy = 2
3
)
= 0.44 > τ ∗ (Gini ≈ 0.28, σy = 0.5) = 0.32. (H.87)
Note that both values are way above average tax rates in existing tax systems as disussed
in setion 7.1.
10
This impliitly assumes that the marginal marginal utility of onsumption is not dereasing ucc = 0.
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For the ase of inelasti labor supply (ν = 0), the welfare weights do not matter and
the optimal tax rate is always maximum τ ∗ = 1−g¯
1−g¯ = 100%, also implying total equality.
As we impliitly assume ν = 0 we an simply disregard the soial welfare funtion.
Diamond and Saez (2011) provide an extension that takes into aount inome het-
erogeneity. In partiular, they onsider the fat tail of top inomes. If this fat tail follows
a Pareto distribution with a density funtion of the type f(Y ) ∼ Y −(a+1) with a > 1,
the following optimal tax formula an be derived:
τ ∗ =
1− g¯
1− g¯ + a · ν . (H.88)
Fatter tails (i.e. lower values of a) lead to higher optimal tax rates. Diamond and Saez
(2011) derive top inome tax rates as high as 73% for the very top inome. Note that
standard distribution funtions - e.g. the log-normal distribution of inome assumed in
our work - are haraterized by a nite tail, implying a =∞. In this ase the top inome
tax rate would eventually be zero.
Labor Supply under Dierent Tax Systems and Form of
Heterogeneity
In the following, we ompare the labor supply under a at and a progressive tax system.
We further distinguish between heterogeneity in tastes and abilities. We start with
the simple ase of at tax rate system. We argue in the general framework provided
at the beginning of this setion. Following Piketty and Saez (2013b), we assume that
substitution eets of onsumption prevail the inome eets by setting γ = 0, also
simplifying the analysis. In this ase, tax inreases also inrease the amount of working
hours supplied.
For the linear tax system the marginal benet of unit of labor (MB) is independent
of the number of hours provided:
MB =
∂z
∂h
= wi(1− τ). (H.89)
Consider two agents with either a low or a high ability (index l respetively h). Higher
ability implies that the marginal produt of one unit of labor for a high ability agent
exeeds the the marginal produt of the low ability worker. In a ompetitive setting,
the rm pays workers aording to their marginal produtivity, implying wh > wl. The
ratio of post-tax inome - being the produt of supplied hours of work and individual
wage - is therefore given as follows:
zh
zl
=
wh(1− τ)hh
wl(1− τ)hl =
wh
wl
α−ν([1− τ ]wh)ν
α−ν([1− τ ]wl)ν =
(
wh
wl
)1+ν
> 1. (H.90)
In this ase, the (post-tax) inome inequality is higher than the wage inequality (
zh
zl
>
wh
wl
). This eet is furthermore emphasized the more elasti the labor supply is (high
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values of ν). For the extreme ase of an inelasti labor supply (ν = 0) inome wage
inequality is idential to wage inequality as all agents supply the same amount of labor.
We an ompare this ase to the ase where agents - rather than having dierent
fundamental abilities - only have dierent tastes for leisure. In partiular, one agent
assigns a higher disutility to labor than the other agent (αh > αl).
11
Or put more
boldly, the agent with the higher value of α is lazier. The distribution of post-tax
inome is given as follows:
zh
zl
=
w(1− τ)hh
w(1− τ)hl =
wα−νh ([1− τ ]w)ν
wα−νl ([1− τ ]w)ν
=
(
αl
αh
)ν
< 1. (H.91)
First of all, we have the inverse relationship as the worker with the higher value of αh > αl
works less and therefore also has a lower inome due to idential hourly wages. It is
also notable that wage inequality reats less to preferene as opposed to heterogeneity
of ability. However, there is a reation, implying that the tax system also impats on
preferenes rather than only on abilities, as it supposed to do (f. the disussion in
setion 7.2.1). The most important result of these alulations, however, is that the tax
system itself - being a at tax without demogrant - does not impat on wage inequality,
as the results are in both ases - heterogeneous abilities and tastes - independent of the
level of τ .
We an now ompare this result with the result of a progressive tax system as modeled
in setion 7.2.3. As the tax system is given by:
z = (wihi)
1−τY τTF , (H.92)
the marginal benet of one hour of work is given by:
MB =
∂z
∂h
= wi(wihi)
−τ (1− τ)Y τTF , (H.93)
this time also depending on the hours worked. In partiular, the marginal benet of a
unit of labor dereases with the provided hours:
∂MB
∂h
=
∂2z
∂h2
= w2i (wihi)
−τ−1(1− τ)(−τ)Y τTF < 0. (H.94)
The general labor supply funtion in this ase is given as:
hi =
(
w1−τi (1− τ)Y τTF
α
) ν
τν+1
. (H.95)
Using this result, we an ompute the ratio of labor inome for agents with heterogeneous
abilities (wh > wl):
zh
zl
=
(whhh)
1−τ
(whhh)1−τ
=
(
wh
wl
w
(1−τ) ν
τν+1
h
w
(1−τ) ν
τν+1
h
)1−τ
=
(
wh
wl
)(1−τ) 1+ν
τν+1
. (H.96)
11
This analysis an also be redone for dierent values of labor elastiity νh > νl, where agents with
higher elastiity supply less labor and thereby have a lower labor inome. The results, however, are
qualitatively idential to the results for the ase of heterogeneous αi.
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First of all, and in ontrast to the result for the linear inome tax system presented in
equation H.90, the inequality is smaller. This is the ase sine:
(1− τ) 1 + ν
1 + τν
< 1 + ν → 1− τ < 1 + τν → τ(1 + ν) > 0, (H.97)
for all positive tax rates τ > 0. Moreover, the inequality dereases with the level of
progressivity τ . For the extreme ase of τ = 1, all agents are equal.
We an one again ompute the ase for heterogeneous tastes (αh > αl), leading to:
zh
zl
=
(
whhh
whhh
)1−τ
=
(
αl
αh
) ν
ντ+1
(1−τ)
=
(
αl
αh
) ν−τν
τν+1
< 1. (H.98)
We ompare this result to the ase of the linear tax presented in equation H.91. In
partiular, we ompare the oeients:
ν >
ν − τν
1 + τν
→ 1 + τν > 1− τ → τ(ν + 1) > 0, (H.99)
showing that the inequality in the progressive system is one again lower than in the
linear system. This holds for any progressive system τ > 0. Hene, one again the
progressive tax system leads to a ompression of inequality. Also note that the system
reats less to inequality in tastes as ompared to abilities. This beomes lear when
omparing the oeients:
(1− τ) 1 + ν
1 + τν
>
ν − τν
1 + τν
→ 1 + ν > ν. (H.100)
The result an also be presented graphially (f. gure A.3). As the progressive
system is aompanied by a negatively slopped urve of marginal benets (in ontrast to
the zero slope for the ase of a linear tax system), the inequality in hours is ompressed.
Graphially, the total inome an be presented by the retangle given the point of origin
of the oordinate system and the intersetion of the labor supply and the marginal
benet urve. This result in partiular is notable sine it does not rely on the government
redistributing inome between agents, but results solely from the eet on labor supply.
As a progressive strongly punishes strong labor supply, there is a ompression of labor
supply and thereby of inome inequality between agents. It is important to point out
that this is the ase where the leaky buket - as elaborated in appendix A.7 - is at its
maximum Φ = 0 implying that all tax revenues are lost within an ineient government
system. It is, however, also important to note that this is only a short-run analysis.
As put forward by Heathote et al. (2014) the long-run eet an eventually be dia-
metrial. First of all there is a general equilibrium eet of the supply of labor of het-
erogeneous underlying ability. Sine the supply of high-skilled labor dereases whereas
the supply of low skilled labor inreases, rms an reat by inreasing the skill premium.
This is the ase of endogenous wages. Moreover, in the very long-run, the progressive
tax system also disourages the aumulation of human apital. This leads to a fall in
wages for agents with little human apital and generates a large wage premium for the
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Figure A.3.: The eet of progressive taxation in ontrast to at taxes on inequality
resulting out of heterogeneous tastes or abilities
sare part of the population that holds high human apital ontributing to inreased in-
equality in the long-run. This is the ase of endogenous human apital. Heathote et al.
(2014) eventually ompute an optimum level of taxation and show that it is sensitive to
the planning horizon of the soial planner. If the soial planner has a short horizon it
favors more redistribution in order to ombat onsumption inequality, whereas a planner
with a long horizon hooses lower redistribution, aounting for the long-run negative
eets of redistribution on investment in skills.
A.9. The Aggregate Demand Eet of Redistribution
As presented in setion 7.2.4, we identify a Post-Keynesian eet of aggregate demand,
implying that a redistribution of labor inome from high-inome to low-inome house-
holds boosts aggregate demand. This, however, is only the ase if the onsumption as
a funtion of labor inome is onave (C ′′(Y ) < 0). The opposite, lower aggregate de-
mand for for a redistribution from rih to poor, holds true for a onvex onsumption
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funtion (C ′′(Y ) > 0). Furthermore, for a linear onsumption funtion (C ′′(Y ) = 0)
redistributive poliy does not impat the overall onsumption at all.
12
The statement an be proofed very easily following a similar rationale as for the ase
where the optimal distribution of resoures from a utility-maximizing view presented in
setion A.7. Consider a simple onsumption funtion of the type:
Ci(Yi) = Y
θ
i , (I.101)
where for the ase of θ > 1 we have a onvex onsumption funtion and for 0 < θ < 1
we have a onave onsumption funtion. We maximize aggregate onsumption dened
as:
C(Y ) =
N∑
i=1
Y θi . (I.102)
The onstraint is the total amount of labor inome available for redistribution:
Y =
N∑
i=1
Yi. (I.103)
The rst order ondition requires:
Y θ−1i = Y
θ−1
j , (I.104)
for any i 6= j, whih only holds for:
Yi = Yj, (I.105)
indiating a total egalitarian soiety. We, however, one again have to ontrol for the
seond order ondition requiring:
θ(θ − 1)Y θ−2i
!
< 0, (I.106)
for a loal maximum. Sine we only have positive levels of inome Yi > 0 this ondition
is idential to:
θ < 1, (I.107)
requiring a onave onsumption funtion. Thereby, for a onave onsumption funtion
the optimal distribution of labor inome to ensure maximum onsumption would be
total equality. For total equality the target funtion takes the following value:
Ceq(Y ) =
N∑
i=1
Y θi =
N∑
i=1
(
Y
N
)θ
= N1−θY θ. (I.108)
12
It is also interesting to point that the urvature of the onsumption funtion also implies a rela-
tion between inequality of onsumption and inequality of labor inome being: Ineq(C) > Ineq(Y )
(C′′(Y ) > 0), Ineq(C) = Ineq(Y ) (C′′ = 0), and Ineq(C) < Ineq(Y ) (C′′ < 0).
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The optimal distribution for a onvex onsumption funtion would be total inequality
giving all inome to a single agent, implying a value of the target funtion of:
Cineq(Y ) =
N∑
i=1
Y θi = Y
θ. (I.109)
Similar to setion A.7, we an ompute a ratio between the two target funtions:
Ceq
Cineq
= N1−θ. (I.110)
For 0 < θ < 1 going along with onave onsumption funtion, this ratio exeeds 1
implying that total equality is optimal. The onverse holds true for θ > 1, implying a
onvex onsumption funtion. Note that for a simple onsumption linear onsumption
funtion (θ = 1) distribution does not matter for aggregate onsumption.
So far we assumed a very abstrat onsumption funtion of the type Ci(Yi) = Y
θ
i .
Now we lassify the funtion prevailing the one prevailing in our model, in the ategory
of onvex or onave. In our model, we assume a speial version of the onsumption
funtion of the linear type (ε = 1).13 The linearity in general would lead to neither
a positive nor a negative redistributive eet on aggregate onsumption. As, however,
already suggested in gure 6.7 the onsumption exhibits a onvex shape. More formally,
the onsumption funtion an be written as follows:
C = c¯+ cy(Y − rD) + cw(HY −D). (I.111)
The rst partial derivative with respet to Y is given as follows:
∂C
∂Y
= cy − ∂D
∂Y
· cyr + cw
(
H − ∂D
∂Y
)
. (I.112)
For a onave funtion, the seond-order partial derivative must satisfy the following
ondition:
∂2C
∂Y 2
= −∂
2D
∂Y 2
(cyr + cw) = C
′′(Y )
!
< 0. (I.113)
In setion 5.5.1, we derived a simple linear relation between apital K = −D and labor
inome Y whih would imply that −∂2D
∂Y 2
= 0 and thereby C ′′(Y ) = 0. The simple
losed-form omputation in setion 5.5.1, however, disregarded the role of ollateral
onstraints.
As presented in gure 6.7 the relation between debtD and labor inome Y is an inverse
u-shape, making the ondition
∂2D
∂Y 2
< 0 hold. In this ase the onavity presumption
only holds for:
cyr + cw < 0↔ r < −cw
cy
< 0. (I.114)
13
We already showed that a higher degree of onavity of the onsumption funtion - given by higher
values of ε > 1 - leads to lower aggregate onsumption (f. setion 6.2.1.
272
This implies that the Post-Keynesian ase only emerges in a senario with negative
real interest rates below a ertain threshold given by the MPC. One might also insert
the values of the optimal ontrol derivation of the Keynesian onsumption funtion as
presented in setion 4.2, implying cy =
ρ
r
and cw = 0. In this ase the ondition would
read:
cyr + cw =
ρ
r
r + 0 = ρ < 0, (I.115)
going along with the unrealisti assumption of a negative rate of time preferene, imply-
ing that individuals prefer future opposed to urrent onsumption.
All in all - in our model - redistribution of labor inome has a negative impat on
aggregate demand. On the other hand, the inequality of onsumption is lowered, whih
might be onsidered an improvement from a welfare point of view. This result an be
diretly attributed to the ollateral onstraint. Meanwhile, in a soiety without naning
onstraints, redistribution would not matter at all. Therefore, even though we assume
a linear onsumption funtion, redistribution matters for aggregate onsumption due to
the distribution of debt.
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